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P R E F A C E .
MANY books have been written on tbe bistory of Indian 
Pbilosopby bat all tbe writers have taken Indian Philosophy 
to mean Hindu Pbilosopby. They bave not taken notice of 
tbe fact that India came into contact with Muslim culture 
about twelve centuries ago and that tbe Muslims settled 
down in India and made it their borne and that tbe two com­
munities, Hindu and Muslim, bave been living as neighbours 
for such a long time that it was not possible for tbe 
Hindus to shut out completely all foreign influence in 
their thought. Moreover, tbe writers on Islamic civilis­
ation bave confined their attention to Islam as they found 
it in Arabia and her neighbouring countries and Spain, and 
did not think of Islam in India.
My aim in writing this thesis is to trace tbe influ­
ence of Islam in tbe teaching of tbe various Hindu sects 
of medieval India, and to give some idea of Islam as it 
flourished in India. Tbe sects in India are so innumer­
able that it is impossible to do full justice to every 
one in tbe short time at my disposal, and so I bave select­
ed only a few for a discussion here.
I bave compared and contrasted tbe Indian thinkers 
with those of Europe, both modern and ancient, to make 
some of tbe problems more intelligible to a Western reader, 
and at tbe sbme time to show that similar problems bave 
engaged tbe attention of tbe philosophers in different 
lands, and in many cases, tbe solution, though worked 
independently, was tbe s^me. Some of tbe Indian writers 
bave made a passing reference to Western thinkers, but I 
have carried on tbe work in detail.
My views on Shankara are entirely different from 
those of orthodox Hindu writers. Tbe same is tbe case
witb/
■mm
IkjL
with Gita. I have suggested a new theory as regards 
the date of its composition and I have tried to trace 
the theistic ideas in Gita to a foreign source.
In regard to Islam in India, I think I am the 
first to write anything about it in detail, from the 
point of view of philosophy. I have compared the Sufi 
views with those of the Christian mystics and have 
discussed Sufiism on the basis of psychology. I ad­
mit that a few books have been written on the religious 
experience in the West, but they have taken mainly 
the Christian mystics as their basis of reference and 
not the Sufis.
j In tracing the history of Islamic philosophy, I ,
Aca^^ej^gr^current literature on the subject.
I have added a chapter on the Persian poetry and 
ethioal thought in Muslim India and this, I believe, 
has not yet been attempted by any writer. The same 
is the case with the pantheistic views of Dara Shakoh.
In dealing with the Vaishanavite philosophers, I 
have tried to show how they were gradually drifting 
towards a partial acceptance of the Islamic views.
In the end I may say that I have followed the 
popular Indian method of writing the Sanskrit and 
Arabic words, though I fully realise that this method 
is defective and faulty, but out of consideration 
for the work of the typist, time is thus saved as 
otherwise the plaoing of marks and dots over and 
under the letters means the shifting of the paper /
upward and downward every time.
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I N I R O D U C  T I  ON.
INDIA, a country as large as Europe with the excep­
tion of Russia, has been subject to foreign invasions 
from time to time. These invaders came mainly from 
the north-west and brought with them their own ideas 
and culture. We find that a race inhabiting the 
central part of Asia, being compelled by the struggle 
for existence to seek new places and new mocfrs -of 
living, entered the fertile valleys of the Punjab, 
forcing the original inhabitants of the land to beat 
a retreat or to declare their submission to the victors. 
Slowly and gradually they moved on and on till they 
occupied the whole of j&x northern India. They 
were called Aryans. Their early thoughts are set 
forth in the Sacred Books called the Vedas, namely,
Rig Veda, Sam Veda, Yajur Veda and Athar Veda. Of 
these Rig Veda is the oldest. Its date of composition 
is estimated differently by vArioas writers. Some 
go so far as to assign 4000 B.C. as the minimum date 
for the composition of its hymns, while the others 
came down to 1200 B.C. It is difficult to estimate 
correctly the exact date because the Hindus never 
kept ^historical record of their llt£ary composition 
and consequently in the early periods the Vedas were 
handed down orally from generation to generation. As 
the Vedas were composed when the Aryans were con­
quering the fertile parts of India, their hymns give 
us an insight into the social manners and customs of 
the people of that time. It is believed that they 
lived mainly on agriculture and were mostly vegetarians 
in their diet, though meat was also used on certain
cere monial/
(2)
ceremonal occasions. They were divided into 
tril& and each tribe had its own chief. These 
petty chiefs owed submission to a higher chief and 
kingship seems to be hereditary, though based on 
the goodwill of the people. Kaegi says,
"The hymns strongly prove how deeply the 
prominent minds in the people were per­
suaded that the eternal ordinances of the 
rulers of the world were as inviolable in 
mental and moral matters as in the realm 
of nature and that every wrong act, even 
the unconscious was punished and the sin 
expiated.H
They believed that the world was created from 
the limbs of a fabulous monster - man or pursha. In 
this we find some resemblance to the old times 
prevalent in Europe. For instance, in the horse 
legend the earth, the mountains^oceans are formed 
from the limbs of the giant Yamir. The same is 
the case with North America, Egypt and Greece.
As for life after death, it was believed that 
thosewho had done good deeds went to live with gods 
in the heaven.
"To the plain Elysian, where light-haired 
Radhamanthus doth dwell,
Where restful is life and ever with men it 
goeth full well" - Frazer.
The home of the dead was in the third sky, where 
there was joy and delight a place of uncreated light.
But those who had done wicked deeds were cast into
darkness from which they did not come out (Rig Veda 
Vll. 104,3.)
The/
(3)
The phenomena of nature were personified and 
worshipped by the people. Anything that could do 
them harm or was beneficial to them, was worshipped 
as a god. So the number of gods was greatly multi­
plied but of the exact number we are not certain.
It is generally believed that they were 33 in number, 
though some(probably counting the lesser deitis) go 
so far as to raise the number to 330 millions. The 
most prominent of the gods were Dyaus (sky) and 
Prithvi (earth). But any of the gods would take a 
prominent place according to the "need  ^ , 0f the 
people for the time being.
Max Muller does not like to call it polytheism 
and gives it the name of Henotheism.
“To identify Indra, Agni and Varuna is one 
thing, it is syncretism, to address either 
Indra or Agni or Varuna as for the time being 
the only god in existence with an entire 
forgetfulness of all other gods, iB quite 
another; and it was this phase, so fully 
developed in the hymns of Veda, which I 
wished to mark definitely by a name of its 
own, calling it Henotheism”- Man Miller.
But it does not follow that if the bards were 
singing the hymns of one particular god for the time 
being, they did not believe in the existence of others. 
They assigned different functions to different deitii 
and the deitj?s were maftftCLy ind#p«*dent of others in 
the performance of their functions. And sometimes 
it appears that two gods co-operated with each other 
in performing the same act and so we find a mention
of/
(4)
of dual-gods like Indra-Agni, Mitra-tVarunan, Agni- 
Shoman. Tha, idea of co-operation naturally leads 
to the conception of One Supreme Being, under whom 
the various agents do their separate works. Prof.
Macdonell maintains that,
"Henotheism is an appearance rather than a 
reality, an appearance produced by the 
indefiniteness due to undeveloped anthro­
pomorphism, by the lack of any Veaic god 
occupying the position of a Zeus as the 
constant head of the pantheon, hy the nat­
ural tendency of the priest in extolling 
a particular god to exaggerate his great­
ness and to ignore other gods and by the 
growing belief in the unity of the gods 
each of whom may be regarded as a type of 
the divine."
The idea of two gods performing the same act 
ornlxercising his influence in the realm of others 
made the poets realise the necessity of a Supreme 
Being, without an equal. So they finally arrived 
at a conviction that there was behind all the gods 
that one of which the gods were but various names.
"He is one though sages call it Agni, Yama, 
Matarisvan" - R.V.L. 164,46.
"The one breathed breathlessly by itself, 
other than it there nothing since has been" 
Muller. R.V.X129.2.
Such a thought would naturally lead to pantheism. 
So the sages began to identify the One God, the 
Supreme Being with the maniffrid forms of existence.
This/
(5)
This thought finds its best expression in the 
/Upanishads.
The connecting link between the . upanishads 
and the Vedas are called Brahmanas.
The Brahmanas (8OO-500 B»Q«) composed in 
prose deal with the explanation of the saorifioial 
oeremonies, and so are not of any Interest from outf 
point of view. They were developed into Aranyakas “ 
theosophical treatise8 - and these were developed 
into ^panishadSj In the Vedic period we find the 
people bellving in everlasting peace after death, 
and with the exception of a couple of passages in 
the later part of Rigveda which describes the soul 
of the dead man going to the plants and the waters, 
we do not find any trace of the belief in trans­
migration of the soul at that time. Even theare 
passages do not give us any definite idea of this 
belief. But later on we find them drifting towards 
a faith in metenapsychosis or wandering of the soul 
from body to body according to the fruit of its work. 
The soul takes up not only the body of men and animals, 
but also those of trees, and as formerly there was a 
distinction between the soul of man on the one hand 
and the souls of animals and birds o^ the other, this 
distinction is now gradually disappearing and finally 
there results an absolute identification between the 
human soul and all that exists outside man. So the 
"UpsMshads declare that Brahma, the ultimate essence 
of the universe and Aima, the inmost essence in man
are one and the same. The Brahma seems materialised 
in all the manifold existence of the universe; that
Brahma/
(6)
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Brahma, which creat%, sustains, and rec.e&Ties hack 
into itself all the world is identical with Atman, 
the Self in jff. man. The Univers&3lself, the Absolute 
and Eternal Spirit is the unchanging reality behind 
all appearances of the many finite selves, which have 
their being and life ir^ the former. The oft-quoted 
words of Emerson give us a good insight into this system.
"If the red slayer thinks he slays,
Or if the slain thinks he is slain,
They know not well the subtle ways
I keep and pass and turn again,
Par or forgot to me is ,near;
Shadow or sunlight are the same;
The vanished gods to me appear;
And one to me are shame and fame.
They reckon ill who leave me out;
When me they fly, I am the wings;
I am the doubter and the doubt;
And I the hymn the Brahman sings."
This supreme reality is beyond all conditions 
of finite thought and can be described only in ne­
gations, not this, not that, etc. Brahma, the
Absolute is indescribable. Only in inspired intu= 
ition, the soul can reach Brahma andx.thus becomes 
free from bonds of birth and rebirth.
How I come to the systems of Hindu Philosophy.
They may be divided into (a) Those which do not 
believe in the infallibility of the vedas like 
Buddhism and Jainism and Caiyakism (b) the orthodox 
school^ , six in number viz. , 1 Sankhya, 11 Yoga, 111
Vedanta/
(7)
Vedanta, IV Maimansa, V Naya, VI Vais^sika. Their
it
dates of formulation are not known but is generally 
believed that they appeared after the earlier Upanishads. 
Most likely they consisted of the sayings and oral 
instruction of the sages and someone later on collected 
them in a systematic form, with the addition of his own 
views and the collection bears his name. Of these 
maimansa cannot be called a philosophical system as it 
deals with the principles according to which the Vedas 
are to be interpreted. The system of Samkhya which is I 
ascribed to haplla seems to be the oldest one, and is
I,
said to have preceeded Budhism. The original is lost.
But Samkhya Karlla edited by Ishvqf Krishna in the 3**d 
centu.-ry A.D. seems to be the oldest book of this school 
of thought. Gaudapa<ia wrote a commentary on this proba- 
oly in the 8th century. Samkhya Parvacna Sutra is a 
work of late^date most likely of the 14th century.
There is other literature of the school belonging to 
the l^th and l6th century. In the later periods it 
appears that the system has undergone a material change.
This system recognises the dualism of soul and mulle? 
matter 111 l W — H-nnnf "mniffp 'I1 1 hi II 1 There
is no room for the existence of a creator or ruler of the 
universe. The uiiiverse develops according to certain 
laws out of primative matter. Before the world came 
into being, the Prakr&U. or undeveloped matter was kept 
in equilibrium by the opposition of the three Gunas 
(Satya or intelligence slUff, Tamas or energy stuff and 
rajas or mass S4*uff)» Somehow or other this equilibrium 
was disturbed and the world of manifold came into existence.
Professor/
Professor Radha Krishna sums it up 
thus:-
"The process of evolution consists in1’
"the development of the differentiated "
"within the undifferentiated, of the "
"determinate within the undeterminate, of'
"the coherent within the incoherent. The order of** 
"succession is neither from part to the whole,nor" 
"from whole to the parts, "but ever from a "
"relatively less differentiated, less determinate," 
"less coherent , to relatively more differentiated, 
"more determinate, more coherent whole. When the" 
"Karma (reaping of the fruits of the past deeds)" 
of all souls collectively require that there should 
"he no more experience, this manifold world returns 
"to itB quiescent state hy the reduction of the"
"gunas to their elementary disintegrated state.*
The Pursha or self is regarded beginSngless, 
and has no cause beyond itself. "The self, (pursha) 
is in itself without consciousness. Conscious­
ness can only come to it through its connection 
with the sense organB and manas. Ey ignorance, 
will, antipathy*, and work this combination of 
Pursha and the other elements take place."
Das Gupta.
The Psychic Processes are merely mechanical
processes of the internal organs that is of
matter. But by themselves they would have
remained unconscious had it not been for their
combination with the soul. But if the soul had
no germ or potentiality of consciousness it is
difficult to explain how the combination of two Usc?ous
factors can produce consciousness. But Professor
Badha Krishna, following the later versions,
steers clear of this by assigning consciousness to
Pursha/
(9.1
Pursha.
"As its character is consciousness, it 
helps to bring the products of the evolutionary 
ohain into self consciousness. It illuminates
the whole sphere of thought and feeling .
Samkhya denies to Pursha all qual-ities, 
since otherwise it would not be capable of 
emancipation.The characteristics of Pursha 
and Prakrajti|are opposed in nature. Prakreti 
is non-consciousness while Pursha is consciousness. 
Prakratiis active and ever--evolving, while Pursha 
is inactive. Pursha is unalterably constant, 
while Prakratiis so alterably. Prakratiis 
characterised by the three gunas, while Pursha is 
devoid of the gunas; Prakratiis the object while 
Pursha is the subject."
As regards the relation of Prakfeti and Pursha 
the Professor writes,
"The Samkhya says that mere presence of the 
Pursha excites Prakratito activity and 
development.n 
To this it may be objected that the Pres-ence of 
Pursha cannot be neglected even when Prakratt is 
in a state of equilibrium and hence inactivity.
So Professor Radhakrishna gives another explanation 
of this difficulty. He says,
"When the Pursha recognises its distinction 
from the ever-evolving and dissolving world 
of Parkrati the latter ceases to operate 
towards it. The efficient cause of Prakratt 
development is not the mere presence of the 
Purshas, for they are always present, but 
their non-discrimination."
The ultimate state of emancipation is called 
the Brahman state. It means either the absolute
annihilation/
(loO
annihilation or characterless absolute existence. 
There is no consciousness in this state.
Yoga;- Yoga differs from Samkhya in 
maintaining the existence of an Intelligent Being,
"Who should help the course of evolution 
in such a way that this system of harmony or order 
may he attained."
The Ishwara is never subject to ignorance, 
passions or afflications, is pure Sattva, V 
(Intelligence stuff). He is all-knowledge, all­
power. He does not create Prakratibut disturbs 
the influenoe of Prakraii in its quiescent state.
Then He helps Prakra-tito follow an intelligent 
order.
This system mainly deals with practices for 
the Concentration of mind on God.
Kanada, (a nickname meaning atomlst), 
is believed to be the founder the Vaishesbdka 
system. Kanada enumerates Si# ^ categories;-Substance 
quality, motiQG, generality, particularity. To 
these was added another later on , namely, non­
existence. These categories were again broken 
up into sub-divisions. For instance, under the 
Aotioo substance fall earth, water, fire, air, ether 
time, space, soul and mind. Earth possesses oolour 
taste, smell and touch: Water, colour, taste,
touch, liquidity and smoothness; fire-- colour and 
touch; air—  touch only, and ether possesses none 
of these qualities.
Kanada not only gives a discussion of the 
categories but tries to solve the various problems 
of existence and of thought. He maintains that 
the world originated from atoms. The soul is
V
(11.)
is eternal, beginningless and is not limited by 
time and space. The soul perceives the object of 
knowledge through theagency of "manas" or inner 
sense, which is an atom.
Kanadas' doctrine was developed by Gautama in 
his system called nyaya. It is a treatise on 
formal logic and discusses at full length the 
doctrine of the means of knowledge, of syllogisms, 
fallacies, etc. A few details showing the line 
of thought of the nyaya are given below:-
The means of proof are four, viz:- perception, 
inference, analogy and testimony. Perception is 
defined as "uncontradicted determinate knowledge 
unassociated with names proceeding out of sense 
contaot with objects." Inference is of three 
kinds, viz:- (1) From cause to effect
(2) From effect to cause
(3) From common characteristics.
In discussing the question of Self, nyaya
maintains that "each of the senses is associated 
with its own specific object, but there must exist 
some other entity in us which gathers together 
the different sense cognitions and pro^ufes the 
perception of the total object as distinguished 
from the separate sense perceptions. Another 
argument for the admission of Soul is that infants 
show signs of pleasure and pain in quite early stages 
of infancy. Every creature is b o m  with some 
desires. All attachment and desires are due to 
previous experiences and therefore it is argued 
that desires in infants are due to their experiences 
in previous existences." It also discusses the 
Ife.ychological problems like attention, repetition, 
association;etc. in a primitive form.
The/
The system of Vedanta will be discussed in 
connection with the commentaries made by Shankra 
and others.
The system of Samkhya supplied material for 
Budhism and Jainism, the chief theme of which is 
the belittlement of man's life. These two systems 
are very much alike. Though Budhism lost its sway 
in India, Jainism can still count a considerable 
portion of the population as its adherents.
The founder of Budhism was Prince Saki Muni 
Gantama, also called Siddhanta. He was born in 
508 B.C. At the age of 19 he married his cousin 
Yasodhra and for many years lived a life of pleasure. 
In his thirtieth year he was greatly impressed by the 
sufferings of human beings and so he made up his 
mind to find out a way to true happiness. He fled 
from the town and first went to two Brahman teachers 
and became a disciple of theirs. Here he studied 
for seven years. Then he went to the Jungle and 
lived the life of a strict ascetic for six years.
And now Gautama's great period of temptation came, 
which lasted for 24 hours and from which he came out 
victorious. V/hen he rose after the temptation, he 
was Buddha, the Enlightened.
Buddha's teaching. Buddha argued that decay and 
death depended upon birth, which was due to previous 
existence. (He does not give any reason for this 
assumption.) All this was due to'desire', which had 
its root in feelings connected with mind and body. 
(This is called the doctrine of the 12 links.)
Mind's connection with the body makes a man subject 
to constantly unsatisfied desires. No form of 
pen-ance can overcome this because pen:-anee punishes 
the body only. Even if a marttries to follow a 
virtuous path, a certain amount of evil is left
13-
and so he is still entangled in the weh of 
material life. A man can only he freed from 
suffering hy annihilation.
"The mind released is like the extinction
"of flame."
The following are the four main points of 
Budhistic doctrine:
(1) Misery invariably accompanies existence.
(2) Every type of existence, whether of man
or of animals results from passion or desire.
(3) There is no freedom from existence hut hy 
the annihilation of desire.
(4) Desire may he destroyed hy following eight 
paths leading to Hirvana.
The eight paths are:- (1) right views, (2) right 
feelings, (3) right words, (4) right behaviour,
(5) right exertion , (6) right obedience, (74 right 
memory, (8) right meditation.
An individual in his natural state takes birth 
again and again, and the chief aim of the individual 
should he to act in such a way in his present life 
as to do away with the necessity of rebirth. The 
only thing permanent is the individual's "Karma",
(his actions and thoughts in this life which decide 
what form his incarnation shall take place in his 
next birth).
Budha does not believe in any substratum or 
centre of reality beyond this phenomenon. More­
over he does not say anything about the b o u I.
When pressed by his disciples about eternity and 
definition of the ego he remarks,
"“Why has not the Budha taught his followers 
whether the world is finite or infinite; whether 
the saint continues to live or not in the Beyond? 
Because the mere knowledge of these fellings does not
- lead/
lead to any progress in sanctity because such 
knowledge does not necessarily conduoe to spiritual 
peace and illumination. He teaches the truth about 
pain, the truth about the origin of pain, about the 
suppression of pain. Hence let that which has not 
been revealed by me remain unrevealed. The mind 
has come into existence by means of unfathomable 
mystery, and it is useless to try to discover what 
this mystery is. The monk who is striving to secure 
thfe safety of his soul has something else to do— "
Dhamma Pasha, Beal*s translation *
In addition to the above systems of Philosophy 
I may mention the two schools of materialists,
Dhurtta and Susiksita, oommonly known as Carvakas 
Schools. The period in which they flourished is 
not oorreotly known.
"Aocording to them there wis no soul. Life and 
consciousness ware the products of the combination of 
matter. There is no after-life and no reward of action 
as there is neither virtue nor vice* Life is only for 
enjoyment."
They did not believe in the transmigration of the 
SpulffDas Gupta^) According to them inference had no 
validity. If in any case an inference comes to be true 
it is only an accidental fact.
An account of ancient Hindu philosophy will not be 
complete without mentioning Bhagwa^ita, a poem in 
Mahablifcata. William von Humboldt calls it "the most 
beautiful, and perhaps the only true philosophical song 
existing in any known tongue."
It teaches the method of Bhakti or devotion. 
Krishna the (fc»d incarnate, addresses Arjuna when the 
latter is hesitating to fight in the battle of
Mahabharta/
Mahabharta. Ar j una says,
"If to slay is to sin, it is a worse sin 
to slay those to whom we owe love and 
worship."
But Krishna removes these disquieting thoughts by 
saying,
"Never the Spirit was born; the spirit shall 
cease to be never,
Never was time it was not; end and beginning 
are dreams;
Birtnless and deathless and changeless remaineth 
tne spirit for ever,
De<a.th hath not touched it at all, dead though 
the house of it seems.
Sir Edwin Arnold’s
translation.
The following lines will give an idea of the main 
doctrine of Gita:
Much these teach,
Prom Veds, concerning the " three qualities"
But thou, be free of the "three qualities"
Pree of tne "pairs of opposites", and free 
Prom that sad righteousness which calculates.
Let right deeds be 
Thy motive, not the fruit which comes from them 
And live in action] labour! make thine acts 
Thy jjiety, casting all self aside,
Contemning gain and merit; equable 
in good or evil
Unto pure devotion 
Devote thyself; with perfect -meditation 
Comes perfect act.
If one
Ponders on objects of the sense, there springs
______  ...   /attract io
(16) I
Attraction; from attraction grows desire^
Desire flames to fierce passion, passion breeds
Recklessness; then the memory - all betrayed -
Lets noble purpose go, and saps the mind.
Only with him, great Prince
Vi/hose senses are not swayed by things of sense -
Only with him who holds his mastery,
Shows wisdom perfect.
But if one eats
Bruits of the earth, rendering to kindly Heaven
No gift of toil, that thief steals from his world.
Thus, action is of Brahma, who is One 
The Only, All-pervading; at all times 
Present in sacrifice.
All things are everywhere by Nature wrought 
In an interaction of the qualities,
The fool, cheated by self, thinks, "This, I did".
All’s then Godi 
The Sacrifice is Brahm, the ghee and grain 
Are Brahm, the fire is Brahm, the flesh it eats 
Is Brahm, and unto Brahm attaineth he 
Vi/ho, in such office, meditates on Brahm.
By works the votary doth rise to saint,
Amd saintship is the ceasing from all works; 
Because the perfect yogin acts - but acts 
Unmoved ^y passions and unbound by deeds,
Setting result aside.
He so vowed,
So blended, sees the Life - Soul resident 
In all things living, and all living things 
In that Life - soul contained.
I make and unmake the Universe:
/Than
Than me there is no other Master, Prince!
No other Maker! All these hang on me 
As hangs a row of pearls upon its string.
I am the fresh taste of the water; I
The silver of the moon, the gold of the sun,
The word of Worship in the Veds.
These am I, free from passion and desire;
for all those moods 
Soothfast, or passionate, or ignorant,
Which nature frames, deduce from me,* hut all 
Are merged in me - Not I in them! The World - 
Deceived hy those three qualities of heing 4 
Wotteth not Me who am outside them all,
Ahove them all, Eternal.
My Being -
Creating all, sustaining all - still dwells 
Outside of all
See! as the shoreless airs 
Move in the measureless space, hut are not in space 
(And space were space without the moving airs)
So all things are in Me hut are not I
By energy 
And help of Prakrati, my outer Self 
Again, and yet again, I make go forth 
The realms of visible things - without their will 
All of them - hy the power of Prakrati
I am the Prayer 
I am the Euneral-cake set for the dead 
I am tfee healing herb! I am the ghee 
The Mantra, and the flame, and that which hurns!
Seed and seed sower,
Death am I, and immortal ife I am,
/Arjuna
(18)
Arjunal Sat and Asat, visible life 
And life invisible!
Now we pass on to Vedanta and the medieval 
philosophy.
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Vedanta is composed of two words veda- anta 
Xadh&Ya, Wallabha ato. differ materially in their 
meaning the end of the Vedas, The Vedanta Sutra 
▼ lews of the Sutras. "It seems likely that the 
is also called Brahma Sutra as it de&Ls with the
commentators expressed their views and triad to 
doctrine of Brahma and also iourirake lutrr or the
force the texts to bear testimony to the truth of their 
book of the Unconditioned Self. Vedente is based
own philosophic theories." *- Reqh&krishua. 
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the Vedas, Its authorship is ascribed to Bsdreyava,
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who is identified with Vyesa. Though authorities 
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such es Ramsmijalfallabha admit that Vyase was the 
teaftfctag about 3 q 4>, the world, the soul, in its 
author of Vedanta Sutra, yet they do not identify
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apparent oo atredietfona of thi doctrines, binds them 
«s regards the date of its composition the 
systematically together, and is especially concerned 
historians differ. According to keith, this book 
to defend them against the attacks of opponent s."-Deus sen 
wes not composed later then 200 A,D. while the Indian 
The philosophy of Vedanta is an attempt to 
writers assign to it a much earlier date i.e., from 
understand the nature of £ Reality underlying the 
500 to 200 B.C. Frazer also agrees with the Indian 
world o£ manifoldness. It is the seme problem which 
scholars (about 400 B.C. ) Jacobi, however, 
has presented itself to the thinkers of the world 
considers that it is unlikely that the Sutre was 
in every age and for which various solutions hnve
composed earlier than 200 a .D. and most probably was
been made from time to time. For the student of the
written between 200 end 450 A.D.
f e s t e m  Philosophy it would be interesting to note
The book ha3 555 Sutraa^oonsisting mostly of a 
that the thinkers in India ds not .lag behind the
fev words, which admit of different interpretetions.
Vest era philosophers in giving the world an explanation 
It is not very d e a r  why the author or authors put
of this problem and the position of the Vedsntiets 
the a into so obscure a form. Xost probably the book
2.
was meant as a guide for thdse who were most 
advanced in their intellectual attainments/ arid so 
that the secret dootrines were guarded against common 
encroachment. As a matter of fact the Sutras are 
unintelligible without the commentaries and the 
commentators, ohief of whom are Shankara, Ramaaija, 
Madhafc'a, Wallabha ate. differ materially in their 
views of the Sutras. "It seems likely that the 
commentators expressed their views and tried to 
force the texts to bear testimony to the truth of their 
own philosophic theories." - Radhakrishua.
The work of Baydrayaya stands to the Upanishads 
in the same relation as the Christian Dogmatic 
to the ®ew Testament, it investigates their 
teaching about God, the world, the soul, in its 
conditions of wandering and of deliverance, removes 
apparent contradictions of the doctrines, binds them 
systematically together, and is especially concerned 
to defend them against the attacks of opponent s."-Deus sen.
The philosophy of Vedanta is an attempt to
understand the nature of i Reality underlying the
world og manifoldmess. It is the same problem which
has presented itself to the thinkers of the world
in every age and for which various solutions have
been made from time to time. For the student of the
Western Philosophy it would be interesting to note
UiJ
that the thinkers in India ds not lag behind the 
Western philosophers in giving the world an explanation 
of this problem and the position of the Vedantists
is very creditable in this respect. Vedanta 
discusses two very important questions: (1) "The 
theoretical determination of the nature of substance 
or reality underlying experience and of the origin 
of knowledge. (2) The ethical problem of duty 
and the ultimate ideal of human life. "
There are four schools of Vedanta, viz. those 
of (l) Shankara (2 ) Ramanuja (3 ) Madh^aa and
(4) Vallabha. Their corresponding types of 
int erpretation are known as (1) Advaita.
(2) Vishistadvaita (3) Dwaita and (4j Suddhadvaits.
The hon- Dual (advaita ) Vedanta of Shankara
S H A N K A R A .
Shankara was a great philosopher of the middle 
ages. He was born in 788 A.D. and died in 820 a.D. 
(Max Muller and Professor MaoDonell). Telang 
thinks he lived in the second half of the seventh 
oentury, while Bhandarker considers the 8th century 
as the period of his' life. Professor Keith also 
agrees with Max Muller as to his having flourished 
in the ninth century.
He was born in a Brahman family at Kaladi in 
the Province of Mai ibar. Early in his life he 
became a pupil to Govinda who held a school at 
Kaladi. Shankara was possessed of great intellect 
and from his early boyhood was considered a great
• v v
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genius* He had a wonderful memory and learnt quickly 
what others generally take a long time to master. He 
learned the Vedas at an early age and this impressed 
him so much that he gave up wordly pursuits and 
became a sawyasi. He wandered from place to place 
teaching to the people and holding discussions ura  ^
those who differed from him- in their views. During 
these travels he expounded the advaita system of 
philosophy which has given him an everlasting fame. 
Nearly all the Indian and some of the European 
writers of modern times are unanimous in their 
praise of Shankara/. Thibaut says: "The doctrine 
advocated by Shankara is^a purely philosophical 
point of view* and apart from all theological 
considerations, the most impotent and interesting one 
which has arisen on Indian soil} neither those 
forms of the Vedanta which diverge from the 
view represented by Shankara, nor any of the 
non-vedantio system can be compared with the so 
called orthodox Vedanta in boldness, depth and 
subtlety of speculation.
"It is impossible to read Shankarefs writings, 
packed as they are with serious and subtle thinking, 
without being conscious that one is in contact with 
a mind of a very fine penetration and profound 
sp i r i t u a l i t y - Radhakrishua.
"Is he (Shankara) not the Guardian of the 
Sacred Waters, who by his commentaries, has hemmed 
about, against all impurities or Time's jealousy,
first the mountain tarus of the Upanishads, then 
the serene forest lake of the Bhagwadgita and last 
the deep reservoir of the Sutras; adding from 
the generous riohes of his wisdom, lovely 
fountains and lakelets of his own, the Crest 
Jewel, the Awakening, the Discernment."- Johnston.
Shankara was not the first exponent of the 
Advaita vedanta. There were others before him 
suoh as Gaudapaya, Bhartrahri, who held similar 
views. But it was Shankara who brought it to 
a sublime height.
That was the age of conflicting creeds. 
Speculation had undermined the authority of the 
Ye das. The people had been led to scepticism.
They did not know what to believe end what to 
reject. So a natural longing for the old faith 
was arising. Budhism was giving way to 
Brahmanism. The people wanted a man who could 
reconcile the old faith with the new ideas.
Shankara was the man for the purpose. Though 
his task was difficult he achieved it brilliantly. 
This is the root, the basic principle of all his 
efforts and he keeps it in view in all his works. 
But in spite of all the energy he threw into his 
work, he fell into serious errors, whioh make his 
works of very little value. I am of opinion that 
Shankara has been over-estimated and in the
following pages I will try to show how he 
falls short of the required standard.
(Bote- The quotations in the following,
(where no reference is given, are taken 
(from the translation made by Paul Deussen.)
is in the thing, not transcendent. Heo-Platonism
THE _SOURCES_OF KNOWLEDGE.
The Vedantist admits of three sources of 
knowledge - (1) Perception (2) Inferenoe (3)Soriptums.
43 cording to Protagoras, as Plato interprets 
him, knowledge is perception which is the result of 
of the meeting of movement within and movement 
without the sense otgan. The process of perception, 
the thing perceived and the process of perceiving, 
are identical. For every man that which appears to 
hds senses to be true or right is the only rule of 
truth or right. For Plato scientific knowledge 
is purely intellectual knowledge, often Forms or 
Ideas.
Knowledge does not count in impressions of 
Sense but in reasoning about them. Thinking is 
systematio reflection by which the soul contemplates 
universals in all things. We do not see and learn 
by the eyes and ears but through them. Aristotle 
carries out the fundamental insight of Plato in
a more systematic fashion. He maintains 
the existence of intuitively known principles 
as well. For him all knowledge is not the 
outcome of sense experience • But he insists
that the universal (the object of knowledge )
•%ere it (the sense of So r iptaire ) Is doubtful. 
is in the things not transcendent* Heo-Platonism
s permissible to have recourse to a rule of 
preferred religion to Philosophy and maintained
that the knowledge of God could not be attained
by reasoning. God was above human reason and
was consequently unattainable by it. He was
rml M d4 it# is not Rfiiofid fey othsr kssjis of 
super-rational and his knowledge oould only be
got by revelation. So neo Platonism built up
a system oil ancient oracles or myths.
Shankara does not attach much importance to
perception and inference. He relies chiefly on
Scriptures ."And, therefore, mere reflection
must not be quoted in opposition in a matter
which)) is to be known by tradition; for reflections
the Scriptures. Does not the doctrine 
which, without tradition, rest only on the
speculation of men, are untenable since this
speculation is unbridled. For instance, the
reflections thought out by some experts after
great trouble are recognised by others, still
more expert, as (merely) apparent, and those of
the latter in the same way by others. Therefore
one cannot rely on it, that reflectionshave
stability, because the opinions of men vary.
But, (it may be objected) when there is a man
of recognised greatness, a kapila or another, who 
has made a reflection, one could at least rely on it 
as well founded. Even here a sound foundation is 
lacking, since evn the recognised pioneers such as 
Kapila, Kan adit and the like openly oontradiot each
0 ther."
"Ihere it (the sense of Scripture) is doubtful, 
it is permissible to have recourse to a rule of 
experience for the sake of clearing up the question.
The knowledge of the Brahman is gained by the sense 
of the word of the Veda being considered and 
determined; it is not gained by other means of 
knowledge, such as inference. But although it is 
the Vedanta texts which inform us of the cause of 
the world coming into existence , yet to make sure 
that we have grasped their sense correctly, an
1 nferenoe which does not contradict the word of the 
Ve danta is not excluded as a means of knowledge. ”
So reflection does not have any validity 
against the Scriptures. Does not the doctrine
Or*
quoted above lead to dogmation? The words of 
De ighton in reference to dogmatic assumption in a 
Ve stern religion can be applied to the present case : 
"The wise man will not be sure that he can be sure 
of anything except Scriptures (in his experience).
He will guide his life wholly by probability. Like 
Cratylus and others, he will not pass judgments; he will 
not even wag his thumb. " There is no standard of 
of truth but scriptures. Experience counts for 
Nothing. But a modern philosopher would say that
t?
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as the mind recognises the inconsistencies of the 
different reactions of different individuals, it 
i s the function of thought to formulate standards
Us ,
of truth. (By Truth is meant proportions that are 
objectively valid or valid for all normal-thinking 
beings under similar conditions of experience.)
We have standards of reference in all natural 
Sciences, because we assume the uniformity of 
nature. Of course, we admit that knowledge does 
ultimately rest on assumptions. But having made 
these the most universal and the most fundamental 
wo rking hypothesis we then procedd to learn to 
control nature.
What about propositions in pure logic and 
mathematics which are not based on Scriptures?
Have they any validity ?
Professor Sarkar in explaining the doctrine 
of the Vedanta says : "Perception should be held 
as the source of valid knowledge when it is not 
oontradicted by subsequent experience. But as soon 
as the facts of perception are challenged, perception 
lo ses all value as a mode of knowing. And it is a 
common experience that knowledge aquired through 
Perception is later on denied by authority -e.g. the 
illusory percept of rope-serpent."
It is not clear how this proves the validity of 
authority against perception. Does not subsequent 
experience have its basis in perception? Again, if a 
man, who mistakes a rope for a snake, realises his 
mistake when some one tells him that it is a rope
10.
and not a snake, is not this authority based on
the perception of someone else?
$he following objection is put in the
ttouth of an opponents" Yet one can, perhaps, come to
a well-founded reflection, in reflecting in a
different way, for that there can be no well- 
founded reflection, afcayc and because one
reflection is false, the other need not also
be false; the opinion that all reflection is
unreliable, would make an end of all wp wordly
action resting thereon."
To this objection Shankara partly gives 
way. He says : "Even though it appears that in 
many provinces reflection is well-founded, yet 
in the province here spoken of, reflection 
c annot be freed from the reproach of groundless- 
ness; for it is impossible to know at all this 
extremely profound e* essence of being, without 
the sacred tradition, connected with liberation; 
for this subject does not fall within the 
province of perception because it is without 
form and the like, and therefore also not 
within the province of inference end the other, 
because it has no characteristics and the like." 
Compare this with Kant : "Since we can have no 
Perception of God,of an act of freedom, or of 
an indivisible self, belief in the latter is 
based on faith. " But inhis Metaphysics of 
Ethics he maintains that the implications of 
our moral consciousness not only entitle us 
tut require us to postulate or assume the
*ZJ?
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music we attend to what the accredited great 
reality of God, freedom and immortality.1’
As regards the infallibility of the beauty. 
Scriptures, Shankara writes : "The Veda,as 
a source of knowledge, is eternal; its subject 
stands fast; the full knowledge of it formed 
t tare from cannot be turned aside by all the 
reflectors of the past, present and future. fn 
By this the full validity of the Upanishad jprove 
teaching is proved.
Again : " The followers of the aBrahman 
investigates the being of the cahse (of the iotec 
world) and the like, relying on the (sacred) 
tradition, and it is not unconditionally necessary 
f o r him to accept everything in accordance with 
perception. "
Professor Sarka^ writes : " When the Surti 
(Scriptures) denies enjLrioal facts and establishes 
the oneness of Being, its finding should be,, 
accepted, though it is quite opposed to perception 
in its denial of the manifold. " ...at of certainty
Professor kadha Krishan argues that "to 
accept *Su*■•jfid.s to accept the witness of the 
saints and the sages. To ignore such is to 
ignore the most vital part of the experience of 
the human race. In matters of physical scienoe 
we accept what the greatest investigators 
in those departments declare for truth; '^t ermine
in music we attend to what the accredited great 
composers have written, and endeavour thereby to 
improve our natural appreciation of musical beauty*
In matters of religious truth we should listen with 
respect to what the great religious geniuses, who 
s trive by faith and devotion to attain their 
spiritual eminence, have given out. "
But here the two processes are confused. In 
Sc ience the facts are collected to prove or disprove 
a certain hypothesis. If there is agreement the 
hypothesis is confirmed, otherwise it is rejected or 
modified. 2ae findings of science are not contradicted 
by the experience. The conclusions drawn are 
reliable, and the independant workers, following 
the same method and working under similar circumstances, 
will arrive at the same conclusion. Water, if 
analysed, will give us hydrogen and oxygen in a 
certain proportion and no more, or at least this 
conclusion has been true upto the present moment.
But what about the sages and the saints ? Are we 
justified in giving them the same amount of certainty 
as we give to the laws of science ? Is it the 
business of Philosophy to accept them simply because 
they are claimed to be revealed? No. The aim of 
Philosophy is to find reasons for our beliefs and 
reject those beliefs that are inconsistent with 
facts or with well-grounded principles.
So it is the business of philosophy to determine 
the nature and meaning of religious behefs, find out
3 /
o ©refully whether there is oonsistenoy in them or 
not, and find out their relation to the' Principles 
of the Sciences and to other main interests of life 
suoh as moral conduct, social order, art and culture* 
Philosophy cannot take for granted what the scriptures
say without thoroughly investigating* And which
the world i* connected wi th Brahman (as cause), or 
scripture is to be taken as true when there are
apparent contradictions between the teaching of
different religions ? Kay, even in Upanishads there
are passages that cannot be reconciled with one
another* Authoritarianism has its value but has its
m that pxji Ioscphy wee- utterly incapable
limits as well* Here comes philosophy to our aid
and Shankara makes full use of it as will be seen 
/%
in later pages.
Bw4r Shankara also suggests the possibility of
bringing in reflection as an aid to authority
pae-iticn* wadAtained tnat what was true In 
the following passage
philosophy mi^ht fce quite false in theology which 
"For in the investigation of the Brahman the
scripture is not, as in the investigation of duty,
fbomas Acqulaam, on. the other hand, made some 
the exclusive authority, but the authorities here are,
according to circumstances, the scripture and the
perception and the like. For the knowledge of Brahman
© jf th^ forjQfr aid to thuo 1 Attat «
reaches its final point in perception, as far as it 
rendered possible a certain amount of independent 
refers to a really existing subject. But does not 
thinking as long as no referenoe was made to the 
the Brahman, so far as it is something really 
concepts of Christianity. Spinoea holds a different 
existing, alone belong to the province of other 
▼ lew of the Scriptures. WA11 scripture ,* he says, "was 
means of knowledge, and is not the consideration of
the words of the Vedanta consequently aimless?
“9 ©oHo&x 11 v for tu6 wiiOls buiB&ii rsico * v
By no means the Brahman, for,as it is not on
object of Sense, the (causal ‘) connection with the
world would not be grasped (with certainty ). That 
is to say, the senses according to their nature, have as 
their object external things and not t#e Brahman.
If t ^  Brahman were an object of Sense, then the 
world might be grasped as an effeot connected with 
Brahman. Now, we only perceive the effect, so that 
(without revelation) it cannot be decided whether 
the world is connected with Brahman (as cause), or 
with something else (for the seme effect can have 
different causes. ) 1
a similar tendency is found in the philosophy 
of the Middle Alge in Europe. William of /ccam 
maintained that philosophy was utterly incapable 
of proving the existence of God and demonstrating 
his attrinutes. From this bankruptcy of the natural 
light of reason he inferred the necessity of 
revelation. Duns Scotus held a somewhat similar 
position. He maintained that what was true in 
philosophy might be quite false in theology which 
left no room for philosophical dialectics.
Thomas Aoquinas, on the other hand, made some 
concession to philosophy, though he subordinated 
natural to the theological knowledge in the sense 
of making the former aid to the latter. This 
rendered possible a certain amount of independent 
thinking as long as no reference was made to the 
concepts of Christianity. Spinoza holds a different 
view of the Scriptures. "All scripture,"he says, "was 
written primarily for an entire people, and 
Secondarily for the whole human racej consequently
its contents must necessarily be adapted, as far as 
possible, to the understanding of the masses . . .
Scripture does not explain things by their secondary 
oauses, but only narrates them in the order an^style 
whioh has most power to move men, and especially 
uneducated men, to devotion • . « its object is
not to oonvince the reason, but to attach and lay 
hold of the imagination. *
P E R O E P T  I O R .
"Perception is the direct oonsoiousness of objects 
obtained generally through the exercise of senses. "
In external perception, as distinguished from 
internal or introspective perception, the internal 
organ —  the mind stuff —  goes through the sensory 
organs towards the object, assumes its form and 
oognises it. " As the water of a tank issuing 
through an aperture enters a field by a small canal 
and assumes the shape of the field, so the inner 
organ leaves the body through the eye or other sense 
organs, moves to the external objects and takes their 
form. " It occupies the seme position in space as the 
object i.e. there is unity of the space position 
between the mind and the empirical object. This is the 
mark of a distinction between perception and inference. 
There is also a unity of time in the act of perception; 
that is why the remembranoe of a past event is not a 
oase of perception, *
In oontrast to this, Bergson says : " A percepticn 
is not something added to reality, nor is it 
something of the object projected towards the mind
nor some tiling of the mind projected on the object. • 
according to Hume and Locke mind is passive, 
but Shankara agrees with Kant in assigning activity 
to the mind, tl^bugh the form which this activity , 
takes is different in each . 3hankara takes no 
notice of the image5which, according to liohmer 
supplement the group of sensations, to make up 
the percept, itforeover perception involves much more 
than can be described as direct apprehension of sense 
quality. In mature perception a vast amount is 
discerned through the aid of awareness of similar 
objects. He holds that sensations come es discrete 
psoyhioal facts. Hume also maintains that constituents 
of experience are discrete minds. Agtinst this theory 
James points out that Primitive Consciousness is not 
a duality but one confused mass of presentation in 
which the subject, the object, space, time and the 
categories are all rolled up together. All 
knowledge grows by dissociation among the elements of 
this oonsciouness. It is out of such a matrix that 
clear consciousness is evolved. " -l^anguli.
Shankara also ignores will ^inters stay which play 
an important part in perception. Bergson says: "It is 
vain to attribute to the cerebral substance the 
Property of engendering representatives. Its function 
is selective, and those parts of the environments which 
it selects by its action are the content of perception."
"It is selection, " says Prof. Wilson Carr, "which 
gives to perception its distinctness and individuality."
Shankara does not give a detailed account of the
psychology of Perception. From the fragmentary 
and meagre account which we find here and there 
we ofcme to the conclusion that his theory of 
perception was rather crude. He says : "That 
we perceive depends upon the nature of^  the mode.
If the mode takes the form Of the weight, we 
pe rceive weight and so on. " As to how this mode 
is determined'and why is it that it takes this 
t^e particular form of mode and not the other, 
he says nothing. As regards the perception i of 
dist?noe he says that we oannot perceive distant 
objects beoause the internal organ oannot come in 
contact with them. A modern scientist would say 
that they are too far to throw any image on the 
retina or that they cannot come in contact with 
the mind through their images. Shankara is correot 
in holding that perception of distance is mainly a 
matter of vision, but he ignores the action of the 
movement of the muscles of the eyes as well as the 
convergence and divergence of the lenses of the eyes 
and the help derived from other senses.
Perception depends the internal organ as 
well as the objects. If the objects are not fit to 
be cognised, no perception can take place. In inner 
perception i.e perception of desires, eto. virtue 
and vice are not oognised as theywt* are not fit 
objects for cognition. He does not state the 
criterion th^ st distinguishes the objects fit for 
inner perception from those that are not.^les li5ce
Perception may be divided into conceptual 
knowledge J ( the distinction between the thing
determined and the determining attribute ) and 
relationless intuition (that whioh does not enter
* /t-
into relation of concepts ). Conceptieftal knowledge 
is derivative and the % relationless intuition 
i s the original dictum. In the latter the
attributes are there but they are left out and*
do not enter into any relation. No destruction 
exists between S and P as in the propositions 
"that art thou," "this is that Devdatte."
According to Kant, though there is much divergence 
of view on this point, determinate perception 
is undeterminate innthe form of a manifold of 
Sense and it becomes determined when ordered by 
means of categories. According to Hegel the 
c atsgories are not something fdreign but something 
already there as an implicit form. The passage from 
the implicit to the explicit is the result of the 
inner dialectic. Shankara recognises the relationless 
intuition stafce as a pure manifold.
One may say that Shankara * s theory of perception 
somewhat resembles that of 'liale^branches, underlying 
whioh there is an implicit assumption that to know 
a thing, the mind must, in some snese, be that thing,
"On such an assumption only an omnipresent being,
* which was at the same time one and all things/ 
oould know everything in and through himself." —
Dialogues in Metaphysics (translated by Ginsberg). 
Perception as a function of many variables like 
position, light, shade, movement is ignored .There
is another objection to Shankara’s theory. If the
mind takes the form of the object why is it that 
no two persons see the same objects in the same 
way ? Why does it differ when seen from 
different positions? Moreover this theory 
violates the law of impenetrability of matter* 
because the illustration of the water and the 
field shows that the mind becomes one with the 
object* How can two material objects occupy the 
same space? In order to understand the position 
of Shankara clearly it is better to consider what 
he means by mind* The old distinction of 
mind and matter is not maintained by him. Mind* 
or rather internal organ, is a subtle matter.
It is not infinite in magnitude but has a limited 
or measurable magnitude. It is not eternal. It 
has the capacity of expansion and contraction 
and is limitless in this respeot, and so it caneo 
take the form of any thing, large or small. It is '* 
not itself regarded as a sense, for then it would 
not have direct perception of itself or its 
modifications. It is transparent and reflects 
objects, and this power is not innate in it but is 
due to its relation with the soul. Internal organ 
and soul are two different things. It undergoes 
ohanges and modifications of forms, and is oailed 
toy different names according to these modifications. 
It is celled mind in the mode of indetermination 
and understanding when it is determined.
Sq, according to this view* the internal organ 
y'
is the cognise* of things, but it is not intelligent. 
It derives its intelligence owing to its proximity
B so far to it is a totolto* of lotted *
to the soul, just as an iron gets magnetised under 
the influenoe of a magnet. But why should we call 
the internal organ,whioh is material, a oognisey?
Why should we not give this title to the soul itself ? 
But according to the Vedantists the soul does not 
take part in cognition at all. It is just like 
oailing the brain the cogniser of objects.
Siankara writes : " Between the Atman (self ) 
and the organs of sense a connecting link is necessary. 
If we do not admit the internal organ, there would 
result either perpetual perception ora perpetual 
non-perception, the former when there is the 
conjunction of the Atman, the sense and the object, 
the three constituting the instrument of perception. 
If, on the conjunction of these three causes, the 
effeot did not follow, there would take place 
perpetual non-perception. But neither is the fact.
We have therefore to acknowledge the existence of 
an internal organ on whose attention and non-attention 
perception and non-percept ion take place. " This 
means that Atman lacks the power of attention or 
non-at tent ion, which will make it inactive*
If the internal organ derives its power of 
reflection from the Atman, it is not clear how 
this power of volition can be held to be innate in it. 
External perception is of five kinds corresponding 
to sight, touch, etc. Internal perception is of 
two kinds according as (i) it gives us a knowledge 
of the self (2) knowledge of states and processes
of consciousness. The former is again of two kinds 
in so far as it is a knowledge of limited self 
or Supreme self.^^08 "^ *ermS relating the
objects to a brain rather than to a mind or 
ERRONEOUS PERCEPTION 'it??
According to Shankara illusion is not a case 
of unconscious judgment, nor an inference, nor a 
memory image. He asks whyb it is we mistake a igh 
shell for silver. The answer is that the internal a 
organ in going out through the eye affected by some 
disease or disorder and coming in contact with the
object, is modified in the form of this object end
holds that thouch ir an ilTtislrin 4its glitter. wiere is no
It is due to the force of a mysterious entity
o ailed avidya that we see silver in place of the
shell. This avidya (ignoraae) i9 aided by the
residual traces of the past cognition of silver,
revived by the quality of brightness common to both
silver and shell. So we have two mental modes, one
of "thisness " and the other of apparent silver.
* .
They are both unified by the same rChafctanya * 
which is thus connected with both —  what is true 
and what is false. The fusion of true and false 
gives rise terror. Illusory silver has for its 
substratum consciousness particularised by the object. 
An illusory object is not nothing, for in that case
no illusion can arise. We may call it relatively
^eal. Compare this with what the neo—objectivism 
or Belativistio objectivism maintains : It s accords a 
a physical objective status to real and unreal objects 
alike, but admits the relativity to the percipient
Individual of all perceivable objects* It explains 
all errors in physical terms by relating the 
objects to a brain rather than to a mind or 
consciousness. Again, the Hon j k tjllfas hold that 
a silver perceived elsewhere may be the object of 
the present false apprehension. Shankara replies 
"that in order to be an object of apprehension though 
illusory, it must be immediately present, and hence a 
Piece of silver perceived elsewhere at a different
time cannot be the object of present perception.
tteai itThe flftujaylka, in order to defend his position, 
holds that though in an illusion there is no 
direct sense contact with the object, yet there is 
some mediated contact called non-sensuous contact.
The Sankarite replies that in that case inferenee 
oannot be established as a separate entity, since 
fire, which is a matter of inference, can be held to 
be an object of perception through mediated and 
indirect contact. " it is also objected that on 
the Shankarite principle it is impossible to 
distinguish between the real silver and the illusory 
silver. The Vedantist says that though real silver 
is not absolutely real yet there is a difference 
between the so-called real silver and illusory silver* 
The perception of the latter has an element of 
subjectivity. My illusion of silver is cognised by 
me while the empirically real silver may be cognised 
by all. it is just like my perception of pleasure and 
Pain which is closed to the other selves. Like 
pleasure and pain illusory silver is imposed on the 
self. But when the so-called real silver is cognised
by all, why apply the prefix "so-called" to it?
The great defect of Shankara *s theory of 
illusion is that it takes notice of the factor of 
presentation and ignores/^representation. It 
assumes that illusion consists in the experience of 
something indescribable. He calls illusion an error 
of perception, while it is an error of inference. 
When hi we look at a rope and mistake it for a snake 
we do not perceive all its qualities necessary for 
right cognition, but we perceive some of the 
qualities and then infer that it is a snake.
Mo d e m  psychology defines illusion as a 
misinterpretation of experience. It is the result 
of misconstrueting some real sense stimulus or 
stimuli. Something is actually there to stimulate 
the senses. So far Shankara is correct, but the 
illusion arises owing to established habits of 
rapid association to the temporary ’het^ l of the mind, 
by whioh the observer mistakes the thing for 
something different. Inshort, the mind either 
fails to analyse and determine the data correctly 
or it may fail to set the data in the right 
connection with the items of reality. An illusion 
no doubt in itself seems to be objective as sny 
true perception and it is only by ascertaining 
its relation to what is external to it, i.e. its 
interaction with the totality of the thing, that we 
can find whether it can olaim that reality or not.
Shankara does not take notice of this 
Psyohological fact, as regards the theory that 
illusion is purely subjective, it does not
explain the optical illusions, where everyone has 
the same illusion under similar circumstances.
The same is the case with illusions caused by 
jugglers and hypnotists.
Shankara agrees
It will not he out of place here to give the 
theory of dreams. In a dream the self is not 
subject to the limitation of sense. The word 
impossible, whioh to waking mind seems unavoidable 
in many cases, has no meaning in a dream. The 
dre am world seems real to us though its existence 
passes off like vapour when we wake up. How are 
dreams oaused ? Shankara bases his theory on 
Prasna Up a ni shad. It holds that a dream involves 
a new construction, a new grouping spontaneously 
woven out. "What is seen over and over again, he 
sees once more in a dream. What is heard over and 
Over again he hears once again • . . What is seen 
and not seen, what is heard and not heard, what is 
enjoyed and not enjoyed, he experiences all*"
Siankara does not regard the dream world as
* tne other, and how this g r o u p in g  i s  c a u s e d *
objectively real, but as relatively real like the 
waking world. He calls it maya (illusory ) : "Dream 
world is not a creation of the Self but a 
reproduction (in new construction) of the 
residuum of waking —  presentation left in 
oon soiousness. "
Modern researches divide dreams into classes 
▼iz . Representative dreams and Presentative dreams
V,
.«3i
The first are due to a kind of automatic excitation 
of the cerebral regions, especially in the case of 
those clearly arising from the occupations or 
sensations of the day or the hours immediately 
preceding the dream. To the same cause is 
attributed the recalling of images apparently 
long since forgotten. " So Shankara agrees 
with the modern psychologists in adopting^ the 
representation theory of dreams but he makes no 
mention of the presentative factors in dreams, 
i.e. the real sensations that more or less arise 
from the state of internal organs and similar other 
causes. If a man takes heavy food, he may experience 
nightmares or if the heart is not working satisfactory 
it may give rise to terrible dreams. The common 
sensation of flying is mostly due to the irregular 
beat of the heart caused by indigestion. Moreover 
the awkward position of the limbs or the pressure of 
the hand on the chest lead to dreams of a similar 
kind. A dream may also be due to the action of 
external stimuli on the organs of sense.
So Shankara does not discuss why in a dream 
one particular grouping of images takes place and 
not the other, and how this grouping is caused.
It appears that he did not base his theoiy of dreams 
on the observation of facts, but relied mainly on 
the testimony of scriptures.
(Leneral Remarks •
It is better here to explain the distinction 
made by Shankara between higher knowledge and lower 
knowledge. Higher knowledge is absolute truth. It is
the knowledge of reality by which Shankara means 
oneness of Atman, the higher Brahman* It cannot 
be acquired by empirical means. Reality cannot 
be grasped by means of logical tools. Shankara 
discusses* the so called proofs for the existence 
of God and refutes them one and all
(i) Logioal proof. There must be a perfect 
Subject, with the whole existence related to him as 
an object. The universe seems to be a system
in whioh the events are interconnected. This actcry.
oonfirmed by everyday experience. But there are many 
thi ngs whioh do not enter ones experience and one ' s 
knowledge is imperfect. "Only a complete apprehension 
of reality as a wh^le can justify the hypothesis 
that God is and he is the Creator of all. The of 
logical belief that all facts belong to a system and 
express the mind of God is only an idea. "—
1t feel the pain of soul also, even
(ii) Cosmological argument. There must be an 
uncaused cause of this world, Shankara says that
we can only infer a finite creator from a finite 
world. The first cause must be a unity of the same 
Order of being as the objects of experience, since 
the latter are brought into relation with it.3 
If Ishwra is the cause of the world he must be 
within the spaoe time framewdrk , a vastly 
magnified man , whose self-oonsciousness is 
defined by the instrumentality of a body and mind 
analogous,to our own. If suoh a being exists, no 
ibsseeable extension of our knowledge could enable 
us to determine his nature and existence ... we 
oannot admit within the world of Phenomena an
uncaused cause. The question of an absolute 
beginning of the phenomenal series is a self 
oontradiotoiy one. "
(3) Moral argument. —  This world shows 
the workmanship of a benevolent God- (Saadi, the 
well-known Persian poet, says : "Every leaf of 
a green tree is a book of knowledge of God for 
intelligent percepient. ")
Shankara holds this argument to be unsatisfactory. 
"However the matter be turned, in a real world 
the responsibility for sin and evil falls on God.
If , to relieve him of the authorship of evil, we 
accept something like the mythology of Persia and 
make Satan responsible for it, then the oneness of 
God disappears and we reinstate a dualism between 
God and Satan. Again, if the soul is a part of 
God, God must feel the pain of soul also, even 
as when one member of the body suffers, the whole 
body suffers with it. It follows that the 
sufferings of Gi>d are much greater than those 
of the individual soul, and it is better for us to 
remain self-enclosed individuals with our limited 
sufferings than rise to the level of God and 
take upon ourselves the burden of the whole world.
A perfect God does not require the world for 
his satisfaction. If it said that the world is 
for his enjoyment, then God is no God but only a 
samsarin. If we say that God has determinations,
gun as, like personality, perfection, etc. it is
' 4 1 *1 i i  i I M F ®  * ibo r c f o r  * x © 3?*  k o o u  » t r u s  • © tic  • 
difficult to conceive how these can exist with
absoluteness. The attempt to conserve the 
characters of personality and absoluteness seems 
to be well nigh impossible for logic."- Radhakrishua.
Western philosophers have discussed the point 
fully in their systems of philosophy. Plato 
demonstrated the existence of God on the basis of 
reason i.e. the universal validity of the principle 
of causality and the regularity of oosmical motions. 
Aristotle gave us the idea of the "unmoved move."
The motion and change of the world were 
explained to us as due to the world s struggle to 
become actual. The universe, which is in constant 
motion, moving towards pure form as actuality of 
the potential, must have some source for it beyond 
itself and this source is God^ Who is not aware 
of the existence of the universe £  Thomas Acquinas 
gives five proofs for the existence of God : -
(1) Anything which is moved is moved by some other 
thing. This series of the moved and the mover
c annot go on infinitely, for in that case there 
would be no first source of movement and consequently 
no movement at all. So there must be an unmoved move
(2) We cannot rest content with an indefinite series 
of causes and effects, because if there is no first 
cause there can be no last effect. (3) Every 
possible existence must have a necessary existence 
as its ground, and this necessary existence must be 
necessary in itself, hence the idea of God.
(4) Things are ’more' or ’less’ good, true, etc.
This points to something 'greatest' i.e. most true,
most good, etc. (5) The unconscious object does 
not tend towards an end unless directed by an 
intelligent and conscious being.
Hume and Kant struck a great blow to these 
arguments. Though Hume interpreted cause and 
effect in a different light, yet it appears that he 
did not wholly abandon the conception of First Cause. 
Kant based his idea of existence of God on moral 
necessity. There is a great difference of opinion 
as regards the telelogical end of the world. Some 
thinkers like Leibnitz maintain that this is the 
best of all possible worlds, while the others hold 
a different view. Descartes based his idea of 
God 's existence in an autologioal argument, first 
formulated by Anselm, in the words: "that than 
which nothing greater can be conceived^which 
derives the existence of God from the idea of 
God, since this includes perfection and existence 
is a perfection. This argument has also been 
rejected by many, especially by Kant. He points 
out the fallacy of treating existence as a merely 
additional quality. The premise that asserts that 
existence is a perfection, is false. A world with 
God appears more perfect than a world without a God. 
But existence implies a relation with the totality 
of other things, and to make this argument valid 
one would have to show that (i) a perfeot being 
would be more consistent with the totality of things 
than an imperfect being, and (ii) that such 
oonsistence is equivalent to existence in space and
time • But neither of these vague propositions has
ever been proved.
Then again the argument from values in 
general maintains that our apprehension of 
value leads us to the oonoeption of an absolute 
value, viz. a complete Truth, a perfect Good etc.
As these values are not opposed to one another in the 
end, they may be taken as the attributes of our 
supreme value i.e. God. + <n
So , according to Shankara, the Real cannot 
be known by logical means which have validity only 
in the world of experience. "The reality of God 
transcends our rational power of conceiving as 
well as comprehending, only if we resort to the 
sp iritual insight of seers as recorded in the 
scriptures can we be certain of God. " Study 
of vedanta only leads us to the higher knowledge 
of the real. The mind should suppress itself so 
that the veil may be lifted. Here the distinction 
of the subject and object are obliterated. "It is 
the ineffable experience beyond thought and speech 
which transforms our whole life and yields the 
certainty of a divine presence. It is the state of 
consciousness which is induced when the individual 
strips himself of all finite conditions, including 
his intelligence. " It is the experience when the 
individual himself is face to face with the Reality. 
Nay, to call it so is incorrect. The individual 
himself is the Reality. Shankara thinks that this 
is not an idealised fancy, because one cannot 
experience unreal objects though we can 4 meditate 
on them. In the beginning a yogi sees God when
when he meditates on him, but this state is far 
beyond that.
For Spinoza the knowledge of Reality could be 
obtained by intuition. This is the state of mind 
where the individual realises himself as a part of 
God, where he feels his veiy heart throb and where 
the distinction between himself and the Living 
Universe lapses. But Spinoza's God is quite 
different from Shankaid’s Absolute. Though
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Spinoza identifies God and nature, but for him 
nature means^the active and vital processes 
underlying the material oontentaj of this world.
The universal laws of nature and the eternal 
decrees of God are one and the same thing. Wha& 
the laws of circle are to all oircles, God is to 
the world. Moreover, for Spinoza the intuitive 
stage is only possible after one has been through the 
rational stage. Intuitive vision is not a substitute 
for thought or different from it. When one is so 
thoroughly absorbed in a train of thought that he 
begins to identify himself with the object of thought, 
he reaches the stage of highest knowledge.
"The object of intuition is not a private fancy 
o r a  subjective abstraction in the mind of the 
knower. It is a real object, by which is unaffected 
by our apprehension or non-apprehension of it, though 
its reality is of a higher kind than that of 
a particular object of space and time which are 
involved in a perpetual flux and cannot therefore be 
regarded as strictly real.
How can one contest the fact of another
po ssessing the knowledge of Brahman, though still 
in the body, vouched as it is by his hearts 
conviction. " All faith and devotion, all study 
and meditation, are intended to train us for this 
experience, intuition of self, however, comes 
only to a mind prepared for it. It does not come 
out of the blue. It is the noblest blossoming
of man's reason. It is not a mere fancy which 
refuses to make an appeal to marts intelligence.
What is true is true for every intelligence that 
can apprehend it. Hie re is no such thing as a 
Private truth anymore than a private sun or a 
private science. Truth has an intrinsic end 
general character which depends on no individual, 
not even God. The process of apprehending reality 
may be private or singular, but not the object 
apprehended. The real cannot be real now and then, 
here and there, but always and everywhere. "
In these emphatic words Prof. Radhakrishua 
tries to establish the truth of vedantists integrsCL 
experience. But the difficulty is that each 
individual that has this experience of reality 
does not interpret it in the same way. Of course, 
he is interpreting what he has experienced and so 
the difference in interpretation oannot be unreal.
If the individual correctly experiences reality 
and if the reality is not manifold, how is it that 
the interpretations differ? Surely the contradict­
ory interptetations cannot be correct and then the 
question arises which of them is oorrect. Should 
we believe the vedantist who sees reality as his
own self or someone else who sees it in a different 
light as something transcendental? Again the
Professor writes :"$hose who have no direct insight
' we are not
into reality are obliged to take on trust the 
ye die views whioh record the highest experiences 
o f some of the greatest minds who have wrestled 
with this problem of apprehending reality. The 
vedic testimony is superior to the evidence of the 
senses or the conclusions of reasons. "
It may be noted here that in the West, too, 
religious experience has been advanced as an 
argument for the existence of God. "Though it 
is open to the critic to dismiss the whole 
religious experience of humanity as based on illusion 
and mistake, such a drastic rejection of a universal 
type of consciousness is hard to justify. If we 
base our knowledge of the universe on experience, 
religious experience has a claim to be included*
If further we find that eur the religious 
experience tends to pass from obviously inadequate 
forms to forms which lend themselves to rational 
p resentation, we shall be justified in regarding 
the later and higher as the nearest approximations 
so far to adequate discriminations of the Object 
with which all religious experience is concerned."
Prof. Mathews.
If religious experience is presented in an 
adequate form end can be analysed by a scientific 
method, it would be a folly not to accept it. But 
Prof. James in his Varieties of Religious Experience
writes : "Modern psychology has only recently begm
to realise the importance of a careful study of the 
oontents of a mystic consciousness and we are not 
yet in possession of a really effective scientific 
method to analyse the oontents of e non-rational 
mode of consciousness. "
I do not wish to minimise the value of religious 
experience but I maintain that it should not be 
accepted merely in authority* It may be pointed 
out here that I am not discussing the subject 
from the point of view of religion and so I am 
not attacking the faiths and doctrines held sacred 
by the people as followers of particular religions.
I will take up the subject of religious experience 
again in connection with//ajwairi.
Lower knowledge or empiricalf^ ower knowledge 
has its validity in the world of phenomena. It is 
inadequate to express Reality as it is not free 
from the distinctions of subject and objeot which 
according to Shankara do not apply to Reality. 
Considered from the point of view of Reality this 
knowledge is false and has its baiMk in ignorance 
as will be explained later on, but in the realm of 
phenomena its truth cannot be denied. Shankara 
compares mails knowledge to that of the animals 
"For this reason also" (v h m3I worldly and vedic 
knowledge belongsto the province of ignorance ) 
because (thereby) no difference is made between 
man and animal. Ftr just as the animals, for 
instance, a sound strikes their ears, in case the 
perception of sound is disagreeable to them, move
away from it, and in case it is agreeable move
towards it —  as when they see a man with an upraised
stick before them, thinking: *He will strike me* 
they try to escape, and when they see one with
a handful of fresh grass, approach him, so men also 
whose knowledge is more developed, when they perceive 
strong men of terrible aspect, with drawn swords in 
their hands, turn away from them, and turn towards 
the contrary. — Thus with reference to means and 
objects of knov/ledge, the process in men and animals 
is alike. Of course, in the case of animals perception, 
and the like, goes on without previous judgment 
but as can be seen by the resemblanoe even in the 
oase of spiritually developed men, perception and 
the like for the time (of false knowledge ) is the 
same; end if according to the spiritual canon 
the performance of works is permitted only to one 
who has gained insight, and not to one who has 
not recognised the connection of the soul with the 
other world, yet for this permission it is not 
imperative that one should have recognised the 
truth concerning the soul freed from the samsara, 
to be taught -t by the vedanta, which leaves 
behind hunger and the other desires", and turns 
sway from the difference between Brahmans, warriors 
and the rest. Tor this truth is not implied in 
the injunction ( o f  the work of sacrifice ), but 
is rather in contradiotion to it. And while the 
oanon of ordinances is valid only for this degree 
of knowledge of the soul, it does not rise above 
the province of ignorance. "
Thus it shows that the difference between
empirical knowledge and that of animals is only that 
of degree and not kind. The former is only on a 
higher level of evolution. It lends itself to 
egoism which makes us seek the satisfaction of our 
desires either in this world or the coming rebirths. 
But vedanta has passed far beyond the regions of 
desire and so the knowledge given by it is really 
true. "All those laws of empirical knowledge and 
action are valid for us only so long as we are 
influenced by the Ignorance, resting on a false 
transference which nature imposes on us, of which it 
is said in conclusion: " Thus it stands with its 
beginningless, endless, innate transference, which in 
its essence is a false assumption, producing all the 
conditions of doing and enjoying (or suffering) and 
forming the natural standpoint of all men. To 
remove this the root of evil, and to teach the 
the knowledge of the unity of the soul, —  this is 
the aim of all the texts of the vedanta. trans­
lated by Johnston.
For Kant the object of empirical knowledge 
was phenomena and not noumena, but Hegel rejected 
this assumption in toto. A reality is reality in 
and for mind or self-consciousness. Thought and 
Reality are identical.
In explaining Shankara's point of view as 
regards the inadequacies of empirical knowledge to 
reach Reality. /  Prof. Radhakrishua writes :
"It is diffioult to know precisely how far 
our knowledge of the external world which scienoe 
investigates is objeotive. The more we reflect on 
the matter, the more impossible it seems to assert
that the e world known to us under the oonditions
of empirical knowledge is the real in itself . r^e
men with five senses knows more than the blind man.
May not the real exceed the empirical conception of
it , even as the world known to sight exceeds that
known to touch? May not a state like that of 
\/
brahmanubha^a or what Tennyson has called "a last 
and largest sense " enlarge our own knowledge of 
reality, as the gift of sight would enlarge that of 
a race of blind men ? "
Here the Professor gives way to scepticism 
and denies the possibility of knowledge at least in 
our present state. The underlined words show that 
he does not believe that the world as known to us 
is real, because knowledge gained through more than 
one sense exceeds that obtained through one sense 
only. But does this argument justify our rejecting 
in toto the knowledge gained through one sense or 
Say through all senses ? It is true we know reality 
in part but we are capable of knowing it more fully. 
But to say that we have no knowledge of reality and 
that the world known to us under the condition of 
empirical knowledge is unreal i3 to take a very bold 
step. For knowledge works in the world. In the only 
world with which we have anything to do we find that 
knowledge does function effectively. Vhen I look at 
the electric lamp before me am I to believe that all 
knowledge of electricity, of physics, etc. is false? 
Take the case of astronomy. Do not the events 
Predicted occur at the exact time and position? If 
w ® do not believe in it we find ourselves nowhere but
in scepticism . Someone would say : How do we know 
that we know only phenomena, if we do not know the r- 
real? The lapidariste says of a certain specimen 
handed to him, "this is a sham diamond. " Such 
a pronouncement is impossible unlesa there be 
a knowledge of real diamonds, of which it is an 
qtp appearance. How do we know that there is a veil 
between us and reality if we have never known waht 
what is on the other side of the veil. ( Reality )T 
si is not something hidden behind the veil. Reality 
i-e what is or may be experienced or what may be 
inferred from experience • n0ff , rea>
That what I dream may not be real but my 
dreaming itself oannot be false. So in this we have 
something which is known and known with certainty.
We admit that all appearance is a partial 
reality. Wholeness of reality involves a systematic 
unity. A 3tick placed in water looks bent, but it 
is not felt crooked. ” .Vhen images fail to fit in 
within the,; one portion of space-time with veridioal 
sensations, they are distinguished as being only 
images " - Alexander. Rvery departure from the 
Constancy of character of an object indicates 
appearance. A scientist would say that by 
comparison of the appearances in different relations 
and by eliminating the perceptual errors by means 
of different mechanism ye have a knowledge which 
approaches certainty, which is brought about by 
its satisfactory working in praotice. Or in other 
vords the knowledge of effects (i.e. appearances ) 
gives us the knowledge of the caume ( reality ).
Again the Prof. writes : "All thought struggles
to know the real, to seek the truth, hut unfortunately 
it can attempt to know the real only by relating the 
real to something other than itself. The real is 
neither true, nor false. It simply is. "
To this one would reply that Truth is Reality. 
Reality is that which does not contradict itself. It 
must exclude any form of self-contradiction. We may 
think away anything but we cannot think away being or 
existence. Being is therefore truth. But once it is 
taken for granted that this world is not real, then 
of course we are attempting to know the real by 
relating it to something unreal. Whether the world is 
re al or unreal will be considered later.
Criterion of Truth:- Climbing down to the field 
of empirical knowledge Shankara discusses a few 
Problems of knowledge. He maintains that thought is 
nothing but true. We cannot think what is not true, 
s inoe any standard of truth that we can apply to any 
problem will lose its intrinsic virtue, because it 
it self will be a product of thought and will thus be 
subject to the uncertainty of thought. But how to 
account for error? "Error is only privation due 
to the passions and interests of men which cloud the 
intellect. " What does it mean ? If we get rid of 
Passions and interest we cannot have but a true 
thought. But whether we can get rid of interest and 
feeling in thinking is a question which does not occur 
to Shankara. in order to find out the error in 
thinking we have to apply certain tests. "The question
of the reality of a thing does not depend upon human 
notions. It depends upon the thing itself. To say of 
a post that it is either a post or a man or something ft 
else is not to give its truth. That it is a post is 
alone the truth, since it answers to the nature of the 
thing. "
Among the Western thinkers those who distinguish 
between truth and existence maintain that the test of 
truth regarding things is their correspondence with the 
nature of the things, though to justify this theory 
they do not think it necessary to formulate the precise 
k ind of correspondence! involved.
Some maintain that knowledge that is not 
contradicted is true and that which is self contradictory 
or is contradicted by subsequent experience is false.
What we see in a dream is contradicted by our 
waking experiences. So the former is not true.
Moreover, in knowledge there must be an element of 
novelty in addition to its being original and primly, 
if there is to be any real advance. To say that a post 
is a post or a man is a man or A is A does not take 
us any further. This reminds me of the Socrates and
Plato, the great thinkers of the world. Socrates held
that to know the essence of a thing you must consider it 
as distinct from everything else, you must define it; 
by defining it you demarcate it from what it is not and 
So present the thing before you in its essence. Plato
the capacity of the self to grasp 
universals without which no thought was possible.
7hat do I mean by dog, man, or bear ? By man I mean
a specific type of being who belongs to a certain class
distinct from dogs and that this class is 
distinguished by certein characteristics. Should we 
o lassify a bear that walks like a man as man ? No. 
There must be a body of typical ways of behaviour 
present before we olasnify the object as man. This 
means that there is no knowledge without the 
systematic ordering of things we have knowledge 
ebout. Shankara rejects the class concept and 
the relation of inherence. This philosophy 
supersedes the theory of genera and species for 
they never exist independent of each other. He 
discusses this point vaguely and it is difficult to 
ascertain his views so as to class him with 
nomihalists.  ^0 • the Self, Fox1 one
In the theory of knowledge Shankara did not 
go so far as his western predecessors did,
Of course, when he was proving the unreality of this 
world it did not concern him much to go into the 
details of the empirical knowledge which was after 
all based on the wrong conception of reality.
DOCTRINE OF BRAHMAN.
The best known position of Descart£s 
Philosophy is Cogito, ergosum, taken not as an 
inference but as an intuition. It was another 
form of old formula, “know thyself" though it was 
so differently interpreted by the early Greek 
philosophers. To them it was essentially practical. 
Descartes makes knowledge of the existence of the 
self to be the bases of all knowledge, it is the 
ground of absolute certainty; whatever it distinctly 
proolaims must be true.
Similarly Shankara tries to find out whether 
there is anything of which I can be certain and 
naturally comes to the conclusion that I am certain of 
my own existence. He says,
“It is not possible to doubt the Self. For one
cannot establish the Self (by proof) in the case of 
anyone because in itself it is already known. For 
the Self is not demonstrated by proof of itself.
For it is that which brings into use all means of 
proof such as perception and the like, in order to 
prove a thing which is not known. For the objects 
of the expressions ether etc. require a proof, 
because they are not assumed as known of themselves.
But the self iB the basiB of the action of proving
and consequently it iB evident before the action of 
proving. And since it is of this character, it is 
therefore impossible to deny it. For we can call 
into question something which comes to us (from 
outside) but not that which is our own being. For 
it is even the own being of him who calls it into 
question; fire oannot oall its own heat in to 
question. And further when it is said; "It is
I who now know what at present exists, it is I who 
knew the past, and what was before the past, it is 
I who shall know the future and what is after the 
future,' it is implied in these words that even when 
the object of knowledge alters, the knower does not 
alter, because he is in the past, future and present; 
for his essence is eternally present, therefore, even 
when the body turns to ashes, there is no'passing 
away of the Self, for its essenoe is the present, yea, it 
is not even for a moment thinkable that its essence 
should be anything else than this."
How the question arises what is the nature of 
the Self? In order to answer this question I make 
myself the object and I become Self-conBCious. That 
aspect of myself whioh is conscious is not identical 
with that about which I am conscious. The oontents 
of self-oonsciousnesB are always changing. The 
oentre or cone of my selfhood vmrLs from time to time 
under the influences everted by my surroundings both 
physical and social. The self iB clearly a changing 
complex of experience and this fact is clearly seen 
in the case of multiple personalities, moreover a 
large part of my personality iB never in my 
consciousness at any time. But in spite of all this 
fluser, there is a feeling of permanence of my real 
Selfj "The I,*^an this "I" or my real self beoome 
an object of thought ? To this question, Shankra 
replies in the negative. We cannot know self by 
means of thought because thought itBelf belongs to 
the region of flux.
"Though it escapes over knowledge it does not entirely 
escape us. It is the object of the notion of the 
self and iB known to exist on aooount of its
immediate presentation" ^  v . v „___
^adhakrishua. (It is not clear how we can £now
^  or interpret an "immediate presentation" without 
JT focussing attention on it. An immediate presental
J without interpretation merely indicates unconscious
^  yness^Thou” (Nofi^ -I) and the *I"^are of a nature as 
opposed as darkness and light. If it iB oertain 
that the being of the one is incompatible with the 
being of the other, it follows so much the more the 
the qualities of the one also do not exist in the 
other. Henoe it follows that the transfer of the 
object, which has as its province the idea of the 
"Thou" and its qualities, to the pure spiritual 
subject, which has as its province the idea of the 
"I" and conversely, the transfer of the subject ani 
its qualities to the ob'ject is logically false—  
yet in mankind this procedure resting on false 
knowledge of pairing together the true and untrue 
(that is subjestive and objective) is inborn, so 
that they transfer the being and qualities of the i 
to the other, not separating object and subject, 
although they are absolutely different and so sayi: 
for example, "ThiB am I,* "That is mine." This 
the fundamental point in Shankara's philosophy and 
must not be overlooked in his further statements. 
Hegel has been often compared with Shankra but I 
think they are poles apart from each other. To 
Hegel, subject and object are identical, thought i 
the Thing, Being and non-being are the same. The 
anti-thesis and synthesis constitute the formula 
and secret of all development and reality. The 
movement of thought is the same aB the movement of
focussing attention on it. An immediate presentation 
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things. The distinction between phenomena and 
noumena is illogical. Reality is the systematic 
whole of inter-related qualities. Reality is to 
be interpreted in terms of experience. God is 
the Absolute mind for whom the whole organised system
of
of things exists* He is Absolute in whioh all 
opposites are resolved into unity, that great sum 
of being in which matter and mind, subject and object 
good and evil, are one. God is the system of 
relationships in which all things move and have their 
being. In man the absolute rises to self-conscious­
ness and beooming the Absolute Idea-- that is thought 
realising itself as part of the Absolute and therefore, 
transcending individual limitations and purpose and
catching, underneath the universal strife, the hidden 
er*+i
harming of all thingB. So Shankra distinguishes 
tr
the true self (A^man) from the object. "What is 
truly real is what has being in itself and for itself
LT
so that to affirm the reality of AJiman or the
permanent self is to affirm the reality of an eternal
<r
Brahman"- Radhakrichna. So AJama is identical with 
Brahman or rather Higher Brahman (for Brahman has two 
forms higher and lower as we shall see later).
Brahman is spaceless and timeless. Time and 
space have no meaning as far as Brahman is concerned*
It is relationless. Relation has meaning with reference 
to something else, henoe is inapplicable to Brahman.
For Bradley too the Absolute is neither a sum of finite 
minds, nor a self-conscious mind, for the former implies 
external relations and the latter internal relations and 
the point about reality is that it is non relational, 
requiring nothing outside of it to complete its being. 
Brahman i£ not also the cause for the Bame reason.
Brahman has nothing similar to it nothing different from
K
it. It is non-dual (advaita) not one (e^ia), It is 
not the creator and sustainer of the World and not an 
enjoyer, because all thisimplies activity which is to 
be denied of Brahman. It is free from growth, decay, 
development and manifestation and all kinds of change. 
"Brahman is what is assumed as fundamental though it is
in no sense a substance"- R.K. In short whatever 
quality, attribute or property can be named or thought 
of is to be denied of Brahman, "It is a thing of which 
we know nothing} it is indesoribable"- Vivedi,
"It is unknowable by any logical process formal or 
transcendental"- Prof, Bhattacherya.
"Its nature is inexpressible; one may speak about 
it, though we cannot describe it adequately or have any 
logical knowledge of it*- R.K, Is it a mere abstraction, 
a group of letters, a non-Being? Shankara says, no.
In spite of the previous statement of Shankra that "we 
do not know what it is, whether finite of infinite, 
Knowledge or Bliss" and that it is devoid of attributes 
and that it is unknownable he gives a positive definition 
of Brahman. Brahman is Being, intelligence and BlisB, 
"Vidya equates Brahman with the attributes of oonscious- 
ness/intelligence and Bliss" R.K, There logic oomes 
to the aid of Shankara. Brahman is not non-being, be 
beoauee absolute non-being is inconceivable, negation 
of a portion is possible but cannot be applied to Being 
in its integrity and universality. "In the inmost 
nature of our self, we cannot make any distinction 
between our being and our consciousness. Consciousness 
is our being. Being is identical with consciousness.
How are we to understand the thing-in-itself. Is it a 
conscious or unconscious existence? It cannot be any* 
thing else, for a real must be either of the two alter­
natives. If it is unconscious in the sense of an 
existence totally different from and contradictory to 
consciousness, we have the unwarrantable hypothesis of 
metaphysical dualism - that two absolute substances can 
coexist. It (Brahman) must necessarily be conscious" 
Sirkar -(we are not concerned with the nature of dual­
ism for the present but we want to see how far this is 
applicable to Brahman)
Brahman/
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Brahman is consciousness. “Brahman is of the nature of
ultimate consciousness and yet it knows nothing*-. Radha-
krishna. "It is of the nature of non objective oonscious
ness" R.K. (It is consciousness without consciousness of
anything!), "It is not self consciousness because self
iv**
and not self are not unraanent in and compatible with the 
absolute"- Sirkar. It is not oonscious of itself 
Brahman is intelligence. On this topic Shankara answers 
a few objections which will incidentally throw light on 
the above question.
(1) First objection:- An eternal Cognitive in Brahman
would take away the freedom of Brahman with reference to
the action of cognition: To this Shankara replies,"To
begin with, it is to be held that only an eternal actual,
si
and not a potential oognition, satisfied the demands of 
omniscience. A cognition of this} kind does not take 
away the freedom of Brahman; for in the case of the sun 
also, although it continually gives forth heat and 
light, we say, 'it warms1, 'it shines' and thereby 
indicate that it does this of itself, bf its own accord; 
that iB to say, the following out of the law of its own 
nature does not take away the freedom of a being.
(2) Second objection: A cognition is only possible,
if there is also an object of perception, which was not 
the oase before creation.
Answer:- As the Bun a l s o  shines when there i s  n o t h i n g
cr^.
for it to shine i«, so Brahman might know without
having an object of cognition. Yet one existed, even
o
before the creation. What is this pre-o^smio objeot?- 
It is the names and forms which are neither to be 
defined as beings nor as the opposite, which are not 
evolved, but striving towards evolution, "the names and 
forms * of the world' hovered before the spirit of the
creator/
oreator before the creation*
(3) Third objeotion:- Cognition oannot proceed without 
organs of perception, body, senses, etc*,
Answer - Beoause Cognition inheres in Brahman as shining 
in the sun, as an eternal law of its nature, it requires 
no organs to this end like the individual soul. In 
regard to answer Ho.l, Shankara seems to suggest that 
Brahman gives out knowledge as the sun light. In this 
oase there can be no freedom of action, for freedom 
implies a choice between two alternatives: whether one 
should do a thing or not. ThiB also means that the 
subject has the power of Willing* But Brahman is denied 
j*f" any such power. In fact no aotivity can be applied 
to Brahman. But the question of freedom in itself here 
is not relevant. If Brahman at any time is not cogni­
sant, He oannot be called ’Brahman*. A God without the 
power of cognition actual or potential is no God* As 
for the question no.2 that a oognition is not possible 
without the object of cognition, Shankara's illustration 
is not appropriate* But Shankara supplies the object
of cognition in 'names and forms' and makes the Absolute
Consious of 'names and forms'. This is not consistent 
with the position he held formerly in making Brahman a 
"non-objective Consciousness."
Brahman as Bliss. If this means pleasant feelings
it $s difficult to see what connection has bliss with
Brahman. The Absolute must be indifferent to
pleasure or pain, because pleasure aai the outcome of
^ 1^*^1
the gratification of desires, in activity/ or 
imagination, and pain is caused by their frustration.
We cannot attribute desires to the absolute because 
desire implies want hence deficiency.
Pjrofessor Sirker explains this in a different 
way ( p r o b a b l y  o n  t h e  b a B i s  of b r o l o g i o a l  t h e o r y  of 
f e e l i n g . )
J U . /&• ft' *5
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Ho Writes; "The oonsciousneBs of existence,
because it is absolute, iB the perfeotion of existence# 
And because it is perfeotion, it is bliss, for bliBs 
is the indication of amount of being. In finite 
self-conscious experience we are dearly conscious 
that, with the gradual growth of our inmost being, 
we have the invariable expansion, fulfilment and 
perfection of ourself, with the unfailing 
accompaniment of delight consequent upon the sense 
of expansion. The absolute, since it is the ultimate 
existence, is also the perfection of being, and 
consequently is identical with bliss. We read in the 
Sruti
"What is great and limitless is bliss there is no bliss
in littleness and limitation.r
We oannot accept the ordinary theory that pleasure 
(bliss) is consequent upon stimulus agreeable to us, 
and pain, upon stimulus disagreeable to us, surely 
this is playing with words. Pleasure is, no doubt, 
an agreeable feeling* But why is one stimulus 
agreeable and other, disagreeable ? It is only 
because one is in harmony with one being and paveB 
the way for its expansion, while the other retards 
the process. A stimulus by itself is indifferent.
It has no absolute oharacter. It has an acquired 
virtue."
To thiB I would say that it is not perfeotion or 
expansion but the gratification of the desire for 
perfeotion that gives *p pleasure or bliss. In 
every-day life we desire the perfection of our being, 
it is an ideal towards which we are striving and the 
more we are satisfied with our progress in this 
direction, the more have we a feeling of pleasure.
But pleasure and pain have no reference to the 
absolute which is perfect and which has no desire to
/be
W -  L( . o
be fulfilled, no want to be satisfied. I think,
by bliss Shankara simply means absence from pain 
0* * 
ratliFr the state in which pain and pleasure have no
meaning, and this meaning seems to be more probable
when we find that in Shankara1s system feeling and
oonation are not asoribed to the Absolute, Shankera’s
Absolute as has been said before is inactive. Willing
and feeling are conspicuous in this system by their
absence at this stage. It may be oalled an
intellectual system, not beoause it attaches more
importance to cognition at the expense of the feeling
and conation but because the latter has no existence
in it at the present stage of our discussion.
In connection with the positive characteristics of 
Brahman it would be interesting to quote Deussen, 
who is of opinion that Bliss is counted by Shankara 
among the negative limitations as freedom from 
suffering;-
"This oompound (Sao-Cid-ananda. Existenoe, Intelligence 
and Bliss) is nowhere found in Shankare's commentary, 
and appears to be aB yet unknown to our author. It Is 
true that he repeated/by explains that where Brahman is 
spoken of as Bliss, this limitation refers to Esojtrio, 
attributeless Brahman, but here in striotly exoteric 
part, this is not spoken of, perhapB, beouase Shankra 
counts it among the negative limitations as freedom 
from suffering ; thus besides existence, as the only
l/*C
position quality of the exoterio Brahman, remains 
intelligence."The scripture explains, that the
4
ctndifferentiated Brahman is pure intelligence free 
from all that is different from it, for it says,
'as a block of salt has no (distinguishable) inside 
or outside, but through and through consists only of 
salt taste, so this Atman has no (distinguishable) 
inside and outside but consists throughout altogether
of intelligence. That is, this Atman is throughout
^jothing
4
nothing hut intelligence; intelligence is its 
exclusive nature as the salt taste is of the lump 
of salt"
As regards the relation between existence and 
intelligence Shankera>p remarks,
"Brahman cannot he Existence without Intelligence, 
because this contradiots the passage of Soripture and 
because otherwise he would not be the self of the 
individual*soul, which is by nature intelligent ; 
not Intelligence without Existence either, beoause 
this is impossible; and just as little existence 
and Intelligence in their separate charaoterB, 
beoause this would give rise to a pluralily, whioh 
oannot exist in the oase of Brahman; it therefore 
only remains that Existence is the same as Intelligence, 
and Intelligence the same as Existence. It is true
er wp—i^ ay here
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*We may, however, point out in connection with 
this, that both ideas in the End are resolvable into 
that of Force, All existence, in its eseenoe, is 
nothing but a manifestation of Force and all knowledge 
may be considered as a reaction against the crowd of 
impressions, and therefore as an activity of Force.*
This makes the reality to be dynamic, and I do not think, 
Shankara had any such idea of a dynamio reality when he 
was explaining his theory of the Absolute. On the 
contrary the Brahman is devoid of all activity.
Advaita does not recognise this world as a manifestation 
of energy or even mysterious Vital force, henoe the idea 
of the Absolute as Force or Energy is not preached by 
Shankra.
Before going any further we may here consider 
Shankara*s statement that the Absolute is unknowable, 
and that even though its existence were known, we 
cannot know anything about its nature, because thinking 
involves comparison and there is nothing outside the 
Absolute with which to compare it. This argument is 
based on the application of the principle of relativity 
of knowledge. This theory assumes that in order to 
know the Absolute we must separate it from other things 
and set it side by side with these things and note the 
differeno*. *2/ *-> A-c«-c.
that there is nothing outside the Absolute with 
which to oompare it. But when we look at the 
things that are finite, their finiteness implies some 
kind of relation with each other and with something 
on whioh they are dependent for their existence.
We cannot know a thing as related to something else 
unless we know that whioh gives it this relation 
i.e. the Absolute. Absolute and Relative are related 
ideas and in knowing the relative we know the 
Absolute, whioh manifests itself in the relative 
things and makes them relative. Without suoh an 
Absolute, the finite things will be so many absolute 
themselves, without any sort of relation between them 
and hence they will be unknowable. Shankara makes 
the mistake of thinking the Absolute apart from the 
relative and hence makes it an abstraction, without any 
real existence. Mr. L.P. Jaoks says,
"In the whole realm of thought there is no partition
/ so
b o thin as that whioh divides God from nothing and 
such ie the eagerness of the soul, in its flight 
Godwards, that it constantly breaks through and 
plunges into the abyss on the other side, when once 
philosophy has reached the point of oonceiving God as 
the only Heal, the moment has oome for thought to 
return upon itself,not a step further can be taken, 
and the warning to turn back is peremptory. If thought 
neglects this warning and tries to refine once more its 
last refinement .... it passes the boundary line between 
thought and nothing, and enters the realm from which there 
is no return."
As regards the second point that the Absolute is 
not self-oonscious, because it does not have anything 
from which to distinguish or discriminate itself. This 
theory is based on the analogy of human consciousness, 
which means a feeling of limitation and impression 
imposed upon the self from outside. But this also has 
its root in considering the Absolute in the Abstract,apart 
from the World of relative things. The Absolute as 
containing the relative within itself has the required 
material for discrimination and self consiousness. So 
Shankra makes the mistake of not calling the Absolute as 
Universal Consiousness, which includes the Conscious 
feelings and thoughts of finite beings, but which at the 
same time transcends and differs in kind from the human 
consciousness. Its self-awareneBs must be awareness of 
its own activity, purpose and products i.e. the world of 
finite things.
KuiT Ohanhuur^ -^ gplains ^ the ~>vorld
o ^  ATtipr-f^ rwLfi.
MAYA,
Shankara has described the Self ae qualityless. 
Moreover, he says that A^man (the self) ie Being and 
intelligence. Is there anyone in this world who is 
qualityless; who possesses no attributes, and is there 
anyone who is perfect intelligence, who is all-knowing, 
who is free from all suffering? If not, how can we
say that *1* is identical with Alman or Brahman? To 
explain this, Shankara introduces the idea of "Maya." 
This is a crucial point in his philosophy and with
is as old as Rigveda, but the word "Maya" was later on 
interpreted as "illusion" and this interpretation 
first ooours in Svetasvatra Upanishads. In rigveda, 
the word means a "mysterious will-power. In Upani- 
shads it comes to mean as
In ranra Spstras, this word occurs only in 
one of the Sutra, where it means "illusion" (dream­
world is an illusion" Jhankra1s^Arnmentary on Brahma 
Sutra or Seriraka Bhasrya it means "illusion**
As regards the etymology of the word it has been 
said that it is derived from "ma", to measure, to know, 
to build, to show e.g, to measure the immeasurable 
Brahman, Some say that it is a compound of ma - ya 
that which is not, but this interpretation is not
based on the principle of etymology.
So from the above, we see that"may& means 
"illusion" and it is in this jUnse that it is used 
by Shankra.
In connection with the doctrine of Brehmin 
:maya" is explained in the vedanta in the following 
ways :»
this his system stands or falls.
The oonoeption of Maya, aocording to Dr. Shartri,
(1) Illusion and (2) Appearance
C
"Maya"
"Maya* which is without beginning and without
end - is that, on account of which or by means
of which, Brahma, whose nature is eternal purity,
intelligence and freedom, becomes the omniscient
and omnipotent creator of the world; "maya" is
again that, on account of which or by means of
ir
which, the Alma of man becomes ignorant of its 
true nature, which is simply Brahma whose nature 1b 
eternal purity, intelligence and freedom, - and 
mistakenly assumes itself to be, or to have the
characteristics of, that which is not Alma; "maya" 
is further that, by means of which or on account 
of which Brahma, which is pure and absolute unity 
without any difference whatever, comes to be full 
of multiplicity, division and difference; "maya* 
is also that, by means of which or on account of
which, the a^man of man perceives multiplicity, 
division, distinct ion. and form, where there is none 
”-Besal#Professor Scri-M -ar remarks,
"Maya" may be tfcgcfcflel as the principle of 
indusduation, a force, a power, revealing the 
world of forms and modes. It has two forms; the 
will tomanifest^ to preserve, and the will to destroy. 
Will has thus been the original cause of the empirical
the principle of individuation inherent in Brahman
"The self is associated with certain power called 
"maya" or cosmic illusion. It is due to this power 
that the appearance of the material world with the 
individual self is projected and the individual self 
appears to be enveloped in conditions or upjKf-his" . - 
Gan gil*.
(j
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tendency to regard "maya” as
i But I do not find any such tendency
"Under the spell of Cosmic illusion, the self manifests 
itself iD a peculiar way and becomes subjeot to a set of 
Upadhis ( attributeqJ  and thus appears £  individualise 
itself"-Ganguli.
"The principle of the universe of forms (Maya) is 
beginningless as the self is eternal. The relation 
between the two is admitted. But Maya iB no substance, 
being a mere illusion, which is simply the means by whioh 
variety is lent to self manifestation and self realization" 
-Gupta.
"The Divine power or Shakti, the Will of Ishura,
making the universe manifest, is called Maya, Maya is
inseparable from iBhura. Their unity is like that of the
moon and the moonlight and that of the fire and its power
4
to burn. 'While in/eparable from the Lord, when turned 
towards Him, Maya is called supreme knowledge, she is also 
called Avidya when turned away from Him"-
It is better here to explain another term which is 
closely connected with Maya. It is avidya, literally it 
means "not knowledge" or absence of true knowledge.
"Avidya is either absence of knowledge or doubtful or 
erroneous knowledge. It is not simply negative but is 
also positive in character" E.K. Shankara does not argue 
about the existence of Avidya but takes it for granted, 
because everybody has the feeling that he does not know 
everything. "The evidence for its exitence is universal 
in scope, since all finite minds share the deficiency."
But absenoe of knowledge is not error of knowledge and 
Shankara is not justified in his conclusion . Knowledge 
or non knowledge are contradictory terms. A judgment 
may be true or false but it is still a judgment.
Judgment and false judgment are not contradictory. Why 
do we call it avidya or false knowledge? Because, in 
reality there is nothing else besides Brahman al%pe.
If we imagine that we perceive a transformation of him
into the world, a division of him into plurility of
individuals, this depends upon Avidya"- Deussen.
A*
Shankara uses avidya and ^ ilaye indiscriminately,
though we find a distinction between these two in the
later Advaita. According to Professor Radhakrishna “the 
tr
AJiman which is pure knowledge somehow lapses into Avidya, 
just as Brahman, which is pure being, turns aside into 
Bpaoe m time - cause world. Why there is this universal 
and primeval turning aside or perversion is more than we 
can say, yet we must hold that neither one logical mind 
nor the world which it apprehends is an illusion.
(It is not dear why Prof. Radha Krishna does not 
interpret Maya as illusion here). A pheuomenon is not a 
phantasm. "Even as Brahmanand Atman are one, so are 
Maya and Avidya one" R.K.
Modern Hindu Philosophers have tried to save 
Vedantism by interpreting the terms Maya and avidya in 
the light of modern knowledge and to show that this 
system is as sound as any advanced by the modern 
Philosophers of the West.
The question arises, "Is this principle inherent in 
Brahman". Professor Sirkar calls it transcendental 
because it is revolting to the nature of Brahman as 
"intelligence? But if Maya is outside Brahman and is
A,
eternal with Brahman, we have duality, instead of1 
non-duality like the Zoreastrian Principles of "Light" 
and "Darkness". But the vedantists to oome out of 
this difficulty interpret it in a different way.
They say that the world is false because it is imagined 
by ignorance, but this ignorance is itself false 
because it is also ignorance imagined i.e. ignorance 
imagines itself to exist. Can a mind assent to the
belief/
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belief that ignoranoe which is nothing can imagine 
itself to exist. If ignoranoe is not nothing but 
something positive, the soul cannot be ever pure and 
intelligent. If it be pointed out here thatthe 
vedantists argue for distinct kinds of existenoe not 
the various modes of existence and that one is true 
existence and the other is untrue existence, just as 
a man in hallucination^ sees a crowd of people in the 
room, where there is none, still it will not save the 
situation, This question has already been discussed 
in connection with Shankaras theory of knowledge. 
Moreover Monism will stand only if the vedantists 
equaffalse existenoe with non-existence but by simply 
calling it false existenoe they do not escape the 
verdlot of duality, because this false existenoe is not 
dependent on true existenoe. Shankara altogether 
differs from the Western Philosophy in their conception 
of the world. They either take the singularistic 
or pluralistic view of the universe. As regards 
the former we can site with Spinoza in saying that 
there is one all inclusive Substance, “Sub qua^ram 
speoie aeternitatis" All that 1b finite and temporalis 
the necessary expression of the infinite or eternal.
The true being of man consists in seeing himself aB 
part of the One. Or wemay affirm the Hegelian doctrine 
that there is one All-»4tusive Spirit of Individual.
Inorganic and organic, mind and body, Belf and society, 
finite and infinite, God and the world are inter­
related in the whole which is an organic system.
As for pluralBm, we can say that there are 
many separate and mutually independent beings, which 
taken in the aggregate, make up the world, not 
call it a universe but multiverse.
This
This is how the Universe is explained by the 
singularists and pluratists, but Shankhara denies 
pluralism and also denies the above views of 
singularism in which the principle of individualism 
can work. He denies that the world is a manifesta­
tion or transformation or expression of Brahman.
To make his point of view more clear, the name, 
forms, attributes, qualities, etc,, do not belong 
to Brahman whioh is qualityless and their relation 
to Brahman is due to Avidya. But as (aooording to 
Shankara) there is nothing else but Brahman, 
physical world m*wat -he either identical with Brahman 
or a manifestation, transformation or expression of 
Brahman. If none of these cases is true, afe we 
justified to conolude that the physical world has no 
existence? To this Shankara replies: "The whole
empirioal reality with its names and forms, which can 
be defined neither as being nor non-being rests upon 
Avidya, while in the sense of highest reality, Being 
persists without change or transformation. A change 
resting merely on words oan alter nothing in the 
individuality of the real." Bythat element of 
plurality whioh is the oreation of Avidya characterised 
by name and form which is evolved as well aB not 
evolved which is not to be defined either as existing 
or non-existing, Brahman becomes the basis of this 
entire changing world, while in its true real nature 
it remains unchanged beyond the phenomenal universe. 
Shankara explains it by quoting an illustration,
MA man may in the iark mistake a piece of rope for a 
snake and run away from it, frightened and trembling. 
Thereon another man may tell him, "Be not afraid it is 
only a rope not a snake, he may then dismiss the fear 
caused by the imagined snake, and stop running.
But all the while the presence and the subsequent
/absence 
a.
absence of his erroneous notion as to the rope being a
ake makes no difference whatever to the rope itself*"
^       —‘0
Shankara gives many other examples like "Silver
and Shell" which need not be quoted here.
On this point Professor Radhakreshna says: "The
Magician produces a tree before us from out of nothing.
The tree is. there, though we cannot explain it, so we
call it Maya." But there is a difference between the
Magician and Brahman, The Magician has the power of
producing a tree or at least making us believe in the
existence of a tree, while the Brahman has no such
power. This power is outside Brahman. Dr. Shastri
strikes a similar note. He oompares Brahman to a
Magician that appearB in different forms. This
analogy doeB not apply to Brahman, The Magioian is
under no false belief as to his identity, while
Brahman is under the influence of Avydia, believes the
forms to be real.
To sum up the arguments of this chapter, we have
a positive entity, which Shankara calls Brahman or the
absolute, and which is qualityless and laoking in all
kinds of activity and energy. Along witji this, there
is another mysterious entity called maya, which Shankara
oonsiders both positive and negative at the same time.
This entity is beginningless and endless like Brahman.
I call it endless because it never comes to an end as
a whole, for Ishwara is never qualityless like the
Absolute, In the case of an individual, I consider
it endless, beoause we have no proof of ity non-existence•
In a man’s life, there is not a single moment when he
does not possess the energy^, potential or actual, to
be translated into aotions. A mere belief in a man
that he does not possess such an energy is oontradicted by
his own experience and by the experience of others.
/Moreover
VMoreover we have no positive proof that such an experi­
ence in itself amounts to nothing. We have also no 
proof of the oessation of the influence of Maya after 
death. If Maya is heginningless and endless like 
Brahman, are we justified in oalling it non-existent? 
Brahman for the creation of this world depends upon 
Maya, which is outside Brahman, Is it not lowering 
the position of Brahman to a dependent Being? If 
Maya is nothing, it cannot produce anything, so this 
world must he considered as non-extent. If Maya is 
a positive entity, it produces a kind of duality 
between Brahman and Maya. If it he said that from the 
point of view of Brahman Maya is nothing, we have no 
valid ground for this assumption as far as human 
knowledge is concerned, because we do not know of any 
human being, who has been qualityless and identioal 
with the Absolute. From the point of view of the 
individual it is not clear how and why a^d Brahman came 
under the influence of Maya. One thing should be 
borne in mind, Shankara assumes the existence of Maya, 
but does not give any reason for this assumption.
He does not prove his statement that there iB nothing 
else but Brahman and that this world is the product 
of an error on the part of human beings. He takes 
it for granted on the authority of the Umpaijishads 
and then tries to explain it the analogy of the 
rope and the snake. But this analogy proves nothing. 
When I see a rope and mistake it for a snake, my 
experience iB not unreal, Similarly the Absolute, 
which under the influence of Maya sees the multiplicity 
of the world, cannot be said to have an unreal 
experience. If this experience is real, the Absolute 
comes down from its position of Absolute intelligence.
/Think
^  /
Think as hard as we can, we do not find any valid 
ground for the assumption of Maya."
What are the consequences of this theory? The 
world is merely a dream, a shadow falsely imposed upon 
the self hy Maya or Avidya, As in a dream we find 
ourselves subject to various kinds of experience, possible 
or impossible, and in that state consider that all such 
experience is real, so in this world all that we see, hear, 
feel, is nothing but a dream, though it looks real.
Vidya makes us realise our mistakes, and this waking would 
become*a dream-world as compared with the world of Vidya 
in which we subsequently find oursleves. A man struggleso 
to gain a mastery over the brute foroes of nature, 
struggles to remove the obstacles that beset his path, tries 
to carry on his existence in the best possible way, simply 
to find himself awakened to the illusory nature of all his 
efforts and struggles. What about the laws, the states, 
and the institutions that man builds. It is hard to 
say anything more on this point,
Shankara tries to show that an individual can get 
rid of Avidya, or that ytvidya is possible in this world, 
by stating that in a dreamless sleep man's individual 
soul is one with Brahman, In Uphamshads there are 
contradictory theories as regards the resting place of 
the soul, but Shankara tries to reconcile these by 
xaying, “not at choice into one or into the other, but 
simultaneously does the soul enter into deep sleep into 
the place mentioned (heart, jaeins, etc.,) otherwise we 
have to deny the partial denial of the surtis quoted 
above." "//here the soul is said to be resting in the 
veins, we must suppose that an entrance into Brahman is 
sought through the veins-" Sirkar. When the soul 
passes into Brahman in deep sleep it is not touched by 
evil. But when a man wakes up the soul returns again.
/All
"All these creatureB go day "by day into Brahman and yet do 
not disoover it. Y/hen they come out again, they know it not; 
Whether they are tigers here, or lions, wolves or hears, that 
they Become again." If the individual does not know that
CL
he has Been into Brahjlm, what grounds are there for making 
such am assumption? Surely not the human knowledge.
Suoh a state does not mesm liberation, Because in that case 
the soul would not return. It is only a temporary 
liberation.
In other countries we also find similar Beliefs in the 
souls leaving the Body in sleep. "I asked one of the 
Kumai"(native raoe of Australia), relate* Mr. Howitt, "whether 
he really thought hiB "YamBo" could go out during sleep?"
"It must Be so," was the answer, "for when I sleep I go to 
distant places, I even see and speak with those that are 
dead."
An objection is raised against this theory; *Ho* is 
it possible if deep sleep is a complete union with Brahman, 
that each soul on awaking finds its way Back to individuality. 
If a drfcp^water is poured into a Body of water and a drop 
taken from it again, it can hardly Be the same drop* Ib 
it a different soul that awakes in its place?
To this Shankara replies, "He who awakeb can neither 
Be another soul nor God and must Be the same who went to sleep 
and that for the following reasons
(1) On account of works - It cannot Be said that a work 
Begun in the evening and completed in the morning is 
divided Between two different souls.
(2) On acoount of remembrance - for one remembers when 
one wakes, ’I said this and this yesterday and 1 am so and 
so.
C
(3) On acoount of the text of Scripture.
/On
(4) On aocounts of the precepts as to knowledge and 
works which in the absenoe of personal identity would 
become invalid; for otherwise deep sleep would mean 
complete liberation and what would become then of the 
works that still remain and have to be atoned for and of 
the lower knowledge? The comparison with the drop, which 
cannot be recovered from the body of water does not agree 
with the facts; for the distinguishing cause is wanting 
in this case, but in the case of the Soul it is present 
namely in the shape of works and knowledge. There does 
not exist an individual soul different from Brahman, 
distinguishing from the Existent like a drop of water from 
a body of water, but the Existent itself is, in oonsequenoe 
of the connection with the ki^edhis (limiting adjuncts) 
termed individual b o u I in a metaphorical sense."
(From the above it is clear that individuality does not
belong to the soul. Then it must belong to tt^edjiis but 
UJv*
li’gedhis are only a mechanical apparatus, in themselves dead, 
which are alike an attribute of all. Beussac^thinks 
that individual character is discoverable in a tertium 
quid, which is moral determination and is characterised 
by knowledge, works and previous experience.) This theory 
seems to us to be based on transmigration of soul, 
otherwise No.2. above would make us think that it 
belongs to upadhis if not to the soul because after death 
when the upadhiB are changefl^the soul has no idea of its 
personality in the previous birth.
From the above it is evident that the soul in 
dreamless sleep does not beoome identioal with Brahman, 
beoause it isstillldistinguished by limiting adjuncts.
It is not clear in what senBe it is made to enter Brahman 
in dreamless Bleep. As to why in dreamless sleep the 
soul may be considered to have passed into Brahman Shankra
/ replies
replies that there is nothing strange in it. We do not 
r^ean to say that in waking state the soul is not one with 
Brahman. It is Brahman in whatever state it is hut in
r
waking state, being in contact with the upadhis, A£ma 
remains ignorant of its real nature, wb+^h in a deep sleep 
these restrictions being removed it knows its true nature. 
ThiB is another dogmatio assumption. We have no reason 
to believe that the Soul knows its true nature in dreamless 
sleep. In dreamless sleep there is no cognition. Phen-
iadividual ha~B~ no'cognTtToh. To this Shankra replies that 
&
"A^ma is not conscious during sleep of anything that it 
knows during waking life, not because it oeaBes to be 
intelligent, but simply because it ceases to be in contact 
with the senses and other limiting adjuncts - which are 
Alma's instruments of knowing things in this world and 
therefore, these things cease to be the objects of Aima's 
knowledge during sleep. And so far from ceasing to be 
intelligent during what we call dreamless sleep, Alma knows 
itself to be identical with Brahma.11 - Desai.
A modem Psychologist would consider the deep sleep 
as a state in which there is a complete depression of nervous 
activities - a state which is subjectively described as 
unoonsciousness. But according to Shankra this is the 
state of real consciousness because the soul is one with 
Brahman whioh is pure consciousness. He considers it to 
be different from empirical consciousness. We admit 
that divine consciousness must be different from 
empirical consciousness but it is hard to believe that the 
Soul is one with Divine consciousness in Sleep. Maya is 
beginningless like Brahman. Is it endless too.
According to the Desais interpretation of Shankra it is
/endless
endless in general tut comes to an end in the oase of every
individual. Does it not mean that Brahma is never free
from Maya? Then how can we say that Brahma is qualityless?
Moreover Shankra says "In dedp sleep — —  the soul freed
from all Upadhis enters Brahman" Bow1the subjection of 
0"
AJdma to Upadhi is due to Maya1 (Desai). As long as Maya
exists there is no freedom from Upadhis. Freedom from
Upadhis means freedom from Maya. So in deep sleep the soul
or Brahman is free from Maya. But all the individuals are
not in deep sleep at one and the same time* libelaLinn.
The same is the case with the individuals So the question
arises, "Is Brahman affected with Maya and unaffected at the
same time?4 
^  *
tyy \ part of Brahman is affected and the other part
unaffected? To a similar objeotion Shankra replies as
follows:- "Brahma cannot in itself possess a double nature,
Uu.
For on acoount of the contraction implied therein, it is 
impossible to admit that one and the same thing should by 
itself possess certain qualities,- Such as from etc,- and 
should not possess them".
To the second question he replies that Brahma cannot 
have parts, beoause what is composed can be decomposed.
In that oase Brahma will not be eternal. But how to get 
out of this difficulty? Shankra suggests that Brahma has two 
forms "Are there tow forms of Brahma one higher and the 
other lower? Quite so. Brahma is known to have two forms. 
Under one of these forms Brahma is connected with Upadhi, 
while under the other form it is absolutely free from all 
Upadhis. But we must remenber that this connection with 
.Upadhi does not, and oannot, change the original nature of 
Brahma. For even the connection with the limiting adjuncts is 
not able to impart to a thing of a certain original nature an
%
/altogether
altogether different nature. The nature of Brahma may not 
change hut still the objection remains unexplained.
Brahma has two contradictory forms at the same time or 
Brahma is oonnected with and unconnected with Upadhis at the 
same time.
Besides the presence of Upadhi is due to Avidya. We 
get the real explanation of the difficulty when we learn 
that Brahma is regarded as having one form or the other 
acoording as it is the objeot of right knowledge or
t*
misconception, Desai.
From the above it is clear that this Physical world owes
its existence to misoonception. When the misconception is
removed the Physical world is no more. Again if Brahma iB
affected with Maya, it is the whole Brahma that is so and
not any of its parts. Then Brahma whioh is the object of
right knowledge does not exist and consequently cannot be
known. To this objection Shankara replies, "His view is
not open to any objection whatever (much less to the present
objeotion). For the alleged break in the nature of Brahma
is a mere figment of Avidya. By a break of this nature a
thing is not really broken up into parts, any more than the
moon is really multiplied by appearing double. It is by the
element of plurality-which is the mere fiction of Avidya-
that Brahma becomes the basis of this entire apparent world
with its changes etc, while in its original and real nature,
it, at the same time, ever remains unchanged, lifted above
perceptible world. And aB the distinction of names and
CC
forms,-the fiction of Avidya- originaXs entirely from 
speeoh (and has no ground in reality) it does not militate 
against the fact that Brahma is without parts." But the 
difficulty is hot removed when we take into consideration 
the individual soul which is Brahma linked with Maya and 
Avidya (Iguoranfc^. When the individual soul attains
liberation, it merges into Brahman, it becomes one with the
/absolute.
absolute. It is then either linked with Maya or not.
If it is, then there is no absolute Brahman. If it is 
not, then Brahman is at the same limited and unlimited 
(beoause there are other souls that have not yet attained 
their freedom). Can this difficulty be removed by 
denying all connection with the Upadhis and to oonsider the 
whole universe as illusory? Still the fact remains that 
Brahman as individual Soul considers itself to be connected 
with Upadhis while as an Absolute it is free from such 
belief. The Bame Brahman believes and doeB not believe in 
a certain faot at the same time. Is it not Belf-contradic- 
tion?
Again Shankre continues, "What objection iB there if 
we suppose that unity and manifoldness are both real?"
To this he answers, "The doctrine that the individual Soul 
has Braihma for its essential nature, if once understood, 
does away with the independent existence of the individual 
Soul. But if the independent existence of the individual 
vanishes, the entire perceptible world,-which has its 
source in the individual soul, and for the establishment 
of whioh alone an element of manifoldness as real is to be 
assumed in Brahma all this perceptible world also vanishes. 
Hence manifoldneBs is due to wrong knowledge and therefore 
does not require a real element in Brahma to explain it"- 
Desai. As we stated before Maya is beginninglese and 
endless in general (vide Desai on Shankre) or Brahman is 
inseparable from Upadhis (vide on Shankre) and
Upadhis are neither identioal with Brahman nor have any 
other relation with it, is not Shankra proving the dualism 
of Brahman and matter, while his object is to show non­
duality. To avoid this dualism one haB to deny either
the being of Upadhis or Brahman or to consider Upadhis as 
an illusion or Creation of mind. Professor Radhe Krishna 
repudiates the latter view. He says, "The world, seen, 
felt, taBted and touched is as real aB the being of man, 
who sees, feels, tasts, and touches. The mind and its 
g a ^ o n s on the one side, and the world which it construes 
through them hang together." Here it may be objected that 
the world and the mind are both Upadhis. What is the 
connection between the world and the mind on one hand and 
the Brahman on the other? To this the Professor says, "For 
Shankre the question is am illegimate one and so impossible 
to answer. When we intuit the absolute Brahman, the question 
of the nature of the world and its relation does not arise, 
for the truth whioh disarms all discussions is Been as a 
fact. If we take our stand on logic, then there is no 
pure Brahman, which requires to be related to the world.
For an imaginary difficulty there cannot be any real solution."
In other words when we intuit the Brahman, the world 
disappears and when we take to reasoning, the. Brahman is no 
more. This is the way in whioh Shankra avoids the dualism 
between Brahman and ma^erl But it is hard to say whether 
intuition doeB give us Shankra's Brahman.
DREAMLAND. %
In our dreams we have various kinds of experience, 
both pleasant and unpleasant. Sometimes we find our 
desires so easily satisfied, our objects so quickly 
attained, that what seems impossible in the waking world 
becomes possible as if there hadbeen nothing to thwart 
our wishes, nothing to place any restraint on our 
activities. In short, we become &he monarch of all we 
surviy. On the other hand, sometimes we are Tin such u 
terrible distress, in such agonizing pain and bodily 
discomfort that one shudders to have even any remember- 
ance of it. All objects, both animate and inanimate, 
seem ’to be conspiring to check our desires no matter 
how legitimate they are, or how entitled we are to see 
them fulfilled. But all our pleasures and pains 
evaporate wway like mist when we wake up. We then find 
out that it was only a dream. Similarly, our waking world, 
our present world, is nothing but a dream as compared with 
our existence as the Absolute or Brahman.
Let us now consider what Shankra thinks of this 
dreamland, this present world, the world which is the 
result of Brahman's being affected with Maya. He has 
given a very interesting account of the laws that are 
valid in this woBld,,of the problems of soul and body
(a
and above all, that of God. We will first
begin with Time, Space and Cause.
TIME, SPACE AND CAUSE.
Shankra considers that what is limited by space is 
not real, because it is divisible. As regards the 
origin of space, he refutes Kanada's theory. Kanada 
maintains that space can have no origin because
(a) there is no causal relation between space as an 
effect and its cause,
Now /
’Now for space there is no homogeneous and manifild 
substance from which, as inherent cause, together with 
the union of the same (that is of its particles), as non- 
inherent cause, space could originate. And if this does 
not exist, much less can we think of an existing efficient 
cause for space.”
(b) If space be considered as created, there must be 
time before creation, but in the case of space this is 
inconceivable.
(c) Space is different in nature from earth because 
it penetrates all things.
(c) Scriptures also bear testimony to this.
Sp space must form an all-penetrating formless 
unity with Brahman like milk and water.
To this Shankra replies that water and milk 
differ essentially in their nature though mixed, and 
he proceeds further in this way: -
(1)”The cause need not be necessarily homogeneous, 
for the threads and their combination need not be 
homogeneous and still less thetfficient cause, the loom.
Or is homogeneity to be asserted of the inherent cause 
only? That cannot be maintained unconditionally, for a 
single cord is twisted out of yarn and cowhair. Further, 
the cause need not be manifold. It is not necessary that 
the cause should consist of several factord, for the 
effect can also be the result of transformation, since a 
substance passes into a different condition and is then 
called an effect.”
(2) As regards the time before the creation, one 
may say that space with all bodies is there now and that 
nothing was there before.
(3) It does not hold good, either, that space had 
no origin, because it is different jn essence from the 
earth and other elementd because it possesses qualities
which are not everlasting and is itself not everlasting, 
therefore we must not postulate a beginning for it."
(5) Space is said by the scriptures to be immortal, 
in a relative sense.
"Whenever we see anything that has originated through 
transformation whether it be pitchers, pots and pans or
bracelets..... .we see division also in the world. On
the contrary, a thing without origin can never be thought 
of as divided. The division of space is, however, shown 
by the earth (that is in space), therefore space must 
also be a transformation.
He does not show any difference between the 
perceptual and conceptual space. Moreover, he does not 
take space in the sense of relations. Shankra differs 
from that modern standpoint which considers space as a 
type of order that belongs to all the parts of the 
physical world as the latter is perceived, i.e., space is 
not something in itself. Shankra holds an opposite 
view that Is why he gives it an origin and thinks that 
space is created.
It appears to me that Shankra considers space as 
something of subtle matter or material and not ao a 
frypo of urflei1 Llial bel'dhgs lu all tTi5' parts of Llie* 
phvalnal wnr>l d na tihft Int. har- His point of
vi ew seems to be allied to the "intuitional theories" 
which explain space as a reality given^direct perception - 
Something that we directly see and feel outside of tti, 
without supposing any such process of’ gradual construction 
by experience and memory. . But it differs from "A prior^V 
theory which assumes that space is a form under which we 
must represent things in our mind’s eye, in order to be 
liable to conceive, understand and think about theip.
As regards the Ontological question regarding space 
he seems to side with the Realist who maintains that
a1
extension in space is a real 
attribute of things, and that space itself therefore is 
something real containing all other things in it, but 
itself independent of them, so that if things were 
annihilated, spacoe would still remain the same.
The same is the case with time. "It is real in the 
world of experience, within the world of experience time 
has universal scope. But the unending dueation of the 
world is not self sufficient."-R.
The search for casual connections is native to the 
human being. Even in very early ages, when people saw 
an event, they wanted to find out the Q&use of that.
A man cannot rest satisfied unless he finds out something 
to explain the event under observation.
In primitive ages the people believed that the 
natural phenomena behaved like human beings . To them 
Nature was alive, so they considered many natural 
phenomena to be the outcome of supernatural causes or 
magic. With the advance of civilization this view 
changed. People in different ages have put forward 
different views to explain the problem of causality, 
and even in these days philoshphy largely revolves about 
the problem of the relations of mechanism and finality, 
as one of its main issues. It would, therefore, be 
interesting to see what Shankra thinks of this problem; ) 
A/^^w^^The cause persists in the effect. Take the case of 
a vessel made of clay. The clay persists in the vessel. 
You cannot take out of a thing that which it does not 
contain. Oil cannot be pressed out of sand. The agent 
only changes the cause into the form of the effect. 
Moreover, the cause and the effect are continuous. They 
are not distinct from each other. So c&Cisesnd effect ere 
not different. In things which are different the 
perceptibility of the one is not conditioned by the
persistence/
of the other, for instance, a horse can be perceived 
without the presence of a cow. The effect persists 
before its manifestation, namely, as cause. The 
difference between the effect before manifestation and 
after is a relative one. They are merely two aspects 
of one thing and are really of one nature.
"Manifestation, like the springing of plants from 
seeds, is only a becoming visible of what was already 
existent, conditioned by the accumulation of like 
particles; and in the same way dissolution is a becoming 
invisible, caused by the disappearance of the same particle. 
If we were to recognizd a transition from non-existence 
to existence in them , and from existence to non­
existence, then embryo would be other than the sub­
sequently born man, the youth would be other than the 
greybeard he becomes and the father of the one would not
change in outward appearance." The effect is pre­
figured in the cause. "Substances themselves persist, 
e.g. milk through its existence as sour milk, etc.
They take the name of effect and we cannot think of effect 
as different from cause even if we tried for a hundred 
years. As it is the original cause which, up to the 
last effect, appears in the form of this oto that effect 
like an actor in all possible parts, it is thereby 
logically proved that the effecf exists before its 
manifestation and is identical with the cause."
Here Shankra gives an illustrative example:
"So lomg as a cloth is rolled up, we cannot see whether 
it is a cloth or something els$ if it be seen that it is 
a cloth, its real length and breadth are still unknown; 
if, however, it be unrolled, we perceive what it is, and 
how long pr broad it is; as the rolled up and unrolled 
cloth are identical, so are cause and effect."
be father of the other. notochanged by a
From/
From the above it would be clear that he bakes into 
consideration only the material cause. Causes and 
effect for him is simply the transformation of things, 
in which a thing takes up a different form. He does not 
take up the question where one thing produces a change in 
another thing or transforms power or motion from one thing 
to another. We may say that he neglects the view that a 
cause is complex - it consists of a number of conditions 
each of which is only a part of the cause. Moreover, 
he says nothing as to how we obtain the idea of causality.
In one respect he comes very near some of the modern 
thinkers, who consider that in a temporarily continuous 
series we cannot say when the cause ceases and thw effect 
begins. For if the empty time elapses between the two, 
causation is an unmeaning miracle. Since no time 
elapses and the full presence of causal conditions is 
simultaneously the effect, the temporal distinction 
between cause and effect is arbitrary.
'• 5^
B M H M A N A S  THE COURSE OF THE WORLD.
Stemkara writes, ’’The effect is this manifold world, 
consisting of ether and so on, the cause is the highest 
Brahman. Of the effect it is understood that in reality
it is non different from the cause i.e. has no existence
, * *
apart from the cause. How so? On account of the 
Scriptural word origin and others. The word origin is 
used in connection with a similie in a passage undertaking 
to show how through the knowledge of one thing everything
is known viz. Chand: Up; VI, 1.4!! a q q
: > Sotfa one I by one
clod of clay all that is made of clay is known, the 
modification being a name merely which has its origin in 
speech, while the truth is that it is a claymerely, thus” 
ek. The meaning of this passage is that if there is known
yf
a lump of clay, which really and truly is nothing but clay, 
there are known thereby likewise all things made of clay such
as jars, dishes, pails so on, all of which agree in laving
clay for their true nature. For these modifications and 
effects are names only, while in reality there existo no such 
thing as a modification. In so far as they are names they 
are untrue — -- We understand that the entire body of effects 
his no existence «.part from Brahman. Later on again the text, 
after having declared that fire, water, andeartn are the effect 
of Brahman, maintai ns that the effect of these three elements
A.*?
hs^e no existence apart from them. Other sacred texts also
| a
whose purpose is to intimate the unity of the Self are to be
^V5-t A
quoted here in accordance with t3ga o tii&rj of the Sutra. On 
any other assumption it would not be possible to maintain that 
by the Knowledge of one thing everything becomes known. We
must, therefore, adopt the following view:-
J  -  • - £
"In the same way as these parts of ethermal space which are
limited by jars and water pots are not really different from the
A»
universal ethereal space , and as the whileo of a mirage is not
really/
really different from the surfa.ce of the desert-for the 
nature of that water is that it is seen in one moment andB 
haB vanished in the next and moreover, it is not to be 
perceived by its own nature- So this manifold world with I 
its objects of enjoyment, enjoyers, etc., has no existencM
apart from Brahman.......  The entire complex of
phenomenal existence is answered as true as long,,as the 
knowledge of Brahman has not arisen; just as the phantnJ 
of a dream are considered to be true until the sleeper 
awakes. For as long as a person has not reached the 
true knowledge of the unity of the Self, so long it does I 
not enter his mind that the world of effects with its 
means and objects of right knowledge and its results of 
actions is untrue; he, rather in consequence of this 
ignorance, looks on mere effects as forming part of and
belonging to his self, forgetful of Brahman being in
reality the self of all. Hence as long as true knowledge
does not present itself, there is no reason why the ordinl
course of Secular and religious activity should not hold I 
on undisturbed. The case is analogous to that of a 
dreaming man, who in his dreams sees manifold things and I 
up to the moment of waking is convinced that his ideas 
are produced by real perception without suspecting the
IfH*.
perception to be merely an apparenti4«. "
With this reservation, the problem of the causality 
of Brahman will be considered.
(heflnition) - "The cause from which (proceeds) the origiil
or subsistence, and dissolution of this world which is
JL I
extended in names and forms, which includes many agents I
and enjoyers, which contains the fruits of works specially
/determined
determined according to space time and cause, or world 
which is formed after an arrangement inconceivable even 
for the spirit, this omniscient, omnipotent cause is the 
Brahman." “Brahman is the omniscient, omnipotent cause 
of the origin, persistence and passing away of the world.“ 
Here by Brahman Shankra does not mean Brahman the 
Absolute, but Brahman, associated with Maya, also called 
Ishura. So Brahman is the material cause of the world 
and the whole universe springs from Ishura. The Akasha, 
or ether comes first. It is an all penetrating space 
consisting of very subtle matter. Modern atomists also 
believe that the vibration of atoms takes place in an 
ethereal space. Professor Radha Krishna is of opinion 
that Shankra believed in Cosmic Vibratory motion. If it 
is true, it brings him very near the modern theories 
of energy, which form the basis of important developments 
in the modern Mechanical Science. Coming, again to our 
point, Air comes out from ether and from this, fire, and 
from fire, water. These five elements are called 
subtle elements and are distinguished by certain qualities. 
Sound belongs to Akasha, Air has the quality of energy;
fire, heat and light; water,taste; and earth smell.
£. S
Shankra does not tell us how he finds out the^ re qualities 
in the elements named above. Here he differs from modern 
scientists. Water is now considered tasteless and as 
far as energy is concerned it belongs to everything >.* 
material. Moreover, he makes no mention of other qualities 
like colour, as a matter of fact the question whether 
the qualities belong to the objects or not has been fully 
dealt with by t&e Western philosophers while in the 
Vedanta philosophy it has not been considered of
any consequence. It is also held by Shankra that each
successive element is not produced by the one preceding it
but by Ishura himself who takes up the form of that element.
iUid so at the time of dissolution when the whole world returns
to Ishura, a reverse process is carried on. In their
gross form, these elements not oniy exhibit the qualities
belonging to them but also the qualities of the elements i>re-
ceding them. For example the earth shows Sound, energy,
heat, light, taste and smell. The relation of the
properties to the elements is one of seed to plant. The
Sound-essence/ gives rise to Akasa, which in its turn,
produces the outer form of Sound. "So we see that the
whole universe is the product of Sound." This would seem
strange to the modern world. They would consider the
whole material world to spring from energy and they consider
sound also as a manifestation of energy. But Shankra
derives energy from Sound. Most probably by sound he
means expression of Ishura's will, the speech, the word
0>' A***.'
or in gross forms "Logos as Oratio." In this connection 
Ishura1s word is the beginning of the whole universe.
Compare the above with the doctrine of Creation in Islam,
G-od said, "Be and it became." So it is the manifestation 
of Ishura1s will to create. The following passage from
Chandogya Upauishad may be quoted in support of the above;-
"Now it is the Ether from which all these beings arise, and 
into which they return, the Ether is older than them all, 
the Ether is the highest goal. This most excellent of 
all is the lidgitha (Song), it is the endless. So this 
Song is Ishura1s song of creation
So we find that Shankra has made an addition of one 
element to the four elements of the early western
/Fhysisists
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Physiflists. Moreover he considers matter as animate, alive, 
though he admits a continuous gradation of life and 
materiality between mind (Subtle matter) and matter. He writes 
"A3 in the series of beings which descends from man to blade 
of grass, a successive diminution of knowledge, power and 
so on is observed-although they have the common attribute 
of being'animated so in the ascending series, extending from 
man up to Hlran gerbba, a gradually increasing manifestation 
of knowledge, powers takes place," Plants are places of 
enjoyment and possess living Souls, which have entered into 
them in consequence of impure deeds." "In material object 
consciousness does not die but lapses"
He may be compared with the Hellenic Hylozoists, who 
believed that every particle of the substance of things had 
the germ of life in it. Why does Shankra hold this opinion? 
Because Ishura is the material cause of the world and 
Ishura is "Consciousness" linked with "Maya", These two 
factors constitute the whole material world and they are 
inseparable. So they must be present in an inorganic 
object as well, though in a different degree and the result 
is clear. The trees in Inaia are considered sacred, 
because they are the abodg. of the living Souls. When a tree 
is cut, the Soul departs to find its place in some other 
object according to its previous deeds.
An objection is raised. Why sould not prakrafi (atoms) 
be considered the cause of the world? To this Shankra 
replies, "PrakralX is unconscious and so it cannot be the 
cause of this conscious world. The regularity with which 
the things move lead us to infer a conscious director. In 
the world no non-intelligent object without being guided by 
an intelligence brings forth from itself the products which
/serve
serve to further the given aims of man,for example, houses 
palaoees, beds, seats, pleasure^ardens and the like are 
contrived in life by intelligent artists, in due time for the 
purpose of obtaining pleasure and averting pain. It is 
exactly the same with this whole world. For when one sees 
how, for example, the earth serves the end of the enjoyment 
of the fruit of the manifold works, and how, again, the 
body within and without by possessing a given arrangement 
of parts, suitable to the different species and determined 
in detail that it may form the place of enjoyment of the 
fruit of manifold works. . . how should this arrangement 
proceed from the non-intelligent Pradhna?. • . clay, also 
for example, is formed as experience teaches, to different 
shapes only so long as it is guided by another intelligent 
powerl* In the above example Ishwra is taken as an efficient 
cause of the world. How the question arises how can 
Ishwra be a material cause as well as an efficient cause, 
because the material cause generally does not possess 
knowledge. To this Shankra replies, "It is not necessary 
that it should be here the same as in experience; for this 
subject is known by revelation, not by inference".
Another objection-If Ishwra is the material cause of 
the world then it must be of the same material as the world. 
Shankara*s answer: unconscious objects frequently spring
from conscious objects, such as hair and nail from man; and 
vice versa as the dung beetle comes from dung, moreover the 
world and Ishwra are not totally different.
Another objection-At the time of dissolution when 
the world returns to Ishwra, will not Ishwra be defiled by
the impurities of the world.
Shankara replies, "When the effects return to their
cause, they lose their specific qualities and merge in their
cause as when gold^L ornament returns to gold". Then to
another objective as to why the world should go out again
when/
when it has lost its specific quality in its absorption 
in Ishwra, Shankara replies, "As the soul in deep sleep 
and meditation returns into its original unity, but on 
waking from these, starts, and returns to its individual 
existence so long as it is not free from Avidya, so also 
it is with the return into Ishwra".
Shankra here contradicts himself. ^t first he 
says that the effect loses its specific qualities when it 
merges into its cause. According to this the individual 
soul must lose AVidya, its specific quality, its impurity, 
before coming into Ishwra. But in the answer to the 
next question he points out that the Individual Soul goes 
out again because it still retains Avidya.
But what is the motive for creation? Or Ishura 
proceeded to create at random. Shankra does not ascribe 
any motive for creation to Ishura. He created this 
world without any external motive. Just as a prince, who 
has got all that he requires, may undertake something 
just for the sake of fun, Similary Ishura created this 
world as "Lila" (Sport) Though„in the case of a man a 
slight motive may be taken for granted for sport or fun, yet 
for G-od we need assume nothing of the sort, for the Scripture 
does not permit us to attribute any desire or motive to Him.
To the question whether Ishura^n requires any
instrument for creation**. Shankara replies that "creation
takes place by the specific quality of the substance in
much the same way that the change of milk into curd or
water into ice takes place without exterior instruments .
Gcertainly warmth assists in turning milk sour, still the 
milk follows nothing but the laws of change inherent in 
Itself. Were the power to become sour not already in the 
milk, the warmth could not help it to change. It is true
/That
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that milk and curd are unintelligent substances and we see 
that beings with intelligence like potters etc., call in the 
aid of instruments." But Shankra quotes the examples of 
Rish$s and Saints, that create many bodies without any 
external instruments. Or in other words the Saints work 
miracles. So Brahman does not, in creating, use any outward 
means to assist himself.
y
S« Ishura transforms himselfiinto manifold world by 
his great powers. It is his nature to create; or change 
himself in names and forms. There is no motive behind it, 
just as it is the nature of man to breathe in and out. It 
is spontaneous activity that finds expression in creation. 
Shankra considers this world as eternal in which there are 
periods of creation and dissolution. This world is 
beginningless and endless, and only goes in and comes out 
of Ishura at different periods. "The past and future world 
period are measureless." The combination of these cycles of 
creation and dissolution is due to the consequences of man’s 
deeds. As the consequences of his deeds are not exhausted 
he is to be recreated to suffer the penalty or reward .
This question will be taken up again.
So according to Shankra, Ishura transforms himself 
into the Physical object Ishura that is cobscious energy 
gives rise to this world of manifoldness. But by this 
theory the so called^animate object (according to Shankra 
all object have life) must have some germ of consciousness 
in them, a.nd this is not denied by some of the modern Indian 
Writers who maintain that there is a series of gradation 
from the highest to the lowest, from Ishura to the inanimate 
objects, the former being perfect consciousness, while in the 
latter consciousness is not absent, but cannot exercise 
it^self. But it is difficult to say how we can assume
/The
the presence of consciousness in manainafo objects if we 
do not see the effect of it in anyway. As an alternative 
to the above we shall have to say that Ishura becomes 
partly unconscious in changing himself into the universe. 
as the physical objects consis/of matter, dead or alive, 
it is not possible to explain how Ishura, who is not material, 
changes himself into the material world. If Ishura be 
taken as material, he cannot be infinite but must be 
classed as finite, because no sum-total of finite objects 
can reach infinity. Take the series: 1. + 1, + 1  to
If it be said that according to the views of the 
modern Scientists, matter is only another form of energy 
aad so Ishura who is energy constitutes this universe, 
still it does not solve the problem. Modern Science 
considers an atom as composed of many ujjiits called ions 
or electrons. They revolve about one another and about 
a common centre andthus hold each other in equilibrium. 
Though they are comparatively stable, yet this stability 
is modified by eternal influences and the atoms get partly 
or wholly disintegrated. Hence it is considered that 
matter is not indestructible. But I hold a different 
view on this point. To make myself clear I shall quote
'•The Cathode rays therefore appears to consist of 
negatively charged particles much lighter than the atoms 
of any element, They can be obtained from different kinds 
of matter, and must therefore be constit^Snts of the
it is natural to suppose atoms are built up out of them 
and positive electricity." So aijfclectron is not energy
Infinity. The total is always finite.
a ^a 4a
a passage on jfilectrons from
ordinary matter Since matter contains these electrons
but/
f o
but a particle of matter carrying a negative electrical 
charge. Force or energy never acts without any material 
medium. We must not confuse the material vehicle with 
force, energy or electricity. The modern researches 
have only proved that an atom which was considered in- 
divisable can be divided into smaller particles called
ions. These ions may show j but they never
disappear. The future may probably prove the electrons 
consisting of still smalley^r particles. In short 
Shankara's theory that conscious energy can be changed 
into material particles still remains unproved. Material 
particles can carry energy but are themselves different 
in nature from energy.
Again Shankara's argument that unconscious objects 
spring from objects that are conscious such as hair from 
body does not carry much weight.
In the system of Shankra there is no place for 
teleology or purpose. The world is merely a product 
„f ... . *0!,  .. 
less against the workings of Kama. He is indifferent 
to the moral advancement of the human beings. He 
works like a machine. He awards punishment just as the 
blind forces of nature inflict punishments on the animate 
objects, who in anyway violate the laws of nature.
’What a great difference between Christianity and Vedantism.
• V  ^ ' '
INDIVIDUAL SOUL f O  S  !
cr
Ajtfman linkod with Hay a or Erahma in contact with the
internal organ is the individual soul. The individual
souls are different from one another, and are considered
as parts of Ishwra. The difference between the
individual soul and Ishwra is this:- The individual soul
is subject to avidya, while Ishwra is not subject to
avidya and knows his true nature, but is still limited
by Upadhis or Maya. The Upadhis of Ishwra are perfect,
and those of the individual soul are imperfect. But as
individual souls are parts of Ishwra as sparks are parts
of fire., Ishwra cannot be the sum total of individual
soul, for in that case Ishwra will not be free from
avidya. So it follows that Ishwra is individual souls
plus something. But it seems that Shankra when speaking
of Ishwra means only the part unaffected by ignorance,
and not the other part. Here Shankra considers Maya as
something different from ignorance. As to the nature of
Maya in this sense he says nothing except that it is
false. The individual soul as identified with the
material body is called "Jiva". The individual soul is
%
regarded as immortal thatyit survives after death, which 
is merely a separation of body and soul. Against the 
materialists who do not believe in the immortality of 
soul, Shankra advances the following arguments:-
(1) Soul persists beyond the body because its existence 
does not depend upon the existence of the body. There 
are certain qualities that do not persist, even though 
the body does(i. e.after death)so they do not belong to 
the body. Moreover, the qualities of the body like shape 
etc. are perceptible while the qualities of the Self are 
not.
(2) We can prove the existence of the qualities of the
self from the existence of the body in a. living state,
but the reverse cannot be proved; for "there is always the
(possibility)
possibility that whenever the body perishes the qualities 
of the Self persist by entering another body".
(3) The origin of consciousness can not be derived from 
the elements. If the opponent says:-
"Consciousness is the perception of the elements and 
the products. Consciousness )*as the latter as its 
object and consequently cannot be a quality of them.
The fire cannot burn itself; if consciousness is a 
quality of the elements and their products, the 
elements and their products cannot be objects of 
consciousness. If the existence of tve elements and 
their products is concluded from the fact that they are 
perceived, so the conclusion must also be drawn that 
this perception is different from them and the proper 
nature of perception is soul".
The soul is an externally intellectual being, because 
it is the Highest Brahman disguised by the Upadhis. In an 
objection that if soul is eternally intellectual how is 
it that it is not so in the case of sleepers, fainting 
.persons etc.
Shankra replies that the soul does not cease to exist 
as such in the above cases. The soul does not perceive, 
not because perception is wanting , but because the 
gateways of perception a.re closed.
Another objection:- If individual soul is a part of 
Ishwra and. etc., does it not follow that Cod also suffers 
when the individual soul suffers, God will be more 
miserable than any of us, and to seek a convection witv 
God would bo to attain a state in which wo would be more 
miserable than we are now. To this objection Shankra 
replies that pleasure and pain belong to Upadhis and not 
to the individual soul. When we hear of the death of at 
friend wo are sorry because we think he belongs to us; 
we fool pleasure and pain because we think that tve body
(belongs)
belongs to us. This is ignorance, avidya, God is free 
from avidya. To quote tho words of Shan&ra
"Ishwra does not feel the pain of tho Sauc;**? state as 
the individual soul does. The individual soul , while 
engrossed by avidya, identifies itself as it were with 
tho "body and ot^er limiting adjuncts, and imagines 
itself to be afflicted by t^o experience of pain wMch 
is thus due to avidya, and which really belongs to 
Upadhis. Ishwra on the other hand, neither wrongly 
identifies himself with the Upadhis, nor, therefore, 
Imagines himself to bo afflicted by pain, besides tve 
pain experienced by the individual soul is not real, 
but due to avidya, and the consequent non-descriminaticn 
betw.eon itself and Upadhis which is itself due to 
avidya. For these reasons there is no ground to suppcs. 
that Brahma as Ishwra is affected by tho pa.ir. to wh.ich
tho individual sou}, is liable.............  Two things
' being admitted, namely that tho experience of pain is 
cue to misconception and that right knowledge prevents 
this misconception even while wo are in tho 
(this world) state, is it necessary to point out tvat 
Atma, , when it is conscious of nothing else except 
itself with its nature of pure external intelligence, 
must bo free from all pain, and that therefore perfect 
knowledge is not useless''.
Again he writes
"Pain is consequently a delusion which arises from 
our not distinguishing the self from the limitations,
such as body, senses etc.........  Pain depends only on
a mistaken idea".
But how is pain caused? A Physiologist would say tv t
’
in tho slan there are special nerve endings, \ itv 
appropriate paths in the spinal cord, whose service is to
(transmit)
Lb
transmit painful sensations, which are referred to and 
appreciated in consciousness at the site of actual injury.
Is there any way of stopping the entry of painful 
sensations inter consciousness. To this an ordinary man 
would say that much depends upon the power of khinu-ltts 
and the ideas already occupying the consciousness.
Shankra says that it can he stopped by right knowledge .^
take as real the pain wjpi^h one feels? Ey no 
means, f&ss^the feeling of pajm like the entire body, 
is Eased on illtttei^n.. .y:....;. For like the body, 
all feeling of pain i'ie^sutside the spirit; wherefore 
also it ceases >n deep sleep, wh£b«<t^ activity of 
spirit is jadt interrupted.”
^3$ knowing that the body does not belong to the self; 1 
by believing that pain is illusory/ How powerful the
««It t ■?
slumbers may be, it will .cause no.pain to the man who 
considers that he is one with Brahma, who is not subject 
to avidya. Such a man would be called Jpwan Mukt**, or 
one who has attained liberation in life. But the diffi- 
culty is that JOwan Muktea?-© are of two kinds.(1) A class 
indifferent to all concerns of life, and hidden in the 
mood of thought of Atman. (2)A class actuated by a 
universal sympathy. They are busy in helping others. In 
the case of the first it may be said that there is nothing 
else in their consciousness but a thought of Atman,and thsL 
they are not subject to external stimuli, though this state 
cannot last long with the living beings. As for the 
second, if they are sensitive to external influlences, it 
is difficult to see how they can be free from the 
feeling of pleasure and pain. If the soul is nothing but 
Atman, how is it that the works of various people do not 
intermingle? To this two replies are given
(1) The soul that is one with Atman is not the acting or 
enjoying soul, because it is conditioned by Upadhis. As
(the)
t^o Upadhis arc not all pervading, the individual soul is 
not so either. Therefore there is no confusion of works 
etc.
(2) The individual souls are only phantoms of the highest 
soul, Just as there are various images of the moon in the 
water, and when one image quivers the others do not . So 
tho deeds and fruits of one soul do not concern the others 
Moreover, these phantoms and their deeds all depend upon 
ignorance.
Y/hat is tho connection of the soul with Buddihfe
; >
(Intellects? The Atman ’becomes an individual soul by
~£Ll
uniting itself with the Upadhis of Buddl>». This 
connection lasts as long as the state of Saitsara lasts, 
which can be removed by perfect knowledge.
Under this connection tho A^raan is called individual soul, 
but from tho point of view of the highest reality, the 
individual soul (does not exist at all. But death does 
not terminate the connection of the soul with tho Budd:kr&. 
Death only moans separation from the body. Therefore the 
connection persists till the awakening of the consciousness 
of unity with Brahman. Moreover, a link is considered 
necessary between the soul and the organs of sense. If 
there wore no link between the soul and the senses, there 
would be either a continuous perception or no perception 
at all, for the soul is unchangeable, and as for senses, 
why should they be one time active and then inactive?. 
Therefore, a connecting link is necessary on whose 
attention or inattention depend a perception or non­
perception. This connecting link is mind or manas. As to 
the necessity of this connecting link, we Vave given our 
views in the chapter on Perception.
Shankra refutes the arguments of Jainas that the soul
u
is as large as the body, in that case ifc could not 
migrate into another body. Is the soul infinitely large?
I" . JtfJ ’.s' J %■ £"A,i rUl 1*? y * ’ f 5 ' a _
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No, because in case of transmigration motion for an 
infinitely large soul is impossible. In Scriptures where 
soul is described large, omnipresent, infinite, it refers 
only to the highest, not the individual soul. Then it must 
be xpinute. If this is the case, how can it perceive 
throughout the body. Shankra repliesthat the soul, whose 
seat is in the heart, is in contact with the sense of 
touch, and thereby perceives throughout the body. Later 
on he refutes this argument, and says that the sense of 
touch is not sufficient to explain the minuteness of the 
soul. As a matter of fact, Shankra is not consistent here 
£bout this Deussen writes
"Our author’s inconsistency in first disputing the 
possibility of a sense of feeling throughout the body 
for the minute soul, and then himself admitting the 
minute size of the soul in the state of Sansara is
self-evident........  The fact is, arguments and counter
arguments are thrown together in such confusion that
tC
the assumption of a fusion of different tejnts is in the 
highest degree probable.”
The Scriptures pre-suppose that the soul is an agent, 
otherwise the commands and prohibitions will have no meaniig 
but activity is not a part of its real nature, however, but 
one which is founded on ignorance.
"Is the activity of the soul which from the standpoint 
of ignorance is conditioned by the Upadhis dependent 
upon God or not"?
To this Shankra replies
God causes the soul to act, but in so doing he has 
regard to the efforts made by it towards good or evil. 
The good and evil done by the soul is unequal: having 
regard to this, God divides the corresponding fruit 
unequally, for He, like the rain, is only the efficient 
cause. But can this regard to the efforts made by the
III
soul exist together with the dependence of all activity 
on God? Certainly'. For though the activity depends 
upon God, it is only the soul that acts, and as He, 
now causing it to act., pays regard to forma’ acts, so 
too, He in causing it to act formerly, had regard to 
still earlier effects; for Samsara, is without 
beginning". ( fr r & w t y  g
A brief description of some of the important items
will suffice here. The sy^'ptoae of conscious and
' rti
unconscious life are those which the soul puts oejt during
life, and withdraws with itself at death. These consist 
of five senses, five organs of action, Manas, and the 
Hukhye Prane with its five branches. They accompany the 
soul even if it enters a plant, but in that case, Manas 
and indrya are unable to unfold themselves. What is the 
connection between the organs of action that accompany 
the soul, and the material parts that bear their names?
To this Shankra replies
"The functions(Vritlfc-) go with t^e soul, not the organs. 
When a man dies, the will to hear, see etc. persists 
with the soul. The relation between the two is that 
of a seed and developed plant.. Similarly, subtle 
body which accompanies the soul is the seed of the 
gross body".
TRANSMIGRATION OP SOUL 
Shankra is often confusing in this part of his work, 
but we will try to describe briefly the way in which the 
departing soul leaves the body, and what happens to it 
afterwards. In commenting on; the following text^Chand
(ap)
Ud?:-
"lii/hen now, oh dear one, man departs hence, speech 
enters into Manas, Manas into Pranas^ Prane into heat, 
heat into the highest Godhead".
Shankra holds that only the functional activity of 
the Manas etc. perishes with the death. The organs of 
conscious and unconscious life enter into the soul. As 
the soul has to get out of t^o body, it needs some sort 
of material vehicle , for without any such material basis 
no living thing can move or stand. This basis is t^e 
sublte. body"the five parts of the oloments(earth, water ete 
which form the seed of the body" Clothed with these 
Upadhis the soul loaves the body. hhere does it go after 
death? To this Shankra replies that it all depends upon 
the works done by a man in his previous births. Those 
who have done good, works,their soul goes to the moon to 
enjoy tho fruit of their pious deeds, by being tho 
Companion of God. who inhabit the lunar sphere. Put 
those who have done evil deeds are taken to a place of 
punishment whore they undergo different kinds of torture 
at the hands of lama. Shankra also mentions a third place 
but it is not clear for whom this place is meant. However, 
from the above it is evident that in addition to t'O 
elemental substratum, tho soul, is also accompanied by a 
moral substratum. The soul stays in the above plrces as 
long as it has to suffer to enjoy tho fruit of its deeds. 
But in the retribution of works in these places, a 
residue is still left for which the soul cones down to 
the earth to take another body. It is not clear why tuis 
residue is left. Probably Shankra thinks that t^ .ore are 
two kinds of works, one of whic1^ requires retribution in 
the upper regions, and the other in this world, but vo 
does not state what are the distinguishing marks of these 
works. But, however, the soul in its descent first passes 
into Akasha, then through the air, smoke, cloud and rain.
*1 -- - > ''"li S
t it>
It comes into tho plants, and passes as food into tho 
male bpdy as sood and then into a womb to emerge finally 
into a now embodiment. while tho soul passes through all 
those mediums, it does not share in their nature, but is 
entertained by then just like a guest. In its stay in 
the plant, the soul must be distinguished from the plant 
soul which has taken up the body of t’-w plant, and as 
a retribution of its past deeds, bo when a plant is 
cut, the plant and soul leavesthe plant to take up another 
body(of a man, aaimal or plant according to its deeds), 
but the guest-soul remains with the plant, till it is 
eated by the living being, through whoa it has to come 
to the world. (Compare with it the modem Physiological 
qnd evolutionary wiew of life, i.e. - the theory of 
living germs. The deeds done in one bltth exert their 
influence not only in the next birth, but sometimes in 
nany successive births. The soul, as well as the organi-
• i. * ' .1
sat ion with which it is clothed is unchanging, the 
covering persists till the soul attains liberation.
In bharikra*s philosophy Mukti is only to become one
Ym' derttwyef %  the leek^ r nlwcellHsy * Oxoar, ]
with Brahman. As mentioned before, it does not mean that 
the soul was not identical with Brahman. It even is, 
but its wrongly bolelved, in the dsallty of soul and non­
soul and liberation means the removal of this false 
belief and the attainment of right knowledge. Shankra 
holds that liberation is not attained by good deeds, or 
by moral improvement, but solely by means of ri^it 
knowledge. This is an important point in his philosophy. 
One may question whether the attainment of right 
knowledge is not in itself an activity of mind. Shankra 
replies in the negative. He holds that an action depend) 
upon the will of the Agent or doer, but knowledge depnds 
upon the quality of the object known.
"Whon it is said man is a fire, this is an undertakir^
(to)
to conceive of man or woman as a fire and its realisa­
tion depends upon the ohoioe of the conceiver. On the 
contrary,the knowledge of actual fire as such depends : 
not upon any invitation or action of man, hut only 
upon the object which lies before the eyes, and thus it 
is,knowledge and-not action. *
/>•
But attainment of knowledge means an activity •£ the part 
f)t the self and hence may be classed as a good deed or a 
bad deed and consequently must lead to Some kind of reward 
or punishment. Bven with right knowledge, one has to 
suffer the consequences of his actions. But Shankra 
maintains that knowledge does not arise by any effort 
whatsoever of our will. It arises when it does arise, 
how, why, whereby it arises, remains an unsolerable 
problem".
. tfere we come to the doctrine of grace of God. Professor 
Gerttar writes:-
"The Shankra school does not accept the theory of grace 
Vedankism cannot lend its support to such a doctrine, 
for it sees clearly that the bondage is self-creation, 
to be destroyed by the seeker himself by a clear, 
penetrating and discriminating consciousness"
It is difficult to reconoile this passage with what has 
been described above. If the bondage is to be destroyed by 
the seeker himself * who in the state of avidya is the 
'individual soul, it means that it can only be destroyed by 
the seekers efforts. But Shankra holds that knowledge 
does not arise by any effort whatsoever of our will. 
Moreover, the following passage from Shankra gives a 
different view:-
"Por the individual soul^ whioh is impotent, in the 
condition of ignorance, to distinguish from the soul) 
the aggregate of the organs of activity( appear!ne as 
the body)and is blind through the darkness of ignorance 
from the highest soul, the overseer of the work, the
( onl
onlooker dwelling in all being, the Lord who is the 
cause of spirit, from him, by his pamiesion comes the 
Sansara, consisting in the state of doing and enjoying 
(suffering)and through His grace is caused knowledge 
and through this, liberation". "Granted that the sdul 
and God are related as the part and the whole, yet it 
is evident that the soul and God are of different 
character. How stands it then, with the identity of 
God and the soul? Does it exist or does it not? In 
truth it exists, but it is hidden, yet when a creature 
thinks on and strives toward the highest God, just as 
the faculty of sight in one who haa become blind after 
the darkness, shaken off by the power of remedies, in 
him whom grace of God perfects it, does it become 
manifest, but not naturally in any being whatsoever.
Y/hy? Because through him, through God as cause, the 
binding and loosing of the soul are accomplished, 
binding when it does not recognise the essence of God, 
and loosing when it does".
So it is clear that man may think on and strive towards 
the highest God, but it is only through the grace of God 
that he may be able to see the light of true knowledge.
By God is here meant Ishwra who is free from avidya. 
Individual souls are part of Ishwra. It is the whole that 
brings about the liberation of some of its parts. But in this 
case it is difficult to say how Ishwra ag* a whole can be 
said to be completely free from avidya, when some of its 
parts are still in the grip of ignorance. So Shankra is of 
opinion that the performance of works does not bring about 
the release of the self from the bondage of ignorance. Worls 
may be either good or bad, and in each case they demand 
their retribution in the next birth.
"It is impossible to avoid all works throughout an 
entire existence so> long as the natural disposition
w/ ' i
of the soul traction and enjoyment persists, for 
actions continually come forth afresh from this inborn
nature, through causes which are always potentially
'
inherent in the soul, just .as much as its natural 
disposition.to action”
However, Shankra holds that:-
1
"As it cannot be shown that there is any connection
between Mukti and action, it is impossible that Mulcti
should in any way depend upon action" - Dessai. So we
must avoidall kinds of works in order to obtain real
liberation which is a state of bodilessness. But such a
state of inactivity is impossible. So fcgiankra suggests
that works should be performed without any desire for
fruit. Works should be done for the sake of duty. There
is some slight resemblance here between Whankra and Kant.
Por Kant the only thing unqualified^good in this world is
a goodwill - the will to follow the moral law regardless
of profit or loss to ourselves. He would say, never mind
your happiness; do your duty.
"Morality is not properly the doctrine how we make
ourselves happy, but how we make ourselves worthy of
5*%*.
happiness" Practical Rearpt p.227.
But this view does not help Shankra much. A man may 
renounce all claim for reward, but the bad deeds must be 
atoned for in the next birth. So he* givef up a desire for 
fruit does not relieve us of the cycle of births.
However, Shankra maintains that the performance of such 
works is not necessary for the attainment of liberation.
But it is worth while to notice that though it is 
optional to a man whether to become a Grihastha or not, 
yet if fce chooses to become a Grihastha without entertainirg 
the desire for their fruit, still he cannot attain Mukti 
until he gives up the Oausas statetend all that that state 
involves*, and resort to ascetiwm" Desai. Again he writes: 
"Mukti is attained by naeans of the study, consisting
(OF)
of reading, understanding and reflection, of the VedantiL
rules of morality is necessary preliminary for the study 
of Vedanta and so cannot be given up. But this life must 
be lead without any desire for fruit. (Is not a desire for 
liberation for which the study of Vedanttf is undertaken a 
desire for fruit?) Muckti can also be attained in one’s 
life. How is it possible when Muckti implies bodilessness. 
To this Shankra replies
"If you maintain that bodilessness is only attained 
after the dissolution of the body, not during life, 
then we do not admit this, because being clothed with 
the body depends(only( upon false cognition".
Again Shankra writes
"When once Brahman is known, sin committed is
I
annihilated and further sins cannot cleave to such a
one...... Annihilation and non-cleaving apply equally
to good works and evil"
As Shankra believes in Jiwan Mukti(, life)
such a person according to the above must have no body, 
because if he has a body he is not liberated. Tbat is why 
Shankra believes that bodilessness does not only take 
place after death, but even in this life, because this 
belief depends upon false cognition. Then how can we 
account for the body that we actually see before us.This 
point is difficult for Shankra to explain, and so he 
changes his position. He writes:-
"Knowledge does not destroy those works whose seed has 
already germinated, that is, those from which the 
present life , serving as basis for dawning knowledge, 
has been fashioned"
So the body exists for the retribution of those works.
He gives two reasdins for this:-
(1) As the vessel which is being formed requires the
philosophy." Desai. Moreover, a life in confirmation the
(pottert s)
potter's wheel to support it, so liberationrequires a 
life as a substratum; and as the potter's wheel continues 
for a time to revolve, even after the vessel has been 
completed, so also life continues after liberation,
I
since it contains no cause to check the impetus already. ...... u, ^
gained.-----
(2) As when a man suffering from eye disease continues to 
see two moons, even after he has attained the conviction 
that there is only one moon there, owing to the force of 
the impression, so too the impression of the sense world 
persists, after a man has attained the knowledge of its 
non-existence".
Now we have to consider the question whether right 
knowledge gives us release and salvation. Bondage is 
due to the soul' s connection with the Upadhas and as 
long as the Upadhis lasts there can,he no release. In 
this world the soul is connected with the body. By 
merely deceiving ourselves that the soul has no 
connection with the body, and that when we take our meals, 
go about our daily work, come home at night and go to 
sleep, we are doing nothing of the kind, and that it is 
all illusion, a mistake, we cannot sever our connection 
with the body. It still persists. Even after death, 
according to Shankra, our connection with Manas and 
Upadhis is not completely broken and when we merge in 
Ishwra this connect ion still remains,, though in a potential 
state and makes us take birth again in the next world 
cycle. So where is the release, for which we have so 
great a longing? It is only a temporary relief, because 
the world will never ccrne to an end. After one cycle, 
another cycle begins. So the so-called release is merely 
a kind of make-believe.
We do not find any trace of the belief in Transmigrate 
of the soul in the Vedas. It is in later writings that 
this theory is explained. Some people are, therefore,
of opinion that the Aryans derived this belief from the 
original inhabitants of India, who believed in the 
survival of the soul after death in the form of some bird.
A similar belief is found in many other countries of the 
world. But this is quite different from the 
transmigration theory. Most probably, the belief in 
transmigration sprang up from the reluctance of man to fa® 
death. No one inthis world likes to- leave those who are 
near and dear to him. Even if the world does not present 
any attractive feature still the man wants to live in the 
hope of future prosperity. But if one is given the idea 
that one is simply changing the farm and can have the 
hope of being near the objects Jjjf his affection, to some 
extent this mitigates the pangs of separation. Upon this 
foundation it was easy to build a superstructure of works, 
for a man likes to take birth again as a man, for his 
good deeds.are necessary, and this acts as a motive for 
good actions. As for the idea of release by annihilation, 
it is only of interest to philosophers. Common people 
in their daily lives are quite indifferent to it.
CONCLUSION
What is the sum total of Shankra’s teaching? It can be 
expressed in the word .Deception. Objects of senses deceive 
us. They are not what they appear. They have no existence 
independent of our imagination which in itself is false.
t
We turn away from the material word in repugnance to look 
into our own selves. Here again we meet the same fate.
Our bodies , our-limbs, eyes, ears, nose, hands, and 
feet etc.are not ours. We wrongly consider thorn our 
property. In haste we look upwards to find some consolation 
in the existence of Ishwra. But we find that He is worse 
than we are:. He is himself in the grip of Maya. He knows 
his true nature, but is powerless to free Himself from 
Maya. At least there is one consolation for us. we do not 
know our own nature. "Where ignorance is bliss it is folly
to be wise". We look for Pure Brahman in vain. Pure 
Brahman is non-existent for Ishwra is never free from 
Upadhis, whatever they may be. But in spite of all this, 
Shankra teaches us to believe in Pure Brahman. The? belief 
is &p raise us at least to the rank of Ishwra if not to
1 ^  V »r-t
that of Brahman. And this belief is enough to reserve us 
fjwS^our miseries .Actions do not play any part in our life 
They do not help us to attain liberation. Good deeds are 
useless they do not carry us any further. Even the 
wicked deeds do us no harm because with right knowledge 
our soul is disconnected with the body, though it may 
still inhabit the latter. And when the soul is not connect, 
ed with the body, it cannot he held responsible for the 
actions, because actions belong to the body and not to 
the soul. The liberated man may not be willing to do any 
harm to any other person, but willingly or unwillingly, 
nature asserts itself. To err is human. But he; must rest 
assured he cannot be required to answer for his actions, 
because he holds a belief in non-existence of connection 
between body and soul.
Again, there is no release for a married couple unless 
the partners, leave their homes and take to asceticism. 
Imagine the fate of children and dependents under such a 
system. Either a man should leave hi s. dependents to their 
fate, or wait for release till they grow up and take care 
of themselves. In the latter case, a man must not study 
Vedanta,, for if liberation comes early, he will have to 
bid adieu to his children. What can be the consequences 
of such a syatem on the society.?
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1&UM1Q PHILOSOPHY.
At the time whei^Vedan^ists were engaged in 
metaphysical speculations, a new movement was going 
on in the countries lying to the north west. In 
the sixth century of the Christian era, Arabia, 
which was to play an important part in the civilization 
of the weBt, was herself in utter degeneration. The 
grossest of the evils, which mankind ever experienced, 
idolatry, infantioide, polyandry, in short the germs 
of every disease that can undermine the moral growth 
of a nation were to he found in that country. But 
shortly afterwards Mohammed was horn (570-632) to 
deliver the message of God, which so transformed the 
whole country that instead of jealousy and hatred, the 
people were united in cultivating the good hahits of 
toleration and peaceful living. This made them so 
powerful that they not only freed themselves from the I
nominal sovereignty of Persia hut became themselves 
the masters of that country. In a short time Persia, 
Syria and Egypt all fell into the hands of the Arabs.
But this wave of conquest did not stop here. In the 
year 712, in the reign of Caliph Walid, Mohammed Kairm, 
a young general, appeared on the Coast of Sindh with a 
small army and stormed Daibul, the great medieval port 
of the Indus Valley. After taking the town he marched 
on Mooltan and this expedition laid the whole of this 
valley, which was as large as England, at the foot of 
the conqueror. Here for the first time the new 
civilization of the Arabs came face to face with the 
ancient culture of the Hindus. But as the Province 
was not perfectly subdued, the Caliph did not derive any 
political advantage from this.
/The
€The province was left to take care of itself and 
the Moslem settlers founded independent dynasties and 
ruled the country for more than two hundred years.
But the real conquest of India was to begin from another 
side. From the north west, through the mountain passes, 
Sabuktagin, who ruled Afghanistan, led his army to attack 
the ruler of the Punjab. Shortly after his death his 
son, Mahmud, carried on the work left unfinished by 
Sabuktagin. Between the years 1000 and 1026, Mahmud 
made at least 16 di st^ot campaigns and annexed Punjab 
to the Kingdom of Ghazui. When his descendents were 
expelled from Qhaz^a by the Ghoris they ruled the Punjab 
for a short time, but the latter drove them away from 
this part also. Shahab uddin Ghori overran the Country 
up to Kanauj and left his general Kutb uddin as a 
governor of his India Provinces, of which Delhi was the 
Capital. Kutbjuddin became 3 ^ ^ n<^ependen»a» after the 
death of Shahab uddin and forced. a dynasty known as the 
Slave dynasty which ruled over this part of India for
about 84 years. In 1290 on the death of the last King
*
of this dynasty, ialal uddinxKhalji, an Afghan or ,1 
probably a Thrk ascended the Throne of Delhi. The 
Khalji dynasty, after a reign of 30 years gave way to 
Tughlaks, who in their turn were succeeded by Sayfo^s 
and Lodhi till in 1526 Babays, who being driven from 
his Kingdom in Central Asia had established himBelf in 
Afghanistan, marched with a strong arm^of Turks and 
Afghans and laid the foundation of the ^toghal Empire 
which lasted for nearly three centuries. During all
I this
this time, the Muslims had been gradually increasing the 
extent of their empire, till at the time of the Moghals, 
they were rulers of nearly the whole of India.
Such is the brief history of India under the Muslims.
From the above it will be clear that the moslems in
India were in constant communication with their brethren
in other countries. In fact the Moslem Rulers in India
0
derived their strength from the h^rrds of Turks and Persians
^  /p |A
who emigrate^tgt India search of fortune. Persia was the 
court as well the literary language of all the Indian 
Muslims. They shared the beliefs, manners and customs of 
the Muslims of the other countries. JJven the Moslem rulers 
of India nominally derived their Authority from the Caliph 
of Bagdad. In short as far as culture is concerned,
Moslem India formed a single whole with the other Moslem
/SUM* - •
countries of
As far as Philosophy is concerned there was no distinct 
advance on the thought reached by the early Moslem
cC
Philosophers. But what ha\ been achieved was not allowed
to be lost. A Muslim's education in India was not considered
complete as long as he was not master of the Philosophical
4
works of Muslim pro-Greek Philosophers and Ai^hairas.
Just as in these days a man ignorant of Shakespeare cannot 
lay any claim to the knowledge of English literature,
ilAfL,
similarly a Muslim of that period was deemed fit to move in
the Society of men of letters unless he knew Islamic
Philosophy. There were frequent discussions among the people
a* the subjects discussed by Avicenna and Farabi. As in
Persia, there were two main schools of Philosophy, so in 
/X&kAi&AA**
India there were Parhsans of either Pro-Greek or Anti-Greek 
Philosophers. The noble men of these times encouraged 
Philosophical discussions in their Durbars.
/ They
They encourged the men of learning by means of
handsome rewards, sometimes amounting to thousands of
pounds. Of oourse Philosophy was never separated from
Theology and this has been the case everywhere in the East.
Philosophical thought arose from the needs of theology.
There is a close similarity between the Medieval Muslim
East and Medieval Christendom. But as long as philosophy
is fettered to religion there cannot be muoh real progress.
Of oourse philosophy and religion oan supplement each other.
What is revealed can be verified by reason. However, in
India these theological-philosophical discussions did not
produce any new systems. But they helped to modify the
current views of the Hindu Philosophers. In order to see
how this modification was brought about, we must have some
knowledge of Islamic thought. Instead of giving a
Bummary of Muslim Philosophy I will try to trace briefly the
development of thought, which will make it easy to grasp
the subject matter thoroughly, reserving my comments to
tracing the effect of Islam on Hindu thought in a later
part of the book. To be as brief as possible I will not
discuss the Philosophers of Spain. talamln thought says,
"In regard to his religion the latter (Hindu) is a born
Philosopher and the former (Moslem) is by all reasonable
men understood to be a born fanatic. It is impossible to
give thoughtful attention to the religious system of the
£
Hindus without feeling that the m^ tn who made it in the first 
instance were earnest, great and wise. But the study of the 
religious system of Muhammadens awakens no such sentiment." 
Professor Erdmann is of opinion that a syncretism like that 
of Islam, moreover a reactionary attempt ^
such, as is its view of the world against the
Christian view, contains no seed of development nor 
does the philosophy of those who belong to it." We 
may also quote Professor MacDonald, "The Moslem 
reasoner deals with ideas as if they were blocks of 
wood, solid things in your possession as to which there 
was no question what they were. You could handle them 
as you please and move them this way or that way."
So then writers tell us that what is oalled Moslem 
Philosophy is merely Greek Philosophy in another form.
In this connection it-would be interesting to quote 
Mr. Kingsland, " It is open to question whether either
in Philosophy or religion----- it is possible to
state anything which is fundamentally or substantially 
new. Old or forgotten truths may reappear like jewels 
which have lost their setting and lustre, or which 
have lain in negleot or obscurity owing to the changing 
fashions of men's thoughts and interests. They do 
but require to be reset in appropriate form, to shine
once again in all their pristine and inherent beauty--
It is scarcely possible to find any modern statement 
of root principles which had not been previously 
formulated at some period or other of the world
hiBtory Even pragmatics according to some authorities
(J. A. Steward is not new; it is to be found in 
Plato." If the above statement is true, then Moslem 
Philosophy stands in the same position as any other 
system of Philosophy in the world. But I understand 
that there has been a continuous development of 
thought in the world. The problems are the same, but 
the solutioto differs according to the light shed by the 
knowledge of the contemporary Sciences. As there has 
been a distinct advance in sciences so we think that
been a distinct advance in Philosophy too,
.. _  _ _ cannot he separated from the Sciences.
Both go together. So Islamic Philosophy has kept 
paoe with the Sciences of the time and the solution 
offered corresponds with the knowledge of the Scienoes 
of the age. The difficulty is that the substances 
and summaries of the authors I o b s  much of their charm. 
To form an estimate of the Islamic Philosophy it is 
better to study the complete workB of the authors.
But there is no need to be disappointed by the above 
extreme views. Agail? these we may quote & writer 
in Islamic Cyclopaedia^ Who admits that "Islam had 
a Philosophy of its own among its theologians."
Major Leonard writs, "Is it possible that Europe is
i tmmindful of, and has the ingratitude to ignore, the
splendid services of the Scientists and Philosophers
of Arabia? Are the names of Abn Osman, Alberuni,
Albeithas, Avicenna, the great Physician and Philosoplurr,
Averroes of^Ardova, Ibn Bajja (Avempace) besides a host
of others, but dead letters? ----  Do we owe no tribute
to a great thinker such as Ghazali, who in speaking of
his attempts detach himself from his youthful opinions 
A
says,
"I said to myself, my aim is simply to know the 
truth of things? consequently it is indispensable for
me to ascertain what is knowledge* So it would also 
be worth while to study Moslem Philosophy even if we 
have no other reason exoept that of tracing the influence 
of Greek thought on the Moslem world and how the Greek
Philosophy was transmitted to Europe through the Moslems
O'
and how the Moslems commented on the Qbscure passages 
in Aristotle and Plato. . It is true that some of the 
Moslem Philosophers based their systems of Philosophy 
on Aristotelian Writings but this does not mean that
e
they/
they were mere immitators or stated the old in the
new form and had no original ideas off their own.
The Moslems devoted a long period to studying 
Aristotle and Plato hut in their study their aim was 
not so much blind immitation but to differentiate 
between truth and falsehood. There are men like 
Avicenna, Averroes, Ghazali and others who can be 
reckoned among the Philosophers of merit and to say 
that Islam did not produce any Philosophy at all, 
cannot stand the test of historical research.
Commenting on the defects of the Aristotelian Philosophy 
The Enoyolopaedia of Religion and Ethics *has the 
following:-
"There is a duality of matter and God. There is
no comprehensive view of the whole universe under some
monistio conception. The critical theory of Knowledge 
is interpenetrated by strong realistic tendencies and 
put forward in a lame manner. He gives no origin of 
“forms” God is pure intelligence without any voluntary 
activity. He moves the whole universe as an object of 
love and not as cause efficiense. He takes no notice 
of individuals. But in Moslem Philosophy the great 
notion of contingency brings into unity the total of the 
aotual. It is the light that explains the individual 
problems and allow* them to be examined under the 
widest points of view. In the things of the world being 
and existence are quite different. The two are not 
internally and necessarily connected. Existence must 
thus be imported to things by a self existantBeing and
(4
must be permanently maintained in them. The universe 
is a stream of being which emanating froto an 
inexhaustible source entends to all that is not God.
All/
?' ) \ A
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All the Moslem Philosophers(a special name for 
certain Moslem thinkers) have formulated anew this 
idea with the exception of Averroes". Again it 
would be interesting to study how the School of 
Ashaira especially Ghazali, tried to find out the 
defects in the Aristotelian Philosophy and how they 
advocated their own ideas on the subjeot.
Was Islam opposed to philosophical thought? To
answer this question we have to look to the Quran.
Islam asks its followers to believe in revelation
but it maintains at the same time that what is revealed
though the prophet can be verified by reason. It 
A
lays great stress on the study of nature so aB to come 
to a knowledge of what is beyond nature. The proper 
_study of mankind is not only 1^  man but all things 
animate and Inanimate. * Acquire learning, though 
you have to travel to China," is one of the sayings 
of the prophet. Islam asks the believer not to 
accept anything without rational thinking. According 
to the Quran, the prophets were sent to teach wisdom 
to the people ( philosophy means " love of wisdom").
How can a man learn wisdom if he assumes that all 
knowledge is oommunicated from above and nothing is 
left as an object forsearch or investigation? In 
fact the verse that * there iB great material in the 
Quran for one who thinks* will be meaningless if the 
man iB not to exercise his power of rational thinking. 
Man is asked to believe in the Unseen but how is he 
to know that he is on the right path? The QuJ^ran says, 
" by the aid of reason"* As the result of a careful 
study of the Quran various problems presented them­
selves to the Moslem thinkers* Moreover they had to 
answer the objections of Jews and Christians, who could
not/
not be silenoei by merely relying on the authority 
of revelation. Thus the Moslems were led to Btudy 
oritically the teaching of the Quran and the following 
prohlems^^the forefront:- (1) The nature and attributes 
of God (2) The Freedom of the Will: (3) Relation 
between Faith and Aptions: (4) Reason versus Revelation 
and the doctrine of the 1 Logos'.
As regards the nature of the Ultimate Reality 
oertain passages in the Quran led to various inter­
pretations. The development of thought in this respect 
may be traced as follows:-
(1) God is a person—  a subsisting(Alqayyumjnature 
that is rational and intelligent. But personality is 
not ascribed to God in an analogical and supereminent 
way. He is considered to be oorporeal having hands 
and feet like man. He encompasses the whole universe 
both in his knowledge and person. God created the 
Universe out of nothing and in a way may be said to 
have limited himself. (God appears to be finite but 
has unlimited powers). God is absolutely independent 
self^existent, ^eternal, whereas the world has 
derived its existence from God and is therefore created^ 
temporary^ and conditional. The world will again 
lapse into nothing with the exception of the SouIb that 
have beginning but no end. But the world will be 
created again in a new form.
(2) God is oorporeal asd but his body is not like man.
He pervades the whole universe and is unlimited and
infinite. %
Wy
(3) God is oorporeal and the words used in the Quran
/Hi
are to be interpreted metaphorically. He is all 
powerful, all knowing, eto., but the^e attributes *a are 
distinct from His Essence.(Sifatie), "They made no 
distinction between the attributes of essence and
attributes/
'n
a ^  wv
attributes of action (Shapristai*)
V
(4) God is Pure Being and the world is an emanation
from Him in descending order.
(5) God is the unique Substance, absolute and void
of all phenomena and all multiplicity, but viewed
from the aspect of plurality^ He is the whole 
created Universe. The ifcniverse before it was 
evolved to outward view was identical with the Real;- 
and the Real after this evolution is identical with 
the Universe (Jami)
The problem of the Free Will early attracted the 
attention of the Moslems, and they were naturally 
divided into two opposing groups ; Jabriah believed 
in the predestination while Kadriah upheld the 
doctrine of Free Will. It was just like the struggle 
between (Calvinist and Arminian in the middle ages in 
ristianity- AiRt like th* passage in the Bible. /
"Then shall say also unto them on the left hand,
A
"Depart from me, ye cursed, into everlasting fire, 
prepared for the devil and his angels" Jhere are 
passages in the Quran which led to this controversy 
among the Moslems;-
"Ho accident befalls in the earth or in yourselves, 
/4ut/3or#
but it was in ll4'S 1(5 0 before we created them
(Surat ul Hadid (Vll 22)
"And God’s ordering is in accordance with a determined 
decree"
"Verily, God accomplishes what he ordains - he hath
< x
established for everything fifed decree."
"God guides into the right path whomsoever He ^ il^?”
In fact the Arabs of Pre-Islamic days were fatalists 
and this tendency was oontai-a-ed even after the rise 
of Islam. They believed that each and every thing 
was predestined and preordained. Man had no power
/ to
to choose his own path. In the words of Mohammed 
A1 Berkevi we find an expression of what the people 
thought in those days;-
"It is necessary to confess that good and evil take
place hy the predestination and predetermination of
God; that all that has been and all that will be was
decreed in eternity and written on the "Lajfhmahfue^i"
(preserved tablet); that the faith of the believer,
the piety of the pious and their good actions are
foreseen, willed and predestined, decreed by the writing
on the preserved tablet produced and approved by God;
that the unbelief of the unbeliever, the impiety of the
impious and bad actions come to pass with the
foreknowledge, will, predestination and decree of God
but not with hiB satisfaction or approval.”
This must not be confused with the Christian idea of
Sin, According to Christianity man, sinful through
•/
participation in the original transgression, falls
short of the standard. Man is born in sin corrupt
in his nature and in the actions which must follow
from his nature. Salvation can only be the work of
//
God, man himself can contribute nothing to it. It is 
through the sacrifice of Christ that he is saved, Christ 
took away man's sin. According to the Islamic 
determinists man is not sinful by nature.
"A child is born good by nature" is the saying of the 
prophet. When questioned as to whether this makes 
God the author of the evil the determinists would 
reply, that there is nothing evil in this world .
We look at things from our own point of view. If we 
could look at things sub specie aeternitatis we should 
see that everything is right and good in its place.
Man regards everything evil which is inconvenient to 
him. His point of view is limited. He cannot see 
the events as a part of the whole and that is why he
/falls
falls into the error of pronouncing all those things 
evil that do not in any way help in the furtherance
of his own persuits. To quote Birkevi again,
"Should a man ask why God willeth and produceth evil, 
we oan only reply that He may have wise ends in view 
which we cannot comprehend." But what about moral 
responsibilityi If a man has no power to do good 
or evil, and his actions are simply the conformation 
of God’s eternal decree why should he be punished for 
hiB evil deeds? To this the Jabriahs have made no 
reasonable answer. Soon a revolt-against-the Jabriahs 
began in right earnest. In fact even before the
Jabriahs there were people who believed in the free
*(/ m * * 4 4  p
will fftnao.. Ali, the Son-in-law of the prophet in
X^jC
explaining the ve». of the Quran^y
"God directs him whom He chooses, and leads astray him 
whom He chooses" says,
"This does not mean that He compels men to evil or 
good, that He either gives direction or refuses it 
according to His Caprice, for this would do away with 
all responsibility for human action; it means on the 
contrary that God points out the road to truth and 
lets men choose as they will." - Amir Ali. Imam
Jaj^ar Assadi^ in refuting the doctrine of Jabr
U- 0
(comp^lsin or predestination) says,
"Those who uphold Jabr make out God to be a 
participates! in every sin they commit and a tyrant 
for punishing those sins which they are impelled to 
commit by the compulsion of their being. This is 
infidelity." Similar other passages can be quoted 
from other writers. But this problem was taken up 
in great earnestness by the Luta^-alites (dissenters) 
who are called the Nationalists of Islam. We ought, 
therefore, to give an account of this Sect.
MUTAZALITES.
Abu Huzaifa Wasil bin Ata al Ghazzal was the 
founder of this Sect. He waa born in 699 and died 
in 748. He was the disciple of Imam Hasan Baari, 
but differed from the Imam on the question of a 
religious dogma and founded a new school called 
Mutazalites (cLea-er IgTB). The Mutazalites styled
themselves the "people of monotheism and justice."
Some people call them scholastics of Islam, but it 
is better not to call them by this name, because in 
Moslem theology the dogma to be explained waa only 
the Unity of God. On all other points the religion 
allowed a great latitude of judgment. For several 
centuries his school exerted a great influence upon 
the minds of the Moslems. The later Mutazalites 
were well versed in Greek Philosophy, as by that 
time the translations of Greek books were readily 
accessible to the Muslims. Among the Mutazalites 
themselves there was great difference of opinion on 
certain points, but their main teaching is given 
below; -
They maintained that there are two sources of 
knowledge, viz., experience and Reason. The latter 
only gives the true knowledge, and the knowledge 
gained by experience is subject to interpretation and 
reinterpretation by Reason. Moreover, reason can 
give us knowledge of the supersensible as well. So 
we can have a knowledge of God as well as any other 
entity. This is opposed to Sifaties (and Kanfcians) 
who denied any such authority to Reason. The Sifaties 
also believed that Revelation was the only source by 
which a knowledge of the Almighty could be obtained. 
Reason also provides a criterion for distinguishing 
between the true and the false, and so cognition of 
good and evil is also within the province of reason.
They/
They also held that the only attribute which could be
ascribed to the Ultimate Reality was eternity. They
were strictly opposed to anthropomorphic conceptions.
No finite quality was applicable to God. Though
various attributes could be applied to God by way of
analogy, yet these attributes were not something
distinct from His Essence. His attributes constituted
His essence, or were various aspects of His essence.
His being is a unity indivisible, but man separates in
thought what is one in reality, because he regards
each aspect in the abstract and apart from the others.
God is omnipotent, omnipresent,, etc., but knowledge,
power, life, etc., are His essence and not attributes.
There is only One power and these are 1he various ways
/v
of looking at that power. Hisearning and knowledge 
are not different. They are one and the same thing.
So they denied the existence of any eternal attributes 
as distinct from th£* nature, because they maintained 
that such an attitude would be an eternal entity co­
existent with God, which would be a contradiction to 
His unity. An eternal divine Wisdom would be anothef 
God like the persons of the Christian Trinity. The 
resemblance of some of Mutazalite theories to certain 
Christian Trinitarian speculations is obvious, but 
we cannot say whether or not it was a mere coincidence.
So according to Mutazalites God is the only Reality. 
All else is change and has no reality of its own, though 
a dependent reality is assigned to it. They also 
maintained that all laws regarding human activities 
are the results of growth and development. Justice 
is the animating principle of human actions and is 
itself the dictates of reason.
Again, man has perfect freedom of Will. They 
reasoned that if man's actions were determined, It
would: /
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would be unjust in God to punish him for them. As 
God is just, freedom of will cannot be denied to man.
Man irresponsible for his actions. No moral evil 
can be referred to God. In everything that God does 
He has the best interests of His creatures in view, 
and everything that befalls us, seen from His point 
of view, which comprehends all is for the best.
Here we find some affinity to the Stoic doctrine.
Our finite minds cannot go beyond our selfish interests 
and so we cannot see the whole of the truth as it is. 
The world as a whole is good. By predestination 
they mean trial and deliverance, adversity and 
prosperity and other doings of God, exclusive of 
moral good or evil.
How are we to know the distinction between 
right and wrong? By revelation? The Mutazalites 
held that man, by reason apart from revelation, 
recognises some actions as good and right and others 
as bad and wrong. This difference is independent of 
God’s will, He does not make a thing good by command­
ing it, but He commands it because it is good. 
Revelation that contradicts reason is i&self false.
Was the Quran, the Word of God, uncreated and
eternal? The Jews believed that the Law existed
before the creation of the world, not as an idea in the
rud
mind of God, but as a supersensible reality and it was 
created. Christians spoke of an uncreated and 
eternal Word of God, (Logos) It seems probable that 
the Moslems were led to the discussion of this problem 
by the Jewish and Christian doctrines. Thus some of 
them believed that Quran as an eternal Word of God was 
uncreated. But the Mutazalites maintained that this 
gave the Quran an independent existence in conflict 
with the fundamental dogma of the Unity of God.
They/
They thought that the original in heaven (written on 
the Preserved Tablets) was created in time. The 
Korans in men’s hands are produced by men, though 
they correspond with the original. This was the most 
burning controversy of the time. In this, the 
Mutazalites have violated their own principle of 
interpreting the Btetitpfeid hidden metaphorically. Here
k,
they ascribe a material existence to LauJn (preserved
tablet) while they interpret the paradises figuratively.
Some of thwm, no doubt, admit that every one will
find the kind of heaven he is capable of appreciating.
Even with this the existence of a material ’Lau^’
cannot be maintained reasonably.
Now I give some of the views in which they differed
from one another or which they particularly emphasised.
Annazzam maintains that God does not possess the
capacity of doing wrong. As His nature is good, no
evil can flow out of Him. God is All powerful, but
His omnipotence is confined to what He does. -
Willing in man implies need, so we cannot ascribe
will to God in this sense. The Will of God means the
Divine Agency itself. He deniejjl that the created
reality exists from all eternity, but he maintains
that the primitive substance was created in a moment
by the Divine Will and one thing emerges from another
by a continued process of differentiation and
integration. Here we find a germ of a theory of
evolution. Again, he denies the theory of atoms.
The bodily substance is composed of accidents instead
of atoms, or in other words, he substantialises
accidents. An accident is either a substance itself
or part of a substance. The warmth is latent in the
wood and appears when^its opposite cold disappears.
L
So he does not believe in quantitative change in a
substance but only a change of motion or transposition.
Modern/
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Modern Science also interprets quantitative change 
as a change in motion or vibration, though in a 
different way. The soul of man is a subtle body and 
has the same form asihe body which it pervades.
ABU HUZAIL (died in the middle of the 9th Century.)
He maintains the eternity of attributesbut they
’ tain.
have reference to the world which was afterwards created.
/\ a
The Absolute Word of Creation (Kun) is midway between
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the Creator and the Created. But the Declaration of 
the Divine Will are not personal spirits. They are 
more like immaterial powers. Moreover, there is 
also a distinction between the Absolute Word of 
Creation and the Accidental Word of Revelation, (Quran). 
The latter is significant only for this world and 
not for the next wor^d, in which there is no freedom 
of Will. Everything there is absolutely determined
by God. He does not believe in the resurrection of
the body.
MUAMMA^ Ibn-i-Abbad As salami.
He was an advocate of the platonic theory of 
•Archetypes’ and consequently his followers are called 
idealists. He maintained that every accident subsists 
in a subject by virtue of some idea in the human mind. 
Accidents have merely intellectual or ideal existence.
The Soul, as the true essence of man, is an Idea.
Thus, the Mutazalites may be called the Rationalists 
of Islam. There is a close similarity between Mutazalites 
and Fatimides (the descendents of Fatima, the daughter of 
the Prophet and their followers). According to them,
God was not like any object that the human mind can conceive. 
No attribute can be ascribed to Him which bore the least re­
semblance to any quality of which human beings have
perception/
perception from theib knowledge of material objects.
The perfection of pftety consists in knowing God. The 
perfection of knowledge is the affirmation of His 
verity and the perfection of verity is to a cknowledge 
His unity in all sincerity; and the pa?fection of 
sincerity is to deny all attributes to the Deity.
He who refers an attribute to God believes the attribute 
to be God, regards God as two or part of one. He 
who asks where God is, assimilates Him with some object. 
God is the Creator, not because He Himself is created; 
God is existent, not because He was mon-existent. He 
is with every object not from resemblence or nearness.
He is outside of everything, not from separation. He 
is the Primary Cause, not in the meaning of motion or 
action. . . .  He has no relation to place, time, or 
measure. God is Omniscient because knowledge is His 
Essence; mighty because power is His Essence}, loving 
because love is His Essence. . . . not because thwaa 
are attributes apart I rom His Essence. "Taq^d^r’' 
construed by the followers of the ’Salaf’ to mean 
predestination meant ’weighing', ’probation,’ 'trial'. 
(ImamJafar Sadl^ quoted by Amirali.)
The Fatimidf^were not acquainted with Greek 
Philosophy but the Mutazalites were. We will now see 
how the Greek wisdom was rendered accessible to 
Moslems•
Greek/
GREEK PHILOSOPHY IN ISLAM.
The Hellenistic learning flowed to the East 
through Syria. The Syrians had embraced Christian­
ity. For a time the new religious beliefs filled their 
minds.uninterruptedly, but they were soon destined to 
face the attacks of Philosophy. In orde£ to ward off 
these attacks the Christian theologians had to make 
themselves acquainted with Philosophy and so they had 
to take up the study of Greek learning and philosophy.
In this way the Greek books were translated into 
Syriac, but it was simply a work of translation andmo 
more. In some cases even the translation was not 
correct.
The period of Syriac translations extends from the 
4th to the 8th century. Then came the Muslims on the 
scene. They established a powerful Caliphate under
hf\M
Muaviyah, who founded the Nsiayyid dynasty that lasted
from 661 to 749. They were succeeded by the 
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Abbasids, who were great patrons of learning. It 
n
was in this period that the great work of rendering 
Greek philosophy into Arabic was performed.
The first important person to begin the work of 
translation was Ibn-ul-Muqaffa (died 759 - 760) who 
lived in the reign of Mausur, when several treatises 
of Aristotle as well as the ’Almajesta' of Ptolemy 
and the books of Euclid were translated into Arabic.
The Caliph Mamun founded an Academy in Baghdad 
in 832 and thework of translation was entrusted to this 
body. In a short time the whole of Aristotle and 
Plato was accessible to the Muslims in Arabic.
Now we (name to Muslim t>inkers who are commonly
called "Philosophers”, because they derived mainly
their/
I lit
their ideas from Greek Philosophy. To them Plato 
and Aristotle were divinely inspired and their 
system of thought the best possible in the world.
They did not take fehe trouble of ascertaining how 
far the works ascribed to Plato and Aristotle were 
genuinely their workd and moreover, in their writings 
these Muslim thinkers do not show how far they are 
indebted to Greek Philosophy, whether they took any­
thing from other sources and what were these sources.
We will give an account of a few important philosophers 
of this period.
TFARABj, (870 - 950) f w  tr
Abp lias^Mohd, B Muhd: Turkaan A1 Farabi was a
native of Farab In Tranxonia and vas born about 870 A,D, 
In a Turkish family. He 1b said to be the greatest P 
Philosopher before Avicenna, The people called him 
*Muallam-i-Sani," the Second teacher, the first being
Aristotle, He was well- in all the sciences of his
Philosopher, He was the greatest of all the Muslim 
Philosophers and composed a number of works on logio, 
music and the sciences, Ho Mussal-man ever reached the 
same position in Philosophy as he, and it was by the 
study of his works and the limitation of his style that 
Avicenna attained proficiency and rendered his works so 
useful,* He is chiefly noted for his commentaries on 
Aristotle, Carra De Vaux credits him with clearly 
Sxpounding the theory of active intelleot1 as a pure 
form separate from matter. He writes, "Farabi is a 
really powerful and singular personage — — —  more 
fascinating than Avicenna more impetuous and daring in 
his intellectual flights, more agile in his retorts.
His thought usually attains to the elevation of the lyric; 
his logic is keen, clever and bold and he gives expression 
to a flow of profound speculation in language that has 
the rare merit of simplicity and consciousness," He 
studied De Anima 200 times and the PhyBics 70 times, but 
he was more interested in logic than in anything else.
He wrote the following commentaries in Aristotle
(1) A1 Muqalat (The Categoris)
(2) A1 Qiyas (The Analytica Priwra)
(3) A1 Tafsir (The Hermeneutical
(4) A1 Burhan (The Sapioa^ )L.
age. Ibn-i-Khalla^an writes about him, *A well-known
(5) A1 Javk (The Topica)
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(6) A1 Maghalit (The Sophistioa &.enohi)
(7) A1 Kha/aba (The Bhetoric)
(8) A1 Shir (The Poetics)
(9) The le^goge of Porphyry.
Id addition to the abovehe had also a large number
of original works viz., his treatises on "£he intelligence 
and intelligible", on "the Soul", the faculties of the 
Soul, the One and the Unity; substance, time, empty space, 
space and measure. He had a cyclopaedia of science 
(Ihsa U1 Alum) in which he gives a criticism of all the 
sciences, viz., mathematics, Political and Social 
economy, logic, languages, etc. His treatises Sirat- 
Ul-Fazila and Asseyasat U1 Madeniyya deal with ethics 
and politics respectively. The latter is a part of the 
more comprehensive woxk called Mubadi-Ul-Mafcjudat*.
In a similar treatise, "Resala fi arai Ahl- 1- 
Madinat-Ul Fazila" he discusses the problem of the 
"model town", as oonoeived by Plato and Aristotle, but 
he soon reveals the fact that he has no idea what is 
meant by suoh terms as oligarchy, democracy, etc.
Farabi was a great admirer of Plato and Aristotle.
He considered them the prophets of his time. If their 
teaching was true, there should be no contradiction 
between them, so he took up the task of showing that 
there was no disagreement between the two and their N  
doctrine was in conformity with Islam.
We do not say that he succeeded in this task but this 
was a genuine attempt at a critical analysis of these two 
great philosophers and shows the originality of his mind.
In fact the people before him merely explained the 
philosophy of the Greek thinkers with a^p comprehensive 
examination of their teaching. Farabi, after showing 
the points of similarity between Plato and Aristotle 
refers to the teachings of Aristotle which seem contradictory 
to him and tries to show that Aristotle ultimately came 
to the point of view of Plato. The chief difficulty that
/he
he feels does not lie in the transcendence and immanence 
of ideas hut in the creation of the world, because here 
he does not or cannot go beyond the pale of Islam,
Aristotle acknowledged no cosmogony or origin of the 
world in Time, but Farabi has to deny that Aristotle 
ever taught the eternity of the world. How oan this be 
possible? In order to overcome this difficulty he 
explains the term "Creation" in a different way. He held 
that"God created all things instantaneously in unmeasured
441-
eternity through the agency of the 'Aga' (Intellect),
The Universe existed in eternity as a created thing. Then 
God through Age, introduced movement, at which time began. 
With the coming into existence of time and movement, the 
Universe came out from its concealment into reality",In 
other words, time is logically posterior to the actual 
creation of the world. This is materially the same view 
as held by some of the Mutazalites,
Farabi calls philosophy an all-embracing ^Lence - 
the science of Being as suoh. According to some modern
C:
thinkers Philosophy is the general sience of which the 
special Aenoes are the constituent portions, bo here, 
Farabi Is at one with the modernists. He blames both the 
Mutkallamin and the natural philosophers like Razi (Razes) 
for not taking a true view of Philosophy, The 
Mutkallamins took for granted the deliveranoe of ordinary 
consciousness without testing them and the natural 
philosophers are not philosophers because they look at the 
things from the point of view of their particular science 
and not as a whole.
The study of the different departments of the world 
if the work of the special science. But the co-ordination 
of the results of the sciences with a view to arriving at 
the true conception of the system of the world as a whole 
is the work of philosophy.
In logio, though, he mainly commented on Aristotle, 
yet in his"letter in reply to certain questions, he shows
/evidences
evidences of original thought. Hie logic does not only 
give an analysis of scientific thought hut also a few 
remarks on grammar and epistomology. He distinguishes 
logio from grammar in this way - "Grammar is confined to 
the language of our people while logio has to regulate the 
expression in language of the aggregate intelligence of 
mankind”. He has a two-fold division of logio, viz.,
(1) Tasawwar (conception and perception) and (2) Tasdi^ 
(proof). The former deals with ideas and definitions 
while the latter is concerned with judgement, inferences, 
eto. The ideas in themselves are neither true nor false. 
Thtf have in themselves no relation to actuality. Ideas 
are of two kinds, viz(J.)those derived from sense perception 
which are the representatives of the individual objects.
(2) ideas innate in the mind which cannot be derived from 
experience as eternity, actuality, perfect being, etc.
These ideas have the highest degree of certitude. They 
cannot be demonstrated or explained empirically. A 
judg/ment is the combination of ideas. It may be either 
true or false. The truth of any proposition can be 
established by certain fundamental propositions which are 
immediately obvious but which cannot be demonstrated to be 
true. They are the axioms of all the sciences. The most 
certain of all is the Priniiple of Contradiction. It is 
impossible that the same predicate should at the same time 
and in the same relation both belong and not belong to the 
subject. Logio proper is the doctrine of Proof. We 
start from known premises and arrive at something which 
was formerly unknown or not clearly known.
"The doctrine of Protff points out the right way to 
"the truth; it must itself point out the truth; it 
"must generate science".
In all this he mainly follows AriBtotle but it is said 
that Aristotle*s researches often rested on an altogether 
insecure basis of fact. But Farabi lays stress on first 
establishing the truth of the premises, and this can be done 
by the investigation of the particular sciences and both
^positive
I
positive and negative instances should he examined.
He maintained that Universals exist in mind as
Buhstanoes. They are not merely accidents in Particulars.
Though the man extracts them from particulars, yet t h ey^t^
existence of their own before such extraction. Abstraction
simply means bringing into limelight with the help of the
Particulars, what is already there. Particulars are
interpreted in accordance with the Universale. In reply to
the question, whether mere being belongs to Universals, he
says, "Existence is a logical or grammatical relation,
"but not a category of actuality which makes any 
"assertion about things. The existence of a thing 
"is nothing but a thing itself".
Existence and manifestation are one.
He defines a cause as something which positively
influences the happening or being of something else. A
thing which was non existent is brought into existenoe by
s o m e t h in g  e l s e  a n d  t h i s  a g a i n  h a B  i t s  c a u s e  i n  s o m e t h in g
else and so on.
But the chain of causes must have its beginning, so
there must be the First Cause, which is and always has been .
This is God. He is necessary, self existing, Eternal Being
and has the sufficient reason of H1b actual existence in
Himself, in his own essence. The First Cause cannot be
defined as it has neither gen/us, species nor differentia.
It is £erfeot, It is both external and internal but
cannot be perceived by the senses. As regards the proof^
of God’s existenoe, he maintains that everything possible
can only be actualised by an Efficient Cause which cannot be
manifold. The First Cause must be single. So the World
being contingent cannot exist independently of some other
actual being. The First Cause must be intelligent, perfect,
good, immutable and one, but its qualities are neither
internal nor acquired but as aspects of its own essence.
Here also we find that Farabi mainly relies on Aristotle.
God is one alone and from Him proceed the manifold.
The Universe is due to God's knowledge. God's intelligence
needs something to be intelligent of.
/His
His consciousness demanded an object* So the foims
or types of things are from eternity in God and the Universe
means the unfolding and drawing out of these types. The
Universe is not due to the Will of God hut to His self-
oonsolousness, His self-conscleusnesa gave rise to the
First Created Spirit, His Image (or Horfs ) which m o veB  t h e
outermost celestial sphere. From this spirit came the seoond
sphere-spirit and so on. There are nine such spirits. They
constitute the seoond grade of being. In the third grade
is the Reason and in the fourth, the Soul, But these two
multiply according to the number of human beings. In the
fifth grade comes the 'ftorm " and last of all the matter. The
first three are spirits per se but the last three, though
incorporkL, enter into relation with the bodies. The
Corporal is also divided into 6 grades viz; celestial bodies,
human bodies, bodies of animals, bodies of plants and
mineral and elementary bodies.
The faculties of the Soul are not of the same rank but
the lower supplies the material for the higher , The highest
of all is the faculty of reasoning. Material objects give
rise to sensations. These sensations provide material for
imagination and memory and these latter again are worked
together into reasoning. He recognises three aspects of
consciousness viz[Hognition (2) feeling and (3) willing.
He calls these (1) cognition (2) Inclination and
disinclination (3) Bffort or Will, In a mental act these
are not separated but one of them may be more predominant
than the other two. By means of data of perception the
Soul passes judgement according to its inclinations and
disinclinations of the moment, "a|i ” (or spirit) is an
integral part of the Soul, It is not absent even in
childhood but is potential in that period and actualised
later when the child develops its sensory powers.
The spirit oannot work unless it gets its material
through the senses. As the parts of the body develop,
the spirit is actualised more or less according to this
/develop“ment
development* This aotualisation is not affected by the 
activities of the child, but is influenced by the last 
sphere-spirit or the Universal Spirit •
The data are obtained throught the senses but it is 
the Universal Spirit that gives it meaning and makes it 
intelligible. The individual spirit interprets the data 
with the help of the Universal Spirit* The former derives 
its activity from the latter. The Universal Spirit is 
oMled Active or Creative* Some people are more highly 
intelligent than the others* This is due to the influence 
of the Creative Spirit.
So the spirit in man is/ possible (2) actual (3) 
inspired from above. The man has spiritual potentiality,
which is actualised by a knowledge of Reality and in this
from
actualisation it is influenced above*
It is not clear whether Farabi believes in the
immpartality of the Soul. According to Ibn - i -Tufail
Farabi has doubts about this point moreover he is not clear
whether the souls are finite or infinite in numbers* At
one place he speaks of the souls as infinite in numbers
while in his "Model Town" he considersthem as finite.
In the gradation of spirits we find a mystical element
in Farabi. In fact in Farabi mysticism penetrates
everything. He maintains that the lower spirit has a
tendency to rise towards the higher, while the latter trieB
to lift it up. By uniting himself with the celestial
spirits a man attains a union with God. But it is not
clear whether this union can take place in this world or
only in the next world.
In his Ethics Farabi maintains that reason is the sole
criterion of what is right or wrong. Willing is
subordinate to "Knowledge". "Knowledge * influences the
actions of a man. "Man has free 7/ill, Pure Thought is the
Sphere of Freedom. Freedom depends upon motives
furnished by thought. But as ultimately Freedom is
determined by the rational nature of God, Freedom is a 
necessity" _ _ _ _
Ibn-i-sina (Avicenna) //* t
v W  |
Abn Ali A1 Hussain ibn-i-Abdulla ibn-i-sina 
(980-1037) was bora at Afshina in the district of Bokhara.
In his early boyhood he was put in charge of a tutor and his 
intellectual capacity was the talk of the day. He acquired 
a sound knowledge of the Arts and Sciences of his time in 
his boyhood and when he was sixteen he knew the theory of 
medicine so well that he was known as an expert physician.
At this age he was able to cure the SultanNuh bln Mausur 
of a dangerous illness, as a reward for which he was 
permitted to study in the Royal Library. This was of great 
advantage to him, because in a short time by his diligence 
and hard work he excelled all his oompatripts in learning.
As regards Philosophy he studied Aristotle's metaphysics 
forty times, but still considered himself deficient in 
thoroughly understanding it, till by chance he purchased 
Farabi1scommentary on metaphysics which made the subject 
quite clear to him. On this ground he is sometimes called 
the pupil of Farabi. When the Sammanide dynasty declined 
he had to seek the patronage of the chief persons, one 
after the other, but in all his wanderings he never gave up 
the study of his favourite subjects, - Along with this he 
was busy writing a series of volumes on medicine.
Philosophy and natural sciences. In fact he was a 
voluminous writer. He composed no less than 100 treatises. 
Some of these are tracts of a few pages while the others 
extend through several volumes. The most famous of all 
his writings is his philosophical work called As^hifa 
(Sanatio). He made an abridg-ment of it and called it 
"Eajah". This was written in concise language but clear 
and logical. Other philosophical works are Falsafat ul 
Arudi, Falsafat ul Alai, called after the names pf the 
patrons to whom they were dedicated, Kitab ul Isharat 
wa Tanbihab, Guide to Wisdom, fountain of Wisdom, The 
Human Faculties and their Perceptions and a series of 
mystical treatises and poems.
He wrote a compendium on_Soul when he was only eighteen.
He aiviria Philosophy into Logic, Physics and
Metaphysics. "In its entirety it embraces the
science of all existence as such and of the principles of
all the separate sciences, whereby as far as humarly
possible, the soul which is devoted to Philosophy attains
the highest perfection." If Philosophy is the science
of the sciences, the above classification does not seem
right but we may include under Physics both social 
i c
scenes as well as natural. .'.His Logic, metaphysics,
Physics give a synoptic view of Aristotelian doctrines.
He discussed metaphysics under ten theses. Under the
first five he deals with the origin of knowledge;
experimentation; induction and deduction; matter
and force; the relation of cause and effect; substance
and accidents; the universal and particulars. In the
6th and 7th he shows the unity of the First Cause.
In the 8th and 9 th he deals with cosmology and the
relation between the human Souls and the First Cause.
In the tenth he discusses the doctrine of Resurrection.
0
De V/^ lf is of opinion that "he was among all the
Arabians, one of the most faithful interpreters of
Aristotle and that starting with the system of Farabi
he freed it from many neo-platonic theories in order to
bring it nearer genuine peripateticism." But I think
Avicenna, on many points does not interpret Aristotle
correctly or differs from him in his views
fundamentally. In fact he was quite ignorant of
Greek language and literature and nis knowledge of Greek
Philosophy was based on the translations made by persons,
some of whom nad no interest in Philosophical
representations and were consequently unable to render
the philosophical doctrine correctly in arabic. In most
/ cases
cases he does not give trie sources of hia iiifow»fioii 
and as he was commonly known as an interpretor of 
Aristotle, all that he wrote was taken by the people as 
the teaching of nristotle. The task of faithfully 
interpreting Aristotle was left to Ibn-i-Rushd (Averroes), 
who points out in his book Tihafat ul Tibafat the 
difference between Avi-cenna and Aristotle. De Boer's 
view as regards the rank of Ibn-i jBina among the 
philosophers of the world is worth nothing. "The 
nntion that Ibn-i-sina pushed on beyond Farabi and 
reached a purer Aristotelianism is perhaps the greatest 
error which has found a footing in the history of Muslim 
pv.j >osophy. What did this our man of the world in reality 
care for Aristotle? It was not his concern to commit himself 
wholly to the spirit of any system. He took what was to 
his liking, wherever he found it, but he had a preference for 
the shallow paraphrases of Themiskus. Thus he became 
the great philosopher of accommodation in the Bast and 
the true forerunner!' of compendium writers for the
whole world  Every moment of his life was fully
employed. In the day time he attended to state affairs
or gave instruction: to his pupils, the evening was
devoted to the social enjoyment of friendship and love and many
a night found him engaged in composition, pen in hand and
goblet within reach lest he should fall asleep. Time
and circumstances determined the
direotion/
direction of his activity. If at the Princes Court he 
hai the requisite leisure, and a library at hand, he
wrote his cannon of medicine or the great Encyclopaedia
s
of Philosophy, while travelling he composed epitome and 
smaller works. In prison he wrote poems and piouB 
meditations, hut always in a pleasing form; in fact his 
smaller mystical writings have a poetio charm about them .... 
He did not, like Farabi, withdraw from oommon life to be 
oome immersed in the commentators of Aristotle, but he 
blended in himself Greek science and Oriental Wisdom.
Enough commentar^s, he thought, had already been written 
on the ancient authors; it was now time for men to 
construct a philosophy of their own.*
A brief account of Avicenna's teaching will be 
given now:-
Logio - Ibn-i-Sina defines logic in his 'Efajat1 as 
follows:- "logic is the theoretical speculative 
science that teaches out of which forms and materials 
there will oome about satisfying argumentation, (if .this 
argumentation that which is strong and imposes an 
assertion, is called dialeotio; and that which is weak 
thereof and imposes a prevailing opinion is called 
rhetorical." His compendium Essay on Logic remains to 
this day one of the clearest and best that beginners can 
find in the Arabic language on this abstract Science of 
the laws of Thought. Ibn-i-Sina considers logic an 
important soience but he does not exaggerate its power, 
which he considers is negative. He says, "The aim of 
logio is to provide mankind with a rule, the observance 
of which will prevent him from erring in his reasoning.*
The intellectual constitution in human beings is 
defective and the man easily falls a prey to errors;
/ so
/s>
so he cannot do away with Logic. "Logic does not aim 
at discovering truth hut serves as a guide to those who 
already possess it and saves them from making mistakes,"
In the allegory of of Hai-ibn-Ya^zan he says,“Logic is a 
science whose income is paid in ready money; she brings 
to light what nature conceals and what may be a Bouroe 
of either joy or sorrow; she points you out the way of
ru
freedom from earthly entanglements and seytsual propmsities. 
If her healing hand touches you, it will give you sa/utary 
support, but if your weakness causes you to stumble,
you/
you will be exposed to ruin, accompanied as you are 
by bad companions (i.e. Unregulated imagination etc.)
He discusses Logic in "Isharat, 1’Rajah’ and 
’classification of sciences’ He divides Logic into 
nine different parts corresponding to eight books of 
Aristotle with Porphyry’s^sagoge. The first part is 
an introduction to the book and deals with General 
Philosophy and the second corresponding to categories 
discusses the simple abstract ideas, that can be
applied to all beings; the third deals with'the
- .A . - ... tiie fourth unites the
grouping of ideas to form propositions; propositions to form
demonstrations;fifth discusses tne conditions necessary to the premises of 
reasoning, the sixth and seventh deal^ with probable 
and false reasoning the eighth with the art of 
persuasion and ^e^Jbats of discourseSwhose aim is to stir 
the soul or imagination. In the beginning of his 
Logic he explains the terms specis, difference, 
property and common accident which together furnish 
a method of constituting definition.
Reason gets its material from experience, and with 
the help of the first principles of understanding 
builds a structure of thought. Reason interprets 
wha’t is given in experience. The first principle8 
of understanding are self-evident truths. They are held 
to be true by common feeling. Some of them are 
due to habits formed in childhood, a-differ-ent -vieAfln of—_
^^ >1 f.pviriftnna. They are hereditary experiences 
handed down from generatipn to generation. Then
/ there
there are others that depend upon the experience, of 
life. A child puts his hand in the fire and burns 
himself. In the course of his experience he finds 
that certain events and combination of events are 
always followed by certain other events and this gives 
him an idea of causality. The same is the Gase, 
with the laws of science. The principls of feeling 
and and the principles of reason together bring 
about a conviction in one’s mind, though one is not 
aware how this conviction is brought about.
.«.vicenna further distinguishes between definition 
and description. The definition proper must give 
the essence of a thing, its gen/us, differentia and 
all its essential characteristics while descripti^a* 
only gives the propria and accidents so that the thing 
may be recognised correctly. He follows Aristotle 
in recognising the four causey viz,,material, formal, 
efficient and final. He maintains that they may
all/
(Continued)
a l l  a p p e a r  i n  a  d e f i n i t i o n .  Thus a n ^  a * e  m ay  he
d e f i n e d f a n  i r o n  im p le m e n t  of s u o h  a n d  s u c h  a  B h a p e  f o r
o u t t i n g  "w o o d ?
His treatment of the Universals is similar to 
that of Farabi. The Universals have no objective 
reality. They exist only in the mind of man. The 
Abstraot idea of genjfriB is formed by the comparison 
of particulars and noting their points of Similarity. 
The general idea is realized in matter, accompanied 
by aooidents. Then the mental abstraction serves 
as a standard of comparison with other individuals.
So according to Avicanna everything existed in the 
mind of God as an’Idea*. Then it actualizes itself 
in the plural forms of materiality and then in the 
mind of man is raised the Universality of Idea.
He discusses the questions that arise in 
connection with sciences. First what a thing is if
it is (2) Where it is (3) When it is (4) How it is and
finally why it is. and reason both share in
the formation of dateuof Sciences. Each science 
has its particular field of investigation or more 
correctly looks at a part of reality from a certain 
point of view. The soiences are divided into two 
kinds viz., Theoretical and applied. The former 
disoover truths to be applied by the latter in their 
investigations, just as Maths: may be called a 
theoretical science and Meohanios an applied science.
/Psychology
- . tofs /
Ibn-i Slna finds a difficulty in defining 
PByohology - .?SoulJT>in 5 fife says, "It 1b a prime
Perfection (consummation, realization) attaching
to an organic natural body; and if we wish to say
further, a prime perfection attaching to a natural
body having a life potentially (a first perfection
belonging to a natural body which body may have
life); that is to say, a source of the manifold
animal actions potentially.* This seems to be
taken from Aristotles*De Anima 11 chapter 1,
According to Aristotle the soul is something 
of the body* Only nous or pure intellect entered the 
human body from without, but Avioenna maintains that 
the soul is not the product of the body or the result 
of the mechanical or chemical combination 0f the 
elements in the body, but comes from outside.
Moreover he maintains that body and soul have no 
essential connection with each other. Then he says 
that motion is of two kinds viz 1 natural (motion 
towards the earth) 2 spiritual (motion away from the 
earth). The first is due to the causes outside 
the man and the second to the power of the souls.
(Here Ibn-i-Sina seems to have had a rather clear 
premonition of Hewton's theory of gravitation seven 
hundred years before the falling of the famous 
apple.)
There are three powers of the Soul viz.
1 Vegetative 2. Animal 3. rational. Again the 
vegetative has three Sub-diviBions viz. 1.nutritive
2.growth giving 3.generating. Hutritive power 
"transforms the nutriment into a resemblance with the 
nourishment taken in order that this nutriment may 
succeed in the stead of what shall be wasted and 
attach itself to the taker instead of the
waste1' -najah by Avice«na. The power of growth 
makes the body increase in mass without changing 
the general form or appearance. The power of 
propagation "draws from the body a part which 
contains the body in potentia and is capable of 
producing another body similar to it in action"
Najah p.43. The animal power is of two kinds 
viz. perceptory and motor. The faculties of 
perception are partly internal and partly external.
The external includes the five senses viz. sight, 
hearing, smell, taste and touch. Touch also 
includes the perception of heat and cold; dry and 
moist; rough and smooth etc.
As regards 'perceiving1 he accepts Aristotle's 
view as against Plato'b. He says, "When the 
intervening transparent body becomes effectively 
transparent by light shining on it, then an 
impression of an outspread (flattened) individual 
of such sensible objects as are seen is effected 
in the crystalline lens of the eye, just such a 
piotorial impression as is effected in looking 
glasses. This is Aristotle's way." In regard to 
the functioning of these five senses he writes,
"The eye only perceives that form which has 
imprinted itself in it, of the object felt and so also 
the remainder of the senses." When the stimulus exceeds 
a certain limit, the power of perception is dulled, but 
in most cases it regains its former condition after a 
certain amount of rest. "Again each one of the five senses 
perceives, through the means of its own rightful 
perception and besides the same, five other things to wit |
1.shape 2.number 3.size 4. motion 5.rest (or quiet)
That sight touch or taste perceive them is apparent.
As to hearing, it perceives in accordance (pu.riaa.nce)
with the variety of number of sounds, the number of 
sound*emitting objects and through the strexigth of 
sounds it perceives the size of two objects that 
are hitting against each other and in accordance 
with a hind of change and fi*eaness of the sounds, 
it perceives motion and rest. The same is the case 
with other senses" - Avecenna's offering to the 
Prince or A Compendium for the Soul.
The five inward senses function as follow#:- 
1. Perception, through anyone or more of the five 
inward senses, of the outward concrete form. .^11 
the perceptions are gathered in a hind of common 
centre in the front part of the brain.
2. Mosawwiralk. (Formative or imaginative faculty) 
conception of particular notions, over and beyond the 
concrete form perceived. This faculty s^Lps the 
sensible form of the conditions of situation and place, 
and then retains it after the external objects have 
ceased to produce any Sensation. Here the soul 
perceives the object without the aid of the senses.
3. Mofahhira (cogitative) - performs the worh 
of abstraction and generalisation of ideas
4. Alwahm (iistimative) "passes judgments or comes 
to a definite opinion as to the truth or falsehood of 
conceptions formed." It is situated in the middle of 
the brain.
5. Hafiz a (memory) preserves the judgment formed 
and has its seat in the bach part of the brain.
/In
In respect to memory Ibn-i-Sina in his Qanun makes a 
distinction:- “and just here is a point for 
scrutiny and judgment as to whether the preserving 
power and the power of recalling to consciousness 
such notions as had been stored up by the opining 
power (iilwahm) but have passed away from it, are one 
power or two.*'
“The mind (understanding, Reason) is in fact and 
deed wholly and solely nothing else than the forms of 
mentally grasped things.1*
The motor faculty is either appetitive or 
efficient. The former is again either attractive 
i.e. a desire,or repulsive i.e. a passion. The 
efficient power resides in motor nerves and muscles.
The/
The Rational power of the Soul.- Man is distinguished 
from animals by Intelligence. The soul of the man is 
Self conscious. It knows itself not through the 
medium of the hody hut immediately and hence even after 
leaving the hody it knows itself. It is independent 
entity and can have knowledge independently of senses and 
is consequently immortal, it is not a composite substance, 
hut simple.
The Rational power has five distinct stages.
He has greatly reduced the number of stages or states 
which the A^hwan Ussafa multiplied so excessively.
These stages, corresponding to Successive actuations,are 
1. The Material intelligence or absolute polcptiality 
of Knowledge. 11. Possible intelligence - which 
recognises the First Principles of Knowledge. 111.
Perfect intelligence - completely prepared to receive 
additional knowledge. IV. The Acquired intelligence in 
possession of this further knowledge. V. The Holy 
Spirit which has mystic vision and belongs only to the 
prophets and Saints. _ In all its activity the Soul is 
guided by Intellech4rs agens^ or Achir Intellect.
(i^-faal).
He believes that the Soul is created at the same 
time.^ When the body is created. Gha^ali is of opinion 
that he does not believe in the resurrection of body 
but this is not true as the following quotation from
3hows. "The true religion, which our Lord, the
ight us, clearly states that the body will 
undergo reward and punishment in the next world." He 
discusses the problem of resurreotion in his letter to . 
Ab^said Abul Khair; *A11 creation, whose parts are linked 
together, is subject to influences which all derive 
from a single source I.e. God, Terrestrial
/Souls
Souls differ widely in rank; the highest are endowed 
with gifts of prophecy and perfected bo far that they 
attain the sphere of pure intelligence. A Soul of 
this kind entering after death into eternal beatitude, 
shared with its peers, continues along with them to 
exercise a certain influence on terrestrail Souls."
This shows that the spirits of holy men shall take 
interest in the affairs of this world and man can 
communicate with them and can get their help in 
spiritual affairs. The modern Spiritualists believe 
that they can communicate with any soul, but Avicenna 
maintains that only the Souls of holy persons can be 
approached and that too if they are willing to do so.
Metaphyics - In his metaphysics Avicenna discusses the 
problem of "Being" and the generation of the manifold 
in the bosom of the 'Being1. He considers that the 
existence of God oannot be demonstrated from his 
design or workmanship but the contingency of the world 
furnishes a good proof for His existence. Everything 
in this world is of a possible nature and depends for
its- existence on something else. Their existence of
h .
a possible being necessary only through IfyLe another
existence, which transcends all possibility, plurality
and mutaldLlity. This is God, the Absolute God; the
perfect Intelligence. Again he writes, "The good
is the desirable and that which is desirable for
itself is better than that which is desirable for the
sake of something else. Unless therefore, the Series
of causes be continued infinitely, there must be.some
ullimate Good, deBirable for itself and this must be
Divine Being".
Then he traces out the production of the world of 
manifoldness from this Unity, From the First Being 
emerges the First Caused Being, whioh has a Knowledge 
of the former. From this knowledge proceeds an 
Intelligence. Moreover the First Caused Being knows 
that it has Been oaused By the First Being and from this 
knowledge proceeds a Soul, The Soul must have a Body 
to animate, so a Body is produced. In this way the 
First spirit Soul and body are produoed. This process 
goes on, each spirit producing another spirit, soul and 
body till the last spirit comes out. Th|s Active
Intellect finishes the Series, The Bodies which 
these spirits produce are those of Spheres. The first 
Sphere is that of Saturn then Jupiter . The procession
goes on according to the descendi__w ______  order
of the day. The last Sphere is that of vKeonf. The 
whole of this process takes place in timelessness in 
the substratum of matter. "Matter is the eternal and 
pure possibility of all that exists" As against Farabi 
he maintains that matter is not an outflow of the Soul 
But an eternal element coexisting with God,though “effected 
with absolute indifference to exist or not to exist"
Avicenna discusses the theory of the motion of the 
Spheres, "The atfcular motion of the spheres has its 
ultimate ground and cause in the finality exercised By 
God,the intelligent soul of each sphere seeking the 
supreme Good, BeJ the knowledge of which they are 
attracted." This wprld is governed By active Intellect 
the last of the pure intelligences. The Active
Intellect is not a Psychological factor But a metaphysi­
cal principle, Because from it proceed through the 
influence of heavenly motions all substantial forms 
which actuate suBl%minary matter. The human souls
emanate from the active Intellect in the same way as
/all
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all other terrestrial forms.
The First Cause is the Primary Being. “He 
comprehends everything in a universal manner and at 
the same time no attribute of any particular thing in 
the heavens or on earth is hidden from him." He is 
also a final efficient cause at the same time. He 
does not stand in need of any cause. He is necessary 
Being. He is eternally Perfect. His existence and 
Essence are one.
The stars are not moved by God Himself but by the 
First world Spirit. in its knowledge of God and 
knowledge of self there arises duality and in its 
production of spirit, soul and body arises multipli­
city.
Avicenna forms the theory of Being as follows:
1 "All possibles cannot spring from one possible 
cause, on which their series mounts up infinitely.
2 "A series of causes finite in number cannot be 
possible in themselves and necessary to each other, 
so that they depend upon one another in a circle.
3 "Everything produced has a cause and every cause 
is determinating.
This consequently signifies that all possibles
must have cause, that causes are not linked together
infinitely and do not return on themselves. Therefore
uUc 1
the series of possible ends in the necessary Being 
DeBs(M%n»
Gha zali and others have greatly criticised Abi 
Sina for want of clearness in his essential and 
fundamental idea of the contingency of the things.
He conceives it to be something approaching substan­
tiality, distinct from ’being and existence.1 
Existence seems to come to 'being’ from outisdel1 
moreover his theory of Spheres doe3 not seem to be 
convincing. He himself probably regards it as not 
proved. /0od
(o) God works with Physical necessity and not with 
freedom (d) In his theory of knowledge he could not 
succeed in reconciling Aristotelian abstraction with 
Platonic intuition and emanation. The contents of 
mind obtained from Active Intellect by the process of 
emanation are to be acquired again bythe process of 
abstraction.
A Reaction against Greek Philosophy
So far the Muslim philosophers based their 
speculations on the Greek Philosophy. But along with 
them there was a community of Orthodox thinkers who 
considered it an encroachment on the domain of 
religion and the introduction of unauthorised doctrines 
in Islam. The philosophers considered Aristotle and 
Plato as somewhat infallibly and their teachings 
mainly free from errors and so they tried to interpret 
the Q,uran in the light of the Greek thought. In the 
eyes of the Orthodox Moslems this was a great heresy, 
because it assigned an ’inferior position to the 
Prophet as compared with Plato and Aristotle. If the 
latter were perfect in wisdom and the knowledge of 
ultimate Reality and their teaching did not leave 
anything that was needed for the moral guidance of man, 
then what was the use of Islamic revelation. So they 
had to point out the shortcomings of the philosophers. 
But to pit revelation against reason did not serve theiv' 
purpose. Itis all very well as far as the believers 
are concerned, but for a critical thinker it was of no 
avail. So they had to fight the philosophers with 
their own weapon. For this they formulated a new
U y *
ul Kalam, (dialectics or Orthodox Philosophical
/Theology
M  i
Theology), and they were consequently called "Muta- 
K^ Uclj^ .min" They were not in close agreement among
themselves on many points, hut they were all agreed 
in demolishing the framework of the Greek Philosophy 
as interpreted hy the Moslem Pro-Greek Philosophers. ^
^/-Mutkallemins were Ashari and Matridi.
v
a1 Ashari (073-935) w&s ut first a Zealous 
Mutaza^ite, but when he was forty he suddenly declared 
his conversion from the old faith. "His theatrical 
manner and his eloquent words impressed the people.
Ashari was the greatest man in the Caliphate; he was 
petted by the legalists, idolised by the populace, re­
spected by the Caliph. He gave to the clerical party 
what they had long been wanting - a logical system, for 
the defence of patristic theology against the rationalistic 
conceptions of Mutazila^s, the philosophers and the Fat- 
imid<t Imams. " - Amir Ali.
Ashari was a voluminous writer. He composed about 
one hundred works and two hundred pamphlets but only five 
have survived the wreck of time.
Shahristani, who wrote a history of the Philosophic 
Systems of the World in 1127 > gives a summary of Ashari*s 
views in his “Kitab ul Milal wa Nahal." It is better to 
quote him on this point:-
“He (Ashari) maintained that the attributes of the 
Deity are eternal and subsistent in His Essence, but they 
are not simply His Essence, rather they are additional to
His Essence..........that God speaks by an eternal word
and wills by an eternal will for it is evident that God is 
a Sovereign, and, as a sovereign, is one to whom it belongs 
to command and prohibit. So God commands and prohibits . 
. . . .  that His ordering is eternal, subsistent in Him, a 
quality pertaining to Him; that the Will of God is indi­
visible, eternal, embracing all things subject to volition, 
whether determinate actions of His own, or actions of His 
creatures - the latter so far as created by Him, not as 
they are their own actions by appropriation; that God wills 
all things morally, good and evil, beneficial and injurious; 
and as He both knows and wills, that He wills, on the part 
of His creatures, what He knows, and has caused to be
registered/
registered in the “Memorial Book" - Y/hich fore knowledge
constitutes His decree, His decisions, and His determinations,
therein there is no variation or change, that an
appropriated action means an action\ ability, and which
takes place under the condition of created ability.....
God rules as a Sovereign over His creatures, doing
what He wills and determining as He pleases; so that
were He to cause all men to enter Paradise there would
be no injustice, and if He were to send them all to Hell,
there would be no wrong doing, because injustice is the
ordering in respect to things which do not come within
the sjphere of control of the orderer, or the inversion
of the established relations of things, and God is the
Absolute Sovereign on whose part no injustice is
imaginable and to whom no wrong can be attributed......
and that nothing whatever is obligatory upon God by virtue
of reason - neither that which is beneficial nor that
which is most advantageous, nor gracious assistance.....
and that the ground of (human) obligation is nothing
which constitutes a necessity binding on God1* tZ; by
Amirali. So we find that he is midway between fatalists
and libertarians, Professor Macdonald sums up his
position thus, "Man cannot create anything; God is the 
only creator, nor does man's power produce any effect 
on his actions at all. God creates in His creatures 
power and choice. Then He creates in him his actions 
corresponding to the power and choice thus created, 
so the action of the creature is created by God as to 
initiative and as to production; but it is acquired 
by the creature. By acquisition is meant that it 
corresponds to the creature's power and choice previously 
created in him without his having had the slightest 
effect on the action. He was only the locus or subject 
of the action."
/In
In regard to Quaran's expression about God's hands
and feet he maintained that they should not be interpreted
metaphorically as powers of God. But it does not mean
that God was Corporeal like man. It is merely the form in
which one man can visualise God. In late life he maintained
tru
a oomplete Bilence the subject and exhorted his followers 
not to ask any questions about the "how and why" of these 
things.
As for the Categories of Aristotle he maintained that
substance and quality were objectively real whirl e the others
had no Qbjpct.iv-elg: real while the othershad no objective. *
di(Ujt&n>Lrb
existence. Ab for the qualities themselves they^per se but 
only in the essence. They appear and disappear with the 
existences. But they are not in the things themselves but 
in the mind of the Knower. ^hey are the sensations which 
the things produce in the mind. He denies the Aristotlian 
doctrine that matter suffers the impress of form. The 
impress is subjective to the mind of the Knower. Matter 
is not eternal.
 0O0--
/H ow
Alghazali ( Algazel )
How we oome to one of the moBt emiment persons in 
the Islamio world, th^ .t whose influence is still visible 
in Moslem Indi/t. This was Abn Hamid Mohd. Ghazali. 
Professor Macdonald writes about him,
T' With the time came the man. He was Alghazali; the 
greatest, certainly the most sympathetic figure in the
history of Islam ......  The equal of Augustine in
Philosophical and theological importance. By his side 
the Aristotelian Philosophers of Islam, Ibn-i-RusHd and 
all the rest Beem beggarly Compilers and Scholiasts."
Claud Field remarks, " Alghazali is one of the deepest 
thinkers, greatest theologians and profoundest moralists
of Islam...... Intimately acquainted with all the learning
of his time, he was not only one of the numerous oriental 
philosophers who traverse every sphere of intellectual 
activity, but one of those rarer minds whc^originality 
is not crushed by their learning." Ghazali was born at
Tabdan in the district of Tub in 1058. In his early
childhood he was left an orphan, but one of his father's
friends took upon himBelf the task of providing instruction
for him. Later on he was admitted to a private school.
A few years after he joined the liizamia College at
"ieshapur where he distinguished in the usual religious
and Philosophical studies of the day. In the meantime
his fame spread far and wide and he was soon appointed
president of the/nizamia\ Academy of Baghdad. But
notwithstanding all the worldly prospects his mind was
restless. From the very beginning search for reality was
his sole object. What is it that is true and real.
He would not believe in the truth of anything simply
because he was taught so by his teachers or by the other
people. He tried to go to the root of every probelm.
How to arrive at a certainty about the human knowledge
was the question which he now asked himself. He
A
describes his inner experiences in his " mun^riz min 
adalal 11 ( translated by Claud Field and partly by 
Macdonald )
/So
Hbo I said to myself, what I want is knowledge of the real 
nature only of things, I must ask, therefore, what is the 
essence of knowledge. It seemed to me, then, that certain 
knowledge is that which uncovers the thing known in such a 
way that there does not remain with it any doubt nor 
accompany it the possibility of error or illusion, nor can 
the mind conceive such. security from error must accompany 
the certain to such a degree that if the claim of ability 
to show its falsity is made by someone, for example, who 
can a stone into gold or a staff into a serpent, that
would not produce any doubt or denial. For when 1 know 
that ten is more than three, if someone says to me, ‘no 
but three is more than ten and I will prove it by changing 
this staff into serpent' and he does change it and I see 
him do it, I do not doubt what I know because of that, and 
the only result for me is wonder as to how he could do such
a thing, but never any doubt as to what I know.-------So I
examined all the things which I kiiewband'fouhdethat I had np, 
knowledge which could be described in this way, except sense-
perceptions and necessary intuitive knowledge  So I must
test these first ---  So I turned zealously to consider the
object of sense and necessary knowledge and to try whether 
I could bring myself to doubt them, And doubt reached the 
point with me, that I could not permit myself to extend trust 
even to the object of the sense. Doubt as to thefi kept 
spreading and I said, "How can you be sure of object of sense 
while the stringent of the senses is vision and it looks at 
a shadow and sees the shadow standing unmoved and judges that
there is no motion. In such cases, then, the senses,
decide in one way but reason in another ----  So I said, "my
trust in the objects of the senses, too, is gone, perhaps 
there can be no trust save in those intellectual results which 
.^Tare animatic as our saying that ‘ten is more than three* or 
that 'negation and affirmation cannot exist together in one 
thing.' But the objects of the senses said, "what assurance 
have you that your trust in conclusions of reason is not like 
your trust in the object of the senses. You used to trust
in me; then came the test of the reason and gave me the lie--
Then, perhaps, behind the perceptions of the reason there is 
another test; whenever it appears reason will be given the 
lie by it. That such a perception has not appeared does not
prove its impossibility -----  Do not you see that in sleep
you believe in certain things, and you Imagine conditions and 
believe that they have reality and fixity and in that state 
you do not doubt them?, Then you wake up and you know that 
to all your imaginations and beliefs there was neither 
foundation nor use. Then how are you sure that all which in 
your waking time you believe in, because of either sense or 
reason, is not fact simply in relationship to your then
condition? Perhaps the life of this world is aJbleep in
relation to the other world and when a man dies things appear 
to him which are apposed to what he observes now." Then he
describes how he became a sceptic but unlike tttem his
scepticism was of a short duration. To resume his own
account he says, "When these things came to me a deep
Impression/
impression was made upon me and I desired some 
treatment against them, hut it was not easy. They 
oould be refuted only by means of proof and no 
proof can be set up, except by combining primary 
facts of knowledge, but when these are not granted 
a proof cannot be put together. This disease 
troubled me and remained with me almost two months.
During that time I was an absolute sceptic in mind, 
if not in statement. A t length God healed me of 
that disease .... That was not by means of a proof or 
by any form of words, but by a light which God cast 
into my breast." (Trby Macdonald) So in order to
escape from the doubts of the Sense-perception and
reason Ghaza/i took shelter behind mysticism. He
leaves the objective world to indulge in subjective
speculations and by that means tries to explain
certain problems of metaphysics. He discusses mysticism
in his book called Mishkat-ul-Anwar (Tr. by Gairdner).
In that he divides mankind into four classes viz.,
i. Those veiled with Veils of pure darkness
naturalist philosophers and Egotists, ii. Those veiled
with Veils of mi^ed Darkness and Light i.e. Worshippers
of Idols, etc., Corporealists, ^nthropomorphists, h„.r.: mites
Karramites, later Asharits etc. iii. Those veiled oy
pure light i.e. purged of all anthropomorphism, iv. The
unveiled who Attain^, e. i. Adepts who preserve self-
consciousness in their Absorpfeft*in this-Absolute, all
else being effaced and the Adepts whose self-consciousness
is also effaced. Some people are of opinion that Ghazali
was Pantheistic in his views, but a careful study of the
cJ
book leads us to the conclusion that the preservation the
actuality of the created things and did not identify it
with God, but he maintained that God is self subsistant
and the tilings are not so. "Being is itself divided 
into that which has being-in-itself and that which derives 
its being from not-itself. The being of this latter is 
borrowed, having no existence by itself. Nay, if it is 
regarded in and by itself it is pure not-being. What­
ever being it has is due to its relation to not-itself, 
which is not real being at all If"
Here/
Here by unreal he means Conditioned, and Relation.
Carra De Vaux writes, "Ghazali and the orthodox 
S^fis regarded ascetism as the ordinary means of attaining 
to Sceince, expecting ecstacy to follow naturally, after a 
more or less protracted interval, on exercising of ascetism. 
Ho such doctrine could he entertained by a Christian Philo­
sopher. The idea that Cod can be tracked down as it were 
in the inner sanctuary of His presence by a stern 
perseverance in rigorous ascetism has no parallel outside 
India." There is much difference of opinion about this
point and it will be discussed in connection with Hagwairi.
(Mishkat-ul-Anwar).
According to Ghazali the Absolute, the ultimate Princi­
ple of all existence is ’Light*. "He alone is the Real, 
the True light and beside Him there is no light at all."
"Light is summed up in appearing and manifesting ----  for
unless a thing is manifest itself it is not manifest to othe 
others." So manifestation constitutes 1^ -is very Essence
and is not an attribute, added to it. The affirmation of
Light by necessity p^ w^ t-e* its own negation. There is no
darkness so intense as the darxness of non-Being. To
quote again "Being is itself divided into that which has 
being in itself and that which derives its being from not- 
itself. ’ So there is no dualism between Light and dark­
ness as the Zoroastrianism supposed. ’Por everything has 
two aspects, an aspect to itself and an aspect to its Lord, 
in respect of the firso it is not being out in respect of 
the God-aspect, it is Being. Therefore there is no 
Existent except God. "The whole world is all filled with th 
the external lights of perception and th£& internal light 
of intelligence; also the lower lights.Jare effused or emanate 
the one from the other, as light emanates from a lamp; while 
the lamp itself is the transcendental Light of Prophecy; 
and that the transcendental spirits of Prophecy are lit 
from the Spirit Supernal as the lamp is lit from fire and 
that the Supernals are lit the one from the other and that 
their order is one of ascending grarfes: further, that these 
all rise to the light of lights, the Virgin of Pountain- 
head of lights and that is God." "Just as there is no 
deity but He, so there is no being but He for ’he’ is an 
expression for womething which one can indicate; but in 
every and any case we can but indicate Him’. ’The former 
is more general but the latter is more particular, and 
more comprehensive”.
This kingdom of’Oneness and Onljtness’ is the ultimate 
point of mortal’s ’Ascent’.
Then Ghazali comes to the Platonic doctrine of Ideas.
He maintains that the world is Two World&, spiritual and
material/
material, is a world sensual and a world intelligential, 
or a world supernal and a world inferior. All these ex­
pressions are near each other and the difference between 
them is merely one of view point. . . . The visible world 
is the point of departure up to the world of Realm Supei^jiai 
. . . the former has a correspondence with the latter . . . 
there is not a single thing in this world of sense that is 
not a symbol of something in yonder one.“.
~ o O
Psychology/
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PSYCHOLOGY.
Ghazali discusses the question of the human Soul in 
Hal-i-Masail-i-Ghamiza" Wherein he maintains that the 
Soul is a spiritual substance incapable of division.
In divisibility a part may be conscious and another 
part unconscious of the same object simultaneously, 
and this is impossible in the case of the Soul. It 
is not spacial because anything that occupies space 
cannot be called "Indivisible1 The Soul does not fill 
the body and is at the same time not outside the body 
because these terms can be applied only to the Corporeal 
substances and have no meaning in regard to the Soul.
Its relation to the body is that of an image to the 
mirror. Just as a piece of iron when polished is 
capable of receiving images, so the particles of 
inanimate matter, passing through the vegetative state, 
enter the human body and are converted into blood and 
are thus rendered fit for the reception of the Soul at 
the proper time. In this way the body of an unborn child 
acts like a mirror. Its existence is not prior to the 
body to which it belongs. When the body is made the 
Soul comes into existence. Had the Soul any prior exist­
ence, it would have been either one or many, The 
Soul cannot be a unity because after its connection with 
so many bodies it could^either retain its unity for 
fear of leading to a common cognition, nor become many, 
because it has no magnitude and is consequently 
indivisible. Had there existed many Souls prior to 
their connection with the bodies, they must be either 
differentiated or undifferentiated. The latter is 
impossible because it means unity. «.s regards the
/former
K'state the Souls will he either different in essence 
or different in accidents. The Souls are not different 
from each other substantially. As far as accidents are 
concerned they have no existance prior to Soul's connection 
with the body. From the above he concludes that a 
Soul has no existence prior to the body but is created 
when the body is made fit for its reception. It is 
just like an image in a mirror. In his Mishkat U1 Anwar 
he grades human spirit as follows:- (l) Sensory Spirit- 
the recepient of the information brought in by the 
senses. (2} Imaginative Spirit-recoraer of the information 
filed and ready to hand. It is not found in the infant 
at the beginning of it^evolution.
(3) Intelligential Spirit- This apprehends ideas beyond 
the spheres of sense and imagination such as axioms of 
necessary and Universal application
(4) The discursive Spirit- This takes the data of pure 
reason and combines them, arranges them as premisses and
fH
deduces from thekr informing knowledge and so on. (in 
these he follows .Aristotle)
(5) The transcendental prophetic Spirit- This is the property 
of prophets and some saints. By it the Unseen tables and 
statutes of the Law are revealed from the other world, 
together with several of the Sciences of the Realms 
Celestial and Terrestrial, and pre-eminently Theology,
the Science of Deity, which the intelligentia and 
discursive Spirits cannot compass.
Ethics. Ghazali’s book on Ethics called Ihya ul hlum 
is well known in the Islamic world. Lev/is considers
that if this book had been translated at the time of 
Descartes it would have been thought that Descartes 
borrowed Ills philosophy from Ghazali.” This book is very 
popular even in these days in India. It appears that in 
this book Ghazali has mainly followed Qut ul qulub of Abu
/Talili
Talil/fc Makki* In most oases he had reproduced the very 
words of that book.
In Ihya Ulalum Ghazali has dealt with the subject 
matter very clearly explaining in a clear style the most 
difficult problems which the former philosophers expressed 
in so difficult and complicated a style that it was not 
easy for ^layman to grasp them fully. The ’Kita^* Ul 
Taharat’ of Ibn-i-Maskwai^, may be cited as an example 
of this type. But Ghazali!s composition is very 
different from that. He is interesting both to the 
Philosopher and the Layman.
In kizan Ul Amal he discusses the doctrine of 
Cardinal virtues and the mean and in this he mainly 
follows Aristotle, though here and there he combines 
his arguments with mystic views. He maintains that 
actions and religious experience must go together.
The former must be the manifestation of the latter. 
Religious knowledge not applied in action is useless. 
But when a man attains the state of perfection, 
performance of works is not necessary but in order that 
the other people may not be misled by his behaviour, 
an outward observance of law should be carried on.
He lays greater stress on knowledge than volition. 
Knowledge gives rise to volition which leads to action.
He differs from other Philosophers in holding that 
knowledge without action is worthless. By knowledge 
he means both religious and secular but not the 
knowledge of Reality. a  man may fetudy the scriptures 
but the mere knowledge of the scriptures without
/consequent
consequent actions resulting therefd***. is of no use. 
Similarly the scientific knowledge that is not 
applicable to art or to the welfare of man is of no 
value.
He agrees with Asharites in maintaining that man 
should appropriate or assimilate the Divine Actions. 
Actions are good or bad in as much as they depend upon 
the free choice and free willing of the doer. But he 
does not consider a man to be absolutely free and so his 
actions are to be considered relatively. The material 
world is a world of necessity, only the Divine Will is 
absolutely free. The human will is midway between the 
world of nature and God and so may be called relatively 
free. God is omnipotent and acts as He likes. Though 
He can demand from men what is beyond their power yet He 
does not actually do so. He does not lay on any Soul any 
burden that is beyond its power. Moreover He is not 
bound to have a regard for the Welfare of the people but 
He sends them prophets and Saints for their Guidance.
There are two kinds of creations viz., 1 . Incapable 
of growth. 11. Capable of growth. Gold is gold and does 
not become anj^thing else. But an acorn becomes an cak 
or a child grows into a man. He believes that a child 
is born good by nature and so he has the capacity of 
developing a good moral disposition, hence the necessity 
for a sound moral training. Moral training simply means 
the bringing out what is hidden in the child.
Divine Service is both positive and negative. The
former means the performance of good works and the latter
oonsists in the Self control and abandonment of Sin.
The latter is more important than the former. Hot to 
h)
gratify an unlayful desire when a man has power
n 9 -
to do so is more meritorious than the performance 
of any ceremonials enjoined by the Law.
He discusses the question of marriage and 
celibacy in Ihya Ul Alum. It appears at first that 
he favours the latter and considers it intrinsically 
better, but in a later passage he prefers marriage to 
celibacy. To live in the world with all its storms 
and furies and to guide the ship of life safely to 
an anchor shows greater worth in a man than the life of 
peace and repose in a secluded part of the jungle.
Then he finally decides that each case is to be judged 
on its own merits. He maintains that man can attain 
to moral perfection in this world. The prophets 
were perfect men and a man has to follow their 
example. "Man’s perfection," he says, "consists 
in reproducing the characteristics of God and in 
adorning himself with the true essence of His 
attributes." In his heart the man is the image 
of God but with corruption the heart becomes rusty 
and does not reflect the Divine light. The sheikh 
or a saint can then lead him out of his pitiable 
condition.
"The aim of moral life is not the attainment of 
paradise or an escape from hell but to make oneself 
a perfect m a n . "
Perhaps Ghaiz&ls’s importance he mainly in his 
attack on Pro-Greek philosophers. These people 
had interpreted the Quran in the light of Greek 
thought, but Ghaza/i maintained that this interpretation 
was against the real teaching of the Quran. He 
consid e r ^ t h e  Greek thought to be defective and the
interpretation of the holy oook in the light of that
/ thought
thought would naturally lead the followers to fall 
into heresy. So he came out to dethrone Aristotle 
and Plato from the position they held in the Moslem 
World. In order to make himself sure that he 
understood correctly the teaching of Greek philosophers 
he composed a hook called MaqAsidul Palasafa in 
which he gives a summary of the views of the Pro-Greek 
philosophers. This hook deals with all the branches of 
philosophy. Then he took up the task of refuting 
their arguments one hy one. With this aim in view 
he wrote his well-known hook "Tahafat Ul Filasafa”
(The Destruction of the Philosophers). It may he 
said that in this Ghazali acted like Kant in 
demolishing the shallow rationalism of his time, hut 
unlike Kant he often takes shelter behind mystic 
experiences. The main points of attack are as follov/:- 
a. The philosophers’ claim that matter is eternal
is false.
h. according to their accepted principles God
cannot he the creator of the world.
c. They fail to prove the existence, the unity, 
the simplicity, the incorporeality or the 
knowledge (both of species and accidents) of God.
d. Their description of the deity as demiurgos is 
unspiritual.
e. They cannot prove the ascription of the souls to the 
celest/lal spheres.
f. Their theory of causation, which attributes effects 
to the very nature of the causes, is false.
g. They cannot prove the spirituality of the soul nor 
prove its immortality.
h. They are wrong in not believing in Resurrection of
the bodies.
/The
The importance of this hook can he judged from 
the fact that Averroes had to compose a treatise.,
"The Destruction of the Destruction of the Philosophers" 
to uphold the doctrine of the Philosophers. i°.
ISLAMIC CULTUHE III INDIA 
HA.JWAIBI
We have given a "brief outline of the culture which the Muslins 
had brought to India. W© have seen.from the pure pro Greek 
philosophical speculations Ghazali and Ashairas had turned the 
tide of Moslem thought into the channel of Mysticism. So for 
.a long time Su-jfism was the acknowledged creed of the learned 
men of the Moslem woitld. With the coming of Islam in India
1 I
mysticism found a fertile groung in the newly converted Hindusiwho
learned the doctrine of Ghazaliwith a zeal which was no less
yy A t
m xked than that of the Pers&wa and Tartar ^ noslems. In fact the 
history of Islamic thought in India is more or less a history 
of mysticism. Philosophy made no advance in any direction other .
L ’than this. To separate philosophy and religionin the Sast is 
an impossible task. So for our data we have to rely upon the 
mystical teaching of the Saints and theologians. During the
whole of the Moslem rule in India we find the rulers and the 
wtalthy people patronising the man of learning and talents, but 
no where in the whole history we find anyone coming forward y/ith 
purely metaphysical speculations apart from what can be gathered 
here and there in theological discussions and poetic expressions. 
The patrons cared more for literature than philosophy. But any 
wprk of literary merit must have something to say .about. In 
this way some of the poets have left fine work where guided by 
an inspiration from the above their thought leaves behind the 
realm of externality and intellectuality and penetrates dreper
and deeper into that of spirituality and^uition, where in the j
I,
words of Carlyle "Understanding waves and recoils dazzled into 
utter darkness by that "Sea of Light" at once the fountain and
the termination of all ±*»e true knowledge "•
The first of the mystic s ints to settle down in India was 
Abu HasanAli bin Usman Haywsiri. He was a native of Ghazijui im
Afghanis ran,,
Afghanistan . Ha was born in the last decade of the tenth 
or the first decade of the eleventh century and died between 
1072 and 1076. So for a short time he was a contemporary 
of GhazAli. His teachfcag Sufism (mysticism) whaxs were 
Abul Eaiz Mulhammad andAfeu Abbas Ahmad^. He was a great 
traveller and travelled all over the Islamic world and finally
came to India where he settled down permanently. He was held 
in great respect not only by his contemporaries but by the
Majority of Muslims of the later time as well. His tomb in
Lahore is visited by thousands ofppKpJiftd people every year.
As regards his writings he composed a number of 
works on various subjects . Apart from his poetical work^s 
he had (l)'Mlnhajuddin1 on the method of Sufism (2) Asraafc,
Ul Hhira^Wal Maunat or the patched frocks of Surf is (3)
Kitabul fana wal Baga (%n annihilation and existence (4) Life
rv , . C"
MatLSurs bin Hallsj (5) Kil^jabul B yan li ahl al Iyan on
union with God (6) Bahr ul Qulub on Sufism (7) Al Hisyat 
xixiyjpst li Hagu& ullah on the divine trinity etc. But all 
these works have been lost . His ohly extant work is 
Kashful Mahjub (unveilihg of the veiled) composed during 
his stay at Lahore. This hook has been translated into 
English by Prof. Nicholson and gives us an idea of what 
Sufism m ant in those times. It not only gives the views 
of the Author but also the tea chings of the various schools 
of thought in Sufism and in this way/ is a valuable help 
in understanding in Islamic mysticism from various points 
of view. After studying this book I do not think there is 
any need of studying further literature on India^ufism. >
Hajwairi in discussing the problem of knowledge quotes 
the Sphists who deny the possibility of knowledge.
Be says " The e is a sect of heretics called So hists who 
believe that nothing can be known and that knowledge itself 
does not exist I say to them " You think that nothing can be 
known ; is your opinion correct or not ?, If they answer
it is correct « they hereby affirm the reality of knowledge
and
#and if they reply 1 it is not correct 1 then to argue against 
an avowedly incorrect assertion is absurd. But knowledge 
consists of knowing something or we may say knowledge con­
sists of knowing ’’truth”. At the highest level it consists 
in knowing the ultimate truth.
Here Wajwairi ^regjjj^^that all men "by their essence
from
can know the 'truth'. One man is veiled fc;p: the truth hy his 
essence so that in his view truth and falsehood are the iaipe8.
Another man is veiled from the Truth by his attributes 
so that his nature and heart continually seek the Truth and 
flee from falsehood. Therefore the veil of essence is never r 
removed. "
Consciousness is of two kinds, viz Human conscious- 
-ness and Divixte Consciousness. ' God's ' knowledge is an 
attribute of Himself, subsisting in Him whose attributes 
are infinite.
Our knowledge i3 an attribute of ourselves subsist-
is us, whose attributes are finite.
God knows all .things existent and non-existent.
(This means that feality existed in God's mind as an idea
from eternity and this Idea is actualized in existence,)
In fact the dtfltinctieiijibetween existence and non existence
does not apply to this knowledge. His knowledge Is absolute
free from the limitations of finite minds. He does not share
His knowledge with man. So man's knowledge ixxkxiHgxxEkjcfclxe
differs from God's knowledge is not capable of division norA
separable from Him.
Man's knowledge may be sub-divided into (l) Knowledge 
of the Physical (2) Knowledge of the Spiritual. The Highest 
level of the latter is the knowledge of "Truth". This has
i i
three pillars viz 1 Knowledge of the Essence of God 'II' 
Knowledge of the attributes of God 'III' Kno?/ledge of the 
Actions and V/isdom of God which includesthe knowledge of the 
Physical. In a sense Hajwairi is correct. All man's know­
ledge is a knowledge of God that is to say it is a particulay
determination
determination of man’s knowledge of the Infinite. But it 
does not follow that man is able to discover His Perfections 
as they are in themselves.
"Knowledge of Divine Essence involves recognition that 
Sod exists externally by His Essence, that He is infinite 
and not bounded by space, that His Essence is not the cadse 
of the evil, that none of His creatures are like Him.
God has attributes existing in Himself which are not 
He or part of Him i.e. Knowledge, powerr life Will etc.
God is the creator of mankind and of all their Actions "
This means that God has given man power to act. But Hajwairi
IXW
believes 4-f predestination " He brought the non-existent 
universe into being, he predistines good and evil and 
creates all that is beneficial and injurious i.e physical 
good and evil.
Comparing with Western mysticism we find that accord­
ing to St. Gregory { as interpreted by Mr. D&dden) "God’s 
nature is the object of the knowledge of the angels and 
blessed spirits, and sometimes of mortal men, raised in con- 
-templation , but God’s Hssence can be knowledge only by 
Himself and cannot be the object of the knowledge of any 
created intelligence" But other interprefcs&f^Sls do not 
interpret St. Gregory in this way.
Then Hajwairi discusses the various theories of the 
mystics as to haw t)^ 6 knowledge of Truth is attained. The
Chief Sources considered are :--  1 .Intellect - 2.Intuition
3.Inspiration 4/Sight Peeling.
This may correspond to the 1Heason’ Intuition 
which is partly grounded in instincts, feeling and desires’ 
and testimony of modem methodology .
He denies that knowledge of Truth can be obtained
u
by intellect or reason. He writes ” The Mjtta^Tzalites assert
that gnosis is intellectual and that only a reasonable person
can possibly hrve it. According to this oritAriam madmen .and
children must be without gnosis. If reason were the cause
of gnosis it would follow that every reasonable person must
know
ypf <•
know God and all that lack reason must be ignorant of
Him, which is manifestly absurd. Others pretend that 
' demonstration ' is the cause of knowledge of God and hat 
such knowledge is not gained except by thos^ who deduce it 
in this manner. But soundness of reason and regard to
evidences are a means to gnosis but not the cause thereof" --
What is not God is phenomenal and although a phenomenal being
may reach another like himself, he cannot reach his Creator 
and aoquifce Him while he exists, for in every act of acquisi- 
-tion he who makes the acquisition is predominent and the 
thing acquired is under his power. Accordingly the miracle 
is not that reason should be led by the act to affirm the 
existence of the Agent, ‘but. that a Saint should be led by the 
light of Truth to deny his own existence. The knowledge gained 
is in the one case a matter of logic, in the other it becomes 
an inward experience • Let those who deem reason to be 
the cause of gnosis consider what reason affirms in their 
minds concerning the subft&anee of gnosis for gnosis includes 
the negation of whatever is affirmed by reason i.e. Whatever 
notion of God can be formed by reason God is in reality 
something different • To infer the existence of God from 
intellectual proofs is assimilation and to deny it on the 
same ground is nullifacation. Heason cannot pass beyond 
these two principles which in regard to gnosis is agnosticism"
can have a knowledge of God. But we in our present state 
of knowledge cannot admit the truth of this statement* 
Moreover the acquisition of the knowledge of a thing does 
not mean the acquisition of the thing itself. 'Af may have 
a knowledge of ’B* but it does not mean that ’A 1 has 1B* in 
his power. It is true that a complete knowledge of Heality 
by a finite mind will make the reality finite but it does 
not follow that a finite mind cannot have a partial knowledge 
of God.
So Hajwairi maintains that madmen and children
However it would be better to see what the Western 
thinkers say on this point. Plotinus would say that
that
 — — *0--
that Reminiscence would impart only inferior knowledge , 
"because it implies separation "between the subject and the 
object. Ecstasy is superior - being the absolute realisation 
of their identity. Plotinus does not exclude reason totally 
but subordin*tejit is ecstasy when the Absolute is concerned . 
He affirms a God beyond reason and then a faculty beyond 
reason to disown that God withal.
Bergson says ” Our intellect in the narrow senseof the 
word, is intended to secure the perfect fitting of our body 
to its Environment , to represent the relation of external 
things among themselves - in short to think matter” It is at 
home with solids and inert things it sees all becoming 
as being, as a series of states, it misses the connective 
tissue of things, the Real life.
A
2. Inspiration. Hajwairi continues , " Others declare 
again that gnosis is the result of inspiration . This also 
is impossible because gnosis supplied a criterion for distin­
guishing truth from falsehood, whereas the inspired has no 
such criterion. This view is held by Brahmans” Man has io 
take for granted what is given in inspiration or revelation.
To jrest inspiration he must have recourse to intellect, the 
validity of which Hajwairi does not admit in gnosis. More- 
-over inspiration is mainly meant as a guide for the people 
to regulate their enA&ofct according to a certain pattern. It 
reveals God as an object of worship.
3. Others assert that knowledge of God is intuitive
(A man has a faculty or a capacity by which he can come into
direct telepathic communication with God. Empirical or
individual intuition can be transformed into essential ynsight
or essential intuition, the object of which is the correspond-
-ing pure essence or eidos.) This also is impossible •
Everything that is known in this way must be known in common
by all reasonable men and in as much as some reasonable men
deny the existence of God, it is proved that knowledge of God
is not intuitive. Some aspirants to Suffsm considering the
absolute certainty which they feel declare, ” W0 know God
intuitively/
f Q f
intuitively , giving the name intuition to thia certainty. 
Substantially they are correct, hut their expression is 
erroneous, because intuitive knowledge cannot be exclusive 
-ly restricted to those who ©re prefect; on the contrary 
it belong5to all reasonable men. The agnostic while he 
remains a gnostic has no fear of being separated from God. 
Separation is produced by the loss of gnosis,but intuitive 
knowledge cannot be conceivably lost.
The intuitive faculty of Plotinus, the Intellectuelle 
Ansohauung of Shelling, the Intuitive Reason, soureh of 
Ideas and Absolute truths, the Organ of Philosophy and 
theology of Coleridge, helps a man to behold Cod directly. 
According to Schelling , it is the realisation of the 
Identity of Subject and Object in the individual • In this 
he is blended with that identity of subject and object which 
is called Cod. Prom the centre of their identity he in a 
way, thinks Divine thoughts and looks at the things from 
their point of View.
According to i&nerson he becomes recepient of the 
Universal Soul. "He loses" according to Coleridge, "the 
particular in the Universal Reason, findsthat ideas appear 
within him from an internal source supplied by the Logos 
or external world of Cod, and infalliable utterance from the 
divine Original of man's highest nature " But one may 
object that instead of being a Universal truth, it is merely 
clothing the particular with a kind of Divine authority.
SI
Is there any certainty that it does not give us creaiimg y  
t/r
fancy cr£ flights of imagination or personal idiosyncracies.
(4) Aight Peeling. Hajwairi state5 that " when
reason has gone as far as possible and the soul$ of His
lovers must need search forHlm, they grow restless and
stretch their hands in supplication and seek relief for their
souls and when they have exhausted every manner of search
in their power ("Seek and Ye shall find"-# The Bible^ the
power og Cod becomes theiY i.«. they find a wny from Him
to
to Him and set foot in the garden of intimacy. Gojjd causes 
man to know Him through Himself with a knowledge that is 
not linked to any faculty, a knowledge in which the existence 
of man is merely metaphorical. Hence the agnostic egoism 
is utter perfidy and his remembrance of God is Y^ithout for- 
-getfulness and his gnosis is emply word but actual feeling.
According to St. Thomas Acquinas there are three ways
of acquiring knowledge : —
(a) In the state after the Fall we need a kind of
mirror in which to see a likeness of God, for we know him
only through His creatures. (b) In the state of inno-
-cence God was seen by a spiritual light, flowing upon
man’s mind from the Divinity, which was an express like-
-ness of the uncreated light (c) But in heaven not even
this means is necessary, but God's own essence is the means
by which it is seen. But St. Thomas adds that the second
kind of Knowledge is still given to man in contemplation.
(Chapman).
like Hajwairi both Plotinus and Proclus maintain 
that the hi heat revelation concerning Divine things is 
given to the Soul which becomes dead to all and withdraws 
into itself. Similarly Dionysius exhorts Timothy,
" by assiduous- practice.in mystical contemplation to abandon
lC7+y
the tenses and all operatives of the intellect ;Sfcx*Aii & til 
objects of thoughtjf all things non-existent and existent 
and ignorantly to strive u.wards towards union as close es 
possible with Him who is above all Essence and knowledge "
De Mystica Theologia*
Eckart's 'Spark of the Soul1 is the same as 
kxXfcsxSbcijctaH "The Intuition of Plotinus" By this, 
one can merge oneself into the Unchangeable by transcending 
the "Sensible”. But at this hei ht God is an abstraction, 
above being and above attributes. Plotinus m intains that 
such moments are few and far between, while for Bckart this 
realisation of oneness ith God is habitual.
For Hegel 'thought1 brings about an unity between human 
nature and Divine. Both God and man are unconscious 
of themselves till thought has been developed into a 
philosophical system. Against Hajwairi Hegel maintains 
that when this knowledge which claims to be essential 
and ignores apprehension professes to have sunk the 
peculiarity of Solf in the Essence and so to give forth 
the utterance of a hallowed and unerring philosophy, men 
quite overlook the fact that this so-called wisdom, instead 
of being yielded up to the influence of Divinity by its 
contempt of all proportion and definiteness does really 
nothing but give full play to accident and caprice.
t v
Such men imagine that by surrending themselves to the
A
unregulated ferment of the Substance, by throwing a veil
over consciousness and abandoning the under*Raiding, they
become those favourites of the Deity, to whom he gives
wisdom in sleep; verily nothing was ever produced by
such a process better than mere dreams” - Phenomenologia
In the next chapter we shall see the nature of
mystical experience. Meanwhile we continue Hajwairi's
statement about God. nGod is one hut His unity is not_ 
a
jk number so as to be made t\ o by the predication o± 
another number, He is not finite so as to have sijt
directions. He has no space and is not in space so as
to reauire the predication of space; He is not the accident
so as to need a substance^ nor a substance which cannot
exist without another like itself, nor a natural consti-
-tution in which motion and rest originate, nor a spirit
so as to need a frame, nor a body so as to be composed
immanent
of limbs; He does not become tmaaneldit in things, for 
then he must be homogeneous with them. He is not joined
to anything for then that thing must be part of Him; He is
free from all imperfections* and exalted above all defects;
mHe has no like so that He and His creatures make tY/o;
He has no child, whom begetting would necessarily cause 
Him to be a stock; His essence and attributes are unchange- 
-able; He is living, Knowing, Forgiving, Merciful, Willing 
Powerful, Hearing, Speaking and Subsistent. His knowledge
is not a state in Him, nor His power solidly planted in 
Him, nor His speech divided in Him; He together with his 
attributes exists from eternity; object of cognition are 
not outside His knowledge, entities are entirely dependent 
on His will; He does that which he has willed and wills 
that which He has known and no creature has cognizance 
thereof; His decree is an absolute fact; He is the 
Sole predestinator of good and evil; He creates all 
benefit and injury; He above gives judgment and His 
judgment is all wisdom; no one has any possibility of 
attaining unto Him; assimilation is inadmissible.
Such terms as confronting and seeing face to face cannot 
be applied to His Being*
SUFIS&/
In this chapter on Sufism he discusses the origin of
the word Sufism. He takes the following interpretations
(l) One who w^ars a woollen garment (2) One who is in the
first rank (3) One who belongs to the people of Saffa
(4) One who is pure. He differs from the modern
writers in assigning the last named as the true mean ng of the I
!
word S u f i a s  against the first one. So he maintain^
that a true Sufi is one that leaves the impurity behind.
"Purity is the attribute of those who love, and the lover
is he who is dead in his own attributes and lives in the 
attributes of his beloved"
Again, "When a man has escaped from the cap^tpvity 
of "stations" and gets rid of the impurity of States and is 
liberated from the abode of change and decay and becomes 
endowed with all praisefc/orthy qualities. His presence 
with God has no end and his existence has no cause. And 
when he arrives at this degree, he becomes annihilated 
in this world and the newt, and is made divine in the 
disappearance of humanity. 'Purity is a resplendent 
and manifest idea and 3ufism is an imitstion of that 
idea. The Author then quotes the opinion of the 
various Shaykhs about Sufism. They look upon it from 
different points of view.
Zunn.. "A  Su^ Cfi " says nothing which he is not".
Junayd. "The essence of Sufism is an attribute j
of God and its formal system is an attribute of mankind
i.e. its essence involves the annihilation pf human quali- j
-ties , which is brought about by the everlastingness of 
Divine qualities and this is an attribute of God; whereas 
its formal system involves on the part of man the contin- 
-uance of Self mortification and this is an attribute of 
man, or in another sense in real unification there are 
no human attributes at all, because hum^n attributes 
are not constant, but are only formal, having no perman­
ence, for (jod is the Agent.. Therefore they are
really
are really the attributes of God.
Myptic is one Who has [transcended every accent af ei 
^olyjheigljt and j^ as lefti behind all divine Jights and 
[ounces and\ heavenly discovering!, andlhas passed 
that fcarkneVss wheie He isl really who ii abov\ all 
Myitica Aheologla.
ery
things.
Abul Hassan. :—  "Sufism is the renunciation of all 
Selfish pleasures". If one renounces a pleasure and finds 
pleasure in the renunciation, this is a formal renunciation, 
but if the pleasure renounces him, then the pleasure is 
annihilated, and this is the act of God.
"Sufi is he who has nothing in his possession aafi is him- 
-self possessed hy anything". This denotes the essence 
of annihilation, since one whose -ualities are annihil- 
-tedt neither posses nor is possessed. Whoever becomes 
blind to Self sees by means of God because the seeker of
phenomenon is also a self seeker.
Shibli:- Sufism is polytheism because it is the guard-
-ing of the heart from the vision of the "other" and the*
'other' does not exist. That is to say, vision of 'other' 
than God in affirming the unity of God^is polytheism and 
when 'other* has no value in the heart it is absurd to guard 
the heart from the remembrahce of 'other* Human existence 
is other^when a man does not see "other" he does not 
see himself and becomes totally void of Self whether Self 
is affirmed or denied.
Then Hajwairi concluded that the object of all 
these expressions is that Srakl the Sufi state of mortality 
should entirely lapse and that his bodily feelings should 
disappear and his connection with everything be cut off, in 
order that the mystery of his mortality may be revealed 
and his various parts united in his essential self and 
that he may B-aba it through a and in himself.
Let us see here how the Western thinkers define 
mysticism:--
Joly
Joly. "Love of Go d is mysticism "(Pschologia De Saints) 
Louismet. "Mysticism is only the Christian life lived 
on a high level'.’
Harnack "Mysticism is Homan Catholic piety in
extreme form"
fp-
Sharp. "A (conscious) direct contact with the Soul
with Transcendental Reality"
Evelyn Underhill. "The establishing conscious relations 
with the Absolute"
Rufus Jones. "The Soul's possible union in this
life with Absolute Reality."
The mediaeval thinkers give a somewhat similar view to 
Hajwairi
St. Gregory. "(Mysticism) is a struggle wherein the 
mind disengages itself from the things of the world 
and fixes its attention wholly on spiritual things, and 
thereby raises itself above itself and by dint
of a great effort mounts up to a momentary perception 
of the "Unencompassed Light" as thirost&ha chink and
then exhausted by the effort and blinded by the vision
of the light, it sinks back wearied to its normal state, 
to recuperate its spiritual strength by exercising the 
works of the active life, till in due time it can again 
brace itself for the effort of another act of contemplation. 
St. Augustine. "If the tumult of the flesh were hushed,
hushed the sense-impressions of the earth, sea and sky, hushed
also the heavens yea the very soiil be hushed to herself.....
.......  Were not this : Enter into the joy of thy Lord”
"God, through the Holy Ghost, inclines Himself towards 
us and thereby we are touched in Love.. And our spirit by
God's working and by the power of Love, presses and inclines
itself into God, and thereby God is touched This makes
each of the spirits (God's as well as man's) yearn for the 
other in love. This makes the lovers melt into each other""
(Adornment
(Adornment of the Spiritual Marriage Bk II)
The following passage will give us an idea of the 
extent to which the Soul is sbsorbed in God in Christian 
Mysticism:- "As melted halm that no longer has formness 
and solidity, the Soul lets herself pass or flow into 
what she loves .... she gently glides as a fluid thing 
into the Divinity whom she loves ... being wholly 
mingled with, absorbed and engulfed in, her God".
(St.Francis of Sales)
A Mystic is one who has transcended every ascent 
of every holy height and has left behind all divine 
lights and sounds and heavenly discoverings and have 
passed into that Darkness where He really is who is 
above all things. De Mystica Theologia*
How we give the chief characteristics of Hindu^—' 
Muslim and Christian mysticism.
(1) It lays claim to disinterested love.
(2) It reacts against the Ceremonial prescriptions
of the Vedas 
(3| It identifies subject and object
(4) It aims at ultimate absorption of the
individual into God after many births and 
rebirths.
(5) It develops the idea of Personal God as an 
object of love
(6) It breaks from the barrier of Caste and Class 
distinction slowly.
Muslim. l.It lays stress on the conformation with the
ceremonials.
2. It does not identify subject and object/.
3. It maintains subsistence after annihilation
4. It does not believe in total merging of the
essence of the Soul in Divine Essence.
5. It does not undervalue the manifestation of God
/
Hindu
to nature. CHRISTIAN/
CHRISTIAN.
(1) It heaps up negative terms like “Darkness,1 
"Void," “Nothingness11, instead of “Light and Fullness".
(2) It treats mysticism in a speculative and 
philosophical manner according to the doctrines of 
Plato and Aristotle.
(3) It has many mystics among the fair sex and 
they have more visions than men.
(4) The Devil figures largely in the stories of the 
mystics.
(5) It belives in complete absorption of the 
Soul into Deity, though temporarily.
(6) It looks at the Personality of God more clear­
ly than any other form of mysticism.
MYSTICAL EXPERIENCE
This is an age of science. By observing and 
experimenting on the contents of the world presented to 
ds in experience, we try to discover the cause of the 
things. Our conclusions and results are again verified 
in experience. This method is useful as far as the 
material world goes. But we are apt to apply the 
scientific methods to things spiritual as well, for with 
us nothing is so certain as the conclusion arrived at by 
a scientific method. The people in old times had much 
reliance on authority. Now authority is giving way to 
reason. The sclentiYic method seems to us more reasonable 
than revelation and inspiration. It is based on the 
assumption of the uniformity of nature. Where it appears 
that the normal working of the laws of nature is hindered, 
we try to discredit the phenomenon, or we try to explain 
the discrepancy by physical laws. We give it the name of 
Psyohioal Research. Telepathy - Clairvoyance -Apparitions 
and many others are instances of this process. We do not 
call than supernatural phenomena, but super-normal. Even 
if the phenomena, which we call supernatural, do occur, 
we believe that they belong to more extended order of 
nature than modern, orthodox science now recognises. So 
it is of utmost importance that they should be investi­
gated scientifically, and not accepted blindly.
Prof.Sedgwick says:-
"We are all agreed that the present state of things 
is a scandal to the enlightened age in which we live. 
That the dispute as to the reality of these marvellous 
phenomena - of which it is quite impossible to 
exaggerate the scientific importance, if only a tenth 
part of what has been alleged by generally credible 
witnesses could be shown to be true - I say it is a 
scandal that the dispute as to the reality of these
(phenomena)
phenomena should still be going on, that so many 
competent witnesses should have declared their belief 
in them, that so many others should be so profoundly 
interested in haviing the question determined, and yet 
that the educated world, as a body, should still be 
simply in the attitude of incredulity".
As far as the number of witnesses is concerned, the 
above remarks can equally well be applied to mystical 
experience. In every country, every nation of the world 
we find a trace of this kind of experience. The number 
of persons who had mystical experience in their life is 
so great that we cannot set it aside a» simply absurd.
But the difficulty is that we cannot investigate it like 
other super-normal phenomenal by any known scientific 
method, because we hardly find any person in modern times 
who lays claim to mystical experience, and at the same 
time, is willing to undergo a scientific test. This 
experience is of a peculiar nature and those who have it 
do not care for the world or its tests. But still from 
the sayings and utterances of the mystics, we shall try to 
investigate it as far as we can. we will confine our 
attention to Muslim mystics only, we must strip ourselves 
of all prejudices. As a matter of fact, opposition to 
mystical experience among certain people is based chiefly 
upon the inner conviction that such things cannot happen, 
therefore they do not happen. They do not, and cannot fit 
into the particular schema of the universe held true by 
the individual, and so rather than alter his philosophy, 
he prefers to ignore and deny the facts. The standpoint 
from which we may begin our investigation is this: let us 
begin by disbelieving everything except facts. Let us 
investigate these without religious prejudice, on the one 
hand, or scientific prejudice on the other.
It is a fact that we have ample record of mystical
(experience)
Jxporienco, in tho writings of the 'Eufis saints and 
their disciplos. We have to see "how far we can believe
these records to he true. There is no doubt that Orfental
mind is much given to exagg jfat'ion. A disciple would not 
fail to make much of tho experience of his Shaykh and 
present it in a more favourable light than it naturally 
warrants. HU.oh also depends upon the capacity of the 
writer to observe carefully the phenomenon under 
consideration, and very few people have this capacity. 
Moreover, there has boon so much fraud, especially in 
modern: times, that one does not know v/ham to believe.
But because there is much fraud, this does not by any 
means prove that there are not also genuine cases.
Mystical experience has been reported from nearly every 
part of the world. Throughout ancient and medieval 
history the same story has been told, again and again.
If there were no substratum of reality behind this, how
comes it about that such similar accounts are given in
every country, and in all stages of world's history?
This makes us believe that such a phenomenon does exist.
There is much truth in the saying "Where there is so much
smoke there must be a fire". Instead of discussing the 
nature of this experience, we must first see what are the 
outward manifestations end v/hat facts accompany such an 
experience. The first is the loss of touch with the 
world of sense. .When a man experiences a vision of God,
he is dead to the outer world. The world of
manifoldness does not make any impression on him. How to 
explain this? A medical materialist would call it by the 
name of Catalepsy. Dr Franz Hartman saysj-
"fhere seems hardly any limit to the time during which 
a person may remain in a trance; but catalepsy is due 
to some obstruction in the organic mechanism of tho 
body on account of its exhausted nervous power. In the 
last case the activity of life begins again as soon as
(tNs )
the impediment is removed, or the nervous energy has
recuperated its strength".
But there is some difference between a mystic trance 
and catalepsy. In the latter the body becomes rigid, and 
the subject seems dead. The pulse gets very feeble and 
there hardly seems any sign of life. The mystic does not 
show signs of lifelessness. There have been* cases of 
catalepsy where the patient under some kind of excitement 
sang songs and uttered exclamatory phrases, but they were 
connected with hysteria, and there is a great difference 
between hysteria and mystical trance. Only the women are 
subject to the former. When a man recovers from catalepsy 
he feels very weak and depressed, and has no knowledge of 
having experienced anything in his unconsciousness, while 
a mystic remembers and feels his union with God. He is 
cheerful and optimistic . Catalepsy is due to nervous 
derangement, and though it is true that some sufis, by 
self mortification weaken their bodily health, yet in 
many other cases the subject of such experience has no 
bodily disease, and is capable of enjoying the normal life 
like other persons. Unconsciousness of a subject may 
also be distinguished from ajk epiletic fit! The latter 
shows a regularity in the way in which they come, and 
also in contortions and convulsions. The same is not the 
case with superunconsciousness.we may also refer to 
the cases of insanity. It is very difficult to 
distinguish between an insane and "Ma^zub". But I think 
fits of insanity do not come too often. Whema man recovers 
from insanity he may be quite well for a long time, and 
if he is again subject to insanity, there is less 
likelihood of his recovering again. But a su^i has such 
like attacks very often, and between the intervals he is 
quite normal. From the above, it will be clear that Sujjis 
abnormal state is not due to any bodily disease or nervous 
disorder.
(again)
Again, sometimes tho Sufis in union with God do not 
lose their consciousness, and it is said that in that 
state they behave as if tvey are quite a different person.
A modern scientist v/ould explain this phenomenon by tho 
hypothesis of multiple personality. But it does not affect 
the validity of mystic experience. The older conception 
of human personality was that it consisted in a sort of 
sphere ; a single invisible boing(Plato as wo know, used 
this as a proof of the immortality of the soul) Modern 
scientists are, however, of opinion that tho 'v'uman mind 
is capable of being split up into various 1 solves" at 
times, when a certain disintegration takes place - often 
as the result of some emotional shock. These "solves" 
represent entirely different personalities, with widely 
different tastes, ambitions, likes and dislikes. In this 
sense the Sufi may be said to have different personalities 
but there is one difference. In double personality the
(/UJL.
subject does not remember anything of ovkv state, while he 
is in another state. These two states are quite closed
from each other. This is not the case wit1^ the sufi. For
I •.r.-i xyZ'bsth the prophat* and tvo. a&iat**-
j him these are the different states of one self. It is
j true that both sufis state and tha state of double
i personality are caused, by some kind of emotion. ' Just as ii
U
jthe emotional state of anger one forgets oneself for the 
 ^ 'moment, so in double personality one forgets ones’former
self. But the difference between the two shown above
makes them quite distinct from each other. In fact our
knowledge of dual personality is still in its infancy, and
iswe cannot say .much about it^ Some of the arguments in
support of this thary do not appear to me to be convincing
at all. For instance, the famous French Psychologist
Poulhan quotes the foilowing
"Richer observes ; the patient may be shared by two
experimenters, between whom connection is maintained
only through the half of the body which each is
(working)
working upon ...... Each of then can move his hands
ovor one half of the body without provoking any gesture 
or prohibitory motion, but directly the operator ’ s 
hands cross the median line, B.moans and recoils in 
order to avoid the touch of the hand which exceeds 
the limits of the territory allotted to it"
In our* opinion, it is a case of double hypnotism and 
not of double personality.
Taine writes
"I have seen a person v/ho while talking and singing, 
writes coherent sentences and even whole pages without 
looking at her paper, or being conscious of what she 
is writing. S he declares that at the end of the page 
she has no idea of what she has written". This again 
is not a case of dual personality.
Some people are in the habit of drawing sketches while 
singing or talking. This does not make them possess many 
selves.
Thirdly a su^i is said to possess miraculous powers.
We use the word "miracle" for the supernormal or
supernatural works of both the prophets and the saints,
though sufis makes a distinction between "Mujiza"
and Karamat". These miracles take the form of telepathy,
television, premonitions etc.and Hajwairi has quoted a
good many of them. These odd phenomena have been the
subject of Psychical Research and it is better to see how
they are explained by modern writers, and then to find out
whether they have any connection with sufistic experience.
In regard to telepathy, Sir William Crookes is inclined to
believe in the existence of brain-waves similar to radio
waves. Vibrations in the eiter travel from brain to brain.
Just as an electric disturbance at one end of the current
produces a similar disturbance at the other end, so the
brain disturbance in one person produces a similar
disturbance in the other. But this theory does not ex­
plain why one person is able to translate these
(brain)
brain disturbances into consciousness and not the other, 
if they are caused by the same wave-lengths. In fact 
this theory is based on very meagre data. Some explain 
it on the basis of sub-conscious mind. Its functions are 
technically called 1 spiritoid functions”. It perceives 
many facts which conscious mind does not notice. Of the 
thousands of events going on all around us every day, we 
perceive but a few; all the rest are ignored though they 
are lodged within the great mental store-house within us.
The process of telepathic message takes pAace as follows: 
ITrom the conscious to the sub-conscious mind of A. : 
from that to the sub-conscious mind of B.and from the 
sub-conscious to the conscious mind of 33. But this theory 
does not tell us why this process takes place in the order 
given above or what reason we have to say that it does 
take place in the above order. Moreover, according to 
this theory message may originate in the living or the 
dead. This means that sub-conscious mind retains its 
existence even after the deat^. We will revert to this 
point later on
ITow we come to Clairvoyance. An example of this has 
been noted by Kaut in ”Dreams of a Spirit Seer".
Sir William Barrett summarises it as follows:- In 
September 1759 at four o'c3;ock Swedenborg arvriived at 
Gottenburg and was invited by a friend to his house.Two 
hours after he went out, and then came back and informed 
the company that a dangerous fire had cust broken out
in Stockholrii( 50 miles from Gottenburg) ; He said that his
.
house was in danger. At eight o’clock ho declared that
the fire was extinguished at the third door from his
house ........  On Monday evening the letters received
from Stockholm described tho fire exactly as ha had stated
and that it was extinguished at 8 o’clock.(abridged).
Hoto) - The*writer of this thesis also noted a similar
case^on 27th.August’" which took place 6,000 miles away
on the same date. Subsequently it was proved that his
(statement) i
statement was true, and that he did not get the informa­
tion by telegram
Some people explain Clairvoyance? by- the theory of
"Astral matter". By the operation of the will it is
possible to construct a sort of definite telegraph wire,
composed of Astral matter, and that through this wire
acting as a conductor, impressions are convoyed.
The above is quite enough to show the trend of mpdern
thought H o w  wo shall quote a few instances from the
Sufi Shaykhs to show the similarity of the phenomena.
The following are taken from Ficholson’s "Ilystics of Islam
"Once the Sheykh(Abul Hasan Khurgani) said, "This night
a great many persons(he mentioned the exact number)
have been wounded by brigands , in such and such a
desert". On making enquiry they found that his
state lent was perfectly truo. Strange to relate, on
the same night his son’s head was cut off and laid
upon the threshold of M s  house, yet he knew nothing
of it. His wife, who disbelieved in him cried"Y.hat
think you of a man who can tell things which happen
many leagues away, but does not know tv t his own son’s
M a d  has been cut off, and is lying at his very door"?
► - . ■ * '
"Yo s " T M  SMykh answered "When I saw that, the veil had 
been lifted, but when my son was killed,it v ad been let 
down again"
"llawlana Saduddin of. Kashgar after a little 
concentration of thought, used to exhibit signs of 
uh conscious nos s.” Any one ignorant of tvis circumstance 
s Would have fancied that he was falling asleep. One day 
according to hi’s custom he fell intjo a trance. I 
supposed, that ho was going to sleep and said to him 
"*f you* desire to rest for a sMrt time, you will not 
seen to no to be far off". He s dlad and said 
"Apparently,'you do not believe that thfs ic something 
different frofa si rep".
(whilst)
"Whilst Dhu*1-Nun was conversing on this topic with some 
friends, he said "Here is a sofa. It will move round the 
room if I tell it to do so". No sooner had he uttered
the word "move" than(sofa made a circuit of the rorom and 
returned to its place
"Avicenna paid a visit to Abul Hasan Khurgani. After 
a short conversation the saint went out to mend the 
wall of the garden. As soon as he had cl imbed on the 
top of the wall, the hatchet dropped from his hand. 
Avicenna ram to pick it up, but before he reached it,
the hatchet rose of itself and came back into saint'sA
hand"
In all this we find a close similarity with the odd 
phenomena which are the subject of Psychical Research in 
these days, and we have seen how they were explained by 
the Medical materialists. In fact, every miracle can be 
explained so as not to violate the ordinary laws of nature. 
Por instance, the miracle of,the parting of the sea when 
Moses waB about to cross with his followers, may be 
explained by the rise and fall of the tides, or the sea 
may mean the river Nile which is subject to sudden floods
ct 'I
(the word Bahr means both a sea and a river). The beating 
of the rock and the issuing forth of the fountains,, may be 
similarly explained. But a Sufi may be distinguished from 
an ordinary spiritualist in having the power df performing 
miracles when he likes. His miracles are never false, while 
a spiritualist is often unable to carry on his work and 
very often his conclusions are shown to be incorrect.
But much depends upon the details and the words in which 
the miracle is recorded. Unfortunately, we have very 
little contempoary evidence which may help us in 
investigating critically the data before us. Por want of 
such evidence and the details of the miracle, it is very 
difficult to express an bpinion one way or the other. 
Supposing the miracle were correctly recorded, is it
(possible)
%
\o r
posoitl: to offer an exp Ip. at ion v M c v may not. "bo /ppoe j<? 
to common s 3ns j? v'0“ will try to offer sucv e solution of 
thib problem, though we realise t^o difficulty of express- 
irfjg an opinion on a non-enpirical subject.
If'we look around us we find t^o forces of nature 
Manifesting themselves in various phondmena, both organic 
and inorganic. In the latter we know that otrr principle 
holds good, the principle of action and re-action. ”To 
every action there is an equal and opposite reaction? is 
a law in Oynamics, to which no variation has yet been 
found. It is stated symbol!ically as B-?Ta. Scientists take 
special delight in expressing physical phenomena in terms 
of waves, so we have light waves, heat waves, sound waves 
etc, But what is meant by a wave. Simply action and re­
action between particles. Look still deeper into the 
origin of Matter. That are ioi^ s? Particles of matter 
revolving around a certain centre according to the above 
principle. Look upwards into the planet3. You will find 
the same law ^pressed there. Bacv’ and every particle is 
connected with all others, and tv-e whole forms part of a 
system. Ifow we come from unconscious things to conscious 
objects. A Psychologist considers man as highest of all 
conscious objects. !!an is an incompletely organised co pie: 
of organico-Psyehieal systems. Moreover, he is a systema- 
tising system.. There is a constant action and ro-action, 
between man and his environments, and this is tho basis of 
all man’s knowledge of external ,world. But are we to take 
tvo mind of an individual as haying n0 connection with 
other minds? This will be to fly in the face of experience 
A nan exerts influence on thor minds, and is in itself 
influenced by others. But tve npture and intensity of this 
influence is not the same in all cases. Bor instance, a 
stranger appears among a crowd of people. All are at once 
attracted by his personality. He may not be well-built, 
strong or handsome, His manners may not be very polished
(but)
but still there is something in him v/hic^  attracts the 
people. What is it that binds one person to tve other in 
love? Is it manner, speech, dress, beauty or outward 
behaviour. Not in all cases. The lover neither loves 
beauty nor any outward manifestation. It is something 
quite different. Symbols may be useful'in the beginning, 
but they servo no useful purpose in the end. In short, v/e 
find that mind, conscious or su•-conscious, exerts an 
influence over other minds, 'with creator or less intensity 
Why is this difference? Just as a human body may be stroig 
or weak, fully developed or underdeveloped, so minds are 
in various stages and developments. In case of conscious 
minds we are aware of the difference as between the mind 
of a savage, and that of a cultured man. But in the case 
of sub-conscious mind the difference is not perceptible.
But as we see the difference exerted by a mind, we may
naturally infer that this difference is due to the
variation in the development of mind. This influence may 
be exorcised through a physical medium or without such a 
medium. Just as the Sun exercises its attractive 
influences on the planets without any physical medium.
The same is the case with a magnetic influence, or what is
called "lines of force". Now I believe miracle is nothing
but the influence exerted by a highly developed mind on 
other minds. An example Of that is seen in the case of 
hyptonism, though here the phenomenon differs to some 
extent from a miracle. But how to explain television and 
telepathy? If we look at a man’s face, we so&etimes try to 
read his thought, and it is the case with some people that 
they can read the thought of others by looking at their 
faces, and observing the outward signs. Again, sometimes 
we find ourselves uneasy on account of some dear one who 
is far away, and the cause of this uneasiness turns out 
to be true. How could we feel an uneasiness of tvis sort 
if there were no hidden connection between two minds.
To many persons, I think, this phenomenon occurs sometime 
or#»ther iin their litres, so we have no reason to doubt its 
truth. As we have said, before, this power or energy by 
which we experience this phenomenon can bo: developed not 
by physical exercises, but by other means. VTe have to see 
how v/e derive this power. V.re derive our bodily pow ;r from 
the energy stored in matter. I am not discussing the 
question how this energy came to be stored in matter, but
in*
I take it for granted 9-# the basis of modern scientific 
researches that this energy spreads outward to parts from 
a single source. Similarly for mental power, there must 
be some unitary source from which all minds derive their 
power. This mental energy, we believe, must be different 
from physical energy because the functions of mind and 
mattor differ in their nature. Here I am parting company 
with many modern Psychologists. If there is a common 
source for all mental energy, telepathy and television 
can be explained by mutual influence of the minds on the 
basis of this common energy. As there are exercises for 
the development of the bodily powers, so there are 
exercises suited to the development of mental powers, but 
their nature differs from that of the former. The more a 
man's mind, conscious and sub-conscious is developed, the 
greater is his sphere of influence and sphere of internal 
vision. So far we have been using the terms sub-conscious 
mind and mental energy, but in order to use the technical 
terms of the Sufis, we should substitute ’spirit'1 for the
The
source of energy in this, case will be God Himself. The 
odd phenomena can be explained from various points of view 
For instance, from the standpoint of panentheis^we may say 
that the absolute realises itself by evolving the world 
of finifthings from within itself. The many are factors 
in the life of the Absolute and Unlimited One, and every 
individual s^res the life and freedom of the whole. In 
this way fini£minds are connected with one another by
_________(jBharinx^
sub-conscious and "spiritual energy" for the mental.
sharing the knowledge and life of the Absolute, not 
infinitely, but within certain limits. They are like 
various batteries connected by the conductor. So they 
influence each other, and have a relative knowledge of 
the other members through the whole, i.e., the Absolute.
Now wa come to the nature of mystic union with God,^nd
will explain it Psychologically. The S^fi is said to
/
have developed a sentiment of love towards his Maker.He 
tries to devote himself wholly and solely to the object 
of his love. Now to love a person means that the image 
of that person, or his manifestitations, emanations, get 
themselves attached by powerful links, to our mental life. 
Thus wo form systems of ideas, impulses and tendencies, 
which become more and more connected with one another.
If the lover meets with an obstacle which hinders his 
union with his beloved, the arrest of tendencies takes 
place and thiiB gives rise to violent emotion. The 
unexpected arrest leads to the abrupt nervous .discharge?, 
which set free energy unable to spend itself in a 
systematic manner, so the lover has violent outburt of 
emotions. This may be caused by some external stimulus, 
say;caused by the sight of anything that has some 
connection with the beloved. We see in the case of a 
Sufi that the crowing of a cock made him fall senseless. 
Such an emotion is often accompanied by many physical 
phenomena. According to Maudsley there is not a single 
nutritive act that emotion does not affect. The action 
exerted upon the heart is very severe, and sometimes 
results in death, as we have seen in the case of some 
sufi8. The mind seems to be paralysed, and becomes 
incapable of imagination, reasoning and even sensibility, 
except in so far as the emotion itself is concerned.
The entire field of consciousness is invaded by this 
single impression, and that is why there is sometimes a 
loss of consciousness. Even in weaker cases, the
(consciousness)
consciousness is almost entirely engrossed. About this
Letourneau writesS . xa -~>r; v Tj > * ““•■III
"The brain, reeling from the effects of a severe moral 
blow, is alive to nothing else. The organs of the 
special senses become practically useless ... 
Intellectual functions, are, of course, almost 
suspended. It is impossible to apply one-self to 
anything that is Extraneous to the impression of the 
moment. But this period of depression is of short 
duration. The tide of life, momentarily checked, or 
abated, rushes on apace, and an energetic action is
produced......  The concentration of nervous activity
is followed by a great expansion. .. .The senses 
awaken, but the attention still holds fast to a 
single idea,, and will not allow the exhausted individual 
to perceive anything that has not some bearing upon 
the' emotion. The intelfectual faculties, likewise, can 
function energetically only in the direction of the 
moral impression. For the same reason, there is still 
partial or entire insensibility to pain".
It is during this state that sufi gains a knowledge of 
the object of his love, and when the sufis describe their 
experience, they describe what they see in this state.
From the above it would be clear that the mystic 
experience is not something supernatural or supernormal. 
Everyone can have such an experience; the only difference 
being that in the case of the sufi the object of love is 
the Divine Being and not human personality.
The question arises; does Sufis vision of God have 
any sort of objectivity behind it, or is it merely a 
creation of his own fancy? In fact, Sufistic experience 
as a feeling cannot be described. It is personal. Hy 
feeling of pleasure or pain is mine own. It cannot be 
shared with others. But I can describe the cause, t^o 
symptoms and effects of the feeling. I can describe it
XtQ
as pleasurable or painful, intense or weak, and so on.
What is the cause of Sufis feeling. What is it that he 
falls in love with? It is something imperceptible to 
the senses. But to be an object of love, it must be 
capable of being an object of thought, and so the Sufi 
has some kind of mental picture of his beloved, and when 
the Sufi has a vision of God, he has a vision of this 
picture, and this changes with the advance of Sufi in 
his path. When a Sufi describes his vision of God, he 
describes certain aspects of this mental picture. In 
the final stage he identifies himself with this image. 
There is nothing extraordinary in it. A man in extreme 
love waiting for the arrival of his beloved, mistakes 
every passer^7for hissweatheart. So a Sufi sees nothing 
else but his beloved. The Poet Hafiz expresses it 
beautifully in a couplet,
"I am so deeply absorbed in you that I mistake 
everyone that I see at a distance for my beloved"
If my object of adoration is Fire, I see everything around 
me, and I feel the pleasure or pain of being consumed by 
the fire. Some Sufi see The Divine Being as "light", and 
so thfry describe their experience in terms of Celestial 
Light. They say that they have been illuminated by tve 
Divine Light. If there is such a thing as Divine Light, 
the Sufis experience has some sort of objectivity, and it 
is not merely a personal imagination. But we cannot 
prove this by any empiracal means. Only one tMng we can 
say about it. When the Sufis describe their experience, 
they do co in similar -ttmns. Whether this is due to t^eir 
preconceived notions, or they really have the same vision 
is hard to decide. Moreover a Sufi can fully understand 
the experience of other Sufis, and can talk to otvers .in 
a language of their own. This may mean that their object 
of vision is not imaginary. If we do not understand their 
language, we are not justified in denouncing them as
aubjeot to creations of fancy. How many people do
(understand
understand the technichal terms of various sciences.?
, To an illiterate, the Algebraic signs are merely black 
dots without any meaning.
Again, the miracles performed by the Sufis give us a 
reason to believe that they are in contact with some 
superhuman power, that they see that power in their 
vision. But this depends upon the assumption that the 
Writers have given a true account of the Miracles of the 
Sufis. How far our assumption is based on facts we can­
not say in our present state of knowledge.
SECTS OF THE SU1IS 
The most important chapter in Kashful Mahjub is that 
in which he gives an account of the various sects of the 
Sufis, because this gives us a good deal of information 
about the doctrines held by the Sufis. But it may be 
pointed out that the Sects owe their origin to their 
emphasising the different aspects of Sufism. They are 
all agreed as far as the fundamentals are concerned.
(1) MAHASABIS
They are the followers of Abu Abdullah.Bin Harith bin 
Asad-Al-Mahasabi. The peculiarity of his doctrine lies 
in the fact that he does not reckon "satisfaction" among 
the stations but includes it among the states. The 
distinction between station and state is thusexplained by 
Ha ^wa iri; station denotes anyone standing in the Way of 
God, and his fulfilment of obligations, pertaining, 
appertaining to that station. "State" is something that 
descends from God into a man's heart without his being 
able to repel it when it comes,, or to attract it when it 
goes by his own efforts. Therefore it is not connected 
with any mortification on man's part. Station belongs to 
the category of acts. State to the category of gifts.
Here it may be pointed out that the first station is 
repentance, then, conversion, renunciation etc., and the 
states are meditation, nearness to God, love, fear, hope, 
longing, intimacy, tranquility, contemplation and
(certainty^ ^
\f V
certainty.
Then Haywairi explains what is meant by satisfaction; 
satisfaction is of two kinds, (a) the satisfaction of God 
with man (b) the satisfaction of man with God. Human 
satisfaction is equanimity towards fate, and spiritual 
steadfastness in regarding events whether they be 
manifestation of Divine Beauty or of Divine Majesty, so 
that it is all one to a man whether he is consumed in the 
fire of wrath, or illuminated by the light of mercy.
There are four classes of quietists; (1) Those who are 
satisfied with God’s gift which is gnosis (2) Those who 
are satisfied with happiness which is this world. (3) 
Those who are satisfied with affliction ^lich consists 
of diverse probations(4) those who,are satisfied with 
being chosen which is love(. He maintains that satisfact­
ion is the end of the stations, and the beginning of 
the states. Its beginning is in the class of things 
acquired by effort, its end in the class of things 
divinely bestowed. It may be called either a station or 
state.
The doctrine of the more elevated quietists of 
medieval Europe bids the mystic pass beyond the sensible 
enjoyments, and imaginative delights of religion and 
escape from the finer senses of the soul as well as the 
grossest sense of the body, into that state of pure 
and imageless contemplation which has no preference or 
conception of its own. In this respect they may be 
classed with the fourth group of quietists mentioned by 
Ha^fairi, because they have escaped from the bonds of 
stations and stages.
(2) THE TAYSURIS
They are the followers of Abu Yazid. His doctrine is 
rapture and intoxication. Rapturous longing for God and 
intoxication of 16ve cannot be acquired by human beings .
"Sobriety"expresses the attainment of that which is
(desired)
desired. As to whether intoxication is superior to 
sobriety, or vice versa, there is a difference of opinion 
among the Shayk4s. Bone say that sobriety involves the 
fixity and equilibrium of human attributes which is the 
greatest veil between God and man while intoxication 
involves the destruction of 1*he human attributes like 
foresight and choice, and the annihilation of a man’s 
self-control in God, so that only t^ose faculties survive 
in him that do not belong to the human genus.
While others like Junayd prefer sobriety to intoxication. 
They say that intoxication is evil because it involves 
the disturbance of one’s normal state, and loss of sanity 
and self-control, and in as much as the principle of all 
things is sought either by way of annihilation or 
subsistence dir of effacement, or affirmation, the 
principle of verification cannot be attained uni mss the 
seeker is sane. The fact that people remain in phenomena 
and forget God is due to their not seeing things as they 
really are. Personally, I am of t he samo opinion as Ju/aid 
The question arises ’Is there an immediate influence 
exerted by the Divine Spirit. If so, is it above 
consciousness". If it is aboveconsciousness how can we 
become aware of it? The mystics say thst self must be 
abandoned. But what self? Assuredly selfishness and self 
will. Not the exercise otf those powers of observation and 
judgement which God has given us for this purpose. A 
Divine Light is promised, not to supercode but illuminate 
our understanding. L'oreover, in sobriety there is more 
chance of our exercising our faculties to make ourselves 
more pure and ascending higher and higher, while in 
intoxication one is at a standstill.
Haywairi continues
"Seeing is of two kinds. If a man looks with eyes of 
subsistence ho perceives that the whole universe is 
imperfect in comparisin with his own subsistence, for
he doos not regard phenomena as solf-subsistsnt; and 
if he looks with the eye of annihilation he perceives 
that all created things are non-existent besides the 
subsistence of God. In either case, he turns away from 
the creatod things.
Then ho says that tho perfection of the state of 
intoxicated man is sobriety. The lowest stage in 
sobriety consists in regarding the powerlessness of 
humanity; therefore a sobriety that appears to be evil 
is better than an intoxication that is really evil. 
Intoxication is to fancy one’s self annihilated while 
the attributes really subsist and this is a veil. 
Sobriety is the vision of subsistence while the 
attributes are annihilated and this is actual 
revelation.
There are two kinds of int«7xication( 1) with the wine of 
affection(€r-§-&i) and (2) with the cup of love(C-PSn)
The former is caused , since i-t arises from regarding the 
benefit; but the latter has no cause since it arises from 
regarding the benefactor. He who regards the benefit secs 
through himself and therefore sees himself, but he who 
regards the benefactor sees through him and therefore does 
not see himself. Although he is intoxicated, his 
intoxication is sobriety. Sobriety is also of two kinds.- 
sobriety in heedlessness and sobriety in love. The former 
is the greatest of veil, but the latter is the clearest 
of revelations.
Comparing with the Western mystics, we find that St Bernard
sides with Haywairi. dtie mysticism is sobriety itself.
The visit of the Holy Ghost to his spirit was unattended
by visible glory, by voices, tastes or odour; it vindicated
its reality only by the joy which possessed him.
(4) THE JUNAIDIS
The followers Sf Abul Qasim al Janaid; his doctrine
0
is based on sobriety, and ^pposed to Tayfuries as '-as been 
explained.
(5) THE HURTS
The followers of Abul Hasan Ahmad b llohd Nuri- The 
principle of his doctrine is to regard Sufism as superior 
to poverty. In matters of conduct he agreed with J/inaid.
It is a peculiarity of his path that in companionship he 
prefers his companions claim to his own, and holds 
companionship without(^fpreference to be unlawful.He 
condemns retirement. He says:-
"Beware of retirement for it is in connection,with 
Satan; and cleave to companionship, for therein is 
the satisfaction of the mercy of God."
Hajwairi then discusses preference. The truo> nature of 
preference consists in maintaining the rights of the person, 
with whom one associates, and in suboardinating one's own 
interest to the interest of one's friend. Nothing is harder 
to a man than spiritual sacrifice , and to refrain from 
the object of his love. External life is gained by spiritual 
sacrifice, and by renunciation of self-interest in 
fulfilling God's Commandments, and by obedience to His 
friends. But from the standpoint of gnosis, preference and 
free choice are Reparation, and real preference consists in 
union with God, for twe true basis of self interest is 
self abandonment. So ^ ong as the seeker’s progress is 
connected with acquisition, it is pernicious , but when the 
attracting influence of the truth manifests its dominion, 
all his actions are confounded, and he loves all power of 
expression; nor can any name be applied to him, or any 
description be given of him or anything he imparted to him.
(6) THE SAHLIS
They are the followers of Abhl -G-. b. Abdallah of Tustar.
His doctrine includes endeavour and self mortificat ion, and
ascetic training. The object of all Austeritis is resisten®
to lower soul, and so a man must know his lower soul.(Nafe)
lower soul etymologically is the essence of,and reality of
anything, but in poplar language it is used to denote many
(contradictory)
contradictory meanings e.g., "Spirit”, "Virility",
"■body" and "'blood". The mystics of this Sect are, however 
agreed that it is the source and principle of evil, hut 
while some assert that it is a substance located in the 
body, as the spirit is , others hold it to be an 
attribute of the body, as life is. But they all agree 
that through it base qualities like pride, envy, avarice, 
anger etc.are manifested. They hold that both the lower 
soul and the spirit are subtle things existing in the 
body, one is the seat of good and the other is the seat 
of evil.
1 am of opinion that Islam condemns asceticism 
"La rahbaniyata fil Islam" is the saying of the prophet of 
Islam. In fact asceticism is the application of pessimism 
to ethics. If life and all itB connections are bad, why 
should we not get rid of this life by committing suicide, 
/^soetioism considers the soul to be at war with the body and 
it is the duty of the Soul to destroy its enemy. The moral 
oode of ascetism is mainly negative. Women and Children's 
status is very dismal. But thiB iB not correct. Body is 
like a stem to flower. Soul can make no progress without 
body.A"( X  man is nothing but spirit, of which this body is 
the cuirasBjytemple and residence/and of which the attributes 
are sensation and intelligence. This view is false, because 
a body from which the Soul has departed is still called a 
human being though a dead human being. Moreover a Soul 1b 
located in the bodies of animals, yet they are not called 
human beings. Others state that man is an atom, centred 
in the heart, which is the principle of all human attributes. 
This is also absurd because if anybody is killed and his heart 
taken out of his body, he does not lose the name of 'human 
being! Some declare that 'man' is not that which eats and 
drinks but a Divine Mystery of which this body is the vesture. 
To this, he replies, that the name "human being" applies to 
all sorts of persons in whom there is no suoh "mystery" and 
who Buffer decay and eat and drink. The name 'man' is 
given to the sum of substances compounded in us. The most 
perfect composition of man includes three things, spirit, soul 
and body. The attribute of spirit is intelligence, of soul, 
passion, and of body, sensation. a,
a *** ** 6^^ -,
Those who seek God should never relax their resistence
to Lower Soul. While all myetiCB have affirmed thlB need 
of mortification, and have declared it to he an indirect
a
means of attaining contemplation. S4.hl asserted that 
mortification is the direot cause of the latter and he 
attributed to searoh a powerful effect on attainment, so 
that he even regarded the present life spent in search, as 
superior to the future life of fruition. Self mortification 
is the direot cause of the union with God, others, on the 
contrary, assert that there is no direot cause of union 
with God, and whoever attains to God does so by Divine 
graoe, whloh is independent of human actions. Therefore, 
they argue, the object of mortification is to correct the 
vices of the lower Soul, not to attain real proximity, and 
inasmuch as mortification is referred to man whiedt, 
contemplation is referred to God, it 1b impossible that one 
should be oaused by the other. Hajwairi says that the 
difference between the two parties lies in exuression.
One says, *He who seeks shall find.
mortification stands in the same relation to contemplation 
as Divine blessing to Obedience. As it is absurd to seek 
obedlenoe without Divine blessing so it is absurd to Beek 
Divine blessing without obedlenoe, man is guided to 
mortification by a flash of Divine Beauty, bo Divine 
guidanoe preoedes mortifioation*
It may be noted here that the sufis, unlike the 
Hindu mystics, do not minimise the value of existwnoe. 
Aooording to the Budhists all partioulal'and definite 
existence is felt as an intolerable burden and nirvana 
is an escape from a personal and individual life* But 
the sufis are entirely opposed to this view* The aim 
of mortification is not the annihilation of personal 
life* Christian mystics also lay strews on mortifioation#
-it/
*It is the constant teaching of the great mystics,* 
says Butler, "that there can he no progress in prayer 
without mortification; no contemplation without self- 
denial and self-discipline seriously undertaken; no 
real mystioism without asoetioism." Hajwairi maintains 
that ’lower Soul' can he mastered hy discipline hut its 
essence and substance do not perish. If it is rightly 
known and tinder control, the seeker need not care 
though it continues to exist in him,
Then he discusses the nature of Passion - Acoording 
to some ’passion1 is a term applied to the attributes of 
lower soul hut according to others, a term demoting the 
natural volition, whereby the lower soul is controlled 
and directed, juBt as the spirit is controlled hy 
intelligence, A spirit without intelligence is 
imperfect, so a lower soul devoid of the faculty of 
passion is also imperfect. Passion is a veil and a 
false guide, man is commanded to resist it. The devil 
cannot enter a man’s heart until he desires to oommit 
a sin hut when a certain quantity of passion appears 
the devil takes it and decks it out and displays it to 
man’s heart and this is oalled diabolic suggestion*
The moBt manifest attribute of the lower soul is lust* 
Dust is a thing that is dispersed in different parts of 
the human body and is served hy the senses* It bekisves 
the seeker of God to spend his whole life in ridding 
himself of these incitements to passion, which show 
themselves through the senses. The right way of doing 
thiB is "resignation" unless Divine protection is 
predistined to a man he cannot abstain from anything 
by his own exertion.
Some/
Some of the Western thinkers also regard body 
a s  . • • L f
as the speolal seat of sin, Plato sometime sees all
our perversions and ignoranoe as an outoome of the
Soul’s Connection with the world of matter. When the
Soul is set free from the physical bonds, it sees
clearly all the Divine Ideas and then it can do no wrong.
The Same is the case with the Apotle St Paul "For I
delight in the Law of God after the inward man, but I
see another law in my members warring against the law
of my mind and bringing me into captivity to the law of
Sin which iB in my members"- Romans Til, 22,
St. Gregory says, "It often befalls that the spirit
raises up the mind to things aloft and for all that,
the flesh assails it with importunate temptations and
when the mind is drawn to iontemplate the heavenly things
it 1b beaten beach by the Images presented to it of
ik*.
illicitaotions. For the sting of her flesh suddenly 
wounds him whom holy contemplation was carrying off 
outside the flesh and at once the flight of contemplation 
illumines and the importunity of temptation obscures one 
and the same mind. So according to Hajwairi external 
stimulus acting through the senses on the mind causes 
passions which are accompanied by certain manifestations 
But according to James external Stimulus does not directly 
cause the emotion but produces bodily symptoms whioh 
give rise to emotion. Hajwairi only limits passions to 
baser emotions and does not take into consideration those 
that are pure, spiritual and worthy of regard. Hume 
subdivides PasBions into (a) direct such as arise immed­
iately from good or eveil, from pain and pleasure, for 
infctanceddesire, aversion, grief, joy, and (b) indirect 
such as proceed from the same principles but by the con­
junction of other quality for instance., pride, humility 
hatred, envy, pity, etc.,
I think we should make a distinction between a
i
noble sentiment like love and ignoble like hatred.
(A sentiment sharefc all the characteristics of a 
passion hut is less violent and is accompanied by more 
or less a clear consciousness of their object)
Hajwairi considers it best to resist the passions or 
rather base%,PasBionB and Sentiments and so it is better 
to see how a passion disappears. Passion is only the 
last Phase in the evolution of feeling and it replaces 
the feeling when for one reason or another, the Psychical 
foroe set in aotion and not employed in a systematic 
manner happens to increase. When one of the Phenomena 
whioh conditions passion disappears or decreases in 
intensity, the passion also disappears and is replaced, 
according to circumstanoes, either by a feeling, by 
indifference, or by a different and opposite passion.
The gratification of a passion, that is to say, the 
diminution of the arrest of the tendenoy, generally 
transmits it into a feeling, or in other words, the 
diminution or disappearance of the tendenoy brings 
about the diminution or disappearance of the passion 
and sometimes its replacement by an opposite passion 
for instance, by remorse in some cases. So we must 
either remove the external stimulus or find an outlet 
for the surplus Psyohioal energy in some other way.
(7) The Hakimis - followers of Abu Ahdallah Muhammad 
h All al Hakimal Tirmidhi, His dootrine was based on 
saintship and he used to explain the true nature of 
saintshlp and the degrees of the saints and the obser­
vance of the proper arrangement of their ranks.
The principle and foundation of Safism rests on 
Saintshlp, God has saints whom He has specially dis­
tinguished by His friendship and whom He fras chosen 
to be the governors of His Kingdom and has marked out 
to manifest His actions and has peculiarly favoured 
with diverse kind of miracles and has purged of natural 
corruptions and has delivered from subjection to their 
lower Soul and passion so that all their thoughts of 
Him and their intimacy is with Him alone. We have two 
parties opposed to this view (a) Mutazalites and 
anthropomorphists. The former deny that one moslem is 
speoially priveleged more than another. But why should 
a prophet be speoially priveleged? The latter allow 
that speoial priveleges may be oonferred but assert 
that suoh priveleged persons no longer exist though they 
existed in the part. But they do not make out a good 
oase,
There are four thousand saints who are concealed 
and do not know one another and are not aware of the 
excellence of their state. (Hajwairi says he had 
ooula)f experience of intis matter). But of those who 
have power to lose and bind and are the officers of the 
Divine Court - there are three hundred called Akhyajr, 
and forty oalled Abdal, and seven oalled Abrar, and
four/
four called Autad and three called Nuqba and one oalled 
Qutb or Ghawth. All these know one another and cannot 
act save by mutual consent.
The Mutazilites deny special priveleges and miracles. 
They say that believers in faith are friends of God.
They acknowledge only suoh obligations as are imposed 
by Reason without regard to Revelation. They maintain 
that if all the Moslems Share in faith whioh is funda­
mental they should also Share in miracle which is only 
derivative. Hajwairi says that miracles are special 
and not general. Faith is a general term, applicable 
to the righteous and the wicked alike, whereas Saintship 
is speoial,
"The saint is annihilated in his own state and 
BubsistB in the contemplation of the truth: he cannot 
tell anything concerning himself nor can he rest with 
anyone except God", “The saint hath no fear and grief, 
beoause all these refer to the interest of the lower 
soul and when that is annihilated Satisfaction becomes 
an attribute of man and when satisfaction has been 
attained his states become Steadfast in vision of the 
Author of States Jthis back is timed on all states.- 
-God has given to Hiis spiritual saints not only to 
believe but to understand divine things-- St. Augustine.
In miracles the saint does not infringe the obli­
gations of the religious law to whioh he is always 
subject. The apostle establishes his prophecy by 
establishing the reality of evidentiary miracles while 
the saint, by the miracles whioh he performs establishes 
both the propheoy of the apostle and him own saintsfhip.
Saints/
Saints are not preserved froto Sin, for Sinlessness 
■belongs to the prophets* Some people say that saint ship 
involves unoeasing obedience and that when a great Sin 
occurs to the mind of a saint he is deposed from saint- 
ship. But Hajwairi holds that since the saintship of 
knowledge of God which is the foundation of all miracles 
is not lost through sin, it is impossible that what is 
inferior to that in excellence and grace should disappear 
beoause of Sin.
In what state is this miraculous grace manifested :r 
to the saint: in sobriety or intoxication; in rapture or 
composure?' The prophet is a man of law and the saint is 
a man of inward feeling. Accordingly a miracle will not be 
manifested to a saint unlwss he is in a state of absence from 
himself and bewilderment and unless his faoulties are entirely 
under the control of God. While the saints are with themselves 
and maintain the state of humanity they are veiled. A miracle 
oannot be manifested except in the state of unveiledness. This 
is the state of intoxioation with which no human being, the 
prophets alone excepted, is permanently endowed.
Saints in Islam and those in Christianity have one thing in 
common: The help of God is invoked through them. The council 
of Trent expresses the doctrine of Homan Church as follows:
"That the saints who reign with Christ offer to God their prayers 
for men; that it is good and useful to invoke them by supplication 
and to have recourse to their aid in order to obtain from God His 
benefits." But there is no such order of saints among the
Christian mystics who have the power*to bind and loe^e* like the
Kings and their officers.
(8) The /
(b). Tiie Kharrazis-followers of Abu bald Kharraz. He 
was the first to explain the state of annihilation and 
subsistence. Hajwairi says, subsistence in its scientific 
acceptation is of three kinds:-
(1). A Subsistence that begins and ends in annihilation 
as this world.
(2). A Subsistence that came into being and will never 
be annihilated as Hell and Paradise.
(3)- j\ ouDsistence that always was and always will be 
viz., the subsistence of. God and J t x s eternal attributes.
But according to Sufis, these terms do not refer to 
’knowledge1 or ’state1 but ’apply solely to the degree of 
perfection attained by the saints who have become free from 
the pains of mortification and have escaped from the prison 
of Stations’and the vicissitude of states and v/nose search 
nas eiiugd in discovery and who, recognising the imperfection 
of their own discovery have turned away from all things and 
have purposely become annihilated in the object of their 
desire and in the very essence of desire have lost all 
desires of their own, for when a man becomes annihilated 
from his attributes, he attains to perfect subsistence, he 
is neither near, nor far, neither strange nor intimate, 
neither sober nor intoxicated, neither separate nor united, 
he ha$) no name nor sign or brand or mark.
But annihilations does not signify loss of essence and 
destruction of personality and subsistence does not indicate 
the subsistence of God in Man. Total annihilation is 
impossible for annihilation of the different parts of a 
material substance can never take place. Moreover one 
attribute may be annihilated through the subsistence of
another attribute, both attributes belonging to man; it
is absurd to suppose that any one can subsist through his
attributes of another individual. The Uestorians of
Home and Christians hold that Mary annihilated by Self
Mortifications all the attributes of humanity and that
the Divine subsistence became attached to her and so that
she was made subsistent through the subsistence of God
and that Jesus was the result thereof and that he was not
u
originally composed of the staff of humanity because his 
subsistence is produced by realisation of the subsistence 
of God and in consequence of this, hea-and his mother and 
God are all subsistent through one subsistence, which is 
eternal, and an attribute of God. All this agrees with 
the doctrine of the Anthropomorphistic sects of the 
Hashwiyya, who maintain that the Divine essence is a locus 
of phenomenal attribute, What difference is there between 
the view that the Eternal is the locus of the Phenomenal 
and the view that phenomenal is the locus of this Eternal 
or between the assertion that the Eternal has phenomenal 
attributes and the assertion that the phenomenal had 
eternal attributes? Such doctrines involve materialism 
and destroy the proof of the phenomenal nature of the 
wogflrd Universe and compel as to say that both the creater 
and His creation are eternal and that both are phenomenal 
or th t what is oreated may be commingled with what is 
unoreated and that what is uncreated may descend into 
what is created. If, as they cannot help admitting, the 
creation is phenomenal, because the loous of a thing is 
like its substances, if the locus is phenomenal, it 
follows that the contents of the locus are phenomenal too.
Accordingly/
Accordingly, our subsistence and annihilation are 
attributes of ourselves and resemble each other in respect 
of their being our attributes. One may speak, however, 
of an annihilation that is independent of subsistence and 
also of a subsistence that is independence of annihilation; 
in that case annihilation means "Annihilation of all 
remembrance of God** Whoever is annihilated from his own 
Will subsists in the Will of God.
u.
Compare with this the views of Ta/iler: "When through 
all manner of exercise the outward man has been converted
into the inward, reasonable man ---- and thUB he flings
himself with Divine Abyss, in which he dwelt eternally
before he was created, then ---  the Godhead bends down
and descends into the depths of the pure waiting soul and 
the transforming of the created soul drawing it up into 
the uncreated essenoe, so that the Spirit becomes one with 
Him* Could such a man Wtter himself, he woxild see him­
self Irot so noble, that he would fanoy himself God.* So
this abstract essenoe - an essential nothing - into vh ich 
^ ^
Tanler would s»it the soul, does not differ from the abstra 
ot essenoe or super essential unity in whioh a plotinus 
would lose himself or that Divine substance in whioh 
Pantheistic mystios sought to disolve their personality.
The destruction between Hajwairi w44h mystics of the above 
type is clear*
Professor Moholson is of opinion that the conception 
of S4pewd is oertainly of Indian origin. Its first great 
exponent was the Persian mystic Bayazid of Bistam, who 
may have received it from his teacher Abu Ali of Sindh;
"creatures/
"Creatures are subject to changing state, but the
gnostic has no state, because his vestiges are effaced
and his essence annihilated by the essence of another and
his traces a re lost in another's traces." But I do not
think there is anything common between the "Annihilation"
of the Sufis a n d •that of the Eedantists. The latter is
based on the theory of Karma, which the Muslim mystics
never recognise. With the Bedantist complete annihilation
means loss of life, freedom from the cycle of birth & deaths
and m e r 0ing of the soul into Ishwra. bith the Sufis
annihilation simply means indifference to the temptations
of the world. When a sufi gets annihilated, for him,
nothing exists but the object of his love. Ke is so much
absorbed in love that he sees his beloved in everything,
but he does not identify himself with Divinity like the
Vedantist. Similar idea is expressed by Porphyry.
tA>
He maintains that mind does not lose' in consciousness of 
personality in that state of exaltation. He compares it 
to a dream in which the soul dead to the world rises to 
an activity that partakes of the Divine. It is an 
elevation, above reason, above action, above liberty and 
yet no annihilation , .but an ennobling restoration or 
transformation of the individual nature.
Hushbrook gives an idea of what is meant by annihila- . 
tion in Christian mysticism in the Spiritual Huptials". 
chap. , 5 Mh.nd all men who ^re exalted above their creature- 
liness into a contemplative life, are one with this Divine 
glory-yea are that glory". Suso calls it the transit of 
their Soul"- it passes beyond oime and space and is
/dissolved
dissolved in God, "Then the spirit, thus advanced in 
S
holy exercise^, arriveth at freedom from the outward senses, 
before so importunate and its higher powers lose themselves 
in a supernatural sensibilities. Here the spirit parts 
with its natural properties, presses within the circle 
which represents the eternal Godhead and reaches spiritual
perfection ----  He who is thus received into the Sternal
Nothing is in the Everlasting Nov/ and hath neither before 
nor after." Muslim mystics with the exception of one or 
two never go so far.
(9). The Khafifis - followers of abu .Abdullah Muhammad
bin Khafif of Shiraz. The form of his doctrine in Sufism
is absence and preserve's' iir. 'Presence is presence of the
hearty and is a proof of the intjruitve faith so that what
is hidden from it has the same p-gloe as what is visible to
it. "Absence1^  The absence of the heart" from all things
except God to such an extent that it becomes absent from
itself and absent even f rom its absence, so that it no
longer regards itself; and the sign of this state is
withdrawal from all formal authority as when a prophet is
divinely preserved from what is unlawful. According^,
absence from ones self is presence with God and universe.
are
God has eternal attributes which peculiar to Him and 
and subsist in him and that He and His attributes are not 
two, for His unity does not admit differences and number.
Separation in predicaments refers to the actions of 
God, all of which are separate in this respect. The 
predicament of one is being^and of another, not being 
but a not being that is capable of being; of another, 
annihilatfc*Tand of another, subafren e e. There are some 
who refer these terms to knowledge and say that union
4  J* v
k.HnSCut^' ^
-they. •
meaning f>-£--hnman gotione—irrer:— crontemplatTon. rudt* <*-tj
is knowledge of the Divine unity^ and separation ’ ~y9r« y ^ i^ 4.
(11). The Hululis - followers of Abu Hulman of Damascus 
and Paris who pretended to have derived this doctrine from 
Husain bin Mansur Hallej. The author does not know much 
about these people. Their doctrine was incarnation, 
commixture and transmigration of Spirits. Compare with 
this what Eckart says, "I am not less than God, there is 
no distinction: If I would not he would not be. I hesitate 
to receive anything from God - for to be indebted to Him 
would imply inferiority, and make a distinction between 
Him and me;, whereas the righteous man is without distinction 
in substance and nature, //hat ^od is."
Discourse on the Spirit -----  There is much difference of
opinion^are regard to the Spirit. Some have said that the
Spirit is the life wherby the body lives, aview which is
/lUrprtsi.
also held by a number of 3cholaBti^JP£dlosophe£s.
According to this view the Spirit is accident, Conjunction
/
motion, c o h e s i o n  and similar accidents by which the body 
is changed from one state to another. Others say that 
spirit is not life but that life does not exist without it 
and the two are unseparable (as pain and knowledge of pain 
are unseparable). according to this view also the Spirit 
is an accident like life: Sufi ShaykJ^s believe th&t the
Spirit is a substance and not an attriuute, for so long 
as it is connected with the body^, God continually creates 
life in the body ahd the life of man is an attribute and 
by it he lives, but the Spirit is deposited in his body 
and may be separated from him while he is still living as 
in sleep.
/The
The Spirit then is a subtle body which comes and goes 
by the command of God i.e. The spirit is subtle and corporeal 
it is visible, but visible only to the eye of intelligence.
that the spirit is eternal and regard it as the sole agent 
and Governor of things and call it the uncreated Spirit of
dod and aver that it passes from one body to another. The 
author then aShs, “what do you mean by eternity? Do you 
mean the pre existence of a non eternal thing or an eternal 
thing that never came into being? If they mean the pre
existence of a non eternal and—  there is no difference 
between us in principle for we, too, say, that the Spirit
is non eternal and that it existed before the £ody only, 
hut the spirit cannot pass from body to body because just 
as a body cannot have two lives, so a spirit cannot have two 
bodies. If they say that the Spirit is an eternal thing 
that never came into being. In this case I ahk, Does it 
stand by itself or by something else. “ If they say ,£y 
itself “I ash^Is God its world or n o t . M If they answer 
that ^od is not its world, they affirm the existence of feer 
eternal beings which contrary to reason, for the eternal
tnvL
is infinite ana the essence of eternal being would
limit the other. If they answere that God is its world 
then
then I say that God is eternal and His creatures are non 
eternal.: it is impossible that the eternal should be 
commingled with the non eternal or made one with it or
become unimavcnt in it^or that the non eternal should be 
the place of the eternal^or that the eternal should carry 
it, because only homogeneous things are capable of being 
united and separated. -«.nd if they say that the Spirit 
does giot stand by itself but by something else, then it
Here the Hosier^ at variance with these who believe
a
S
must be either an attribute or an accident. If it is 
an accident it must either be in a locus or not. If it 
is in a locus, its locus must be like itself and neither 
can be called eternal and to say that it has no locus is 
absurd because an accident cannot stand by itself. If 
they say that the spirit is an eternal attribute - and 
this is the doctrine of the Hululis and those who 
believe in metempsychosis - and call it an attribute of 
God, I reply that an eternal attribute of God cannot 
possibly become an attribute of his creature; for His 
life could become the life of His creature similarly 
His power could become their power; and inasmuch as 
an attribute stands by its object, how can an eternal 
attribute stand by a non eternal object? Therefore the 
eternal has no connection with the non eternal and the 
spirit is created and under G o d ’s command.1
Hajwairi differs from Ghazali by calling the soul 
corporeal and made of subtle matter. In this respect 
he is also in agreement with some of the Hindu sects.
He also maintains that the soul does not animate the body 
because according to him the soul leaves the bouy in sleep 
and the body still remains alive. He considerably differs 
from those who hold that life and soul are the same thing 
at different stages of development and that life in 
developing its own nature becomes conscious of its 
states and activities at a certain stage and considers 
itself the subject of those activities and thereby attains 
some degree of independent existence. In plant and 
animal it is only life, in man it has developed itself 
into being self conscious, self eegulating soul and 
made itself inuependeiit of this particular body. Thus he 
he believes in the theory of special creation, but maintains 
that the souls were created before the bodies. In this
respect he differs from Ghazali. According to __a
soul is corporeal composed of subtle matter. But in this 
case the soul will have both the property of being conscious 
and also of filling space and that its functions are both 
modes of thought and modes of extension and motion in space 
In this way he makes consciousness as the property of Subtle 
matter. Compare with this the materialistic view that 
consciousness is a chemical product of the cells of the 
brain and that the brain ’secretes thought just as the liver 
secretes bile.’ Hajwairi does not make it clear how the 
subtle body of the Soul is connected with the gross body and 
what is the need of the latter. By making the soul corporeal 
he makes it divisible and subject to decay. One may object 
how on this theory he can maintain the immortality of the 
Soul. But Hajwairi assigns ’derived’ immortality to the
soul because it has been created by a special act of Qod
(/mJ- M l urill
who willed it into existence" ■agseiri. Or in other words the ’
j
soul/though material does not have some of the p r o p e r t i e s ^  
commoft—-t-o gross matter. "That which is created is of 
necessity corporeal visible and tangible" - Jowett's ’Plato ’ 
We have discussed Hajwairi indetail and this will make 
^  dispense with the rest of the Indian Sufis, who do not show 
any advance of thought beyond what has been expressed by 
Hajwairi, though there has been a distinct tendency towards 
pantheism in some of the later mystics and this will be dealt 
with in the chapter on Islamic P o e t r y ’.
ETHICAL THOUGHT IK MUSLIM IHDIA.
A study of books on ethios most oommonly read 
In mediaeval India reveals that the Muslims were 
divided into many seots, whioh,though professing a 
belief in the fundamental principles of Islam, differed 
from one another on many points. There were among them 
the Eationalists, the followers of the .Fro-Greek 
philosophers, the mystios, the shiites, orthodox, 
theologians and others. The ethical views of many 
of these I have described in the chapter on "The 
History of Islamic xhilosophy." I give below the 
views of the orthodoa seots whioh constitutes the 
majority in the Muslim population of India. On this 
point I take as my guide the commentaries or explanatory 
treatises on the Quran and the traditions, the books in
fiqah such as Patawa-i-Alamgiri, the works of Ulemas, 
such as Wall ullah and Abdul Hav± etc. and the sayings 
of the orthodox Sufis.
All the sects in Islam derive their authority 
from the • Quran." The Quran, being one of the 
revealed books, derives this authority from God. It 
bases its claim on the testimony of miracles. It 
oonsidees itself a miracle. Kant maintains that 
miracles cannot prove a religion, for we oan never 
<iuite rely on the testimony whioh supports them. (In this 
way history becomes a dead letter. ) Religion must be 
based on the practical reason of moral sense. Moral
t
sense is innate and not derived from experience* The 
moral imperative is an absolute, a categorical 
imperative. The Quran maintains that moral sense, 
if there is any truth in (±tj cannot be opposed to the 
Quranic revelation. in modern times Kant's theory 
of moral sense has been rejected by the evolutionists.
The philosophy of evolution suggests that the sense 
of duty is a social depoj^in the individui; the content
of conscious is aquired, though the vague disposition to j
social behaviour is innate. The moral self, the social 
man, is no "special creation" coming mysteriously from 
the hand of God, but the late product of leisurely
evolution. Morale are not absolute; they are a code of 
conduct more or less haphazardly developed for group
survival and varyinvg with the nature and circumstances '
of the group.
d
Kant bows to the authority of moral sense and 3
Islam to that of revelation. But why should we submit
to authority and give up our freedom? (Kant insists 
that morality is freedom! -Because we believe that God 
is the creator of this world. This means that God's 
authority is absolute and He is the final source of any
authority in this world. But what about a manfs conscience
Bishop Butler suggests that the deliverences of 
conscience are not opposed to the commands of God.
3
Conscience is the 'voice of God' speaking in human 
beings. T-H.Green considers the 'real self ' as one that 
truly expresses the 'Will of God". So the Quran maintains 
the absolute authority of God and the dictates of one's 
real self must not oppose the "will of God." If they are
contrary to the spirit of Islam they are the suggestions 
of the "Flesh." The created must submit to the
creator’s authority as a man submits to his master’s 
order* In Christianity it is believed that relation 
between God and man aiiS that of father and son. But 
this analogy oannot be pushed very far. a father gives 
his son freedom of action, but when he finds that he is 
going to fall overa precipice, he will try to save him.
But God, knowing that Adam was going to oommit a sin, 
did not save him. a kind father never lets his son 
turn his hand to teeoh him a lesson. If it be said that 
man’s fall was necessary to make him better and purer, 
still we find that this does not apply to many, who are 
doomed to eternal punishment. If they are oalled 
rebellious sons, it does not solve the difficulty, a 
f ather will hot let his rebellious son go to ruin if he £ 
oan prevent it, But God looks on indifferently though^ 
he has the power to alter the career of the wicked Y" 
people. The analogy simply means the kindness of God,"
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in forgiving the sins of man. Islam gives a man freedom
A
of action and is quite indifferent as to what he does.
But id! a man turns towards God and is sincerely 
repentent, God helps him. The first step is to be 
taken by man, not God. So God stands to man asa master 
to a servant and his commands must be obeyed, otherwise 
the consequences are severe. He is the creator and so 
he has absolute authority over the created. But why did 
He create this world and subject human beings to 
suffering and temptations ? Why does he let men wander 
in the labyrinths of error, and from thenoe to plunge 
into the gulfs of wickedness and misery? What was the 
necessity of all this ? The guran says : "Do you 
suppose we have created you in vain." "He hath created 
death and life, that He might test you, which of you 
&as done the best deeds. "
Ao cording to the Quran this world is a trial. But it 
does not give us any reason for the necessity of this 
trial. In Islam this tr&Al is for the sake of
God is quite indifferent to it. But we-have a tradition
vtAoh tells us that this world isthe result of God's
hry
desire td make himself known ^  the appreciation of His
own beauty. 3h this case the world is the material for
God's thought. Thus we see that though God is indifferent 
as to what man does, yet He oannot punish him unless He 
prescribes a code of morals for him. That is why He
Sends a prophet to every nation to guide it to the path 
of righteousness. Mohommad, aocording to a tradition, 
claims to have been sent to improve the morals of the 
People. He has brought with him the Quran, a code of 
morals and a book of wisdom. How is this authority to 
be exoercised and law to be ihterpreted? According to 
the Quran, the chief person who understands the 
Divine Commands and interprets them correctly is the 
prophet. The people are to follow him and take him as 
their model^ He is considered the perfect man. After 
his death, his vicdroy or Khalifa is to administer the 
Law and his interpretation is considered final provided 
it is not contrary to the interpretation of the prophet. 
Then comes the concensus of the learned men in all ages. 
They have authority to make provision for those points 
whioh are not touched by either the prophet or his 
immediate successors. In the matter of details Islam 
leaves some freedom to the public.
Islam divides the duties under two heads viz.i- 
duty towards God ii- duty towards man. Obligations 
arise on account of our relation to God and also on
account of our connection with other persons and 
institutions. Islam does not keep to these two 
spheres as distinot from each other. In respecting 
the rights of other people a person is discharging both 
his duty to God and his duty towards man. But there 
are certain duties towards God whioh do not fall into 
the sphere of duty towards man, for instance, prayer. 
Islam makes it clear that all sins committed against God 
are pardonable by God, but those committed against man 
will in no case be pardoned by God. For instance, if 
A steals the purse of B he has committed a double crime 
viz. against God and against man. God will will pardon 
him for disobeying His orders if he becomes penitent, 
but unless the thief returns the purse to the owner, and 
makes up the damage done, he will still be punished for 
t aking away what did not belong to him if he is not 
punished in this world. The reward of any virtuous 
d ee d that the thief has done will be transferred to the 
owner in place of his purse. I am not quite sure 
whether the same is the case in Christianity. In my 
talk with the Christian theologians I have come to 
know that when a man gets converted to Christianity 
his sins are pardoned, but as to whether they make any 
distinction of the kind noted above I have received 
different answers.
God will judge a man's action according to his 
inner intention. Any action done with a desire to 
please God is considered meritorious. But our mental 
c onstltution is not made up of a number of isolated or 
independent desires. Our desires form a universe. So 
according to Islam the leading desire should be 
obedience to God and all other desires should be
o it. God oan only- read the thoughts of 
men and as'^  a man oannot with any certainty know the 
motive whioh led to the performance of a certain act on 
the part of another man, the Qazi is to judge a man 
"by his actions and not by his intentions.
A few words will suffice as regards ’punishment/
A man who believes in Islam will go to heaven directly 
after his death if his virtuous deeds outweigh his 
wicked deeds. In the other case he will have to undergo 
some kind of punishment before he is finally admitted to 
heaven. But in the case of non-believers they are 
eternally meant for the hell. Those non-believers who 
havenot heard the words of Islam are exempted from this. 
In the oase of punishment in this world the Qazi is 
to act acoording to the laws of the Quran. The 
punishments are not suited to the gravity of the crime.
Fo r instance, the punishment for theft does not take 
into consideration whether it is the offenders first 
orime or the second. The punishment for theft is 
"cutting the hand of the thief J Moreover it does not 
take into consideration the age of the oulprit. From the 
point of view of modem thinkers the punishments are too 
severe. Stomkng to death for adultery is an instance of 
this. Moreover it does not take into consideration the 
oiroumstances under which the act was committed. For 
be inous crimes sometimes the punishment is too lenient^ 
For instance, a man can escape the consequences of murder 
by offering money to the heirs. Supposing the man is not 
on good terms with the heirs or they want to inherit his 
property as soon as they oan. If anyone murders him, the 
he irs will be only too glad to get compensation for a mails 
death. Moreover this fact may also lead the murderer to
s ubordinate^t
o ommit the crime, because he knows that he will not 
be hanged.
The m o d e m  thinkers have put forward three principal 
theories of the aim of punishment viz- i deterrent, 
ii-reformative, and iii - retributive. The punishments 
inflicted by Islam f&ll under the heads deterrent and 
retributive. It is intended to set an example for
others so that they aay may not follow the course
adopted by the culprit and seoondly to oonform to the 
maxim, « as you sow,so shall you reap. " One who has 
done wrong must suffer the consequences of one's evil 
deed. Another aimis to get rid of the offender so that 
he may not be able to work any further mischief, for 
instance, cutting the hand of a thief and stonihg to 
death of adulterers. In the present tim$ some people,
• speoially psychologists and medical men, regard the crime
as the result of some kind edf of insanity and they 
maintain that the offender should not be punished but 
should be cured of his * distempers. In some oases this
view holds good but not in all. There are oases of
c.
neurotic temperament where the subject is not master of 
his actions. The same is the case with an impulsive 
action, but in this case the man is to be blamed for 
leading a life which makes the impulsive action possible. 
Islam does not punish the insane, a child under seven 
years of age and, in some oases, the female sex. But no 
act ion is taken to reform the offenders who have committed 
the offence for the first time or who were too inexper­
ienced to see the oonsequences of their wrong deeds.
The environment of society is undergoing a constant 
change and the legislators of the world are constantly 
oh anging the laws of the oountry to suit the requirements
of the society. But the law of Quran is fixed.
It does not take into consideration the changes of
u,
the society. Take the case of uspry. In the modern 
economic world one cannot help taking interest or 
paying interest on the capital. But according to 
Islam uoery is not allowed under any circumstances.
These objections may be over-ruled by admitting the 
authority of the concensus of the learned men. But 
whether the learned should give a decision against 
the commandments of Islam is a debatable question, 
though they have often actually issued such orders 
under one pretence or another. Wine is totally 
forbidden by the Quran, but the Mazis have permitted 
the use of it for medicinal purposes. The same is 
the case with "interest" and the animals killed by 
an un- Islamic method.
Sin-Islam recognises two kinds of offences, 
viz- opital or mild. Mild offences,and in some 
cases capital offences too, oan be expiated by sacrifice 
and fasting. Islam lays stress on the maxim/ :"Every 
man for himself." Ho one oan take away the sin of any 
other man. One is wholly and solely responsible for 
onefe actions. It is true that in some oases one oan 
transfer the reward of his good deeds to someone else. 
Islam does not believe in the doctrine of atonement in 
the sense in whioh Christianity maintains it.Dividfs 
sins in numbering the people were atoned by the 
sacrifice of thousands of people in some pestilenae . 
"The stripes of the righteous servants are the means 
by whioh the wicked are ehaled- healed." Again, Christ 
gave up His life to redeem the sins of mankind.
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Augustine maintains that "through the fall of Adam 
all mankind has become guilty in God's sight and 
justly exposed to his wrath and ourse. So great was 
"the guilt of this sin that it has involved all his 
desoenents in a common doom, and, apart from Christfs 
redemption, even infants dying in inganoy are justly 
condemned to eternal punishmneht. "—  W. Adama Brown,
I slam maintains the doctrine of intercession. On the 
Day of Judgement the guilty, on account of grief and 
remorse for their sins, will not be in a position to 
plead for mercy. The prophet will plead on their 
behalf. But Islam holds that no one can plead on 
behalf of the other unless he is pwrmitted by God 
to do so•
As regards actions^between "Thou shalt " and "thou 
shalt not" therea are three more grades viz- i 
commendable actions, omission of whioh is not punishable, 
though commission is rewarded, ii- permitted actions 
(Mubah ) iii- reprehensible actions (Makruh ) disa­
pproved but not punishable. Intention to commit a crime 
is an offence, but it is not punishable by the courts 
of justice unless intention is translated into action. 
/Adam Smith quotes in the "Theory of Moral Sentiments" 
a passage from Carlyle. "Prom the purpose of crime to 
the act there is an abyss; wonderful to think of. The
finger lies on the pistol; but the man is not yet a 
murderer : nay his whole nature staggering at such a
o onsummation, is there not a confused pause rather —
I ^  ini lent 1 it ,«.•••** ‘ &':■ by livih
one last instant of possibility for him?"
"Ev il into the mind of Go d or Man ,
May come and go, so unapproved, and leave 
Bfo spot or blame behind. "
Mil torts "Paradise Lost."
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In actions Islam acknowledges the prinoiple of 
"means between two w extremes." God does not lay any 
burden on man which the latter is unable to bear. God's 
commands are considered practical as far as the average 
man is concerned. In case of anyone less than the average 
"there are certain remissions and concessions.
VIRTUES - Virtue is defined as 'good living ' or 
leading a life on the model of the prophet. In order 
to be virtuous a man need not leane his ordinary 
occupation. One who exercises his faculties in a 
natural way amidst the society is considered more worthy 
"than one who leaves the world to worship God in a lonely 
place, a man is considered a social being and for the 
perfect development of his faculties society is 
indispensable. Self- mortification is not allowed by 
"the orthodox seots. In this respect Islam is nearer 
Protestantism than Roman Catholicism. In Roman 
Catholicism (at least in the Middle Ages) the 
religious life tended to be so abstract that it was 
necessary to get away from the life of ordinary duty 
in order to live it at all. Thus society helps the man
in self-realisation and self-development i.e. to work 
out by one? s a own will and effort, the potentialities 
of excellence latent in the Self; to develop knowledge 
love, sympathy etc. to regulate impulses, passions, 
desires, under the guidance of reason; and consequently 
to have a feeling of satisfaction, happiness or bliss. 
Thesd potentialities of excellence are realised by living 
a life prescribed by Islam.
Every society is governed by oertain rules or 
laws whioh are called social manners and customs. In my 
opinion it is generally the men in the upper strata of
the society that set the fashion and the poor people are 
merely imylitators. In Islam, on the other hand, it was 
ma inly the learned that set the moral fashions for the 
illiterate to follow. And consequently we find that 
anything repugnant to or contrary to the fundamentals of 
Islam was not tolerated. In one sense it was a bar to 
the progress of the nations, because Islam lays down in 
detail the regulations acoording to which one has to 
o arry on his daily work. The followers have to take the 
behaviour of the prophet, of his immediate successors 
and Immams as their model, a s  time passed on the 
jurists laid so muoh stress on it that any deviation from
it was considered punishable. For instance, they insists 
that a man must not put on the dress of a Christian as 
it was not worn by a prophet. The trousers must not
hang below the ankles and so on. This spirit led to 
the deterioration of the morals and had a very bad 
effect on the national welfare of the people.
As regards the relations of the members of a 
society with one another, Christianity places a very 
high ideal before us. "Love thy neighbour as thou 
love st th^ownself. * Though this maxim has been 
or i ticised^ by the modern thinkers on certain grounds , 
yet, on the whole, if acted upon, it takes away the 
distinction of colour, caste or oreed. Islam believes 
in the brotherhood of the believers. Non-believers are 
excluded from any brotherly relations with the believers. 
They are considered as something outside the circle of 
fraternity. Among the non-believers, the polytheists 
are greatly hated. They are not permitted to enter 
the mosques and other places of worship. The Christians 
and Jews are tolerated as they belong to "the people 
of the revealed books. " But the contempt with whioh
v<,r
the polytheists were looked upon, made the Muslims 
exclude the Christians as well from entering their 
mosques as they believed in the Fatherhood of God.
There is another high ideal in Christianity, 
namely that of non-violence. "If anyone giveth thee 
a slap on the cheek, turn the other oheek towards him.®
If the people Were to aot up to this, there would be 
an end to all wars in the world. Islam does not plaoe 
this ideal before its followers, though it does not at 
the same time ask its followers to be aggressors. War 
is not considered an evil in Islam. War in defenoe of 
Islam is oonsidered a very high ideal. "Whoever," says 
Nietzsche, "has seen those furrowed basins whioh onoe
contained glaciers, will hardly deem it possible that 
a time will come when the same spot will be a valley of 
woods and meadows and streams. It is the same in the 
history of mankind; the wildest forces break the way, 
destructive at first, but their activity was nevertheless 
neoessary in order that later a milder civilisation 
might build up its house. Their terrible energies are 
the oyclopio architects and roadmakers of humanity. "
The Greek virtue of 'courage ' confined itself almost 
entirely to valour in battle. It is a good thing to 
brave physical dangers, but, in my opinion, thct man is 
"the most oourageous who can face the dangers of his own 
inner self. Not to strike when you have the power to 
strike, and to forgive and forget requires the greatest 
amount of coinage.
Islam permits slavery, but at the same time asks 
its followers to treat the slaves kindly. In many places 
in the East the slaves take the meat at the same table 
with the master. The children of the- slaves are
naturally taken as slaves, yet in reality they are like 
ordinary servants* in spite of all this the faot still 
remains that they have been deprived of liberty. It is a 
great virtue to set a slave free but if one does not do 
so he does not make himself liable to punishment. This 
is another defect of making an immutable law for all ages.
The status of women in some respects is inferior to 
that of men, but their rights are safe-guarded. In the 
middle ages and in modem times, too, in the East the 
women were^ inferior to men intellectually and physioally 
and Islam has in many ways tried to remove this 
inferiority, but still it does not give them the same 
freedom as is enjoyed by man.
Islam and communism are poles apart. Islam believes 
in the right of the individual to possess private property 
and it also recognises the difference in the grades of the 
society. All men are equal in the eyes of Godf As far 
as justice is ooncemed but not equal in respeot to 
their physical, moral and intellectual advancement and 
Islam does not take upon itself the task of removing 
these differences.
Now I will quote a few passages from the Quran 
to show how the believer is to regulate his oonduot in 
da ily life
Charity —  "Give food unto the poor and the 
orphan and the n bondman for His sake, saying, we feed 
you for God's sake only: we desire no recompense from 
you, nor any thanks. " "They will ask thee what they shall 
bestow in alms; answer, the good which ye bestow, let it 
be given to parents and kindred, and orphans, and the 
poor and the stranger/
Avarioe etc. —  "Woe unto every slanderer and 
backbiters: who heapeth up riches,and prepareth the
same for the time to oome ! He thinketh that his 
riohes will render him immortal. By no means." 
Benefioenoe —  •Serve God and associate no creature 
with Him; and show kindness unto parents, and reflations 
and orphans, and the poor, and your neighbour, who is of 
kin to you, and also to your neighbour who is a stranger, 
and to your familiar companion, and the traveller, and 
the captives whom your right hand shall possess : for Gad 
loveth not the proud or the vain glorious, who are 
oovetous, and reoommend covetousness unto men. • • "
Civility—  „q true believers, enter not any house 
beside your own houses, until ye have asked leave, and 
have saluted the family thereof : this is better for you; 
per adventure ye will be admonished. And if ye shall find 
no person in the houses, yet do not enter them until
leave be granted you • • • . "
Co nversation —  "0 true believers, when ye talk
privately together, talk not of wickedness and 
enmity. "
pe bt—  "Deal not unjustly with others and ye shall not 
be dealt with unjustly. If there be any debtor under a 
difficulty of paying his rent debt, let his oreditor wait 
until it be easy for him to do it; but if ye remit it as
alms, it will be better for you, if ye knew it.
. . . .  0 true believers, when you bind yourselves 
one to another in a debt for a certain time, write it 
down, or let a writer write between you according to 
justice . . . Call to witness two witnesses of your
neighbouring men; but if there be not two men, let there 
he a man and two women . . .  if one of those women 
should mistake, the other of them shall cause her to 
rec olleot. And the witnesses shall nat refuse whenever
they shall be called . . • "
/  Dissent Ions —  "If two parties of the believers 
contend with one another, do you endeavour to oompose 
the matter between them and if one of them offer an 
insult unto the other, fight against that party whioh 
offered the insult . . . "
To m e n  "The wpmen ought also to behave towards their
husbands in like manner as their husbands should behave 
towards them according to what is just; but the men 
ought to have a superiority over them . . .  Ye may 
divorce your wives twice and then return with humility 
or dismiss them with kindness. But it is not lawful 
for you to take away anything of what you have given 
them . . . But if the husband divorce her a third
time, she shall not be lawful for him again until she 
marry another husband. But if he also divorce her, it 
shall be no crime in them if they return to each other ."
Jus trice ---"0 my people, give full measure of just
weight, and diminish not unto men anything of their 
matters, neither oommit injustice on the earth, aoting 
o o rruptly. "
In the end I may say th«t the foundation of 
Christianity lies in faith, hope and love, while Islam 
is based on fear and hope, though later on we find an 
element of love in it.
So far I have dealt with what a Muslim ought to 
do according to Islam and now I turn my attention to 
the actual state of affairs in Muslim India. The 
account given by the Indian historians is meagre and 
the course is beset with great difficulties. An Indian 
historian's aooount of an event is often one-sided and 
he fails to see the point of view of his opponent. He
it,y
is also given to exaggeration. He would say millions 
when he only means a few hundreds. Sometimes the 
account is incorrect because he has to flatter the 
men in power.
However, we find that while Arabs, Mongols and 
Persians maintained to a certain extent their own 
national standard of morality, those who were 
converted from Hinduism could not easily give up the 
so cdal oustoms and manners amidst which they were 
brought up. They brought 4n-the with them the idol- 
worship in Islam through another form. They began to 
worship the tombs of the saints and their ancestors.
The saints were looked upon a s demi-gods, who in some 
cases could even set aside the power of God. Ma£io 
and superstition maintained a dominant influence over 
the minds of the people. The women w*e were the chief 
victims of this. Life inside the harem of a newly 
converted Muslim was -different in no way different 
from that of a Hindu. Those were times of war. The 
Muslims were either fighting against the Hindus or 
against one another. Such wars have a great demoral­
ising effect on the minds of the people. They become 
pessimistic. And the misery and suffering which is the 
inevitable result of the war makes the people superstitious 
They try to invoke the help og the supernatural powers.
If anyone claims to be a magician, he is greatly 
welcomed. The majority of the Muslims believed in 
predestination and the Hindus in the doctrine of larma. 
The former ascribed misery and suffering to the will of 
Go d and the latter to the unknown deeds done in the past 
life. In both cases the bodies of men and physical 
environments presented an obstacle to any moral progress.
The people re signed themselves to their lot, instead
past time.
of finding a remedy for the evil state of affairs.
Ag ain, that was the time of militarism. Might was 
right, in suoh a oase greed and avarice easily 
takes possession of a man. There wre were many 
hands of rohbers let loose £ on the people. In fact, 
anyone who could collect some substantial following 
was a self-made king. Though these people were 
Muslims, yet they could easily set aside the rules 
of Islam to suit their convenience. .Was not India 
a d ar-ul- Ha rah (a land of wai)? Islam allows 
c ertain latitude in dar-ul-Harah. And who could 
say no to the oaprioious whims of these autocrats? 
Justice simply meant the carrying out of the orders 
of the rulers. Mutilation and torture were the 
oommon punishments. In fact there was no standard 
according to which punishment was meted out to the 
guilty as well as innocent. Life and property was not 
safe. The people began to hide their women behind the 
four walls of the house. Whenever they had to go out 
th ey covered themselves from head to foot so that their 
beauty and age may not be known. The veil in other 
Islamic countries was not of this type. Even in these 
days the veil worn by women in Egypt, Persia and 
Arabia is altogether of a different type. There is 
much freedom in it. But an Indain woman is covered 
from head to foot in such a way as to make it diffioult 
even to breathe. Their condition in the intense heat 
of summer is pitiable. This is merely a relio of the
past time*
Another evil which crept in Islam was "child 
marriage." The daughter was considered as something 
to be disposed of and the sooner the parents got rid of 
her the better. Though Islam makes a provision for
the maintenance of the girls after their fathers death,
I believe, there is no such provision in the Hindu 
law. The parents feared that after their death, their 
daughters would be left unprovided for, so they 
considered it best to get them married at an early age. 
This practioe«has been the cause of great national 
ruin.
Islam maintains the equality of the believers.
There is no question of high birth or low birth. A 
poor am man stands shoulder to shoulder with a rich man 
in the mosque. But the Hindus have a rigid caste 
system, a  Brahman is considered to be the most 
superior of all men and Sh&dra is untouchable. This 
distinction brought about a corresponding destruction 
in Islam. The Muslims in India wrewere divided 
among various oastes. Intermarriages between different 
oastes were condemned. There was some sort of 
classification of the people according to their 
professions in other Islamic countries, but such 
ol assifioation was not a bar to a social intercourse.
In India, oaste confined them to various dosed groups.
A man of low oaste may become rich but he will not be 
of the same rank as the poor A sayyid.
Asceticism was greatly practised in India by the 
Muslims either by way of self-mort if ioation or to make an 
impression on their co-religionists. In this they 
followed their Hindu fellow men. They gave up 
e a ting of meat and resorted to some lonely place for
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meditation. The jungle was given preference to a 
mosque in this respect. This gave rise to a good 
deal of hypoorisy. There were Innumerable saints 
in India, in fact, any one who showed some deviation 
from the ordinary mode of life was considered a saint. 
Though Islam condemns begging, yet the number of 
beggars in India far exoeeds that in any other 
country, because Hinduism enoourages this evil. In 
rituals and ceremoniew too they mainly followed the 
Hindus. In this respect Islam in India presented a 
picture which had little in common with other Muslim 
countries. It may be called a Hinduised Islam.
In less troubled times the people acted up to the 
Arab, saying : "The people follow the religions of 
the ir kings." If the king was himself an orthodox 
follower of Islam, he would enforce a rigid observance 
of the Islamic law, but when the king was inclined the 
other way, the people were free to choose for themselves 
what they liked. On the whole the priestly class 
exerted a dominant influence on the people. It was not 
easy to openly oriticise the ’fatwas1 of the Qazis.
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PEBSIAK POETRY Iff INDIA.
This is a subject on which volumes can be 
written. A detailed study of every Persian poet, 
the influences of environments in his writing, his 
own genius in exploring the hidden treasures of 
nature, in short a view of the whole from every 
aspect is worth the trouble. But I have neither 
time nor space to indulge in such an attractive 
idea and so I will deal briefly with the main 
points of Persian poetry. In my treatment of the 
subject I will not deal with the literary or 
linguistic aspects, but will confine my attention 
to the thought of the poet. The poets occupied 
an influential position in the Indian courts, 
because their services were urgently needed by the 
men in power for oertain political reasons end they 
provided a polite amusement and entertainment for 
the public. Moreover, in some cases the people were 
afraid of the satires, which was -gk a formidable 
weapon in the hands of the poets to avenge any real 
or supposed grievance. In spite of all this many 
of the poets have risen to a sublime height where 
they have been face to face with the ultimate 
Reality, gaining access to the Royal Presenoe through 
the manifestations of nature.
(1) Exoteric poetry :
The first item in which nearly all the poets 
took a special delight ijti was Qasida or an eulogical 
poem. The rulers bestowed handsome rewards on the 
poets for writing poems in their praise. In some cases 
the reward amounted to a poetf s weight in gold coins. 
In another instance a poet's mouth was filled with 
precious stones. In the first place, Qasida served 
a useful purpose. It was an expression of hero-worship. 
For instance, in modem times few people would take 
the risk of putting their lives in danger or to break 
the speed records in air, sea or land, if the public 
through the medium of newspapers did not encourage 
them in their arduous tasks. Secondly, it was a source 
of income to the poets. The poets had to find their 
means of living and it is evident that they hardly got
anylbhing for their ethical poems, though it is true 
that they were paid according to the literary merits 
of the Qasidas. Thirdly, nothing is more attractive
to man than his own praise. The number of people who 
really like to hear the truth about themselves is very 
small and the rulers in Asiatic countries were no 
exception, to this. Fourthly, in countries like 
India and Persia, where crowns are as quietly lost as
they are won, a ruler has to depend mostly on the 
good will of his followers. Now poetry appeals .rather 
to the heart rather than to the head. It was wise 
for the rulers to have someone to sing their praises 
as a matter of suggestion to the others to be firm in 
their loyalty. Suggestion plays an important part in
irT
Social Psychology. But unfortunately some of the
rulers showed so much weakness of character and the 
poets exaggerated their supposed qualities to such
an extent that all effect on the people was lost.
The people knew that the poet was a flatterer, and
so they did not pay much attention to the praise of
the patrdn. Where there was no patron there was no
Qasida. The number of Qasidas written in the reign
of earlier Muslim kn kings far exceecPthose written
in the reign of Aurangzeb. Now a poet begins a
Qasida with a theme not connected with the Patroris
Praises. So in this way some poets have written
very beautiful verses on various aspects of both
organic and inorganic nature. In many cases the
whole Qasida dealt with the natural subjects and
the mention of the patron was only nominal. For
instanoe, Urfi's Qasida on Kashmir is a beautiful
expression of what man can learn from nature. The
first line runs thus : " Every individual with a
burning soul, that oomes to Kashmir, even if it be
a roasted fowl, gains new wings." Others also followed
the same line and we find a good deal of metaphysical
and ethical thought in these Qasidas. It may be
noted here that the poets knew what kind of *asida
would please the patron and so expressed the same kind
of views. Akbar was interested in philosophical
discussions and so among his courtiers there were
many philosophers. The poets also adopted the same
course; that is why we find a good many philosophical
problems discussed nicely in many Qasidas of urfi
and his colleagues. And if we compare the Qasidas 
of the post-Akbar period with those of Akbefs time 
we notice that the former oared more for the form then 
thought, /debar*s poets expressed their thoughts freefy
without any restriction while those of the latter 
period had one eye on the ohief Qaz i so that they 
may not incur his displeasure by expressing opinions 
contrary to Islam. But poets like Hasan and Kh^isrtu 
did not care much for the kings or their pomp and show. 
Though they have Qasidas in praise of the kings yet 
many of their Qasidas deal with natural topics and 
are wholly devoid of any kind of flattery• This is 
due to the fact that they were under the influence of 
the great Sufi Biz am Uddiot..
(2) Esoteric Poe try (quatrains, longer poems);
Ghazal embodies the philosophy of love, viz. 
love for (feea and love for human beings. Love for God 
is the sole possession of the Sufis, but love for 
mankind has interested many others. Philosophy of 
love is the philosophy of human feelings and emotions. 
Once a lady asked a professor what was the subject of 
his study. The lady was surprised at his answer and 
she remarked, "In a world so full of fascinating things, 
such as glaciers, sea-enemones and shovel-headed sharks 
how oould any really live person be interested in the 
abstractions of philosophy?" The question floored the 
professor. But a later thought showed him that he was 
studying persons. All the problems of philosophy show 
that there are persons in the world and to study human 
beings is indeed a worldly occupation. This is what the
poets have done. But to study persons requires « 
special knowledge, a special skill, and all the people 
wh«-do not possess that insight into (tae^imman nature. 
So we find that many of the poets who express their 
views of mankind miserably fail to impress an impartial 
critic. All the poets are not of equal rank. This is 
what makes them differ from one another. In the Orientd. 
poetry the best expression of human feelings is found 
in ghazal and those that distinguish themselves in 
this branch were men who could study human beings.
Bo r instance, Hkiusrau, Ha san, Iraqi, Urf i , Naz iri, ^ udsi 
and others. For instance, qudsi says : "fho with her 
eye-1 ashes has gone deep in my heart and whose dark 
eyes have darkednd the world to me.’ When a man has a 
t glimpse of some beautifyl object, he gets wholly 
absorbed into it. The environments make no impression 
on him. And when he is separated from his love, the 
whole world looks dark to him.
Mai-fi says : "She accuses me of loving some one 
else. Does any one else exist for me in this world?”
To a lover everything other than his beloved is non­
existent.
Another poet says/"In the marrning the sun rises
trembling on your street, I am proud of the courage of
1/
the mirroar that comes before your face. " The beloved 
is so beautiful and majestic that the sun dares not 
come before her. The rays of the sun seem trembling. 
This is really a specimen of Sufi poetxy. The sun, 
the earth and other** planets dare not d face the 
divine beauty. But a man sees it reflected in the
mirror of his heart* The reference here is to a verse 
in the Quran. "We offered our ' trust ' to the mountains 
and the earth, but they oould not bear the burden. It 
was Man who accepted it. "
Another poet refers to a different aspect of this : 
"The weak eye cannot bear His unveiled Beauty, the 
transparence of a mirror (i.e. the human heart ) before 
His face is like a drop of dew before the sun." Before 
His majestio Beauty man's egoism or personality 
quickly vanishes.
Thousands of such like instances can be quoted 
but I do not think there is any further need for it.
A poet is at home in India, a land of wonderful 
beauty and glorious natural scenes. That is why 
Ghazal has reached such a great height in this country.
A Persian poet was in daily contact with the Hindus 
with their natural tendency to philosophical speculation. 
This encouraged the poets to observe the phenomena 
before them closely. The poems of Urf i , Faizi, Haziri, 
Salim, Jalal etc. are full of metaphysical speculations.
Iraj^i says: "Love and God’s attributes are 
identical. The Lover, the Beloved and Beauty are
■f/
one and the same.” He makes no distinction between 
God's attributes and His Essenoe.
t'
"He wrote a Word in His own likeness and called 
v
it Adam and Eve.” Man is made in the image of God.
r'
khan Zaman :"When they moulded the heart of man,
//
they poured a dropT of love into it. ” Love constitutes
the essenoe of man.
Faizi :"If all the worlds were to combine, they
*
o annot cure the broken leg of an ant. " God is all 
powerful and the world has its limitations.
2Uf%  lew
"We are holy birds, we do not recognise the worldly
music* %  are angelio birds, we do not know the worldly
atmosphere* Hfe £hve positive arguments, we do not talk
in negatives* Learn affirmation from us and not
negation* In the knowledge of Ultimate Reality we
are guided by our moral conscience* We do not recognise
/ /
the authority of the philosophers* "Ultimate Reality 
is not known by negation* Knowledge of one’s own self 
leads by way of analogy to the knowledge of God* 
Similarly
"What is an idol ? It is merely a manifestation
of "Logos " that has found a firm footing in the church
of my heart.**
**I have never seen a more wonderful thing than the
heart of Faizi which is the pearl, ocean, as well as tbB 
(/ ,
diver." Knower and the known are the same*
Urfi says : "The jurists worship the Book* The 
seekers of Kaaba worsttp the threshold* Take away Thy 
ve il so that people may know that they are worshipping 
something else*" God can only be known through "Love * 
not through religion or revelation. "Those who comment 
on Ifcy beauty are really interpreting an unexperienced 
dr earn*. **Either do not get out of ignorance or be a 
Plato for the middle course means nothing but mirage 
and thirst* "
seeker after God is misled both by Islam and 
Paganism* The moth does not care whether the lamp 
belongs to Kaaba or to a temple. " Truth is not 
oonfined to a partiouhhr place or time. Truth is 
un iversal.
JCalim "If the writer of all m e n ’s fate is 
God, why should there be so muoh variation in the 
writing of one person?"
The problem of monism has mainly engaged the 
attention of the poets for a very long time. Some 
of the Muslim poets in India have oome very near 
expressing the pantheistic views, but they have never 
transgressed the limit. They consider God all 
pervading and this world a manifestation of God 
but they do not identify God with the world or 
oonsider the world as unreal. The following line of 
£ Khusran may be taken as an example of this.
•I have become thou and thou hast become I,
I have become 'body* and thou hast become soul, 
so that no one may say that I and thou are 
different. ■ Now Khusran in this poem points 
out his union with God, but he does not identify 
himself with God. The difference of soul and body 
still lies between him and God. Similarly Sarmad, 
who was executed by Aurangzeb for his pantheistic 
views, says : "Wiatever kind of garment you may put on,
I oan reoognise your stature through it. • The 
oreatures are only outward manifestations of God. They
are not one with God, just as a garment is not one 
with a man. or in other words unlike the vedantists, 
the poet does not take God as the material cause of 
the world.
There has been a great store of Sufi poems in 
India. Khusrau, Ghazali, Urfi, Hasan, Faizi, Salim, 
Bedil, Hazin, etc. have masnawis on ethics and sufiism. 
All of them have tried to imitate the style of Manlana
Hum, but none of them has reached the same standard of 
excellence# The reason for this deficiency lies in 
the fact that Rumi was himself a sufi. He recorded 
his own experience, while many of the above named 
poets were ignorant of mysticism. They wt?e were men 
of the world. Their statement of mystic experience is 
second-hand, so it cannot have the force of the original.
It is often objected that "Ghazal " is not a 
continuous narration. Eaoh line is different from the 
other. Perhaps the reason lies in the fact that Ghaxal 
was mainly meant for the expression of love or Divine 
love . In a mystic experience the states of the sufis 
are ever changing. They have no continuity. So their 
expression is not continuous. The poet expresses eaoh 
item as it comes to his mind. Sometimes he is dwelling 
on one thwme, sometimes on another. Sometimes he is 
looking at ohe aspect of the Beloved, sometimes at 
another. He is not a logician, he is only a poet.
He appeals to the feeling, not to intellect. The lover 
for whom he wtites does not care for the continuity of 
the subjeot as long as the poet is engaged in discussing 
love affairs.
The poet is concerned with the human nature as 
it expresses itself in love. He is concerned with the 
feelings, desires, passions, emotions, pangs of 
separation and joys of union etc. and he sees them all as 
a part of one great sentiment of love. Though we find eada 
1 ine expressing a distinct idea, yet they are all 
oonneoted as far as the main theme is concerned. They are 
all different aspects of one predominating object of 
consciousness love.
And the objection has been raised against the 
Persian poets. They describe the beloved as a murderer, 
a liar, a cheat, a fool, fickle, and of loose character. 
Now the beloved may be either Divine or human. Even in 
the# former case the poet has to describe Divine 
attributes in an anthropomorphic sense. In expressing 
Him as an object of devotion he personifies Him, and 
attributes human qualities to Him. Whether the beloved 
be God or man the poet tries to see him or her through 
the eyes of a lover. Now the lovers vary in their 
temperaments and natural disposition. Even one man is 
not the same always. He is changing. Sometimes he ei is 
in one mood, sometimes in another. So he looks upon his 
beloved according to the modd in which he is. When he 
f inds that the separation from his sweetheart is killing 
him, he naturally considers her the cause of his 
suffering and consequently calls her a slayer and when 
he dwells upon this aspect of his beloved, he expresses 
his feelings in relevent metaphors and similes. He 
oonsiders her eyelashes as so many daggers that pierce 
through his heart. If the beloved, being the most 
beautiful, becomes an object of adoration for all and 
thus excites the jealousy of a particular lover, this is 
not a blot on her character. A jealous lover is naturally 
very suspioious and gives vent to his supposed grievances 
in a manner most appropriate to the characteristics of 
his race. The poet in this respect merely expresses the 
ideas of the race to which he belongs. The poet 
himself does not oreate these characteristics. In ny 
opinion the Persian poets have taken a high flight in
the realm of imagination^. to express the feeling of a 
lore in suoh terms. On this point they must not be 
judged from a Vestem point of view.
again it is said that a Persian poet desoribes the 
lover as a very low and disgraceful person. I am of 
opinion that this is due to y the extreme humility of 
the lover, ffhen a lover compares himself with his 
eloved, he finds that they are poles apart. It is natural 
with him to describe himself in as humble terms as possible 
Then he wants to gain the favour of his beloved and 5 the 
only way which he considers most effeotive is to make 
himself an object of pity and then to exoite the 
oompai2a&n of the beloved. In most oases the beloved is 
God Himself, and if the lover describes himself in 
humiliating terms he cannot be blamed for that. He 
merely points to his own limitations and God's 
infiniteness.
r
If we compare the poems of early writers, suoh as 
KhusraA-and those of the later period, for instance, Hasir, 
Ali Sirhindi, we find a great difference. The early 
writers wre more easily understood by a man of ordinary 
ability while the latter are only intelligible to 
philosophers and men of deep learning. This, I believe, 
is due to the fact that poets of the type of Hasir Ali 
aim at describing the mystical experience and they do not 
wish to take ordinary folks into their confidenceJdoreover 
they want to show how high they can soar in the region of 
thought and so they express their views in a language which 
is full of similes and metaphors and one has to think for 
a time before one oan grasp their meaning. Of course,this
is a defect in poetry, but as far as thought is concerned
f * ' • . • I
their poems embody many noble ideas in a picturesque
language.
0OOO00OOO00OOO0
THE EFFECT OF MUSLIM CONQUEST ON HINDU CULTURE
As we have seen be fore, the ancient Hindu considered 
all things alive without making any distinction of body and 
soul. When their minds begam to see order in nature, they 
thought of the processes of nature as various independent 
departments controlled by independent mental powers, finite 
but living from eternity or born from nature like other 
finite beings. So animism gave way to polytheism. In the 
Vedic period we find the world under the sway of different 
controlling powers, equal in authority, but each being 
monopolising the attention of the devotee according to his 
need of the moment. But in this we find a tendency towards 
Pantheism ; for instance, Aghi or Fire or Heat, seems to 
pervade all things. Nothing was alive without Agni. All 
the controlling powers seem to be identified with Agni and 
Agni with all. The same is the case with Upanishads. 
Pantheism holds the minds of Upanishad, Sages.
If we look carefully into the Hindu systems of philosopy 
we do not find any trace of Theism in them. They either 
deny the existence of God, or identify the Absolute with 
the world. Some people find theistic views in nyaya and 
Vesheshikd and consider them as the ground-work of Hindu 
belief in Divinity. But I cannot agree with them. Even 
the name of God is not mentioned in them, and where there 
is such a word as may mean "God1*, it is interpreted in a 
different way by the Commentators, so as to leave no doubt 
as to ,the non-existence of the idea of God. The supporters 
of Theistic belief quote the following in support of their 
theory.
(l)Udayana Acharya, a very celebrated ancient Naiyayika, 
is supposed to have uttered the following couplet on 
arriving at the temple of Jagannath Puri and finding 
the door shut:-
"Thou art drunk with the inebriation of majesty. Me thou
(soornest)
scornest. But let the B a n  die as show themselves and upon 
me will depend thy very existence."
But do we find anywhere any record of the above couplet? 
It all rests upon oral tradition, and therefore cannot be 
much relied upon.
y
(2) The word "God is found only once in Naftjaya Sutra 
in the following aphorism;- ,"God is the cause since the 
works of souls are found to be ineffectual?
But this is interpreted by the Commentors in different 
ways, so the question cannot be decided one way or the 
other.
(3) Again, with reference to a passage in Vaishesh-ika, 
some people consider that the word "Tad" refers to God. 
About this Shankra Misra says:-
"The word ’tad* refers to God - though he is not 
previously mentioned - because of his being Well-known. 
(The meaning of the passage in thia case will be: Veda 
is authorifcive as being God's declaration). But further 
on Shankra Misra says:-
"Or the ’tad' refers to virtue because juxtaposed".
(The meaning will be: Veda will have authority by virtue 
of its treating of virtue)
It may be noted here that even some of the Comment ors
on Nyaya and Vaisheshika who lived in the middle ages, give
a contradictory account of God’s attributes. They hold that 
soul minds, atoms and other things existed co-eternally 
with God and were in no case subject to God’s Will. How can 
then, absoluteness and Sovereignty be predicted of God as 
far as they are concerned?
Early Hindus never gave their mind to the problem of 
the relation of God to the world. It was Shankra that 
tried to bring out some kind of relation between God and 
the world by introducing the term "Maya". But in all this,
we see that the question was not of God’s descending to the
(world)
-Jib
world, but that of man’s rising towards God. They were 
solving the problem how a man can become part and parcel 
of God.
But in the middle ages we find a change in the attitude 
of men. Here we see two distinct currents of Pantheism 
and theism running side by side. Along with Acosmism we 
find a belief in the reality of the world, though this 
reality is derived from God, the Perfect Transcendent 
Being, the object and worship of adoration. So we have 
to enquire how this theistic tendency crept into the 
region of Hindu Pantheism. It is often said that theism 
has its seed in Pantheism and that the latter naturally 
developes into the former. I admit the truth of this 
statement. But there are many factors that help in the 
germination and growth of the seed into a plant. So what 
are the factors that led to the growth of theistic belief* 
in the soil of acosmism or Poncosmism? In my view, this 
belief came from outside, from Christianity and Islam.
But at the same time, I wish to add that the Christian 
belief in the Personality of God was not made known to the 
people of India before the adverat of Islam. Some people 
may object to this, and say that the Hindus who had trading 
relations with the adjoining countries could not be 
ignorant of Christianity for so many centuries. But I 
should point out that between Christian Countries and India, 
there lay Persia, the home of dualism of Zoroaster. Even 
if a people knew something about Christianity, this does 
not mean that Christian belief made any impression on the 
people. The Hindus are very conservative and stick to 
their old beliefs, with great tenacity. This is clear 
from the fact that in spite of so many centures of Muslim 
rule, the Hindus did not wholly give way to Islam, while 
in other countries whereever Muslims went, the old 
religions were replaced by Islam. Had it not been for 
this habit of mind, they would have borrowed womething
( from)
from Zoroasterianism, but as they did not do so it makes 
it clear that they did not borrow anything from 
Christianity before the Coming of Islam. For a change 
in thought they wanted some strong impetus, end this was 
supplied by the Muslim invasion of Scinde. What could 
be more sensational than the defilement of the Holy Land 
of India by a nation whom the Hindus considered as 
untouchable? But the conquest of Sindh naturally opened 
their eyes to the beliefs of the Conquerors. In India, 
which has always been a land of religion, the first thing 
about which the Indians would enquire of a foreign 
nation, was its religious beliefs. What do these 
foreigners worship? Do they believe in images and Gods 
like us? Such questions would naturally arise to the 
minds of the Hindus.
How, the main object of Islam is to refute the 
doctrine ®f Trinity and Incarnation of Christ, and these 
are the fundamental principles on which attention is 
fixed in studying Islam. S»o in this way the idea of 
Incarnation and personal God appealed to the Hindus and 
they began to show a tendency towards accepting theism.
How we have to see whether there is any record of 
theistic belief in the books written before the Coming 
of Islam. So, by careful examination we find that the 
first trace of theistic belief is found in Gita. Now we 
have to see how this belief came into Gita, and what is 
its date of composition.
DATE Pi* COMPOSITION OP GITA
As we have stated before, Gita is a part of the great 
epic poem called "Mahabharata". About this poem 
Macdoxsnell writes:.
"We further find in book 1. the direct statements 
that the poem at one time contained 2,4000 slokas 
before the episodes (Upakhyarra) were added, that it
(originally)
originally consisted of 8,800 slokas, and that it has 
"three beginnings".
In the greater part of Mahabharla the theology is
ct
still polytheistic. Brahma/Vishm^ , Shive are practically 
on the same level. In one passage Vishme and Shive are 
considered as rivals. In another, Vishma addresses Shive 
as the first-born of the God. Prom the points as given 
above, the scholars have tried to show that the poem falls 
into three stages, viz:-
(1) Early heroic songs consisting of 8,800 slokas.
(2) The story of Mahabharla concisting of 2,400 slokas in 
which Krishma is considered as a saintly person or demi- 
God.
(3) The epic recast with Krishma as God.
This idea is expressed in the Gita part of the poem. 
Closely allied to this^the doctrine of Grace and Bhakti. 
So according to these scholars, Gita was added last of 
all somewhere about 500 A.D. It should be borne in mind 
that additions and interpolations have been going into 
the poem for l,000years , and there is no reason to 
believe that this process stopped by 500 A.D.
Now the reasons why the above date is assigned to Gita 
are summed up by Parquhar as follows
(1) A reference to the; Vedas, Brahmanas, Upanishads and 
Sutras and DharmK Shastras points out that the book was 
composed in the fifth period, (i*e. period of Dharamshastra
(2) Mr Justice Telang of Bombay maintains that the 
versification of Gita is later than that of the Verse 
Upanishads. This also points to the above conclusion.
(3) The language of Gita - A great part of the 
phraseology of Gita is the same as that of Atharvana 
Upanishads, and is not found earlier, and so^  it is 
inferred that Gita belongs to the same period.
(4) External allusions and quotations - The earliest 
reference tt> the book is found in the works of Kalidasa
iJ9
(in the fifth century A.D.)
(5) The battle of Mahabharata took place in the Vedic 
period. Krishma, as a God, is not mentioned anywhere in 
the early literature. The story that Krishma called
himself Brahma on the great battlefield is a myth.
A
from the above, Earguhar concludes that Gita was 
composed either in the fourth or fifth century A.D.
But the above arguments merely show that the book was not 
compooed earlier than fourth or fifth century, but they 
do not contradict the hypothesis that the book might have 
been written later than fifth century, or that a consider­
able part of it was added afterwards. Kalidasa's 
reference simply shows that there was some such book as 
Gita , but he does not discuss the subject matter at all, 
and so from the lengthy period of composition it is not 
improbable to infer that some parts were added later on.
I may add another point in support of the above view. 
Gita is considered as one of the best religious books ever 
written in India. It records the words spoken by Krishma, 
the God-incarnate. But strange to say, no notice of it
was taken before Shankra. Mo mention was made of it in
any work(with the exception of one of the dramas of 
Kalidasa) and no commentary was written on this precious 
work. Shankra was the first person to write a commentary. 
If the book was held in tjhe the same esteem a6 it is held 
now, why was it that no attention was paid to it? The 
only solution we can offer is this. Either the book did 
not appear in the form in which it is now, or the people
did not find anything new or extraordinary in it. Even
Shankra(9th. century) in his commentary, does not consider 
it to bo any new departure from the pantheistic views 
held in the Upanishads, because he interprets it in the 
light of hist theory of the Vedantic Absolute. He accepts 
Gita as the authoritative book of the Vedanta, and calls 
Krishma as partial incarnation. He does not equate Krishma
(with)
with Brahma. To him Kriehma was a demi-god. Also among 
the early Saints there was no belief in incarnation. So 
what we see in Gita now, i.e. , the idea of a personal, 
loving God, was not seen by the people of that time at all. 
It is therefore evident, that this idea became associated 
with it at a later date.
Now I may examine one or two external evidences. 
Maghesthenes, the Greek Abbaseador at the Court of 
Chandargupta about 300 B ,C., tells us that Hercules( Heraklc 
was worshipped at Methora and Kleisobra.
Farquhar, on the authority of Bhandarkar, is of opinion 
that "This probably means that Krishma was already 
worshipped as a God at Mathra and a town now unknown, 
called then Krishnapur".
But no stretch of imagination can identify Hercules with 
Krishma and Kleisobra with Krishnapura, 6r Jobores with 
Jamna.
Another passage is quoted by Farquhar:
"A passage in the Santi Parvan in the epic poem contains 
a description of Narda’s visit to the’White Island1, 
where he saw the inhabitants worshipping Vishnia, and 
had a vision of the God himself. Many have thought that 
the story contains reminiscences of Christian influence 
exerted on Veishnuism".
I do not think that "White Island" means England, or the 
story shows any influence of Christianity.
INTERNAL EVIDENCE - 1
Now I come to internal evidence, and first I will take 
up the theory of incarnation.
Indian Scholars often assert that the doctrine of 
incarnation is to be found in Vedic literature, but Farquhar 
calls it a complete mistake.
"There are stories in Vedic literature, which were 
turned into incarnation stories in the early Christian
(centuries)
centuries, but within the whole compass of Vedic 
literature there is no reference to the doctrine". 
Farquhar.
There was nothing precisely like the incarnation of 
Vishma in Budhism too at that timej. I will discuss the 
doctrine of incarnation later on.
Secondly; Macnicol says:
"From the point of view of theism, the failure of the 
religion here(e.g.in Gita) presented lies in its 
vacilliation between two views of the nature of the 
highest good that to which it is a state of contemplation 
and that which regards it as a state of self- 
sacrificing activity. It hesitates between the view 
that the fetter that binds man to it(Sansar)is a selfish 
desire for reward, and the view that it is something 
that so belongs to the very fibre of earthly life that 
every movement of mind and heart must be cast forth 
and stilled. Whether the pens of different writers 
wrote these diverse surmises of the truth, or whether 
they are the work of one man in various moods, we 
cannot determine with any assurance.n
As the composition of the book extends over a long periafl 
I am inclined to accept the former hypothesis.
Thirdly STORIES RELATING TO THE BOYHOOD OF KRISHMA 
The Vaishanavites Identify Vasudeva Krishma with the 
Gopola-Krishma, the cowherd God. This is also the popular 
belief in India at the present time. There are many stori® 
told about the boyhood of Krishma which resemble those 
of Christ, for instance, the story of his humble birth, 
his reputed father’s knowledge that he was not his son, 
and the massacre of the innocents. About this,
Sir R.G.Bhandarkar says:-
"The stories of Krishma's boyhood ... were brought 
by A&hira, and others were developed after they came 
to India, it is possible that they brought with them
(the)
the name "Chri8t"aleo, and this name led to the
identification of the boy-God with VaWudeva-iQrishna.
v*
The Goaneae and Bengalis often pronounce the name 
"Krishna" as "Kusto" or "Christo". The dalliance of 
Krishna with cownerdesses, which introduced an element 
inconsistent with the advance of morality into the 
Vasudeva religion, was also an after-growth, consequent 
upon the freer intercourse between the Wandering
!/
Abhiras and their more civilised Aryan neighbours. But 
who were these Abhiras? Bhandankar tells us that they 
were a wandering race whose occupation was the tending
a
of the cows. They occupied a territory between Mathreji 
and Anupa. In Mahabharata they are described as 
attacking $rjuna in Pancanada, probably Punjab.The 
Vishna Purana locate^them in the south of India.
Though they are mentioned as a southern people, and 
as living in the south-west, the Abhiras must have 
migrated in large hordes into the country"^fehandarkar^
I cannot agree to the above story, with the exception of 
the similarity between Krishna and Christ. If Kristna is 
called "Christo"by the Bengalis and"Christo" is the 
PersianJiefrtc form of"Christ? we do not find any use of 
the word "Christo" in the literature of Persia, but in 
the Persian literature of India, "Christ" is first called 
Christo" by AbdulEeee in his translation of the Bible.
This is most probably due to the presence of European 
Christians in the court of Akbar, and I am of opinion that 
this word was Persianised at that time.
In regard to the story of Abhiras,Bha^arkar is not 
justified to regard them aliens, simply because at one 
period of history thy were found in the Punjab, and at 
another, im Southern India.
The episode of Mahabharata does not exclude the 
possibility of their being natives of Southern India at
(the)
K  CL
the time when they attached /Frjuna. Even if a community 
is found in the north at one time, and in the south at 
another, it does not follow that they came from some place 
outside india, i.e., Syria or Asia Minor. And how is 
Bhandarker justified in assigning the first century as the 
date of their migration on the assumption thay they held 
political power in the second century? Does not the 
presence of them in the battle of Mahabarata indicate that 
they were present in India before the coming of Christ, 
foxr, I think Bhandarker believes that the battle of 
Mahabarata was fought many centuries before the Christian 
era. Prom the above it would be clear that Abhiras has 
nothing to do with the stories of Krishma’s boyhood, 
but these stories were spread later on when the Hindu 
world came into contact with the Muslim civilisation. 
Pourthly:
It has been stated that there have been certain 
similarities between Gita and the Bible, and that these 
similar passages were taken from the Bible.
I quote below all such passages:-
(points)
POINTS OP SIMILARITY 
BETWEEN GITA AND THE BIBLE.
Gita.
"Nature gives birth to 
movable and immovable, throug
Bible.
"All authority li***e been 
given unto me in heaven and on 
earth." (Matth. XXVIII, 18)
i
"All things have been de­
livered unto me of my Father: 
and no one knoweth who the Son 
is, save the Father; and who 
the Father is, save the Son 
and he to whomsoever the Son 
willefeh to reveal Him."
(Luke X, 22.
"Gome to me, all ye that 
labour and are heavy laden, 
and I will give you rest."
(Matt. XI, 28).
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me, the Supervisor and by 
reason of that the Universe 
revolves." (IX, 10)
"I know the things 
which have been, those which 
are and those which are to 
be; but me, npbody knows."
(VII, 26.)
"Forsaking all duties, 
come to me as thy sole re­
fuge. I will release thee 
from all sins: do not griev«
(XVIII, 66).
"But that ye may know 
that the Son of man hath 
authority on earth to for­
give sins. . . . "
' (Mark II, 10),
"Of all mortals he who 
knows me to be unborn, with­
out beginning, the great 
Lord of the world, being 
free from delusions, is 
released of all sins."
If/
Bible. Gita.
"If any man come after 
Me, let him deny himself and 
take up his cross and follow 
Me." (Mark VIII, 34)
"So, therefore, whoso­
ever he be of you that re- 
nounceth not all that he 
hath, he cannot be my dis­
ciple.” (Luke XIV, 33)
"In thought renouncing 
all actions unto me, intent nn 
me, applying thyself to the 
yoking of thine intellect, be 
thou always thinking of me."
(XVIII, 57).
"Having thyself yoked by 
the yoke of renunciation thou 
shalt come to me."
(IX, 28).
"Come unto Me, all ye "in him seek shelter with
that labour and are heavy ladenall thy might; by his grace 
and I will give you rest." thou shalt attain Supreme
(Matt. XI, 28) peace, the eternal dwelling
place." (XVIII, 62).
"if they have called "Hating me in their own
the master of the house bodies and In those of others."
Beelzebub, how much more shall (XVI, 18).
they call them of his house­
hold?" (
"And blessed is he, who­
soever shall find none occas­
ion of stumbling in me."
(Matt. XI, 16).
"Deluded people not
knowing my highest nature as 
great lord of entities, dis­
regard me, as I have assumed a 
human body."
Bible.
"My yoke is easy and my 
burden is light."
"To the constantly yoked. 4.yogi who constantly remembered
(Matt. XI, 30)me, never thinking of another 
I am easy of access."
(VIII, 18).
"Learn of Me." "Learn from me."
(Matt. XI, 29) (XVIII, BO).
(Farquhar.)
In some cases the resmmblances are superficial and 
such like passages are found in nearly all religions.
Even if it be admitted that these passages found their way 
into Gita through Christianity, it does not follow that 
this happened in the first or second century of Christian 
esa.
From the above arguments I conclude that there is 
nothing on record to show that the theistic belief was 
found in Gita before the Muslim Conquest and I am of 
opinion that in hhe absence of an£ other hypothesis it 
may be assumed that this belief derived its present form 
through the Islamic literature.
Now I will deal with similar other points in con­
nection with the influence of Islam on Hinduism.
(1) God in Vaishnava Theology.
We have found a belief in God-incarnate common to botl 
Hinduism and Christianity. But there the similarity ends
In/
 s
p  ?
In Christianity, the idea of Divine Fatherhood carries 
with it (in the words of Kennedy) Mthe changelessness of His 
love, goodness and moral purpose. The Ethical teaching of 
of Jesus follows from His conception of God. The Christian 
ethic is of one piece throughout with the Christian doctrine 
of God."
But this is not the case with Yaishnavism. Further 
light is thrown on this by the following passage: "Many
figs grow on one fig tree, and a million universes float in 
the Primal Water. If one of the figs drop and perish,^ the
tree does not feel the loss. Similarly, if one Universe
i4 *
■be- freed, Krishna feels no loss in the least. Endless is
the wealth of Krishna; including Vaikiaitha and other places,
bounded by the causal water. In it float infinite universes
under Maya, just like vessels full of mustard seeds in a
moat. It means no loss if one of the seeds is lost; just
so there is no loss to Krishna one germinal universe is
lost. Even if Maya herself is destroyed together with the
universes, still Krishna himself will suffer no loss. A
she-goat is unheeded by the possessor of a million heavenly 
0
cyvts; so Maya does not affect Krishna, the master of the 
six supreme powers."
This passage is in direct opposition to the parable of 
the lost sheep given in the Bible. The idea in this 
resembles the Islamic conception of God as "Ghani". It has ’ 
some resemblance to Aristotlejs ’unmoved mover’. To 
Raman^jfa God is an independent Reality. God is not im­
plicated in creation, for He regards it unconcerned as a 
’passive neutral’. In Christianity God is much concerned 
for the Welfare of the people that is why He sent Jesus 
Christ to be sacrificed for the sake of mankind. God and 
man are like father and son. Chaitanya holds them to be
like/
like master and slave. The same is the case with Islam.
In Islam man called ”Abd”, a slave. Under the influence 
of Islam the Hindus began to give up the idea of ’incarnation 
of God', till in Guru Nanak we find a total rejection of this 
doctrine. Guru Nanak saysi ,TIf you say that Rama was not 
subject to birth and death, why was he born of Kaushaliya?
If you call Krishna God, why then did he suffer death and 
why did he d^ive the Chariot of Arjuyi? Adore Him alone as 
your Lord whose mysteries no one has been able to unfathom 
. . . .  If Krishna was the saviour of the families, why was 
his own family destroyed?”
(2) Mysticism.
Mysticism is an expression of man’s intense love for his 
Creator. It is often said that Islamic Sufiism was greatly 
influenced by Hindu mysticism, and in favour of this theory 
the doctr^ine of Nirvana is quoted. But I am of opinion 
that there was no such thing as Hindu mysticism in early 
periods in India. Mysticism loses its existence without a 
love for God, but neither in Veda nor in Upanishads or an£ 
other treatise of that period God was treated as ”The 
Beloved”. This idea originated later on. But Bhandarkar 
in his researches tries to show that the idea of love for 
the Supreme Being was not absent even in early periods.
He says, ”lf the sages gave up the world, wealth. . . .  to 
contemplate and dwell withtiie Supreme Being, must it not be 
considered that they were actuated by love for the Supreme 
Being?” I maintain that their aim in giving up the world 
was not love but a re2iease from the cycle of birth and re­
birth. It was the fetters of Karma that they wanted to 
throw off and with that aim in view they had to take to 
asceticism. Then Bhandarkar quotes such passages as 0 
father, Dayans, avert all evils, Be accessible to us and 
gracious as father to the son.”, In support of his theory.
But I do not see any mystic’s love in these phrases.
But with the coming of Islam the whole atmosphere was 
changed. Neo-Platonism, sufism , Christian mysticism, in 
fact all systems professing ^ove for the Creator were exert­
ing their full force in the Hindu population of India.
Take the case of Chaitanya. He behaved just like other 
Islamic mystics. A flower, a bird, a cloud would excite 
his love for God and would throw him into ecstasy. He 
adored one God, call it by what name you like, Brahman,
Parmatman, Bhagwat, Vishnu or Siva. He took the whole 
world to be a scene of God’s love. . To him mankind was 
united in one universal brotherhood. "My heart,” he says, 
"breaks to see the sorrows of mankind. Lay thou (0 God) 
their sins upon my head, let me suffer in hell for all their 
sins, so that thou mayst fcemove the earthly pangs of all other 
beings." How closely this resembles the Western mysticism.
He did not believe in the absorption of all personality into 
God. He maintained that even hell, where he could still 
feel the pangs of love for God, was preferable to extinction 
in the very bosom of God. How different from the early 
Hindu idea of release.
Again we find a close resemblance between the imagery 
used for the expression of love by the Christian mystics add 
that by the Vaishnaves. In the sermons on "the Canticle of 
Solomon" by Saint Bernard the igagery is couched in the 
language of human love. Sometimes the Bridegroom is Jesus 
Christ and the Bride is the Church, and sometimes the 
Bridegroom is Jesus Christ in his Divine Aspect and the 
Bride is the individual soul. But there are a few instances 
where Jesus Christ is expressed as the Bridegroom of the 
individual Soul. The Vaishnaves take Krishna as Bridegroom
and themselves impersonate as Radha.
(3) Bhakt1.
Closely allied to mysticism is the doctrine of Bhakti 
(devotion). In early times salvation could be attained by 
'gyan', but at a later period ’bhakti' was considered 
necessary for this purpose. Chaitanya explains the differ­
ence between gyan and bhakti: - "By gyan we seek to know 
Sod; by bhakti we seek to have Him. To have Him is better 
than to know Him; for those who have Him, also know Him, 
at least as far asthat is possible for men. But even those 
who succeed in knowing Him partially or say fully, cannot by 
that means have Him. By gyan we seek to analyse God and 
are staggebed by the process and repelled from Him.” - 
Gauranga, Vol. II, p. 241. Compare with this what 
Hajwairi says on the subject. At another place Chaitanya 
writes, "There are many ways to salvation, for instance, 
Inana, Karma, Yoga, which were acknowledged effective in the 
past. . . . butbhakti is preferred to all these . "Therefore 
bhakti is the means of gaining Krishna, which is called 
abhidheya in all the Sastras. Just as the gaining of 
wealth yeilds pleasure as its fruits, by which sorrow flies 
away of itself; so the fruit of Bhakti is the springing up 
of Love to Krishna by the task of which birth and rebirth 
is destroyed. But the removal of poverty or the cessation 
of rebirth, is not the fruit of love; its highest aim is 
the enjoyment of love's felicity." . . . .  "Delight in Him 
is the Supreme human Attainment. . . . the highest be­
atitude comes only from serving his feet." - Chaitanya's 
Charitamrita.
The Vaishnavas prefer Bakti to Mukti. Liberation 
and salvation are contrasted. Love is the essence of 
Salvation. Salvation alome means selfishness, while Bhakti 
means abandonment of One's self to the Lord. How closely 
this resembles Sufism.
Again/
Again we find a close similarity between "tasbih^' 
the repetition of God’s name inllslam ana the rcpetrtton 
nf Ond'g r.^T-.o in trAwn ana the repetition of Krishma’s name 
as tiie great so urcrrt for sin among the Yaishanavas. The 
same kind of repetition we find among the Sikha.
(4). Asceticism - Islam discourages asceticism but the 
Hindus tried to purify themselves from Sin by austeritiCs, 
by inflicting punishment on the flesh. They indulged in 
various kinds of practices oy which they inflicted a great 
amount of torture upon themselves. They thus got themselves 
reduced to skeletons. But we find that the Vaishanavas d 
discouraged such practices as unnatural. It is, they think, 
His will that we should not only live in Society, but
enjoy all its pleasures, provided that the sole object of 
our existence is the attainment of God. Islam enjoins 
on its followers to^reap the /Treates/oenefit from Society 
communion with the Holiest of all holy beings.
But at the same time it warns men to be led away by wealth. 
Similarly' Vaishnavism discourages the acquisition of such 
wealth - wealth that is a source of mans’ deterioration.
(5). Guru - ximong Sufis the spiritual uplift of man is 
brought about by his Shaykh. Ho man can traverse the path 
of Sufism without the guaiance of his Spiritual leader. 
Similarly, Guru is .considered essential in Vaishanvite 
Sects. The Guru must know the mysteries of Krishna.
’Bhakti is to be heard of and asked of the guru.
The guru who gives instruction I know as the very Self of
Krishna" - Chartamrita (The actual inuentity of the
ana the Supreme Being is not meant here). Hanak says,
"Search not for the True on^afar off. He is in every heart
ana is known by guru’s instructions ----
Without Guru none hath found God." xLttendance on a Guru 
«
and propagation of him is also necessary for hoksa in the
/Madhva
Madhva System. The idea of the guru as a spiritual 
guide is not found in the early Hindu thought.
(6) Idols - The ohief characteristics of Islam is 
its abhorrence of all kinds of idol worship. in 
India as early as the thirteenth century we find the 
people inclined to give up idol worship. Guru Hanak 
totally disoourged idol worship of any kind. The 
same is the case with the followers of Malukdas and
Dadu who flourished in the 17th oentury. They 
ridicule men and women who hammer their own gods and 
then worship them.
(7) Caste - For a very long time the Hindus have 
heen held fast in thd fetters of the Caste System. 
According to the Dharm Shastras of Manu, the three 
twice-born castes were in every respect superior to 
the Shudra, who had to undergo all kinds of degradation 
and misery. They are called*'the Untouchables".
But Islam never reoognised any distinction of caste.
It was through the influenoe of iBlam that the 
religious movement of the Vaishanavites brought about 
a democratic spirit among its followers. They were 
all united in a common brotherhood of co-believers.
They rose up to press their claims against the 
Brahmans who had so long treated them with contempt. 
Islam reoognised the universal fraternity of the co- 
believers and insisted on group worship. The social 
movement among the Vaishanavites was, on the other 
hand based on 'bhakti', an emotional state of the 
individual in which no one else could participate.
They lacked that social order which made the Muslims 
so powerful in the world.
However as early as the 13th century Hamdepa 
says,—
" I,went, 0 Lord, with laughter and gladness to
Thy/
Thy temple,
But while Hama was worshipping. Brahman forced him
away
A lowly caste is mine, 0 King Krishma,
Why waB I horn a calico printer?
I took up my blanket, went back,
And sat behind the temple.
As Hama repeated the praises of God,
The temple turned to his saint",
Translated by Maoaulliffe.
Habhaji writes in Bhakta Mala, "Kabir refused to 
acknowledge caste distinctions or to recognise the 
authority of the six schoolb of Hindu philosophy, nor 
did he set any store by the four divisions of life 
prescribed by Brahmans" - Westoott’s translation.
In Kabir*s Bijak we find the following:- "The 
Vedas and Puranas are a looking-glass to the blind.
Brahma died with Shiva who lived in Baneres, all the 
immortals died .... with one look the Brahman established 
the worship of Brahma. With another they taught the 
cowherd to be the Supreme Spirit. With one, they 
taught the worship of Mahadeva and with another, the 
worship of evil spirited
When we come to Guru Hanak, we find him adopting 
the Muslim Creed to a great extent. He UBeb the 
Islamio Terminology largely in his teaching. In some 
cases the exact phrases of the Quran and traditions 
are made use of in the Punjabi form. Some people are 
of opinion that he was a Muslim by religion, but I do 
not believe he ever professed the religion of Islam.
/He
He believed in certain principles such as transmigration 
of soul whichpre directly opposed to the teaching of Islam. 
However, I quote below some of his viewB which closely 
resemble the Islamic thought:
(a). The recording angels take with them a record 
of mans acts.
(b). By Thy power are honour and dishonour.
(c). By one word Thou didst create the whole universe
(d). Mind can be purified by being dyed in the name 
of God.
(e). Prom impure water have been created various kinds 
of oreation.
(f). "Pulsirat" is narrower than the breadth of a hair 
it is sharper than the sword, is like a red-hot iron.
(g). Falsehood is at an end, Truth at last prevaileth. 
I do not think there is any further need of multiply-
ing passages like these. Guru Hanl^ himself says,
"When God ordained, Hanak came in the world, bringing 
with them the chapter of the Quran, Traditions and the 
EpistleB .... There is only one God in the world, Hanak, 
the son of God, brought the message from the true God.
(9). Similarly, the Xallata School of Kashmir Shivism 
denies that God needed Karma as prompting cause or Pradhana 
as material oause for the creation of the world. He 
himself also is not the material cause of the worcl. 
Moreover, the followers of that school do not believe in 
Maya as the cause of illusory appearance of the world.
God oreates by the force of his will. The individual 
soul emanates from the Supreme Being, who is more than 
this world of manifoldness. The creation is just like
an image reflected in a mirror. The individual soul 
returns to the supreme soul, when by contemplation it gets 
rid of impurity and has a vision of the Highest Reality.
We see the influence of Western thought, to some extent 
in the above.
(104. Renunciation - The followers of Ramanuja make an
ample use of the do-ctrine of "Resignation" though Rarpknuja
himself UBes this word once or twice in his commentary on
hXL
Gita. *1 bow before Moka^jya's grace'* says Bedanta Desika 
"Which flows freely even into the ignorant."
u.
Aooording to one of the methods in Ramanuja's system 
(i.e. Acaryabhimana) Mukti can be attained by surrendering 
oneself wholly and solely to God (or Guru according to one 
interpretation) and maintaining an attitude of helplessness 
It has a striking resemblance to Sufi doctrine of renun­
ciation. Again in Madhava we find self surrender
« C<
necessary for Mukt^. "Self surrender which mind is
devoted to God as the best of all beings and is full of 
the highest love and in which everything is resigned to 
God, accompanied with the faith that he will protect and 
the feeling that the devoljsi. is j^£s. The same is the case 
with the doctrine of humility.which I believe is taken 
from the Sufism. The Hindus took a special pride in 
their >eing "twice born", or ifci$4h like^fews, the chosen 
people of God. But humility was the characteristic 
feature of a real Vaishnavite Bhakta: "The Bhakta,
although of high position considers himself inferior to 
grass, and acts patiently like the tree. For the tree, 
when cut says nothing and never begs water even though 
parched to death, but gives away its wealth to him who 
asks, and shelters others, itslef enduring the sun and 
rain. The Vaishnawas ought to be without pride e v e n
/though;
though of high rank" - Chaitanya.
The above, I think, is enough to show how the Muslim 
occupation of India helped in modifying Hindu thought.
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INFLUENCE OF HINDUISM ON ISLAMIC CULTURE .
Now we turn our attention to the influence 
V exerted by Hindu culture on the Muslims of
India. It may be noted here that the Muslims
beoause they, being conquerors, considered 
themselves superior to the subject raoe and it 
is generally the latter that adopts the manners 
and customs of the former. Moreover, in Islam 
any deviation from the traditional path is met 
with strong punishment and so it was not easy 
for the followers of Islam to borrow to a large 
extent from the Hindu religious beliefs. But 
when Akbar came to the throne in 1556 the tide 
was turned. He was b o m  in a desert when his 
father was flying in great adversity before the 
Swelibing tide of Sher Shahs conquest. Then 
again, while still a ohild he fell into the 
hands of his unole, where more or less he met 
with a step-fatherly treatment. At the age of 
twelve he had to fight for b his orown against 
enormous odds. Tbder such circumstances it was 
natural for him to develop a dissatisfaction 
for the current state of affairs, a s  he grew 
up to be a patron of learning, he carried his 
natural habit of not accepting anything 
dogmatically into the sphere of religion and
were not much Hindu thought
philosophy and so he founded an assembly where 
men of all shades were free to discuss religious 
and philosophical questions freely. The emperor 
himself took part in these debates. Islam at 
that time was under the sway of the priests who 
wislded a great power and against whose deoisions 
the emperor was powerless. Akbar could not 
tolerate this. Moreover his oritioal bent of 
mind made him look oarefully into their 
fundamental principles and assumptions. They 
based their authority on the Quran, not on the 
verdict of reason. Akbar noted that there are 
certain principles which are common to all 
religions, and which are considered to be true 
by all. As no one doubted their truth, they must 
be taken as true, a s regards those wherein each 
differed from the other, the claim of each 
religion was to be put to a rational test. So 
he wanted to universalise religion on a rational 
basis and to build up a religious struoture not 
on the basis of emotion and feeling but on reason 
and reason only. His religion was not to derive 
an authority from divine revelation but from a 
scientific study of facts. With this aim in view 
he wanted to test the assumption of Islam that 
a newly b o m  child is by his vezy nature a 
Muslim or in other words the child has certain 
potentialities, which when developed properly 
make him a believer in Islam and when ignored 
Or wrongly cultivated make him an infidel.
Or I may express it as follows ; The 
child's nature is fundamentally good* The Good 
has to struggle for its manifestation through the 
external influences brought to bear on the child 
by the oonscious and unconscious environments , 
that may accelerate or retard its progress 
resulting in the former case in Islam. Islam 
does not say that the child derives these innate 
tendencies from his ancestors or that he is at 
birth a product of society. For instance, it is 
not necessary, according to this prinoiple, for 
the child, whose forefathers have been crooks, 
to develop an inclination towards stealing. So 
Akbar wanted to test this assumption. Nay, he 
went further. He wanted to test another assumption 
of the Muslims that Arabic was the natural 
1 anguage of man. He had a number of newly born 
infants brought up in a palace which was entirely 
out off from the rest of the world. The nurses 
and the keepers were ordered to observe oomplete 
silence. After four and a half years the ohdldren 
were presented to the king. But the king could 
not derive any great advantage from this experiment 
for want of a knowledge of relevant sciences or 
methods, except learning that the children 
immitated various kinds of noises. So any further 
experiment of this kind was given up. Now he had 
to rely only on the facts known in his time. He 
listened to the arguments of the Brahmans, the 
Christian fathers, and the i^arsee priests and the 
others. He found out that there is one thing which
works in the world. It is Power or Energy.
This is the «b solute or ultimately Beal.
Ijfc is the most orehipful. But a man needs 
some image or symbol of this power to meditate 
upon. In this he was influenced by the ouwrent 
Hindu thought. So he oonsidered the Sun as the 
ooaplete manifestation of God in heaven and 
Fire on this earth, so both the sun andthe fire 
were worshipped by the followers of this religion.
In other matters of ceremonials he also followed 
the Hindu tradition. This aroused a great 
opposition among the orthodox section of the 
population, but all their efforts were of no 
avail. This religion, however, did not last long. 
With the death of the emperor, all traces of it 
were lost, though no outward coercion or 
compulsion was used.
In this connection we may note another 
example, that of Hera Shekoh, the son of 
Emperor & a h  Jahan and great grandson of Akbar. 
Though he was a follower of the great mystic Mian 
Mir of Lahore, yet his doctrine is pantheistic.
He h derives his authority from the Prophet but 
I am of opinion that he was greatly influenced by 
the Upsnishads, which he knew full well. 1 am 
opt debating the point that there are pantheistic 
tendencies in some of the Sufis such as Mansar 
H e 1 1 a b u t  as none of the Muslim mystics in India 
before his time expressed any views of this kind, 
it seems more likely that he was influenced in his 
views by the Brahmans, with whom he wes on intimate
Iterms. He expresses his views in a short
a
Pamphlet called *Hag^ Bum a.’ He first
disousseB the question why the spirit oame 
to the earth* He answers that the seed of 
perfection which lay latent in the spirit was 
to be made patent* Though everything that is 
potential became actual yet this is not due to 
any effort of the individual, but is mainly 
dependant on the grace of God* But His grace 
o annot be obtained without the guidance of & 
Shaikh or fcrfeot man, though a man has to 
exert himself to the full extent in following 
the advice of his spiritual leader, so the 
Seeker after God has to travel a path, which 
has four stages* In the first stage the disciple 
travels through Alam-i- Hasut (Phydcoal world). 
He has to undergo oertain practices,which are 
like the Xoga of the Hindus* By this means he 
tries to see the image of God in his heart* Here 
Bara Shakoh gives three meanings of *the heart,' 
one of which is equvHent to "mind* or 
"consciousness*” He maintains that in sleep the 
&oul leaves the gross, being clothed in a subtle 
bo dy whioh is an exact counterpart of the gross 
body. It is just li£e the fcstral body ' of the 
m o d e m  psyohioal researches* The soul in this 
w ay travels through many places and meets with 
ffleny experiences whioh constitute the Breaming 
state of an individual* Similarly in the second 
stage, the soul being separated from the gross 
body, travels through the *1 em-i-malakuITor
or a1 am-i-rtrwsh (The Spiritual world).
Here the soul has a vision of the Prophet of
I si am. This vision is not fictitious, because
the impersonation of theProphet by the devil
is impossible, in this stage the individual is
oapable of performing miracles. But Bar a ahekoh
warns the *Seekef not to remain engulfed in
this stage, but to proceed further. For the third
>t age, one has again to undergo certain physical
practices, for instance the regulation of the
breath. It is said that some Sufis carried the
Practice of holding the breath to such an extent
that they breathed only four times during the
whole day. a 8 a consequence of this the sleep
vanishes totally and the individual in this plane
which is called *1 em-i- Jab rut hears the 'sound
of silence,” whioh has only one unchanging pitch
or note. This is Sound Eternal, the Voice of
God. The man is then thrown into ecstasy*
a1 am-i- J ab rut is that where nothing can be seen
A
in the two lower planes, is visible to the 
seeker. Ther comes over him a state of trance- 
like wonder, where waves after waves of bliss and 
£ peace submerge the soul under their folds, a 
man can have this stage only in dreamless sleep.
(I think Bara Shakoh has taken this theory from 
the vedantists ). This state can be realised 
even when a men is awake : " Vhen in the waking 
8 tate no forms, whether of physical or spiritual 
plane oross his mind, the nun is in the plane of 
Jab rut. But in this state he still retains his
oonsclousness. « (it is not clear what Dare 
Shakoh means by consciousness here. *t k least 
it is not what we commonly mean by consciousness^ 
The fourth stage is "jtliam -i-Lahut." The 
spheres of all other planes when compared with 
this world of Lahut are like waves compared 
with the ocean. It is better to keep silent 
about this plane.
Then he gives an expression to pantheistic 
views The water can never veil the face of 
the ice, though a bubble may form an impression 
in the ice. 'The True ' is an ooean of Reality 
and both the worlds exist in it as ice exists in 
water and the water in ioe."
"yurity and impurity, personality and 
impersonality are all aspects of this mnifestation 
and self-limitation. If thou thinjast even the 
smallest atom to be separate from him, verily 
thou shalt miss the Truth. "
"All that thou thickest as other than God 
are verily in their essence one with God, though
separate in name. Divine Wisdom is nothing more
— o ’"
than this, that thou shouldst realise that thou 
ere That end everything as That, It is impossible 
that there should exist anything which is not He."
"The creature is a creature so long as he 
does know himself to the creator. "
This is nothing else but the doctrine of 
the vedantl8ts.. Various other sufis of this 
period have expressed similar views. But
1 J -
like Hallaj, goes to the extreme in this respeot.
This was strictly against the teaching of Islam.
Even if this fact be ignored pantheism could not
commend itself to the learned men of Islam on
ratioenal grounds. It was opposed to the testimony of
self-consciousness and moral consciousness. By
depriving the human beings of all individuality
and freedom of the will, it strikes at the very roots
of morality. Moreover it is a one-sided theory. It
ignores the world of plurality altogether. It makes
God a'barren identity" and the whole world an
illusion. "It makes God a bare name, a caput
!•
mortuum of the abstract understanding "--liddon. So
there was a great reaction against the pantheistic
Sufis. Anrangzefc was on the throne at that time. He
was pledged to uphold the doctrine of Islam among
the Muslims. He could not tolerate apostacy. All
such Sufis were put to death one by one. No one
again dared to speak in terms like these, 
i"Jr ytft
But must be understood that all influence 
of Hinduism on the Islamic world disappeared.^; 
^he converts from Hinduism brought with them many 
customs and manners which they could not easily part 
with and the result was a mixing of two distinot 
currents in the lowers strata of the population. For 
instance, idol-worship gave place to tomb-worship. 
Many ep superstitious beliefs crept in. But still the 
men of literary tastes and the piok of society 
maintained their faith unadulterated by any form of 
Hindu belief. That is why we do not find any trace 
of Hindu influence in Muslim writings exoept in
those described above.
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RAMANUJA.
The century in which Ramannja was born was a period of 
great religious ferment. There were many sects among the 
Hindus and against these were pitched the Sects of Islam 
and each had to maintain its own position against the 
attache of the others.
Ramankja was born in 1017 A.D. in a village on the 
Terupathy Hill. Of his childhood very little is known, 
but it appears that he lost his father while he was still 
young. He received the education that was generally given 
to the boys of that time and he took a keen interest in the 
philosophical studies especially the vedantas. He studied
1
this system under Yadvapar^asha and soon found out that the 
interpretation o^nany passages by his teacher was not 
satisfactory. This created a great difference between the 
teacher and the pupil and the rising fame of the latter 
made the former more and more jealous of the latter till 
Ramantt-ja was asked to leave the school. An attempt was 
also made against his life which, however, failed owing to 
the timely help of some friends.
Ramanfrja devoted himself to the service of God 
7 Devaraja at Karachi. Here, he made the promise of writing 
a commentary on Brahma Sutra, and so he started towards 
Srirangam. Here, he contracted a matrimonial relationship 
which did not prove happy, and consequently separated 
from the woman by putting on the robes of a Sanyasi. At 
the request of the disciples of his great-grandfather 
Alavandar, he settled down at Srirangam and began to study 
philosophy with great earnestness and zeal. A second 
attempt on his life was made^this time by poisoning his 
food, but the plot was detected before it could take effect 
and his life was saved.
As/
As he had to fulfil his promise of writing a commentary
thoroughly
on Brahma Sutra, he travelled north to make himself ac­
quainted with the various interpretations of the book. He 
wrote three books on the subject, viz., Vedantasaram, 
Vedanta, Sangrahm, Vedantadipam.
He then started on a tour to get the approval of the 
learned people in regard to his books. In this way he went 
as far as Kashmir in the north, and there at Sarasvatipita 
(the seat of learning) he read his books in an assembly of 
learned people, which were duly approved.
But Ramannja’s lifd was not an easy one. He had to 
suffer persecution at the hands of the Sivites. He was 
summoned to appear at the court of the Chola King, 
(Kulothunga). But as his life was in danger, another man 
impersonated him and went to the King’s court while 
Ramannja fled away to the kingdom of Hoysale Bitti Deva. 
Here, he settled down at Saligram and passed twelve years of 
his life. Then he went on a pilgrimage to the shrines of 
the Vishnu saints. He passed away quietly after having 
lived a life of 120 years.
U
RAMANJflJA’S TEACHINGS.
His system of Philosophy is called Vishist Advaita or 
qualified non-dualism. According to this system God is 
the Ultimate Reality and this woB’ld of manifdld is His 
manifestation. He establishes three categories, viz., 
Lord, soul and matter.
Shankra regarded the world as the product of Avidya 
and hence considered it as unreal. Ramannja differs from 
him in maintaining the reality of the world, though it is
subject/
* A  v
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subject to the control of Brahman. It does not exist in­
dependent of Brahman. He considers souls and matter as 
attributes of Brahman. The souls, like matter, are not 
capable of existing independently. In addition to the above 
He has various other attributes which denote His perfection.
He Is All-knowing and the object of His Knowledge is supplied 
by His Attributes. In this respect intelligence is con­
sidered His Essence as well as His Attribute. His 
Attributes of matter and soul do not modify His essence in 
any way, though they themselves undergo modifications.
The Soul is modified by the expansion and contraction of 
Intelligence. For instance, in plants and animals the 
soul's Intelligence is dull and suppressed as compared 
with that of man. Modification of matter means the change 
in the nature of the physical objects. Here, Raman&ja 
differs from Shankra in maintaining the modifications to be 
teal and not illusory.
Brahman has two states of existence viz., (1) State of 
quiescence when matter exists In him in a subtle form, and 
the soul though retaining the faculty of cognizance cannot 
exercise that power owing to its separation from matter.
(2) State of creation. Cfeation is a positive volitional 
act of Brahman.
"He thought I might become many and si> He became many."
Compare this with the Islamic reason for the creation 
of the world .
"I was a hidden treasure, I wanted, to make myself known.*
Why did Brahman create the world? To this question 
Ramannja replies like Heraclitus, who makes the world as 
Zeus's pastime, or like Pqato, who is interpreted by some
to/
to make man as the plaything of God (Law's book VII), by 
calling it an act of play or recreation. No want can be 
applied to Brahman and so the act of creation does not imply 
any need on his part. But if the Universe is a sport or 
plaything of Brahman, there can be ho foundation for a 
healthy ethical system. A lack of moral purpose in the 
creation of the Universe makes it difficult to find in it 
a reason for the moral struggles and aspirations of mankind.
Ramanfcja takes a step away grom pantheism by attacking 
the doctrine of the identity of the individual with Brahman. 
For him, knowledge means the differentiation of the parti­
culars or the perception of differences. If Brahman is an 
tmdifferenced being, it cannot be apprehended by any means 
whatever. Even if We admit that we possess such a faculty, 
it would make Brahman, the Absolute, an object of knowledge, ■ 
a theory which Shankra and his followers try to reject.
To Shankra, Brahman is pure consciousness, b$:t Ramanftja 
maintains that consciousness is an attribute of Brahman, or 
the Self, and of this the Self is directly conscious. He 
argues: we do not say, "I am consciousness," but we say,
"I am conscious." He explains the formula'that art thou' 
by making a distinction between "that""and "thou" .
The word "that" denotes the Supreme Spirit, uncreated, 
free from all imperfections, having infinite attributes.
The word "thou".denotes the Supreme Spirit, characterized 
by consciousness, having all the universe and the-.individual 
Souls as|its body. In this respect God may be considered as 
the Soul of the Souls .
4f When the individual Soul unites with the supreme soul, 
such ■inion does not imply loss of consciousness, for how 
can one substance pass into the nature of another substance?" 
- Carpenter.
(Here we find a step towards Islamic theology.)
"The authoritative books do not teach the doctrine of 
one non-differenced substance, or that the Universe of things
is false. They do not deny the essential distinctions 
of intelligent beings, non-intelligent things and the Lord."
- Sacred Books of the Ea$t. , Page 102.
Thus, according to Ramannja, the whole existence, 
conacious and non-conscious, constitutes the body of God, 
Like the coils of a snake, the world may be considered as 
a part of God. The same is the case with "Souls". They 
are the manifestations of the Divine attributes, and at the 
same time have a qualified independent existence of their 
own. When souls are said to be a part of God it does not
mean a portion cut from the whole, because God is in­
divisible. They are like radiance emitted by a luminous 
body.
"The individual souls are eeternal, otherwise there 
would follow a failure of requital and a fruition (of 
pleasure and pain) unmerited. The Soul is atomic.
"If the hundredth part of a hair be imagined to be 
divided a hundred times
The Soul may be supposed a part of that."
"The visible unsentient world is divided into three, viz., 
the object, the instrument and the site of fruitidn. The 
deity known as Purshuttoma or Vasudeva is the efficient 
cause of the world."
Gough's translation of The Sarva
Sangraha.
Before Creation the individual souls and matter exist 
in a subti]e form in Brahman. The subtile form of matter is 
developed into the mundane egg and the creation takes place 
under the guidance of Ishwra from this egg. Ishwra is the
W
creator, the sustainer and destroyer of the world and has 
a wonderful celestial body. He exists in five different
modes/
rmodes, viz., -
(1) Para (the highest) in which mode He dwells in a 
city called Baikuntha, attended hy His three consorts.
(2) Vypha, in which He manifests His controlling 
power and creating power.
(3) Vibhava, in which He takes up the form of fish, etc.
(4) Antaryamin, in which He is worshipped by Yogis.
(5) In the form of idols and images in the temple.
Ishwra has three consorts, viz., Lakshmi, Bhu (Earth)
and Lila.
Lakldshmi, symbolises the activity of the Supreme Being
in the finite/'The Lord of 5brtune"(Laklishmi), writes
hose essence is absolute negation of all evils, 
accordant with blessedness and infinitude of knowledge 
and bliss - who is an ocean of multitudes of boundless 
and blest qualities of nature, to wit, transcendent 
knowledge, strength, majesty, vigour, power and 
brilliance - whose divine form is a mine of splendour 
, beauty, comeliness, youth and other boundless qualities 
accordant with his will, uniform, inconcievably God-like,
marvellous, constant, flawless and unsurpassed ....
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whose feet are everlastingly praised by countless Saints
accordant with His will in their essence, being and
ten&wxse#© *© r i© irp tw ie s ,g iv e s , as I
activities delighting solely in doing all service to Him 
and possessing multitudes of infinite attributes, such
as eternal flawless and surpassed knowledge, power and
mattes t* himeeirnls live j
empire - whose dwelling is in the Supreme heaven called 
the Imperishable, which is indefinable by speech or 
thought, accordant with this nature, diverse, various, 
boundless, abundent in objects,means and seats of delightj 
infinite in vjpndrousness, in splendour and in extent, 
everlasting and flawless - whose sport is the origination 
maintenance, and dissolution of the whole universe, full 
of endless , diverse, curious objects ,of enjoyment and 
multitudes of enjoyers - who is the Supreme Brahma,
Supreme SpjLrit and jharayna - after having created the
into his own nature and thus became impervious to the 
meditations and worship of the Gods, from Brahma 
downward, and of mankind. But as he is a great ocean 
of boundless grace, kindness, love and generosity. He 
assumed various similar forms without putting away his 
own essential Godlike nature, and time after time 
incarnated himself in the several worlds, granting to
Dhagwatgtta.
Universe from Brahma down stones, withdrew
His
Hie Worshippers rewards according to deserts, namely 
religion, riches, earthly love and salvation and descending 
not only with the purpose of relieving the burden of earth, 
but also to be accessible to men even such as we are, so 
revealing Himself in the world as to be visible to the 
sight of all and doing such other marvellous deeds as to 
ravish the heart and eyes of all beings high and low". 
Release is obtained by means of Bhakti; by means of which 
the Inner Ruler discloses His presence and illuminates the 
heart of the devotee. But the grace of God is not uncondi­
tional. The individual should make himself fit for the 
reception of Hvine Grace. He must purify himself before the 
Divine Light can shine on his soul. The released soul attains 
the sameneBBof nature with God, but not the identity.
"Vasudeva, in his tenderness to his votaries,gives, as 
desired by each,
According to the merits of his qualified worshippers, 
large recompense.
for that end,in pastime he makes to himself his five 
embodiments;
Images and the like are adoration, his incarnations are 
emanations;
As Sankarshana,Vasudeva,Pradyumna,Anirudha, his manifesta­
tion is to be known to be four fold; the subtiie is the 
entire sifc attributes .
That self-same called Vasudeva is styled the Supreme Spirit 
the internal Controller is declared as residing in the 
soul, the actuation of the soul;
Described in a multitude of textsof the Upanishads, such
as"Who abiding in the 8001”".
By the worship of adoration, a man casting off his 
defilement becomes a qualified votary:
By the subsequent worship of "emanation**, he becomes 
qualified for the worship of "Manifestation"next,
By the Worship thereafter of "the subtiife", he becomes 
able to behold the internal controller".
(Gough’s translation of "The Sarva Dassha^nar Sangra^. 
Thus, performance of actions without a desire for fruit 
and acquisition of knowledge are both necessary as an aid 
to Bhakhi. The knowledge consists in seeing oneself as an 
attribute of God, distinct from Prakrati. A devotee 
ultimately has an actual vision of God - a kind of final
(mental)
mental perception. Much emphasis is laid on meditation. But 
it is not clear how far it should be the result of an intense 
love .
Ramanuja attacks Shankara's theory of Maya under the 
following heads:-
(1) Avidya cannot effect Brahman directly because his nature 
being pure intelligence would repel ignorance.
(2) Avidya cannot operate on the individual soul because the® 
result from the action of Avidya and therefore cannot be 
acted upon in anticipation.
(3) If avidya is effective in clouding the intelligent nature 
of Brahman, it makes the latter a non-permanent entity.
(4) Shankara's defination of avidya makes it possible to 
attribute contradictory qualities (i.e.of existence and non- 
existence)to the same object. Simultaneously,- a position 
whiah is apparently absurd.
(5) Shankara maintains that avidya is absolutely 
indescribable. Then it must be non-existent as an entity.
(6) The Sacred books do not maintain the existence of avidya. 
If such a thing is proved to exist, it cannot be remdved by
a knowledge of attributeless because such a knowledge is 
impossible.
(7) Avidya cannot be removed by knowledge but by actions 
because it is the result of Karma.
To prove his theory Ramanftja argues thus:-
"Is any self-conscious principle presented as an object
and as a subject(of ignorance)as distinct from cognition?.
Mm
If the answer is the the affirmative, the ignorance would 
vanish with a knowledge of the essence oi trie thing. If 
not it is not possible for us to be conscious of an 
ignorance which has nop subject and no object. In reply to 
Shankara's statement that “pure manifestations of the 
spiritual essence is revealed only by the cognition 
opposed to ignorance", that is by consciousness of 
ignorance as accompanied by a consciousness of its subject 
and object, Ramarinja says, that this consciousness or
subject can equally arise in the absence of knowledge. It 
must therefore be admitted that the cognition MI am ignorant,
I know not myself"etc.is conversant about an absence of 
cognition. To Shankara's argument that"Right knowledge must 
have had for its antecedent another entity(i.e.illusion), 
an entity different from mere prior, non-existence of 
knowledge, which envelopes the object of knowledge, which 
is terminable by knowledge, which Occupies the place of 
knowledge in as much as it(i.e. the right knowledge) 
illuminates an object not before illuminated, like the 
light of a lamp springing up for the first time in the 
dark nee 6 H.
Ramartts^ replies that to prove the antecedent illusion 
Shankara would need an ulterior illusion, which he did not 
admit.
So Ramar-ingi concludes that illusion does not reside in 
Brahman, who is pure knowledge;-
"Consciousness by its bare existence has the nature of
creating conformity to the usage about(i.e.the name and
* vjrl
notion of) some object, and such consciousness also called 
knowledge, apprehension, comprehension, intelligence etc. J 
constitutes the soul, or knowledge of that which acts and 
knows" .
To the objection that soul, if it consists of cognition, 
cannot have cognition as a quality, Ramarln-ji replies that 
this is not impossible, for instance the sun and other 
* luminous things, existing in the form of light are sub­
stances in which light as a quality inheres.
According to Ramarinji there are three sources of knowledge 
vix:-(l)revelation(2) intellect (3)intuition. Knowledge of 
Brahman is mainly obtained from the Scriptures. Reason can 
only deal with the world of senses, but it can be used as 
an aid to the understanding of the Scriptures. The study of 
the Scriptures leads to an indirect knowledge , while the 
direct knowledge of Brahman is gained by the profound
contemplation. Ramarii»ji defines Bbakti as "only a
(particular)
particular kind of knowledge of which one is infinitely fond 
which leads to the extinction of all other interests and 
desires”. (Ved Sang). From this MacNicol concludes that 
intellectual element predominates in the system of Ramarnji. 
But I believe, by knowledge Ramarnji means a kind of 
religious experience and it is equivalent to "Marifat" of 
the Muslim mystics.
CRITICISM
Ramannja was struggling midway between pantheism and 
theism, between an immanent God and a transcendental deity, 
between the Absolute of Upanishade and Vedanta and the God 
of Islam. He could not give up the teaching of his 
predecessors, and at the same time could not identify God 
with the world mo as to leave no room for the latter. This 
was a difficult task he was trying to accomplish, and if he 
did not succeed fully, we are not to minimise his efforts.
Aa we have seen he considered Brahman as substance and soul 
and matter as his attributes. How a substance is nothing 
apart from its attributes. By a modification of its 
attributes a substance no longer remains the same, for 
instance, a change in the rationality or animality of man 
will not leave him undisturbed. A body without weight will 
not be the same body as it is now. But soul and matter 
undergo modifications. This does not leave the Brahman 
immutable but makes Him subject to change, and hence liable 
to destruction. Moreover, matter is extended, and soul is 
also extended as well as conscious, because according to 
Ramannja soul is about twice in size, and size and extension 
mean the same thing. If soul and matter are attributes of 
Brahman, then Brahman must be extended and this would 
make Brahman material finish and imperfect. In fact 
Ramarmja admits this, though reluctantly. We see that Brahman 
attributes are not perfect.If the world is tending towards 
perfection, Brahman actualiss his essence and makes himself 
perfect through this world. There is another difficulty.
(matter)
matter is unconscious and God is beli>-»ved to be conscious.
It is difficult to conceive how dSti} the unconsciousness be an 
attribute of the conscious.
The idea of a finite God is very attractive to some of 
modern thinkers such as Drs.Rashdall and Howison. According 
to Dr.Rashdall,
"A supreme being of this sort may be considered the original 
source, from which all other beings, who co-exist( according 
to Prof.Howison , “eternally coexist") with him derive their 
existence. He is limited both by the other beings and also 
by the necessities of his own nature, as something which 
he finds given, and as setting to his activity a bound 
which he cannot pass".
RamanrSa’s god is limited by souls and matter, which eter­
nally coixist with him. As he has not created them, he 
cannot be said to be the creator of their properties. In his 
activity he finds himself limited by the properties of soul 
and matter, and so more ofc less he conforms to the type of 
Gdd given above.
Ramannja may be compared with Sprindya, though there are 
more points of dissimilarity than similarity. According to 
God is the only substance. Substance he defines 
as that which exists in itself and through itself.
"God has infinite number of attributes, but mind 
recognises only two, thought and extension.
An attribute is"that which the intellect perceives as 
constituting the essence of the substance". Each attribute 
in its turn manifests itself in modes, thought in will and 
intellect;and extension, in rest and motion. In his system 
mode is a device for deducing the finite from the Infinite.
Ramannja differs from Spinoza in maintaining a number of 
substances. Spinoza’s God is different from that of 
Ramannja.(Spinoza has been interpreted differently by modern 
thinkers). God, according to some interpreters of Spinoza, 
is the sum total of existent things or moods, and at the 
same time is the immanent energising principle of existent
(things)
thingB. God is not the creator of the world. God is the 
world. God is not a person, though God hei* soul and body 
in the sense that life or mind is the one phrase or aspect o-f 
e v e r y t h i n g t h a t  we know, as material extension or body 
is another.
From another point of view Spinoza's God is an abstraction. 
All finite things fall outside Him. No quality can be 
predicated of Him for to define Him is to limit Him, we can 
only say that He is not this or that.
By making soul and matter attributes of God Ramannja 
identifies God with the world. But he does not wish to remah 
in this pantheism. So he considers them as substances having 
a reality of their own, being distinct in nature from God.
God is a person, is a rational individual, and has a celestiaL 
body.
Again, the souls are his in»er body asad matter his outer 
body, and he is the energising principle of the world. 
Spinoza's God is not the first to love man. He does not 
return man's love.
According to Ramannja God responds to the love of man.
For Spinoza the action of reason is human liberty. True 
freedom is to be like God, to be one with God. Freedom is 
rational knowledge. For Ramannja freedom means a union with 
God, and is attained by realising in oneself the real re­
lation existing between man and God, and through meditation. 
Spinoza does not believe in rewards after death.
Ramannja considers reward as the fundamental principle in the 
existence of the world.
Ramannja considers matter and soul as attributesas well as 
substances. Just as a body is a substance in regard to the 
qualities that inhere in it, so it is an attribute in regard 
to the soul which it qualifies. Here he differs from the 
scholastics who maintain that a substance is that which exiefe 
in itself and does not inhere in another substance.
"A substance" says St.Thomas "is a thing whose nature it is
to exist not in another, whereas an accident is a thing
(whose)
whose nature it is to exist in another".
We call God a substance analogically, because He verifies 
in Himself in a most perfect manner all the perfecting of a 
substance , though He is above human categories. Scholastics 
do not take the body as a quality of the soul. They take them 
as distinct substances or two constitutive factors of a compo­
site Bubstance^man. However* taking them as substances 
Ramannja relates them to God as body to the soul. Matter is a 
body to the human soul and human soul is a body to God. In a 
subsequent passage he defines the body as "any substance: 
which a conscious soul is capable of completely controlling 
and supporting for its own purposes and which stands to the 
soul in an entirely subordinate relation" - R.K.
In this case God is the immanent energising principle of the 
world, or more correctly, the controlling principle of the 
Universe. ♦
Now it is generally believed that 'soul' is completion-the 
line of substantial perfection but incomplete in the line of 
specific perfection. It can discharge some of the functions 
but not all without conjunction with another substance. If 
the world is the body of God, God will be considered an 
incomplete substance because it cannot discharge all the 
functions without a union with the world, or in other words, 
the world is a necessary factor for God.
As matter and soul inhere in God, they have their being in 
God, not in the scholastic sense, because the school men did 
not identify the world with God but they meant that God kept 
them in being by His Omnipresent Conserving power. But He 
does not sustain them as a subject in which they inhere, as 
substance sustains the accidents which determine it, thereby 
giving expression to its concrete actuality. For Ramannja,
God and the world are identical, but there is also an element 
of difference. God is related to the world as vhole to the 
parts, or fire to its sparks. But this will make God divisible 
So he makes them constitutive factors of the whole.reality.
God, soul and matter are three distinct substances, because
(they)
they have different natures, but they are one because God is 
related to soul and matter, as substence to its moods.
Then he again says that oneness simply means inseparability, j 
Now a soul united with a body constitutes a person, and God 
is another person having His own celestial body. It is not 
easy to understand how the union of these two persons is
!
effected so as to be identical and at the same time maintain 
the difference; how the finite consciousness is one with the
11
Divine consciousness.
By personality we mean the subsistence of a complete
individual natural nature, i.e. in its existence it is not
a"
communicable to a substance as an accident or an individual
as a universal or to a whole as an integral or essential part.|
Moreover it cannot be assumed into the unity of a higher
personality so as to subsist by the latter’s Subsistence.
According to this, if the soul united with the body is an
integral and essential part of a whole, it cannot be called
a person. We have an instance of this in Jesus Christ, who
is hypostatically or personally assumed united with, and
subsists by the Higher Divine Personality, and so cannot be
called a human person. His nature is truly an individual nature,
j,'
of the human species, but his actions though performed by 
this human nature, are truly the Divine actions, and in this
respect He is God-man. The consequence of Ramannja’s theory j
is to make every man a God-man. It may be noted here that it } 
is not an accidental aggregation or artificial juxtaposition 
of substances, resulting merely in a collective or artificial I
unity. It is a substantial union, a personal union of two 
substances . Two substances, body and soul, unite together 
to form a subsisting nature that is rational and intelligent.
If matter plus soul is the body of Brahman and Brahman is
j'
related to these as a soul to the body, there is every reason
to believe that their union is a substantial union resulting
in a personality of a higher nature.
Monophysittf; believe that in the case of Christ the
substantial union is a union of substances resulting in one
(nature' j
nature, while many other Christian philosphers do not
maintain the same view. Urrabru writes,
"If the subsistence proper to a complete individual nature 
adds no positive perfection to the latter, so that the 
latter necessarily subsists and is a person unless it is 
actually assumed into a higher personality, and by the 
very fact that it is not actually so assumed,, then the 
human nature and of Christ is as complete in every way and 
in every line of substantial perfection, by virtue of its 
own proper unity, when actually united with the Divine 
Person, as it would be were it not so united as the person 
of Peter, Paul or any other human person is".
Catholic philosphers maintain that
Hthe human nature of Jesus Christ has not its own co­
natural subsistence; this is supplied by the subsistence of 
Divine Person. In Christ there is only but one existence, 
that of the Divine Person, whereby also the human nature 
of Christ exists"
Mercier.
Thus the majority of the Christian philosophers believe 
that Christ, though possessing a complete individual human 
nature, was not a person because he subsisted by a higher 
Divine Personality. If, according to Ramannja man is a 
person and God is also a person, the substantial union 
between two persons without absorbing one in the other,cannot 
be thought unless man be considered as subsisting by God’s 
personality. As we have stated before, this would make every 
man a god-man.
There is also a close similarity between Ramannja’s view 
and the doctrine of Trinity. It is difficult to say how far 
he is indebted to Christian Revelation, in finally shaping hfe 
thoughts. But as he lived in a period when the Muslims were 
the masters of nearly two-thirds of India, and Ramannja was 
acquainted with Islamic philosphy, which mainly deals with 
meo-platonic and Christian thought, it may be concluded that 
he was $o some extent influenced by the Christian views.
In the state of quiessence matter exists in a subtle form. 
Some people are of opinion that matter in this state is non­
existent, because it is devoid of name and form. If this is 
true then Ramannja’s view resembles that of Islam or 
Christianity that God created the world from nothing. But I 
believe Ramannja does not equate matter in this state with 
non-being, though matter without form from our point of view 
must be non-existent. Then it must be considered a potential 
being, something which is to be actualised. But this 
something must have materiality or the property of extension, 
and in that case some kind of form, otherwise it will be an
ideal being, an idea in the mind of God. But Ramannja does
c*
not call it an idea. However, Brahman units this something 
with the soul according to K a m a  of the sdul . But as
affirms that finite astd things are evolved from , and sus­
tained by the energy of Brahman who realises the 
potentialities of His nature in this finite world. Brahman 
is necessary for the concrete reality of the world and 
matter and soul s as attributes to be actualised are 
necessary for Brahman. How closely this view resembles 
panentheism.
Again taking the two entities as substance and not 
attribute, Ramannja’s view is similar to that of Descarts. 
God is the primary substance and souls and matter are 
relative and created substances,(though Ramannja does not 
take them as created), matter is inert and as matter it 
remains enert.throughout. Soul is also inert before it is 
united with matter and in this sense may be said to derive 
its activity from God. Matter has in itBelf no principle 
of motion. It cannot move itself. It is moved by an 
external cause. The first cause of its motion is God. The 
similarity does not go any further.
The individual souls have freedom to act as they like. 
The dissolution of the world rests with them. Brahman is 
helpless in this. As for the form which a soul has to get
matter and souls inhere in Brahman attributes, it
( o fterL.
after its separation from the body* Brahman is not an 
absolute master. He has to reward or punish according to 
the Karna of a soul. He has no power to show mercy or 
favour. He has no power to pardon the sins committed by a 
person in disobeying His Commands. Salvation is possible 
through Bhakti and works done for the sake of God. .Such 
works destroy the past Karna. Prof.Radhakrisma writes 
"Bhakti has had a continuous history in India from the 
time of Rigveda to the present day". He quotes the 
following from Rigveda:-
"All my thoughts seeking happiness, extol India, longing
for him; they embrace him as wives embrace a fair young
bridegroom, him the Divine giver of gifts that he may
v
help me. My mind is directed to thee, Ind^a, and does not 
turn from thee; on thee I rest my desire much invoked me". 
Bhakti, in the sense of a lover’s devotion towards the 
Supreme Being , the one Personal God, is of late origin* 
Indra is not the Supreme Being . Hej is one of the many 
Gods of Rigveda, God of Thunder. The lines quoted above do 
not show any devotion, but are a specimen of the poetic 
exaggeration common to the East.
Soul enters a body to atone for its past sins, but when 
it has attained salvation, it no longer needs any body , 
because there are no sins to be atoned for. It is not 
clear, then, why the soul after the state of quiessence 
should again come to the world to take part in the struggles 
of the world. Salvation means the removal of the traces 
of sin, which belong to the body and not to the soul.
When there is no sin, there should be no body. If the 
soul is sent to the body again, it implies injustice 
on the part of Brahman.
I think a few words will suffice to make the position 
of Ramannja clear as regards the formula ’that are thou'.
Shankra maintained that in the proportion S. « P ., 
there is^real and complete identity between S. and P. Of 
course, when we say 'S. is P.1, we assert that what we 
apprehend under the notion of Predicate P., is really iden­
tical with what we apprehend under the distinct notion of 
the Subject (S) . If fully analysed, such proportions may 
be brought to the form A. - A. But Ramannja, like Bradley, 
held that A. : A, is no judgment or proposition, sd that 
there must be an element of difference between S. and P.
He does not maintdn a complete identity between "that" and 
“thou”, but a'partial identity' or 'subsumption' or 
'implication'. He takes the subject denotatively and the 
predicate connotatively; as we say, for example, "This 
paper is white.” Whiteness is ai attribute inhering in the 
paper. This dispute between the bpue arose from the fact 
that the author of the fJbrmula did not make it clear in what 
sense he looked for the identity between 'that' and 'thou\ 
and so both interpret it in their own particular way.
NIMBARKA.
to
Nimbarka, a younger contemporary of Ramonja, modifies 
the latter' s "qualified non-duality”. Ramannja treated the 
world of manifold as attributes of Brahman and laid stress 
on the aspect of identity rather then distinction.
Nimbarka held that the function of an attribute is to dis­
tinguish its possessor from other entities which do not have 
that attribute. But as there was no other entity to be
differentiated/
differentiated from Brahman, the character of the 
attribute fell away and principles of difference and non­
difference stood side by dide on the same plane. Thus, 
the God, the individual Soul and the world of matter are 
distinct from one another as well as Identical. Brahman has I 
in him the capacity to assume any form he likes. Nimbarka 
rejects Ramannja’s theory of composite personality of 
Brahmam.
The Individual Soul*is a substance and*has the capacity 
of knowing without any organ of sense, is atomic in size.
The Individual Souls are infinite in number. They know 
their true nature by the grace of God.
Krishna is the highest Brahman, having eyes like lotus, 
being free from all faults, being the object of adoration 
of all. Men should worship Krishna as well as his consort, 
Radhika, to free themselves from ignorance. Krishna’s 
grace helps those who consider themselves helpless, and this 
grace generates bhakti, or devotion.
From the above it will be clear that this system is 
merely an offshoot of Ramannja's and emphasises the 
doctrine of Self-surrender and love.
Madhava/
MADHAVA ( H 99-1276) . 3/S
Madhava, the founder of the Dwaita System of 
Philosophy was born in 1199 at Belle, six miles to the South- 
East of Udipi. In due course he was sent to the village 
school, but failed to give satisfaction to his teacher in his 
studies, though he distinguished himself in games and physical 
exercises. So he had to leave school, but his education was 
not finished, for he toot to private study of the Vedas and 
Shas At the age of twenty-five he was called "purna
Prajna" in recognition of his vast learning in the Vedas.
Soon, Madhava made up his mind to renounce the world and he 
became the disciple of one Achutha Preksha. The study of 
Shankra's vedanta had led him to philosophical thinking and 
a critical study of the system made him aware of many defects 
in it. His Guru, knowing of his zeal for philosophical 
learning, bestowed on him the title of Kuler of the Kingdom 
of Vedanta and made him the ruler of the "Mutt". On this
occasion hewas given the name of Ananda PijJtha, the name by 
which he calls himself in all his woxkB.
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He then set out on a tour through the south-eastern 
distriot fo South India. Here, he bad many discussions with 
the followers of Shankra and thus developed as attitude of 
great hostility towards Shankra, his system and his followers 
Soon after his return to his native place he wrote his 
commentary on Bhagwad Gita, which was a prelude to his 
commentaries on Brahma SuT^ a and a formal proclamation of his 
faith later on.
Several years after the first tour he travelled through 
Northern India. There he came across the Moslem men of 
learning. A story is told that in talking toa Muslim chief 
he used the Persian language, which shows that he was not 
hostile to learning the language of "Malecha1. In these 
travels he had to hear much hardship etill finally he reached
Hardawar/
Hardawar, Here, he devoted himself to contemplation 
in a Himalayan Valley and began to proclaim the supreme 
Godhead of Vishnu and publish his commentaries on Vedanta 
Sutras. On his return to Udipi he was greatly persecuted 
by the Pundits of the rival faction; one of the consequences 
of which was the forcible appropriation of his library by tbe 
head of the Sringeri Mutt. But the library was restored to 
him b o o n after by King Jaya Simha whose capital is at 
V i shnuman glam.
Madhava spent his last years in Saridantara which lies 
between the rivers Kumara Dhara and Netravai£ - The records 
of Madhava Mutts assign to him an age of seventy-nine years.
Madhava's philosophy
He ditides the whole universe into (1) the conscious 
and (2) the unconscious. The latter is inert in itself. The 
change in the unconscious or matter is brought about by the 
former. The conscious is again divided into the independent 
conscious or the supreme^—  Being and the dependent conscious 
or Soul. The former is absolute and is not identical with 
anything else. It was maintained by some people before 
Madhava that the absolute was unknowable,indescribable and 
devoid of attributes. But Madhava differs from them in 
considering the absolute not wholly unknowable. He Bays,
"The wise see the form of Meru (a mountain) and still 
do not see it (i.e. cannot see it all at once). Similarly 
it cannot be described, reasoned out and known (entirely as 
such and such).... For want of thorough comprehension, 
Brahman, though declared by the whole body of scriptures 
capable of being known and inferred by reasoning, is said to 
be beyond the reach of words, reasoning and knowledge."
- Purna pragna Darsha,
So in this way he believes that Keality is not wholly 
unknowable, but can be partly known* The Absolute is the 
fountain head of energy and the othei' entities are
dependent/
dependent on him, God is a substance possessing an infinite 
number of attributes. Lakhshmi, his consort, though# entirely 
distinct is yet entirely dependent upon Him. She is eternally 
blessed and has various forms but her body is not material.
She possesses the same extension is spacte as the Supreme Soul.
The individual Sbuls are not identical with Br&hman.
He says,
"The Soul£ is separate from Brahman from the statement
in the Scriptures.... Only an account of having for its essence
qualities similar to those of Brahman, theeSoul is spoken of
as Brahman. Brahman is spoken of as identical with all the
world on account of their being all the qualities in ^rahman
which are predicated of the whole world. The following isin
the Bhavishyat Purana: * The Soul^ are separate, the perfect
—
Lord is separate, owing to the similarity of intelligent
nature, they are spoken of as Brahman in the various Scriptur­
al disqulsi tions. "
- Subharao's translation.
$
The soul£ coexist eternally with Bralunan, but are under 
the control of the Lord. When united with the bodies they 
manifest a great deal of variations in the individual, because 
the Impulses of moral nature in the latter are not the same. 
These variations are not due to the Physical matter but the 
sourae of the tendencies is in the essential nature of the 
Soul itself.
Matter also exists coeternally with God. Madhava 
refutes the doctrine of the atomists that an atom is indivis­
ible. Even if matter be reduced to a geometrical point, 
still it has relative dimensions i.e. if it be placed 
between two other atoms it will be in contqct with them on 
each side and hence it is divisible. This is the same 
argument which Ghazali advanced against the atomists in his
•'Destruction
I t t
"Destruction of the Philosophers.M Matter is constituted of 
a number of suotle principles, the different groupings of 
which exhibit different properties in the objects. This 
grouping is brought about by the 8upreme Intelligence.
The duality between the Conscious and the unconscious 
is not illusory, for in the Lord illusory imagination of the 
Universe is not possible, illusory imagination afising from 
non-perception of differences (which as an imperfection is 
inconsistent with the Divine Nature).
"A difference between Soul and Lord, a difference 
between tthe unsentient and the Lord,
A difference among Souls, and a difference of the 
unsentient and the Soul each from the other.
Also the difference of unsentient things from one 
another, the ^orld with its five divisions.
This same is real and from all eternity; if it had had 
a beginning it would have an end:
Whereas it does not come to an end; and it is not 
illusorily imagined:
For if it were imagined it would cease, but it never c 
ceases.
That there is no duality is therefore the doctrine of 
those that lack knowledge.
For this the doctrine of those that have knowledge is 
known and sustained by Vishnu.”
rv
- Madhava*s Sarva Darsaya Sangraha.
There are two sources of knowledge, viz., (1) non- 
sensuous knowledge, (2) empirical knowledge. In the first 
the Soul knows certain things without the aid of the senses. 
The Soul, in this respect, is called Sakshi^r. In the latter, 
the Soul interprets what is conveyed to it through the 
senses. This kind of knowledge may or may not be true.
The first cannot admit of an|y falsehood. In many cases 
the Soul is only absorbed in a ttaining the empirical
knowledge/
knowledge and is forgetful of the great truths that lie 
beyond the domain of senses. But in the long-run it 
discovers its ignorance and thus gets the benefit of direct 
intuition. So, according to Madhava, the sphere of senses 
is limited, but the second source has a wider range.
* Madhava maintains £hat apprehension or knowledge is the
direct and primary evidence of the thing perceived.
"In every act of knowing, the relation of knowledge to 
the Known is immediate. The means or circumstances that 
give rise to an idea become the evidence or the medium of 
the knowledge of a thing not directly, but through the idea 
or knowledge produced by them." - Rao’s translation.
Every idea by virtue of its nature is true. It is as 
true as long as it is not contradicted by another idea.
No idea implies any doubt before it is challenged by another 
idea.
Madhava believes in objective reality. Madhava 
maintains that the followers of Shankra contradict them­
selves, for"the unreal cannot have an appearance even, 
cannot become an object of misapprehension and cannot 
therefore be causally connected with any effect."
- Rao.
Another fundamental principle of Madhava is the affir­
mation of difference. Maya,1 or. Avidya, or ignorance, 
cannot explain away difference. Then he discusses the 
theory of perception of difference. The opponent raises 
an objection:
"Do you hold that perception is cognisant of a 
perceptional difference, or of a difference constituted by 
thebfrhing and its opposite?111r w b i o  ° b ffer-
e). '1'*ch presupposes p"*'' oo^ition, * 11 be 1 • ibloV
Oh the 1'O^ t4r- '^1 ^ ernative * b iv.ifei- ftogbd,
The/ ‘
The former alternative will not hold: for without a
cognition of a thing and its opposite, the recognition of 
the difference which presupposes such a cognition, will be 
impossible. On the latter alternative it must be asked:
"Is the apprehension of the difference preceded by an 
apprehension of the thing and its contraty, or all these 
(the thing, its contrary, and the contrariety) 
simultaneously apprehended?"
It cannot be thus preceded, for the operation of the 
intellect is without delay (or without successive steps). .
Nor can there be a simultaneous apprehension, for Cognition, 
related as cause and effect cannot be simultaneous, and the 
and the cognition of the thing is the cause of the re­
cognition of the difference, the difference not being cognised 
even when the thing is prexent, without a cognition of its 
absent contrary. The perception of differences, therefore, 
(the opponent concludes) is not easily admissible.’"
To this Madhava replies, ’"Are these objections pro­
claimed against one who maintains a diffeimce identical with 
the things themselves, or against one who maintains a 
a defference between things as the Subjects of attributes?'
In the former case the objections you adduce af*e irrelevant.
If it be urged that if it is the essence of the thing that 
is the difference, then it will no longer require a contrary 
counterpart; but if difference presupposes a contrary 
counterpart, it will exist anywhere; this statement must 
be disallowed, for while the essence of a thing isfirst 
known as dCfferent from everything else, the determinate 
usage (name and notion) may be shown to depend upon a contrary 
counterpart; for example, the essencb of a thing so far as 
constituted by its dimensions is first cognised and afterwards
it/
**}
it becomes the object of some determinate judgment, as 
long or short in relation to soxae particular counterpart 
(or contrasted object) - . . Difference is itaelf a
real predicament (or ultimate entity, or in other words, 
difference is a thing) . . , . Difference is also ascertai*d 
by inference. Thus the Supreme Lord differs from the 
individual 30ul as the object of its obedience, , . , 
Difference (or duality between the Supreme Being and the 
Universe) may also be inferred by cognisabiiity and other 
marks.”
Madhava* s Sarva Darsa|*va San-
Con td.-)
Time/
vJ' * **
Time and space are always in the cognition of the knowing 
self. The other objects perceived are cast in the mould
of time and space ever present to the mind.
Emancipation is the highest end of all men. Wealth,
position,rank are all transitory but emancipation is eternal
and so should be sought after by all wise men. But
emancipation is not won without the grace of Vishnu. The
grace of Vishnu can be won by a knowledge of His excellence,
not by a knowledge of his non-duality.
"Knowing Vishnu, full of all excellence, the soul, 
exempted from transmigration ,
Rejoices in his presence for ever, enjoying painless bliss,
Vishnu is the refuge of liberated soul, and their supreme
ruler,
Obedient to Him are they for ever; He is the Lord*1. 
CRITICISM
Madhava breaks away from the pure monism of the Hindus,
which had been held sacred for so long a time, and in its
place substitutes a dualism between the conscious and the
unconscious , between the dependent and the independent.
Again we find a dualism of God and soul in the conscious as
well. There are three real entities, God, Soul and matter.
tr
All of them are uncreated and exist eternally with one
another. Madhava does not explain why the soul and matter
should come to obey the commands of God, when they are
uncreated and are fundamentally different from one another. 
u*Ramarjhja got over this difficulty by making soul and matter 
as attributes of God. But Madhava gives no such explanation. 
Madhava differs from the modern materialist in denying the 
atomic structure of matter. The various forms of physical 
objects are due to the activities of the energy working in 
it. In this way he avoids the objection why the 
fortuitous combination of atoms give rise to an ordered 
world.
The materialist considers the force or ererg^ working 
in the interaction of the atoms^ as self existen<|/^but
(according)
it
according to Madhava this energy is due to God. He also 
differs from materialists in denying the hypothesis of 
spontaneous generation and origin of consciousness.
"Everything on earth is, according to Madhava, a living 
©rganism. The universe is a vast expansion of animated 
nature with every atom of space filled up with souls. 
Infinite are the souls dwelling in an atom of space" .
R.K.
Compare with this what Leibniz says on the subject;
Each portion of the matter is not only infinitely 
divisible but actually sub-divided without end. The 
smallest particle of matter has in it a world of 
creatures, living beings, souls etc.and nothing is 
fallow or dead save in appearance,v 
Like Descartes'world, the conscious being of Madhava 
stands in contrast with the space object. Soul is 
essentially different from matter and has nothing in 
common with it. Soul is not an absolute agent, but 
has its responsibilities. It looks to God for guidance. 
Madhava does not explain how the interaction between 
two fundamentally different substances takes place. 
Moreover, God does not remain Unlimited by having two 
realities outside Him. It seems to me that he could not 
go against the Scriptures by maintaining the createdness 
of the soul and matter, and at the same time could not do 
away with the hard facts of experience. He could not 
think his body and his soul to be an illusion or non- 
being. He could not believe that by simply assuming 
oneself to be God, one could really become God. He had 
no experience in his whole life where he discovered the 
non-reality of his own self. So there was no other 
alternative for him but to maintain the reality of God, 
matter and soul.
The previous Vedantists did not lay much stress on works 
Eor Shankara it was the knowledge that could give release
(and)
*3*1 S'"
and not works.
Ramanuja, too, maintained the doctrine of grace,
meditation and knowledge. But Madhava attached much 
importance to moral life. We should not consider lightly of 
this world. The knowledge of material things leads to a 
knowledge of God. It is the moral uplift that makes a man 
approach the Supreme Being. In this respect, his views 
closely resemble the teaching of Islam. In Islam the poets 
saints and preachers have emphasised the point that a close 
observation of t 1^  phenomena of nature acts as a means to 
the knowledge of God. Moral life is greatly encouraged in 
Islam. Man must conform to the teaching of the Quran.
In Madhava*s case it is the Vedas that are insisted upon. 
Rituals are insisted upon closely. There is one difference. 
Islam does not make any difference between its followers, bit 
Madhava does not aLlow the Shudras to study the Vedas.
Shudras in this respect may take the place of the polythe- 
sists in Islam. In Madhava's system God cannot be 
approached directly but through Va>?i. Some sects of Islam 
maintain that God can be approached only through the prophet 
or Iman* or a Shaikh. Rigidity of the rules of Karma did 
not allow any freedom.to God in the early Hindu sects. But 
Madhava goes to the other extreme. A man can never on his 
own acts claim to be saved. It is the grace of God that 
comes to his aid. Here we find a resemblance to the 
Christian doctrine of grace. The souls are of three kinds:
(1) Those who are eternally free and sinless (2) Those that 
have freed themselves or will free themselves(3) Those that 
are bound to the Sansara(the World), or destined for hell.
We have a somewhat similar classification in Islam 
excepting the belief in transmigration. There are souls 
that are eternally sinless like the souls of the prophets. 
Then there are others who will go to Heaven directly after 
death, or after some kind of punishment .But there are others 
who will fall into the hell. There are certain passages in 
the Quran which tell us that some men are destined for hell.
(For)
For instance;
"God has placed a seal on their hearts , and there is 
a covering dver their eyes and ears and there is 
painful torture for them".
"He honours one whom He pleases and disgraces one whom 
He pleases" and so on.
In Madhava's system a soul goes to Heaven when it 
developes a love for God, but if in this world it 
develop^ a hatred for God, it is cast into the hell for 
ever.
Similarly in Islam, the people by turning away from 
God and developing a hatred for God, have their hearts 
sealed and are thus meant for hell. Just as a man in a 
room can shut out the light by shutting the windows, so 
God's light cannot enter a man's heart who, by his 
wicked deeds, makes himself unfit for its reception.
I believe this is what is meant by a sealed heart. After 
release the soul does not merge inter God, because the 
perfect and the imperfect cannot mix. Madhava believes 
in predestination. The same is the case with a majority 
of the Muslims.
In his theory of knowledge he vassumes the existence of 
a priori knowledge that is one that does not depend upon 
experience. Kant also admits an a priori in religion. 
Paul Kalweit writes:-
"The truth of religion lies ultimately in itself alone. 
It is based neither upon experience, nor science,nor 
art, nor morality, nor culture; on the contrary all 
these are ultimately based on religion ... All this 
goes to show the importance of a priori for the 
religion. In the ‘'priori the independent and self- 
evidencing character of religion finds its clearest 
manifestation. The ultimate and supreme a priori 
subsists in God, and without His self-manifestation, 
without revelation, there could be no religion".
(Here)
% %  f
Here Madhava*s theory comes somewhat close to the doctrine
Of "^OgOB*1.
"All words" he says" as expressing definite meanings 
ultimately rest upon that one summum-genus - pure existence 
it being free from all coming into being or ceasing to be—  
This existence- is called the Great Soul. The real fact 
is that all words ultimately mean the Supreme Brahman."
Or in other words, knowledge of the Vedas means the 
intuitive knowledge of Brahman.
In regard to his theory of'perception of difference",it may 
be said that this is the same problem which has been a matter 
of controversy among the philosphers of all ages. Differnce 
implies relation and relation is"universal. Platg and 
Aristotle struggled between the transcendence and immanence 
of the universals. This controversy was taken up by the 
scholastics and was handed down to the modern thinkers. The 
problem raised by Madhava is as follows
Have the universals any objective reality? If so, can they be 
a& object of sense-perception?
Among modern thi deers some are of opinion that universals 
are purely subjective states, dependent upon consciousness 
and incapable of any meaning or reality apart from 
consciousness, while others maintain that universals ere a 
part or constituent of the particulars. The universal nature 
present in particular* objects could not be conceived unless 
it were there to be conceived. But the independent reality of 
universals does not mean that they exist as a new kind of 
particulars.
Bertra%-Russell eays:-
"We must admit that the relations, like the terms it re­
lates, is not dependent upon thought, but belongs to the 
independent world which thought apprehends and does not
create--   The world of universals is a v;orld of
being ... We find universals by abstraction from the 
particulars".
An act of perception is not separated from the whol'e mental
(process)
process erf the moment. In every mental act cognition,
feeling and willing are all mixed together. However, 
confining our attention to the cognitive aspect only, we 
may say that even in simple perception what is perceived 
is recognised as such and such, and however vague and 
rudimentary the recognition may be, it implies a reference 
to something beyond the given object. In all human 
perception some such implicit apprehension appears to be 
involved. In complex perception we select certain aspects 
of the objects and fix our attention on them. So, 
comparison and contrast, or apprehension of relations, 
goes hand in hand with perception.
"The first and fundamental property of mind" says Bain 
"is the consciousness of difference or descrimination" 
Consciousness is thus reduced to a sense of difference.
VALLABHACHARYA. (1479-1531).
He was the founder of a great sect in mediaeval India. He
was a native of Teluga in the South - the second son of Lakhsman
Bhatt, a Telingana Brahman, and was born at Champaranya in 1479.
At the age of seven he was sent to a school conducted by Narayana 
Bhatta. It is said that in a short period of four months he suc­
ceeded in learning four Vedas, six ShAras and eighteen Puranas, but 
no reliance can be placed on such stories. But it is clear that he 
became a great Sanscrit scholar and philosopher of his time. As was 
the custom of his age, he went on travels while he was still young.
He began to preach his faith and philosophy when travelling through
the southern part of India and scon had many converts to his doctrine. 
While in the South he was invited to a philosophic disputation with 
the Shartes, where his success made him a leader of the Vaishnaves 
of the locality, who elected him their spiritual chief with the title 
of Acharya. Then he returned to the North and went on a second 
pilgrimage in the Himalayan Valleys. At Benares he married a Brah­
man girl - Maha Laksh4miiy by name. Two sons were born of this 
marriage. The remainder of his life he spent mostly in Benares and
Brindvan. His death took place in 1531 at Benares.
Vallabha has left about ten works on Vaishnavite philosophy. In 
writing these works he was mostly aided by his disciples. His cult 
and doctrines resemble a good deal those of his contemporary, Chafc- 
tanya, and were derived chiefly from the philosophy of Ramanuja.
His philosophy may be summed up as follows:
The One Absolute, on account of His nature of Ananda sought joy
in becoming many, and so He Himself became the organic and inorganic
worlds and the controlling forces. These manifestations may be 
likened to the sparks issuing from a fire and consequently may be 
considered to be His parts. But in the inanimate world his joy and 
intelligence are imperceptible, while in the animate these are mani­
fest in various degrees. So we find that Brahman is the material 
cause of the world.
The/
The individual Soul is identical with Brahman and 
is part of Brahman and Atomic, Sat and Chit predominate 
at t^e expense of Anada, which is concealed by the former. 
The individual Soul is not a form of the Supreme Soul 
changed into something different by Maya, but is itself 
the Supreme Soul in substance with the one attribute 
rendered imperceptible. It is the same reality viewed 
from different points, or rather the same reality views 
itself from different angles. Anada is not-absent in 
the Soul, but is imperceptible. ”ln the succession of 
existences ignorance and worldliness had indeed blunted 
its perception. Just as if a man, gliding down a stream 
in a boat and watching the objects at different distances 
front the bank change their position in respect both to 
himself and one another, supposed them in motion, he would 
be right in believing them real, but wrong in imagining 
them to move. So the Soul correctly interpreters the 
world as real, but erroneously ascribes it— te plurality^  
Illusion there is, but it is not divinely conditioned for 
the purpose of creation, it is the issue of our own 
experience which it is our business to throw off and 
transcend”. - Carpenter.
The relation between the two is that of identity, 
(Advaita) or, more accurately, the identity of untransformed 
Souls, (Suddhadvaita.)
Siri Krishna is the incarnation of Brahman, but his 
body is not made of earthly matter but celestial. The 
difference between an ordinary man and Siri Krishna is 
the presence of all the three attributes, (Sat - Chit - 
Ananda) in the latter. Moreover he is considered the 
excellent of all beings. All his sports are eternal.
He is • perfect joy. But hy his will his Sa]6va portion 
overcomes the Ananda and creates the world. He is thus 
called A^isara unchangeable, the Cause of all causes.
To Tfte/
%  1
To the ordinary devotee Brahman appears as the place 
of Purusotiama with the attributes 0t£ extensive Vaikmitha 
and others, while to the enlightened it appears in the 
form of Sat - Chit - and Ananda ^ infinite in qpa.ce and time, 
self-manifesting and devoid of all qualities. The 
positive qualities are not non-existing hut are rendered 
imperceptible to the enlightened, by the above powers.
So Brahmanhas three forms, viz., Purusotiama and 
two kinds of Akasra. Viewed from the aspect of his 
controlling power he is called Antrayami (the inward 
controller). "it is this inward controller that becomes 
incarnate in the vafcious forms usually mentioned.5 
The Sattva quality assumes the form of Vishnu, (protector 
of all), Rajas and Tamas those of Brahmadeva (creation), 
and Shiva (for destruction).
The individual Soul passes through many births and 
rebirths and is consequently subject to misery, because it 
considers the body and the world as its own. But when 
it sees the vanity of the world and devotes itself to 
meditation and love of God it is released. The delivered 
Souls are of three kinds, viz.,
(1) Those who have been released by the cessation of 
ignorance or delusion.
(2) Those-aiho live in the world of Bhagwat other than
the pervading Baikimtha, where they attain the condition of 
the pure Brahman by the favour of Bhagwat. (3) And those who 
have the divine nature in them and through living inthe world 
devote themselves to Bhakti, until perfect love for Him alone 
dwells in their heart and they become associates of the Bhagwat. 
These souls^are of two kinds, viz., (1) those who subject them­
selves to sme kind of moral discipline (Mar^ada Jiva) and (2) 
those who entirely depend on the grace of God (Pusti Jiva).
Pusti (Grace of God) enables man to attain tile objefit of life. 
Mahapusti engenders in a man a frame of mind Which excludes 
every desire except for the Attainment
of/
V
t/
of God. These Bhagats of four kinds viz., (1). those who 
while engaged in wordly pursuits do acts that are calculated 
to bring attainment of God, (2). Those who withdraw from 
worldly pleasures and devote themselves to the hearing of 
discourses about Him or singing of holy songs. (3). Those 
who are made competent by Gods* grace to acquire a knowledge 
about Him, but the acquirement of knowledge depends on their 
own efforts. (4). Those who are wholly and solely devoted 
to the love of God. This kind of Bhakti is produced by God 
and does not depend upon any individuals efforts. Acquirement 
of knowledge takes place in the following stagesviz., (1)
Love or liking. (2). Attachment. (3). jaunting passion which 
is the mature condition of the first two which results in 
the attainment of bliss. To such a person everything is Hari 
and so he indemnifies himself with everything. The final 
result of this is his admission to the sport of Krlshma.
He Joins the sport in the firm of Cows, birds tetc.,
CRITICISM. '
This system maintains that God is wholly immament
in the world or more correctly by the finish. objects of the
the world are nothing but God in abother form. It does
not explain why Gibd, who is unconditioned and Infinite
makes Himself conditioned and flniifc and ±s transforming
Himself into the world of things limits Himself. The fini
C*. u.
world is a system of action and reactions. The finiih sols 
feel themselves acted on by something that Is outside them.
tL
If the finish souls are pert of God, why does G<bd impose 
upon himself this limitation of knowledge and powers.
In the lasinn souls one of the three guiinas Is Imperceptible.
Imperceptible to whom? Most probably to Brahman 
and soul, because Brahman Is the material cause of the world*
So/
1 M  ' ' 1' vM
So Brahman as Brahman knows his full nature. Brahman as
soul knows only a part of his nature and as matter is not
conscious at all. If these three forms exist simultaneously,
yi they make Brahman intelligent and unintelligent simultaneous­
ly, or make Brahman divisible and consequently finistlfe. It is 
not a case of a conscious being involving the object of his 
consciousness out of himself, giving them a relative reality. 
Let us compare it with the neoplatonism; neoplatonism considers 
the primeval being a#s one, the source of all life. It is 
devoid of all attributes. It is being without magnitude, 
thought, life. It is “above existence!* But Vallabha* s 
Brahman, though to some extent considered devoid of qualities, 
still has Being, Intelligence and Bliss as his attributes and 
the three gunas (Sat, Rajas, and Tamas) constitutes His essence^ 
The neoplatonic Absolute is perpetually producing without any 
alteration in itself but Brahman undergoes a change of form as 
well as a change in the relative position of his attributes.
One or the other of his three attributes are predominent in the 
Organic and ingoranic substances. He changed himself into the 
world by His Will at a certain period of His existence. More­
over, in neoplatonism production is not a physical process but 
an emanation of energy, of which nous is the first outflow, the 
image of the One. As image it corresponds with the One but as 
derived it is entirely different. The same is the case with
thejioul, which is an image of the nous. But Vallabha’s “soul“ 
is not different from Brahman. as the images in their outward
flow become fainter and fainter, so Brahman loses his intelli-
gence pffill in matter there is no perceptible trace left of it.
As in neoplatonism the soul through an ecstatic appraoch may
see God, so the Soul in this system may ge£ release from the
cycle of births through contemplation of Krishna. asceticism
is the ground work of both. 
slu. fv . /
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The Age of Reformation,
After the ljth Century India waa in a state of great 
Political upheavel which had a great- effect on the Social 
and Moral life of the people. The Moslems were conquering 
India, hit hy hit, and wherever they went they preached 
their own ideas. Even in places where the Muslims had 
established themselves for a long time, the Hindu Subjects 
saw the coming and going of various dynasties and great 
political disturbance. They also witnessed the great 
religious Controversies not only among their own Kith and 
Kin hut also among the Conquerors. In snort, there did 
not seem to he anything stable# The condition of the age 
has been described hy Majfapati, a Mayhatta historian thus: 
“Sacrifices, alms and religious duties had ceased, 
Brahmans, then styled the lords of. the earth, relinquished 
their religious functions and never retired into forests 
at any period of their lives. Kashatryas forgot their own 
special duties and became unscrupulous. Sons did not heed 
the advice of their parents, and disciples ceased to serve 
their spiritual guides. Husbands listened to the words of 
their Wives and dwelt with their Wives’ fathers. Ho one 
wished to undertake the fatigue of a pilgrimage. Men 
ceased to sing the praises of God and turned, instead, to 
the enjoyment of Shows and Spectacles .. The possessors of 
wealth no longer took pleasure in giving alms' to the needy, 
and the young and healthy renounced religious austerities. 
Kings ceased to love their subjects and all justice and 
morality were laid aside. Ladies of rank became slaves and 
sold their daughters. The reign of falsehood had set in; 
what was base was represented.as genuine. Cruel people 
misled and ruined tne innocent. God was represented by 
stones wnich were broken by strangers. The Gayatri
or/
or formula of Vitiation of the Hindu Saints was never 
uttered* There was Substituted for it the charm of the
magician* And the Secular authorities of the timef to
crown their iniquities, levied taxes on the ancient places 
of pilgrimage*"
Mahapati writes about Southern India. But what was
H
true of tie South can to some extent be applied to the/forth. 
It has often happened in the World that under such conditions 
the people longingly hope to be relieved of their distress 
and think of getting help from some Supernatural Source.
It is at tnis time that a reformer is greatly needed and 
the reformer does come to the people* The same was the 
case with India. In this period we find many thinkers 
whose mission was to reform the World* But they had 
another task before them. They belonged to a race that 
lived in utter subjugation and at the mercy of the foreign-* 
ere. Denouncing of priesthood was peculiar to Islamic 
mystics nottto Hindus. As the people were longing for 
peace, they could only bring about peace by a reconcilia­
tion between the Conquered and the Conqueror. They could 
not accept the views of the Muslims in toto, and at the 
same time could not give up the culture under which they 
were brought up. So their task was to take up what they 
considered best in Islam and to blend it with Hinduism*
Some instances of this have been quoted before. Here are 
a few more:-
"Ifly Lord is a Store Supplier great, in merchandise he 
deals; nor beams, nor scales, in his own hands this great
t
1*1
World weighs and feels" - Kabir- Compare with Itbis Shawns - 
Tabriz^
"Who is that person who weighs and distributes without 
scales or measure, yet his measuring and distibution is 
correct?"
Similar/
Similar is the case with these
"Whatever I have is not my own; it is thine; it is
thine own that I give thee; what have I?"
i\r
"Do not oppress the weak, their sighs have great power, 
hy tile puffs of the bellows iron is converted to flames.
Be true to God and loving to his servants, whether your 
hair be longer entirely removed."
"Whatever I did, you did; I did nothing myself; should 
man say I did it, it was in your strength that it was done.
Should all the earth be turned into paper, and all the 
trees into pens, should the seven seas be turned into ink,
yet could not an account of God be written."
Moreover, they were subjected for a long time to the 
tyrannies of the priesthood, both in Islam and Hinduism.
So their ideal was to relieve the world of this dominating 
influence of priest-craft and lead the world to a universal 
peace which could only be formed in a union with the Creator 
They were so much opposed to priesthood and its Consequent 
Ceremonial observances, that they laid stress on contem­
plation and devotion at the expense of the ceremonies.
The above can be verified from the following quotations
Whither shall I go? I am happy at home, my heart will
not go with me; it hath become a cripple.
One day my heart desired to go;
I ground sandal, took attar of roses and many perfumes.
And was proceeding to worship in the temple of Brahma.
But my spiritual guide showed me God in my heart.
Wherever I go I find only water or stoneg.^ -
But thou, 0 God, art equally contained in everything.
The V e d a s  and Furanas I have all seen and searched.
Go thou thither if God be not here.
0, true Guru, I am a sacrifice unto thee Who hast cut
away all my perplexities and doubts.
Rama nanda's, Lord is the all pervading God.
The Guru*s word hath cut away millions of sins."
Rama nanda. - Trans, by Macauliff.
Why dost thou display to men the wooden rosary?
If thou remembered netted in thy heart, what availeth thy 
rosary?
Why doat the Mohammedan priest ascend the minaret? The 
Lord is net deaf.
Search within thy heart for Him for whose sake thou 
callest to prayer*
If Union with God he obtained by goingLbout naked, All 
the deer of the forest shall be saved.
If mattereth net whether one goeth naked or weareth a 
deer-skin.
If he recognise not God in his heart.
If Supernaturkl power be obtained by shaving the head* 
Why should not sheep obtain salvation?
Saith Sabir, Hear, 0 my brethren, who hath obtained 
deliverance without the name of God?
0 nothing is accomplished by mere words.
It is not by fasting and praying and repeating the 
Creed that man goeth to heaven.
The inner veil of the Temple of Mecca is in man*s 
heart, if the truth be known."
- KABIR.
0, Brahman, thou worshippest and propitiatest the 
Saligram, and deemest it a good act to wear a necklace 
of sweet basil,
Why irrigate barren land and waste thy life?
Why apply plaster to a frail, tottering wall? -
Repeating God*s name, from a raft , for thy Salvation?
May the Merciful have mercy on thee! ■
We can quote many instances of a similar kind.
So, these reformers were midway between Hinduism and 
Islam. None of them laid claim to revelation in its 
theological sense. Their aim was to guide the people 
morally to the attainment of the highest bliss and peace, 
in seeking union with the Almighty.
We will select, here, only tose of them for discussion.
C I<*A yJE.
C H A I T A N Y A  %
Bishamb&r (the real name of Chaitanya) was born in 1785. The
women of the village called him Nimai or "short lived" in order 
to prop^itiate the evil spirits. Bishambar joined a school 
V* at
of Sanskrit leading Nawadii^ at an early age. His father 
died when he was still a student, and later on hedlmarried 
Lakshmi, the daughter of Ballat&ftharya. When he finished 
his education he began to give private lessons to the pupils 
like other Brahmans. He then proceeded on a tour through Bengal 
whe^he greatly added to his knowledge . During his absence 
his wife died of snake bite and when he returned to Nawa^di^ 
he married again. By this time Chaitanya was in highly pros­
perous circumstances but his Soul was to visit a new pli^ee 
in his life. During his pilgrimage to Ga^ fa, he met a Vaishanava 
Monk named Ishwar Puri - a Monk of Madhavacharya order.chaitanya 
became his disciple. He was completely changed now , submerged 
in the ocean of love for Krishna. Often he developed religious 
eestasy and sometimes he behaved like a mad man. He would often 
gather the devout persons of the town and ddnce with them like 
the Moslem dervishes of Syria. This song accornpanied their 
dance
How shall I speak of my Bliss today ,
'•^’he Beloved Krishna has entered my temple today;
With perspiration, thrill , tears of joy, shout and roar, they 
turned and turned touching the master’s feet now and then ...
At the verses of Mokanda ( a deciple) the master could no longer 
be held back. He was all tears, tremour, thrill, sweat and 
broken accents, now rising up and falling down, now weeping.
(The Song, Radha speaks)
Woe is me ,dear Sister, for my present state
The love of Krishna has caused my soul and body like a poisdn
My heart burns day and night, I know no peace
0 that I could fly where Kahn is to be found .
Swwetly did Mukanda sing the above ditty which made the mater's
heart burst. He was stricken down by the force of his passion
andy
and lay down breathless on the ground. The faithful grew 
alarmed when loi He sprang up with a shotrt^  overcome with 
eostaey and saying, FChant? ohantyvfche name' of HaJi^Sircar 
fKrishna Das translated by Prof. Sircar). This oame as a 
complete surprise to the Brahman Pundits of the time, who 
had never witnessed such scenes before among Hindu monks*
So they rah in opposition and treated Chaitanya and his 
companions with open hatred. These moments of ecstacy have 
not been uncommon with the Moslem and Christian mystics.
James has given many instances of this in "The Varieties of 
Religious Experience.* The following is quoted from M,S,
1 of an old man" by Wilfred Monod and requoted by James.
“Jesus has oome to take up his abode in my heart. It is 
not so much a habitation, an association as a sort of fusion—  
The Wall before me, dark a few moments since, is splendid at
this hour, because the sun shines on it ---  I feel the
pressure of His hand, I feel something else whioh fills me 
with a serene joy; Bhall I dare to speak it out? Yes, for 
it is the true expression of what I experience* The Holy 
Spirit is not merely making me a visit; it is no mere dazzling
apparition whioh may from one moment to another spread its
wings and leave me in my night, it is a permanent habitation,
He can depart only if he takes me with him. More than that; 
he is not other than myBelf: he is one with me. It is not a 
juxtaposition, it is a penetration, a profound modification 
of my nature, a new name of being.*
Moreover there is some resemblance between the stages of
Western mystios1 love and t^n^escribed by Chaitanyas 
followers. For instance St. 16^8^(1515-1582) classifies them 
as 1. Recollection 2. Quiet 3* Union 4* Ecstacy 5.^apt 6$ The 
Pain of God 7. The Spiritual marriage.
Similarly in the Vaishanava Poems we come across the
following/
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following stages. The dawn of loee (purvarag) (2).
Union and ecstasy (Milana) (3). Kapt (Sambhoga Milana)
(4). The pain of God (Viraha) (5). spiritual marriage 
(Bhavasammilana)
Chaitanya1 s pain of separation from God may "be
compared withthat of St. Teresa. Chaitanya Saw the hill
of Chatak and Mistook it for the hill Gobardhana and Emuning '
after it e-aid and wept.
Sometimes he would heave a deep sigh and say, "Where is 
my God gone, Pray tell me how c-a* I have Him back. Oh my God 
my father where art thou gone, I cannot live without thee."
In deep agony of heart he would weep and cry till he fell 
senseless. When he came to his senses he would say, "He 
was here with me, oh where is He gone again, my grief is 
unsupportable.
As has been said before Chaitanya saw a great opposition
ClA^v
Iteflrird him, but found a warm support in the person of the local 
Kazi. However he resolved to take up sanyasin to escape the 
hatred of the people. So at the age of 24 he bJStme himself 
initiated under Keshab - Bharah and was given the name of 
Krish^na - Chaitanya.
The next Six years of his life were spent in pilgrim­
ages to the Eastern and Southern India. During these 
v
jouneys he had may disciples and many people accepted his
creed. He often held philosophical discussions with both*
Huidus and Muslims and in this way expounded his teaching 
among his fellowmen. Then he returned to Puri and the 
remaining Eithteen years of his life were spent in that town 
with his disciples and followers. In 1533 he breathed his 
last.
Chaitanya/
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CHAITA!C‘A ,S TEACHING-.
Chaitamya wrote nothing except the eight couplets (Ashtaka) 
so to know his thoughts we have to depend upon other hooks 
written a considerable time after his death. It is imposs­
ible to say how far these books, for instance, Charitamrita, 
considered as the most authoritative source by the followers 
of the sect, are truly representative of Chaitamya^ thoughts. 
BHAGWAU or HARI is another name for God in his totality.
He is not formless, but the source of infinite forms, of 
which the form of Krishna is the most perfect. All that tran­
scends this form is inconceivable. The Shurtis are wrong in 
describing Him in abstract. The Universe originates from 
Brahma, lives in Brahma, and returns to Brahma. (Compare with 
this the famous saying of Saint Paul "We live and move and 
have our being in God"J The three attributes of God are chit, 
or intelligence power, the maya, or power of illusion, and 
Jiva, the power of preservation. The chit power represents 
the supreme intelligence, the maya gives rise to the whole 
creatioh, and the Jiva to the individual soul. These attri­
butes have produced the universe which is real, but cannot be 
adequately described. Human souls are tie atomic portion of 
his nature, and are dependent on him but at the same time 
separate and distinctive. He tries to steer clear of both 
dualism and Monism, and traverses a middle path. It is better 
to call his system an "incomprehensible dualistic monism", 
because it is difficult to understand him. "When he desired 
to be many he looked at his natural powers". This shows that 
he had to see and a mind to will. Brahma is the perfe.
perfect supreme Being and Krishna is his incarnation. Shurti 
contradicts itself in denying material hands and feet to 
Brahma, while it says that
God moves swiftly and receives everything. "How can 
you call that God formless who has the sio^qualities and 
is supremely blissful. You conclude Him to be powerless, 
who has the three natural powers, as is evident from the 
Vishnu Purana," God*s nature consists of Sat, Chit, and 
Ananda. "But all these three offer devotion in the for m 
of love*" He is himself the essence of love, the source 
of all bliss and delight. His supreme delight is in love. 
The Chit power manifests itself in Sijq^iAspects. God 
and Creation differ as the master and slave. Creation is 
not identioal with God* “He is a wretch who denies form 
to God, tou£h not, behold not that slave of Death, Ysr-Sa 
holds that God is an incomprehensible power, but He is 
manifested as Creation."
The Philosopher1 s stone does not undergo any change or
v
decrease when changing a bases metal to Gold, So God takes 
the form of Creation without suffering any corruption." 
People have made a mistake in interpreting the above doc­
trine of^Yasa when they say "I am one with the Creator.
But Creation is not unreal, it is only perishable. "The 
great word Pranaba is the Self of God; from that Pranaba all 
the Vedas have sprung in this world. The words "Tat-twam- 
asi" (thou art that) applied to Creation are only fractional, 
but you, without minding the Pranaba, call these words the 
Supreme truth"- from Chaitanya1s address to Sarbbabhauma.
Chaitanya describes Krishna as the God "at whose 
a A o r a t i o n ,  the formula recited is Love, the offering pre­
sented is the Seed 6f Love," "is the Source of Perfect 
Bliss; i n
comparison/
comparison with Him, spiritual delight is as grass1*,
“He is All-attracting, All-rejoicing, the Source of “High 
Rasa* (Delight, sweetness), making men forget everything 
for His own Form: the .aroma of whom makes men give up
the quest of enjoyment, success, mukti and pleasure. In 
this adoration there is no shastric reasoning, no solution
of theological problems, because in this Nature sweetness
a,
predominates,“ Krishne is Himself Delight and yet He
tastes delight. Hladin£ (the power by which he enjoys
delight) has been created to give enjoyment to the Faithful.
The essence of hladin^is named Prem (love). The
emotion of Prema is filled with the emotions of ananda and
chit. The Supreme emotion (m^abhave) is the quintessence
of Prema. The lady Radha is the personation of that
supreme emotion-Brahma Samhittfr. Chartanya tells us how 
6
to attain this G-od of Love and Joy:-
N OK *** j
“When Passion in* Krishna is deepened it is called Prem^ gfe^
A: *
the permanent form of Bhakti in Krishna- It has two
aspects. If any man has the grace to feel Shradc^ ba.
(faith) be consorts with pious men, from which companionship
result the hearing and Chanting of Krishna’s name.
From the attainment of Bhakti all his troubles are removed;
and a3 a consequence his faith becomes constant which gives
him a taste for listening and reciting Krishna*s name.
From taste comes strong inclination which gives birth to the
sprout of passion for Krishna in the Soul. When their
emotion is deepened, it takes the name of love. That
love is the ultimate fruit, the source of every bliss.
The man in whose heart this emotion sprouts up is marked
by the many qualities named in the Shastras. No earthly
affliction can disturb his mind. Such a man never wastes
his/
his time without communing with Krishna. He never
fears attack hy enjoyment, material success or the objects
JiJvl
of sensual gratifieation. Even the noblest Ghantra 
considers himself as lowly and firmly believes that 
Krishna will take pity on him. He is ever expectant, 
ever passionately longing. As wealth gives pleasure 
and drives away sorrow of itsfelf, so Bhakti Kindles love 
of Krishna, and when love is turned to Krishna, man is 
freed from bondage to the world. The fruit of love is 
not riches or the cessation of re-birth, but its chief 
object is the enjoyment of the beatitude of loving*- 
Translated by SirkaV.
From the verses of Chaitanya and others it is 
clear that in ecstacy ’man is beside himself1, that this 
momentary escape from “himself* is the greatest gift 
that life offers. This shows that Nirwana is not 
annihilation but womething more than that. It is 
subsistence as preached by the Moslem mystics.
Later on the followers of this sect considered 
Chaitanya as incarnation of God.* It is Baid that 
Krishna loved his own beauty (symnolised in the form of 
Radha) and on order to enjoy the Supreme feelings that 
Radha felt for him he t o o k  form in Chaitanya aB himself 
and Radha combined.
Social/
Chaitanya/
Social and Ethical*
«
Chafc-tanya followed the usual Baishvite practice of showing
mercy to all living beings and taking to strictly vegetarian
diet. Humility is the chief mark of the sect and along with
this freedom from all wordly desires, purity of heart and
attainment of tranquility are taught. The Vaishanvite idea
is summed up thusJ "These are the signs of a Vaishanava
indicated only, as everything cannot he said; compassionate,
free from spite, of the very nature of truth, spotless,
charitable, gentle, pure, possessing nothing, doing good to
all, peaceful, wholly surrendered to Krishna, desireless,
harmless, steadfast, victorious over the six passions, eating
sparingly, restraining the self, honouring other without
self-esteem, tender hearted, grave, friendly, poetic, skilful
and silent" - Charitamrita.
In the matter of Caste, Cha^tajaya is not so generous.
He admits that Salvation is not the monoply of any being of
higher cast. "There is no consideration of Caste or family
in the worship of Krishna!? "Give Krishna - bhakti down to
c**
Chandalas." But this did not mean that the destruction of 
Caste or rank was abolished. The men were allowed to enjoy 
their social positions given to them by their being members 
of high Castes and the people of low Caste were not to inter­
fere in the rights of the Superior. "It is the nature of 
Bhakta," he says, "To observe rank. The maintenance of 
dignity is theornament of a Sadhu. People ridicule when 
rank is broken, ana both worlds are lost. My midd is pleased
when propriety of conduct is maintained." (Charitamrita).
U n.
Within the circle of Chattajay as disciples the people of high 
cUb
Caste dtr not eat v/^ith those of low Castes. Chartamya 
himself provided separate quarters for Hari Das, a convert
from low Caste, and had ^  food sent to him separately.
KABIR.
Kahir was born in 1440. Many legends are connected 
with his birth but none of them is reliable. For instanc 
One of the legend says that Kabir was found lying on a 
blossoming water-lily in a lake near Banares. Niru, a 
Muhammaden weaver took him home and adopted him as his 
child. A Kazi or Moslem priest was called to give 
this child a name. He opened the Quran and the first 
word that he cast his eyes on was Kabir, the great.
Kabir being one of God's names, the priest hesitated to 
call the child by that name. Theron other kazis were 
summoned. All opened the Quran but with the same 
result. They were silent for a moment. They tried 
again. Then they found the names *!Zinda,'"Pin, ^hinjar " 
and»Hayya." They oould not give these names to a weaver's 
child. They then asked Niru to destroy the child in
some way. Thereon Niru took the child within the house
to put him to death but before he could do so the child 
spoke, "I have come from an unknown place, Maya has 
deceived the world ; no one knows me. I was not born 
of a woman, but manifested as a boy. My dwelling was
in a lonely spot nigh to Kasi and there the weaver found
me. I contain neither heaven nor earth, but wisdom 
only. I have come to this earth in spiritual form and 
of spiritual significance is my name. I have neither 
bone nor blood, nor skin. I reveal to men the "word”,
My body is eternal. I am the highest being. The^^he 
words of Kabir who is indestructible'.' The authenticity 
of this miracle cannot staid test of scrutiny. The
\ i •- Vi
wordsw2indS and*PirMare Persian words and are not found 
in the Quran though the Modern European Orientalists 
claim to have found one or two wort? of Persian origin in
Quran but they are not ’Erinda" and iPir". There is no
/ such
Mi
such word in the Quran, that contains the letter "p".
This shows that the whole story is merely a fiction*
However, it is generally believed that Kabir*s parents were 
Hindus and that he was brought up b«| a Moslem*
Very little is Known of his early life, but it appears 
that he was given to mystic moods and intrepid disposition.
For a long time he was without a teacher or guru* At that 
time the fame of Rama nanda, a Vaishanvite Theologist had 
spread far and wide. Kabir was also desirous of becoming 
a disciple of Rama nanda, but was not aertain whether he, as 
a Mohammedan would be admitted to discipleship. But some­
how or other he managed to get himself admitted to the fold 
of Ramananda*s followers*
There is some doubt in certain.quarters as to the 
married life of Kabir, but I think^Underhill is corrsot in 
giving a fair estimate of his life*
"It is clear that he never adopted the life of the 
professional ascetic or retired from the world in order to 
devote himdelf to bodily mortifications and the exclusive 
pursuit of the contemplative life. Side by side with his 
interior life of adoration, its artistic expression in Music 
and words - for he was a Skilled musician as well as a poet - 
he lived the sane and diligent life of the Oriental Craftsman. 
All the legends agree on this point that Kabir was a weaver, 
a simple and unlettered man, who earned his living at the 
loom. Like Paul, the tent maker; Boehme, the cobbler; Bunyan 
the tinke*; Tersteegen, the ribbon-mfk«r; he knew how to 
combine vision and industry; the work of his hands helped 
rather than hindered the impassioned meditation of his heart.I
It is said that Kabir was accused of heresy and was 
brought before the Bmperor Sikandar Lodhi. The Courtiers 
advised the King to put him to death, but as the King gave 
great latitude and freedom of thought to the Sufis and 
considered Kabir to be one of that Sect, he let him go in 
peace*
Kabir then moved from one place to another visiting 
important towns of northern India*: He held discussions
with Pundits and Maulvis of his time, in which he often 
came out Victorious* At last in 15^8, old and feeble, he 
died at Maghar near Gorakhpur*
"Not a drop now trickleth from the citadel of thy 
brain - where is the music that filled it?
the
The great Saint hath departed with the name of Supreme 
Brahm, the Supreme God.
Which revelled in divine knowledge, expounded and 
preached.
Whither hath the player gone who played the drum of 
thy body?
Thy tales, thy words, thy divine instructions are no 
longer heard} all thy vital energy hath been drawn away; 
the ten breaths which keep thee together have esopped*
Thou art dead; thou hast left thy friends and relatives*
Sayeth Kabir; He who meditateth on God bursteth his
i
bonds even when alive! M
Translated by Macauliffe*
Kabir* 3/
KABIR«S TEACHING
Kabir1b teaching is expressed in Hindi Songs. His chief 
works are the Bijak, Sukhnidhan, and various other Sabdas, 
Sakhis, rekhtas,etc.
The Bijak was compiled by a disciple of Kabir named 
Bhagodas. "Its style, however, iB more dogmatical than 
argumentative, and it rather inveighs against other systems 
than explains its own? - Wilson in the Religion of the 
Hindus.
Bijak was probably produced fifty years after Kabir’s 
death.
As for the other works, it appears that most of the
couplets attributed to Kabir were not composed by him,
because the language of these belongs to a much later perioft
Some of Kabir*s verses are also quoted in Adi Granth.
Kabir was apposed to the Vedantistic description of God.
The negative philosophy stripped God of all his attributes
and described Him by what He was not. To Kabir, this mode
O f ,description seemed valueless. He says:-
"Brahma can never be found in abstractions”
To describe Him positively he calls Him the Beloved, the
most Beautiful. He pervades the whole world, but is seen
only with the eyes of love and those who have a vision of
Him know the secret of the Universe. The Source of all
reality is Love, which unites the finite and the Infinite.
Love is the keynote of all God’s actions. He is the Lover
as well as"the Beloved". Here we find some similarity to
the Christian iy n T O o ndd i W  ghe s t ^
A
manifestation of God’s love was the sacrifice of Jesus to 
take away human suffering.
Moreover, in
calling God the most Beautiful, Kabir is, at the same level
(as)
as the Christian Saints of the middle ages. We find a
similar instance in an Islamic tradition:-
"God is Beautiful and loves Beauty".
It is true the Rsal cannot he ugly, fpr beauty implies 
perfection, and none but theHeal is perfect. Even in 
this world the beauty of an object is the manifestation 
of its natural perfection by the proportion of its parts 
and the harmony of its activities. And the beauty of 
spiritual realities is, of course, of a higher and nobler 
order than the beauty of the sensible reality. Again, 
from the beauty of the human spirit we can analogically 
rise to the apprehension of the Beauty of the Infinite.
The most Beautiful must be the Beloved, the object of 
adoration, and worship, because even in this world when 
we say"that is beautiful" it means that the object exists 
in a sentiment of pleasure and approval. We value the 
object for its own sake and feel a joy in its contempla­
tion. To have a joy in anything for its own sake is the 
primarily essential for the development of love. We dwell 
more and more on aspects of the object thet make it 
appear more worthy of our joy, and so love is increased 
and our passion is strengthened.
But the objects of this world are not perfect, they 
have certain defects and deformities. They cannot be 
called perfectly beautiful. When by chance these aspects 
come into our view, and show to us the ugliness of the 
object, our joy i* lessened and along with it follows 
the decrease in love. That is why love for the objects 
of this world is not constant. When a man receiives a 
shock of this kind, he sometimes developes in himself aP
longing for the perfect, and thus begins the love for the 
Infinite, when once im this stage he cannot go back.The 
more and more he dwells on the various aspects of 
Divinity, the greater is his love for God, because thereir 
he sees no imperfection to take him away from the object
of his love. So we come to the conclusion that the 
Beautifhl is the Beloved.
Then we see that according to Kabir, God is love. Love 
constitutes Hie essence. It manifests itself in the very 
heart of things. Among all the chang iing forms, this is 
the form that is everlasting. Compare with this what 
Omar Khayyam says:-
"Por all this sin with which the face of man is blackened 
God needs to take as well as give Man'B forgiveness". 
Kabir does not answer any objection as to the existence 
of evil and misery in the world. According to Kabir:- 
God is both immanent and transcendent. He is like the 
unity of mind in the midst of plurality of ideas. God is 
immanent in the world as the soul is immanent in the 
Psychical state. But He is transcendental as well. He 
is more than the finite beings, and is not the sum total 
of them. God distinguishes Himself from the world by 
being aware of himself as subject and agent.
In some passages Kabir seems to be anthro-morphic in 
his conception of God. But I believe this is due to his 
extreme love for God. A man cannot fall in love with 
abstractions. when he has to dwell on various aspects of 
the Deity, and to give expression to his feelings, he 
cannot help using similies and metaphors. The same is 
the case with Kabir.
I quote below a few of his poems to make his idea of 
Godhead clear:-
"The Light of the Sun,the Moon and the Stars shines
bright,
The melody of love swells forth and the rythm of 
love's detachment beats the? time.
Day and night the chorus of music fills the heavens; 
and Kabir says; "My beloved one gleams like the 
lightening flash in the sky.
The whole world does its work and commits its errors; 
but few are the lovers who know the Beloved.y"'
The devout seeker is he who mingles in his heart the
double current of love and detachment, like the 
mingling of the streams of Ganges and Jumna.
I In^
In his heart the sacred water flows day and night;and 
thus the round of births and deaths is brought to an enfl
Behold what wonderful rest is the Supreme Spirit'., and he 
enjoys it who makes himself meet for it.
Held by the cords of love, the swing of the ocean of joy 
sways to and fro; and a mighty sound breaks forth
in song.
See what a lotus^blooms there without water; and Kabir 
says,"My heart^&rinks its nectar".
What a wonderful lotus it is, that blooms at the heart 
of the spinning-wheel oft he Universe' Only a few pure 
souls know of its pure delight,
Music is all around, and there the heart partakes of the 
joy of the Infinite Sea.
V
Kabri says:-
"Dive thou into that Ocean of sweetness; thus let all
errors of life and of death flee away".
They have sung of Him as infinite and unattainable, but 
I in my meditation have seen Him without sight.
The inward and the outward are become as one sky,the 
Infinite and the finite are united; I am drunken with 
the sight offiMsall.
This light of Thine fulfils the Universe , the lamp of 
Love that burns on the ealveyof knowledge.
Kabii;says:-
"There error cannot enter, and the conflict of life and 
death is felt no more.
Open your eyes of love and see Him who pervades this 
world J Consider it well and know that this is your 
own country,
When you meet the true Guiu He will awaken your heart;
He will tell you the secret of love and detachment, and 
then you will know indeed that He transcends this 
Universe.
He is the Ultimate Rest unbounded.
He has spread His form of love throughout all the world.
......  Tagore's Translation.
Note Kabir's doctrine in the following poem:-
^When He Himself reveals Himself,Brahma brings into 
manifestation that which can never be seen.
As the seed is in the plant, as the shade is in the tree, 
as the void is in the sky, as infinite forms are in 
the voidy
So from beyond the Infinity the Infinite come$;and from
the Infinite the Pinite extends.
The Creature*\n Brahma1, and Brahma1 is in the Creature. 
They are ever diBtinct yet ever united.
M  -# M
He Himself is the tree, the seed and the germ. He 
Himself is the flower, the fruit and the sha^e.
He Himaelf is the Sun, the light and the lighted. .
He Himself is Brahma, creature of Maya.
He Himself is the manifold form, the infinite spacej
He is the breath, the word and the meaning.
He Himself is the limit, and the limitless, and beyond 
both the limited and the limitless is He, the Pure 
Being.
He is the Immanent Mind in Brahma and the Creature.
The Supreme Soul is seen within the soul, the point is 
seen within the Supreme Soul, and within the Point, 
the reflection is seem: again.
Kabir is blest because he has this Supreme Vision*
... Tr.by Rabindrandth Tagore ........
Hgdw to attain to God:- .........    Kabir says:-
"0 Sadhu.' the simple union is the best. Since the day 
when I met my Lord there has been no end to the sport of 
our love.
I shut not my eyes, I close not my ears, I do not
mortify my body. I see with eyes open and smile, and 
behold His beauty everywhere.
I utter His name, and whatever I see reminds me of Him;
Whatever I do, it becomes His worship. The rising and 
the setting M B  are one to me; all contradictions 
are solved.
Wherefore I go, I move .round Him, all I achieve i® His
service.
When I lie down, I lie prostrate at His feet.
He is the only adorable One to me; I have none other.
My tongue has left off impure words; it sings His glory 
day and night.
Whether I rise or sit down, I can never forget Him, for 
the rythjpu of His music beats in my ears.
So high is My Lord's Palace, my heart trembles to ipount 
its stairs; yet I must not be shy if I would enjoy His
love.
My heart must cleave to my Lover;I must withdraw my veil 
and meet Him with all my body.
Mine eyes must perform the ceremony of the lamps of love.
Kabir says:-
"Listen to me; friend; He understands who loves.If you 
feel not love's longing for your Beloved One, it is vain 
to adorn your body, vain to put unguent on your eyelid." 
................. Tagore. ..........
(Kabir) .
1
A  .# f/
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Kabir maintains that a man cannot attain to a knowledge 
of God through his own powers. But God reveals Himself to 
those who make themselves fit for the reception of Divine 
Light. But those who are deficient in this respect should 
seek the help of the "gu m ” who can be recognised by his 
intense love for God. (This seems to me to be a vague 
criterion.)
Kabir condemns pride and commends humility. In this,he 
is very near the Sufi Saints rather than the Hindu Pandits. 
He also commends ren^uncemaifbf worldly pleasures. The only 
pleasure that is everlasting is that obtained from devotion 
to God.
-t-
"Make contentment and modesty thine earrings, self- 
respect thy wallet, meditation the?ashes to seal upon thy 
\ body, make association with men thine A.I.path and the 
conquest of thy heart the conquest of the world”.
"There is no devotion without virtue".
He believes that knowledge should be imparted to one 
who is fit to receive it.
"The J^struction of the foolish is the waste of knowledge 
or of soap cannot wash charcoal white ".
Saadi, strikes a similar note:-
"No need of offering advice"he says "to a hard-hearted 
person, because a n*m ---* w- into stone".
Kabir believes in transmigration df the soul, but holds 
that release is obtained by faith , not by works.
It means that good and bad actions both lead to re­
birth but if one ha^. faith in God, God would release him 
of this bondage. But the difficulty is that this doctrine 
makes the mam indifferent to good works. Even bad actions 
need not alarm anyone. To this objection it can be said 
that one who has implicit faith in God would naturally try 
to avoid the actions that are repugnant to Him.
The idea of faith is the same as that of "tawakul" and 
rijfc(hope)in Islam.
Like Mohammedans, he does not believe in Divine
Incarnation.
"Follow the true Sahib who will hold you in all trials.
^ s AHe was not born in ^ fa^raths’family and did not opress the
King of Lanka. Jasodah did not tfoundle him in her lap and
he did not enter: the womb of Dcoki. He did not ravage the
world. He did not descend into P&tal and deceive Bali. He
did not fight with King Ball nor did he Kill Hiranyakhs^
throwing him down on the ground..He is neither Shalgram nor
any other stione.... Kabir proclaims let us not follow such 
teachings; he whom they believe to be of gross material 
elements is of subtle principles.
Kabir dwells on the humility of man’s origin.
"There is impurity at the time of birth, there is impur­
ity in the hour of death" - In this he follows the teaching 
of the Koran.
Shandarkar is of opinion that Kabir preaches dualism.
. He comes to this conclusion froip the following lines of 
Kabir
a
"In the light of Ram* there existed a substance which was 
the subtle element , the sum-total of all individual 
soul^ , and then that substance was illuminated by that 
Light. Then followed a desire in the shape of a woman, 
which was at the same time called Gayatri and Sound 
(Shabda or Logos)and from her the creation took its rise.” 
In my opinion the metaphor oan be explained thus:- 
Looking at the things of the world, we find that they
were potentially what they are actually now, and will
oi
become actually ;something what they are potentially now.
The world existed potentially in God.from eternity and
lised
not outside God, and is being actual*** in time and 
space , hence the idea of dualism does not apply to 
this case.
N i U K .
Among the great personalities of India who 
left an everlasting mark on the history of religious
thought we may mention Guru Nanak. He was
Re­
born in 14-69 in Talwani* a small village in the
Punjab. He was a khatri by oaste. His father was
the aooountant of the village and also pursued the
life of an agriculturist. Even in his very boyhood
Guru Nanak showed a mystic disposition and a
le aning towards oontemplation. But his father did
not like the idea of his renpunoing the world and
so he set him to various secular tasks —  looking
after the cultivations and grazing the oattle. But
Nanak proved averse to them all. He devoted more
and more of his time to oontemplation and devotion.
Under the stress of hard life and mental exertion
Nanak fell ill. A phsician was sent for, but the
Guru welcomed him with the following mystic
outburst
”The physician is sent for to prescribe a 
remedy. He taketh my hand and feeleth my pulse.
The ignofant physician knoweth not that it is in my 
mind that pain is. Physician, go home : take not 
my curse with thee. I am imbued with my Lord; to 
whom givest thou medicine - . . .
. I feel first the pain of Separation$ t ♦
from God, then pangs of hunger for oontemplation 
on Him . • • I forgot God end devoted myself
o x a b u tnio bodily illness befell me •
the wicked heart is punished. Man is useful as 
long as he has breath in his body. So when the 
breath departeth, the body orumbleth away and 
beoometh useless: no one taketh medicine after
that. when man possesseth even a portion of the 
name of the Bright One, his body shall beoome 
like gold and his soul be made pure; all his pain 
and disease shall be dispelled, and he shall be 
saved, Nanak, by the True name. "
Guru Nanak, however, in the village school 
learnt reading and writing and something of 
accounts. Moreover it is believed that he had 
also some knowledge of Persian. But all that he 
le arat from the books was insignificant as compared 
with what he squired in his long travels by the 
study of nature and his association with the 
priests and saints of the time.
Guru Nanak married and had children. But 
the married life did not change the current of 
his thoughts, Soon after he was appointed a 
store keeper under Daulet Khan, the Govenor of
(A
Sultanppr- The Guru performed his duties honestly 
and diligently and gave away natch of his income 
in charity. When the day's work was done, Nanak 
with his companions would repair to some neighbour- 
ing solitude and spend his time in singing and
prayer. But he did not stick long to his post. 
With his faithful companion Hardens, he set out 
on travels through various parts of India end 
as la. Here he gave utterance to beautiful 
hayings which are oolleoted in *di £ranZT, 
the sacred book of the Slkkps. His death came 
at last in the year 1538.
Hanak, like many others of his age, was 
greatly influenced in his thought by the 
Prevalence of Islcanio ideas in the country end 
he gave utterance to the views most of which can 
be traced back to Islam. For instance he 
preached "that he was himself e man among men, 
that God was all in all and reliance on Him was 
one thing needful. • "Think, pray and praise him
always. The £irst shall live by faith alone."
He enjoined on all men “to live righteously with 
brotherly love raid hospitality and to abjure all 
superstitions and fears. • "Falsehood is at an end 
Truth at last prevaileth. * "Worship not the dead 
bow not to stones. * Some of the3e ere literal 
translation:1 of the are bio and Persian sayings. 
In fact it i appears that the religious sects of 
that time came midway between Islam and ancient 
Hinduism. For exemple Guru Ksnak says : "Both 
the Hindus and • Moslems are struggling against 
each other . • . The Almighty ordered,
*0 my son, go to the world, All of them have 
gone wrong. Set them to the right path. Make 
them all respect the one "name." The idea was
to remove the antagonism of the two ohief religions 
in India. So the religious leaders of that time 
ao ted as oonoiliators between the victorious Moslems 
and the conquered Hindus.
Nanak was a religious reformer as we have 
stated before. The Hindus had deified their heroes 
and had made them incarnations of God. They paid 
more attention to the ceremonials than the true 
Spirit of their religion. Hence Nanak fs mission 
wasto purge them of all evils according to his own 
views. He believed that there had been reformers 
before him. He did not wish to lower the values of 
any of these. For instance, Budha says, "Whenever 
there is impiety in the world, the Budha is b o m  to 
set the people right. Many a Budha has gone before 
me and many more will come after me. " The same is 
the case with the Jews and Christians acoording to 
the Muslim view. Nanak did not believe in the 
deification of the reformers. He agreed with the 
Muslims in holding man and God as separate. Macniool 
is of opinion that Nanak believed himself to be 
an incarnation of God : - "No doubt Nanak, though 
he often speaks of himself with humility, believed 
himself to be an incarnation of the Supreme God 
— Macnico}.. He bases his argument on the following 
passage from ’Asa-ki-war ' : "God hath put ILimself
into the true Guru. " I believe this is a 
misinterpretation of the passage. Nanak sikply means 
that God conveys fiis message to the world through 
the Guru. There is a similar passage in the Quran : 
"When you struck, it was not you who struck but God."
This does not mean that the Prophet was identical 
with God. Even the immediate followers of Nanak 
did not believe him to be a god. For instance,
Guru Gobind Singh, the last gu.ru, says, "Those who 
call us gods will fall into hell. Know that I am 
His servant. *
Guru Nanak was not a speculative philosopher 
but Dr . Trump believes that a regular system of 
philosophy can be evolved out of his book, "Granth 
Sahib." However, we give below a summary of
his teachihg
1 . PHYSICAL ffORLD.
Like the old Hindu thinkers Guru Nanak 
divides the world period into four cycles, viz.
i. Sat Tiig, ii. Treta, £v iii. Duapar, iv Kal yug.
The first is considered the golden age. The world 
was created perfect by God. The people had 
Perfect gnosis of God, and there was no difference 
of opinion as regards the belief in one God. Man 
was morally perfect. With the advance of age 
the deoay in moral life began. Monotheism was 
replaced by polytheism and idolatory. The world has 
come down from the highest to the lowest level. His 
doctrine is opposed to the theory of teleologioal 
evolution, in whioh present is considered as a 
s%te of inoompleteness and imperfection and that the 
evolution of cosmos is from a present imperfect 
s tate towards a more perfect one and that the idea 
of future good is working its own realisation in 
the finite world. If we believe Nanaks theory
it means that the world is like a machine which an 
engineer constructs in good condition, sets going 
and then leaves it to itself, though occasionally 
he sends some workman to repair a part of it. The 
machine ultimately comes to a standstill and then 
the engineer puts the material in a moulding pot 
and constructs a new machine. As regards the 
world-oyoles, the scientists have begun to believe 
that the energy of this earth that is being 
dissipated, and is considered lost, may be making 
up another universe which may take the place of our 
wo rid.
Nanak agrees with the Christians in maintaining 
that previous to creation it was utter darkness.
He says : -
"In the beginning there was indescribable darkness, 
There was not earth^>r heaven, nought but God's
unequalled order, 
There was not day^br night or moon or sun,
The Imperceptible God was Himself the speaker 
and preacher, Himself unseen He was everything,
When He pleased He created the world. "
—  translated byMacaullife
God first of all created four elements viz. i 
the air which has direct connection with the Lord.
Fire gets support from air, without which it cannot 
exist. Water gets support from fire. The earth gets 
support from water. In this way the elements for their 
existence depend upon the energy of God and all 
these are considered to be "the Holy Five."
Corresponding to these four elements there are
four spirits, viz. i angel ii. genii iii. sea- 
spirits, and iv. demons . The first two are 
good and the last two are evil spirits. But these 
spirits have no power in themselves, unless 
endowed with power by the spirit of Lord.
Compare with this what Muslim theologians say 
about the angels and genii. According to them 
angels have a subtle or ethereal body and the 
genii are made of fire and that before the creation 
of man this earth was inhabited by the genii. This 
does not seem to me to be improbable. If we look 
at the universe we find it to be composed of so 
many planets and stars, some of which are millions 
of times as big as our earth. Did God make these 
stars in vain? Did this earth have no life for 
millions of years? Is life confined to this 
small sphere which when compared with others 
sinks into insignificance?
If there is any kind of life in the stars 
it must be suitable to their present oondition.
Man cannot live in the sun. The creature that can 
1 ive in a burning plamet must have a body made of 
either a similar material or of such material as 
remains unaffected by it.
It is believed that this earth was in a 
molten oondition for ages. The creatures that 
Inhabited the earth at that time most likely had 
a fiery body. When the earth coiled down, that 
form of life disappeared from the surface of the 
earth. Strange to say, in most of the Eastern
f airy tales and the writings of the sufis we find the 
genii coming out of the interior of the earth, which 
Is still in a molten condition.
l i . BDMaN SOUL. 2he soul is not composed of Physical 
elements. Soul is God Himself. It is not clear 
whether Nanak definitely identifies soul with God, 
because in another passage he considers the soul to be 
an emanation from God. Though it is true that we find 
a trace of pantheism in him, whioh is hard to reconcile 
with his main teaching. Take for instance the following
passage : "He Himself kills Himself and dies; it
is merely a display of his omnipotence. " The 
individual souls emanate from the Universal Soul.
The soul is formless like au air, has no weight like 
fire. It is like light that is confined in an earthen
pot. It has two bodies, subtle and gross. After death
the soul has to pass the b Bridge (pu-tf Sir at of
Islam )• The wicked ones fall down into the hell to
undergo torture for millions of years and then come to
earth again to continue the oyole of birth and death.
%
The idea of the Bridge may be compared to a similar 
idea in the religion of Zoroaster "The Souls of 
doev a-worshippers and of the righteous must cross the 
fateful Kinvad Bridge, where a maid distinguishes 
the evil from the good. The spirits of the evil fall 
into the depths of the dark horrid world of hell, while 
the good come to the presence of Ahura Muzda"- 
Zend Avesta, Yendidad xix, 29.32.47.
The soul has to keep the physical elements under 
oontrol otherwise they lead it astray. Those who 
remain firm and are not led astray by temptations are 
released from the oyole of births. But release cannot 
take place without the grace of God. "Rebirth and
amir deliverance depend upon thy will, * he says, "God 
Himself knows to whom he may give and He Himself 
gives . . .Very few people acknowledge this."
The art of perception or knowing are individual 
in character, though they resemble each other, but 
the truths known are universal in character. They are 
common to all, immutable, necessary and eternal and ha'se 
their being only in the eternal and immutable es enoe 
of Divinity. In this respect Hsnak*s theory resembles
that of Helebrenche who follows St. *ugustine in this.
K
S t . i.ugustine makes use of the neoplatonic doctrine of 
illumination and radiation to explain the possibility of 
knowledge : "God is the source of eternal truths. Through 
Him all beings have being and light. He is the Eternal 
Wisdom, the Id vine Logos." Kenak's "sat nam" is
similar to this. The Guriis words or ideas are true
because they participate in, or are an imitation of, the 
true reality of the 'mundus intelligibilis.' Here is 
another passage from St. Augustine to the same effect 
The Truth, unchangeable shines like a sun in the soul 
and the soul beoomes partaker of the Very Truth. "
There is the Truth, unchangeable, *containing all things 
that are unchangeably true, which belongs not to any 
Particular man. " Truth here means ontological Truth.
In this too he follows Plotinus.
So we see that Nenak’s position in this respect is 
similar to the schoolmen, according to the eoholastios, 
especially St. Thomas, ontological truth is equivalent to 
reality or it is simply reality considered as conformable 
with an ideal type, with an idea in the mind. The mind 
derived these ideal types from experience by abstraction, 
comparison, generalisation and reflection on the data, 
antecedently to the exercise of human thought, the thing
has only potential and not actual
ontological truth means conformity with the abstract 
concepts of essences or natures, how can it be one for 
fell men, immutable end necessary ? To this the school­
m e n  reply that human beings are endowed with the same 
sort of intellect and so they abstract the same 
transcendental notions from their experience and form 
the same specific concepts of possible essences. More­
over the human mind does not constitute the truth but 
only apprehends it. although ontological truth is 
proximately and immediately the oonformity of reality 
with human cono opt ions, yet primarily and fundamentally
it is essential confdrmity of all reality with the 
Divine &Lnd, because the schoolmen admitting the
actual existence of contingent realities and the 
possibility of the minds deriving necessary and
universal principles from such realities, demonstrate 
the existence of a first, necessary and Self- 
existence Intelligence from which the human mind 
derives its intelligibility. Both our minds and all 
things are in essential conformity with the Divine 
Intellect. That is why the things are ontologioally 
true for us. The truth of Divine Intellect is one, 
eternal and immutable. In soholastlo terminology the 
Real and the True are convertible terms. The seme is 
the case with Nanak: "There is but one God, whose 
name is Iruem , the oreatot, the ell pervading, devoid 
o f  fear and enmity, Immortal, Unborn, Sel f-begotten, 
the Great and Gracious. He was True in the
beginning, He was True in the Primal age, He is 
True now and He will ever be True "—  Jap ji Pauri.
E P I L O G U E .
"And though we wear our life, alasi 
Distracted as a homeless wind,
In beating where we may not pasB
In seeking what we shall not find,
Yet shall we one day gain, life past,
Clear vision o'er our Being's whole - 
Shall see ourselves, and learn at last 
Our true affinities of Soul."
MATTHEW ARNOLD.
"For if I should (said He)
Bestow thiB jewel also on My creature,
He would adore my gifts instead of Me,
And rest in Nature, not the God of Nature,
So both should losers be.
Yet let him keep the rest,
But keep them with repining restlessness: 
Let him be rich and weary, that at last,
If goodness lead him not, yet weariness 
May toss him to My breast."
"THE CHURCH PORCH"
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